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Introduction
Monsters abounded in the ancient world. They proliferated on and around 
Phidias’s lost sculpture of Athena Parthenos, one of the most renowned cult 
images of ancient Greece:1 amazons and giants were depicted on her shield, 
which hid the snake Erichthonius, centaurs adorned her sandals; Medusa was 
represented on her peplos, and the Gorgoneion decorated the aegis. Finally, a 
Sphinx and two winged gryphons stood on her crest. Athena, endowed with 
skilful wisdom and warrior virtue, subjugated the monsters who had tried to 
subvert the Olympian order and who are shown here tamed, thus confi rming 
her might. The Greeks praise the gods, celebrating their fi nal victory over 
chaos and monstrosity.
Today’s prevailing cosmological theories on the birth and evolution of 
the universe teach that chaos will indeed, ultimately, swallow it. Theoretical 
physics explains that the universe has two possible destinies, monstrously 
necessary in their remote and yet eternal presence: the fi nal catastrophic 
collapse of the universe on the one hand or its slow exhaustion in an unstop-
pable increase of entropy on the other. I wonder whether the widespread 
interest in monstrosity that characterises scholarship today is dictated by the 
intriguing yet unconscious feeling that, in some way, the ancient monsters of 
chaos have never been fully defeated and, contrary to the Greeks’ belief, will 
ultimately win the fi ght.
The specifi c interest in monstrosity in this book, however, derives not so 
much from its hypothetically eschatological sense, but rather from its con-
cretely ontologico-political meaning. I am interested in monstrosity as radical 
otherness, as the provoking alterity that challenges – sometimes by its mere 
 1 Paus. I.24.5–7. With few exceptions, abbreviations of classical works follow those in 
the Diccionario griego-español (DGE): <dge.cchs.csic.es> or the Oxford Latin Dictionary 
(OLD) and, when the DGE or the OLD does not provide them, I have used the abbre-
viations conventionally adopted.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   1 24/08/19   12:33 PM
2 M O N S T R O S I T Y  A N D P H I L O S O P H Y
presence, sometimes with open defi ance – the norm’s power to signify.2 In 
exploring the history of ancient thought, I have tried to show how monstros-
ity’s challenge often comes in the form of a scandalous ontological project, 
immanent and material. This project is both ontological and political, since 
every metaphysical framework is at the same time determined by, and has 
implications for, the concept of the human and her role in the world. Equally, 
every vision of social, economic and political relations, like every idea of the 
self and the other, is grounded on and determines, explicitly or implicitly, a 
certain notion of being. Every ontology is produced by and produces, in the 
last instance, a politics; every politics conceives itself and is conceived, in the 
last instance, through an ontology.
My aim in this book is to reconstruct the concept of monstrosity in clas-
sical thought from its earliest beginnings, through pre-Platonic and Attic 
philosophy to the Hellenistic systems, arriving fi nally at Neoplatonism. I want 
to follow the discourse about monstrosity – mostly but not entirely – as it 
appeared in philosophy, and show how an apparently peripheral concept is in 
fact central to understanding how each of the above systems explains nature, 
its functioning and its anomalies.
Although monsters have attracted their fair share of attention in the past, 
no attempt has been made to analyse the topic extensively throughout antiq-
uity. Articles and monographs on similar topics exist in recent scholarship, 
such as Morgan’s unpublished PhD thesis (1984), the essays in Atherton 
(1992) or the enquiry on Roman monsters by Cuny-Le Callet (2005), the 
studies of Jones (1993) and Morfi no (2013) on Lucretius, of Johnson (1987) 
on Lucan, of Louis (1975) and Yartz (1997) on Aristotle, and I have benefi ted 
greatly from them. A more comprehensive reconstruction, however, seems to 
me indispensable for a better understanding of ancient thought as a whole. 
Furthermore, it is crucial for the study of more recent historical periods in 
which the heritage of antiquity becomes a battlefi eld that mirrors modern and 
– albeit more indirectly – contemporary philosophical debates on the ques-
tions of nature, the divine, the relation between normality and abnormality, 
and, perhaps most importantly, the construction of identity and otherness. 
In this sense, this book, devoted to the ancient world, is self-contained and 
autonomous, yet it can also be read as a necessary introduction to the study of 
monstrosity in the middle ages, the Renaissance and modernity.
It is easier to say what this book is not and what it does not aim to be than 
to say what it is and what I hope it can do: it is not an exhaustive handbook on 
a specifi c topic, such as the classic monograph on fate by Chase Green (1944), 
 2 See Foucault (1999).
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Cotter’s work on miracles (1999), the seminal study on Hermetism by Festugière 
(1949–54), Jaeger’s seminal study on Paideia (1934–47), or the less well known 
but exhaustive enquiries on destiny by Magris (1984) and the concept of nature 
by Naddaf (1992), all of which I have learnt from. My book intends to show 
the diverse aspects of refl ections on monstrosity and the problems related to its 
interpretation, always conscious of the provisional and incomplete character 
such a study must have. I make no claim to completeness: fortune and time do 
not permit the book to extend beyond geographic, linguistic and chronological 
boundaries that may appear artifi cial. I try, however, to consider the principal 
sources that, in my view, speak meaningfully about, shape and are shaped by the 
development of the concept of monstrosity.
My most serious diffi culty has come from an attempt to keep together 
texts and ideas shaped throughout the centuries, and to follow their develop-
ment without imposing on them a sense of continuity that emanates from the 
observer’s eye rather than the coherency of the object observed. The multi-
plicity of such ideas and interpretations, of the problems and their attempted 
responses across the ancient period, would suggest the necessity to speak 
about a plurality of monstrosities rather than one concept of monstrosity. 
I have resisted this solution. Although plurality does offer an escape from the 
challenges of considering a complex set of problems and questions, it fails 
to acknowledge that this multiplicity challenged classical thought in similar 
ways. Thus this book grapples with the concept of monstrosity and the ques-
tions that this monstrosity poses to philosophy and thought.
Monstrosity is not one concept in the sense that different authors in differ-
ent schools and different periods address it explicitly as a unifi ed theoretical 
object. Neither philosophers nor poets speak of it as if it were an entity that 
passes from one thinker to another, ready for analysis across time. Nonetheless, 
I consider it one concept because whenever it is addressed, however differently, 
it touches upon the same questions, suggests recurring forms of analysis, and 
requires similar theoretical tools, though it is not called by the same name or 
necessarily recognised as a single object. Despite the diversity of the monsters, 
again and again monstrosity compels philosophers to answer the same ques-
tions, to respond to the same set of problems.
Whether it insinuates itself as an uninvited guest or is explicitly evoked 
and placed at the centre of enquiry, monstrosity insists on raising questions 
that philosophers can neither dismiss nor fully solve. It is this powerful force 
that acts across time and systems of thought that I follow in this book. My 
methodological approach is to look for traces and hints of monstrosity even 
when it is not mentioned explicitly, and to consider it as one and the same 
concept despite the apparent multiplicity of its treatment and expression.
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Does order come from, and put an end to, chaos – or is chaos the monstrous 
destiny of any supposed order? Is monstrosity a positive sign of the divine, or is 
it its negation and perversion? Does everything in nature have a meaning and 
a purpose, and if so, what is the purpose of monsters? Is monstrosity what we 
call the lowest level of nature’s reassuring hierarchy or does it, more threaten-
ingly, speak about the absence of such a hierarchy and the illusion of axiology? 
These are only some of the questions that ancient authors discussed across the 
centuries. I am interested both in the answers and in their diversity, as well as 
the questions that are given. Why are they asked? Why in that form, and what 
preoccupations and anxieties do these questions reveal? In a word, what is, for 
ancient thought and for us, a monster?
Of all these questions, the latter is possibly the most diffi cult one, insofar 
as, for the most part, the authors studied in this book rarely defi ne monstros-
ity precisely. What many see as monstrous does not appear that way to other 
authors with whom they are in dialogue, whether explicitly or implicitly. Thus I 
prefer to follow their attitude and avoid circumscribing the present study with 
a precise defi nition of the monstrous. Instead, I extend this study to all aspects 
and phenomena of the scientifi c and philosophical refl ection infl uenced by the 
monstrous. To be more precise, I focus on all aspects and phenomena that 
ancient authors considered monstrous without feeling the need to offer a pre-
cise defi nition. In a fi eld of enquiry like this one, to expect or require absolutely 
clear boundary lines would do more harm than good.
My aim has not been to reify monstrosity or to depict it as the concept that 
positively resists appropriation, and consequently neutralisation, by metaphys-
ics. I carefully avoid building a Manichaean history of thought around the 
opposition between good monstrosity and bad normality. Instead, I attempt to 
consider monstrosity as an unavoidable element that every system must con-
front, a concept that resurfaces in every system, often beyond and against the 
role and status that authors explicitly assign to it. In this way, monstrosity reveals 
all its theoretical potentiality, against the peripheral status that comes when it is 
designated as the exception, the anomaly, the deviation, or the special case that 
confi rms the normality that deserves centre stage.
A concrete example of what monstrosity reveals when it is considered an 
object worthy of analysis relates to the classic opposition between material-
ism and idealism. While this opposition deserves to be maintained in many 
respects, monstrosity puts it to the test, revealing internal divisions within 
materialism, as it is revealed by the struggle over fi nalism between Epicureans 
on one hand and Stoics on the other. It is not just in the opposition between 
materialism and idealism that one recognises the ontological fracture caused 
by monstrosity, but within materialism itself. There the monster’s challenge 
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produces different results, eventually leading to the absorption of some Stoic 
elements within Christian thought, while relegating materialism to the side of 
monstrous atheism for many centuries to come.
Conceptually, monstrosity appears strictly related to several major prob-
lems in the history of philosophy, including the origin of order, the physiol-
ogy and the pathology of nature, the idea of providence, and the nature and 
status of evil in the world. Though its presence in these domains is often 
implicit, it is always central for their analysis. It has been necessary, thus, 
to look for monsters even where they are not, i.e. where the language of 
monstrosity is absent, and yet monsters turn out to lurk below the surface of 
common problematics. Without this kind of analysis, it would not have been 
possible to study the central argument of these books when it does directly 
relate to monstrosity.
Since this is how I have attempted to think about monstrosity and what 
it offers the study of ancient thought, I have assigned both a positive and a 
negative role to it. I have considered it as an object within philosophical sys-
tems, but also as a paradoxical subject, or rather as an active mover of those 
systems. I have sought, in other words, to determine how the refl ection on the 
monstrous engages philosophy and forces it to respond to certain questions, 
how it prevents philosophy from underestimating or even avoiding questions 
that would otherwise be unsettling, inconvenient or seemingly inexplicable. 
Their monstrosity consists in rising within a philosophical system and obliging 
it to hesitate in front of what appears threateningly imperfect, incomplete and 
incoherent.
The major risk, especially in an enquiry so extensive from a chronological 
point of view, is to assign to monstrosity the status of a passepartout or litmus 
test against which everything else in a philosophical discourse must be tested. 
I have tried to avoid that risk by bringing to the forefront of a philosophical 
system or an author’s thought only the elements that are essential to compre-
hend how that system or thought deals with monstrosity, and whether and 
how monstrosity has infl uenced its formation and development, even in doc-
trinal points in which monstrosity as such does not appear.
I begin with Greek mythical thought. This means I have avoided the non-
Greek origins and relations with other civilisations, in part because of lack of 
linguistic competence. But the other reason is that philosophy does not begin 
when it begins to call itself ‘philosophy’. Rather it begins when humans begin 
to question the origin of their civilisation, its status and its values through 
specifi c questions, and when they offer answers, no matter the form or dis-
course in which they are presented, be it mythological, poetical, tragic, visual 
or specifi cally philosophical.
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In each chapter, I explore the many ways in which monstrosity emerges in 
a set of authors and theories. In Chapter 1, monsters rise as the challenging 
adversaries of the new gods of the early cosmogonies, but also as the power-
ful productive forces that support the building of the new order. Similarly, 
monsters are often the ambiguous characters that catalyse the unfolding of 
the tragic universe. Among the Pre-Platonic philosophers, the systems of 
Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus, analysed in Chapter 2, pave the 
way for the recognition of the philosophical status of monstrosity. This sta-
tus becomes central in Attic philosophy, fi rst with Plato’s philosophical use 
of mythological monstrosities, then with the construction of a hierarchical 
structure of the universe, which I take up in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 focuses on 
Aristotle’s study of physical monstrosity and its role within his metaphysical 
and aetiological framework. Chapters 5 to 7 deal with the extraordinarily 
elaborate responses to Attic philosophy by the three major Hellenistic sys-
tems: Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism. The fi nal chapter looks at the 
Middle and Neoplatonist response to Hellenism and explores the richness of 
late antiquity’s refl ection on monstrosity up to its absorption and reworking 
by early Christian thought.
I deal with similar questions in each chapter, looking at the prominent role 
monstrosity plays in shaping an author’s thought or a philosophical move-
ment’s beliefs. I have tried to focus my discussions on texts and authors that, 
although not always widely known, offer an original understanding of the con-
cept of monstrosity, especially when situated in a wider debate either within 
the philosophical tradition they belong to or in the general context of their 
own epoch. I have spent time on texts that might seem to have little or no 
appeal for students or readers outside the discipline of classics itself whenever 
I thought they could throw light on the interpretation of major authors that 
no reader would ignore.
Oversights, whether conscious or unintentional, necessarily happen in 
a work of such scope and extension. I believe, however, that such a com-
prehensive analysis is valuable insofar as it reveals original connections and 
unexpected dialogues between authors who, although writing many centu-
ries apart, are self-consciously participating in the same philosophical struggle 
as their masters, allies and opponents. A wide-ranging analysis such as this 
makes visible the strategical choices these thinkers made – sometimes guided 
by profound theoretical beliefs, other times by more immediate tactics and the 
cultural and political struggles of their own epoch.
I have thus modestly tried to follow in the steps of some great scholars of the 
twentieth century whose works – comprehensive but not exhaustive – indelibly 
marked my formation. I need not mention these works by name, since their 
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presence is manifest throughout this book. However, since my background is in 
early modernity, I have also found inspiration in some comprehensive analyses 
of monstrosity, and more widely on the idea of nature, in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Since they are not mentioned in the following pages, I 
would like to mention at least three of them: Jean Céard’s accomplished study 
of prodigies in the Renaissance, Bernard Tocanne’s monograph on the idea of 
nature in France in the second half of the seventeenth century, and Jacques 
Roger’s exhaustive analysis of the life sciences between Descartes and the 
Encyclopédie. Each has taught me, in different ways, how to listen to the text 
and insist on rigorous analysis and clear interpretation. Whether I have learned 
this lesson, the reader will judge.
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1
The Myth and the Logos
Classical mythology is a domain full of monsters. Its analysis is of paramount 
importance to the comprehension of the role played by monstrosity not only 
in philosophy but in classical culture as a whole. The ancient mythologems 
largely predate the early philosophical systems, and continue to be trans-
formed in the Attic and Hellenistic periods and eventually in the Latin world, 
in the Republican and Imperial ages. Mythology divulges the origin of some 
philosophical ideas, but is also infl uenced by them, without a clear or linear 
evolution from one to the other.
Myth could be seen as an early attempt to make sense of nature, to 
explain its origin and its functioning, while philosophy could be read as ris-
ing above this primitive attempt into a more advanced and rational form of 
thought.1 Reale, for example, underlines how the treatment of monstrosity, 
in Homer, is already different from the primitive and chaotic presentation of 
the ancients: whereas the old versions lack limits, measure and proportion, a 
certain eurythmic appears in the Homeric poems. The taming of the primi-
tive and mythical concept of monstrosity, in Reale’s view, would progressively 
coincide with the advent of the problem of causality as the philosophical 
question par excellence.
Such a linear reading, however, would mask the complexity of mythical 
thought (and philosophical, to some extent), as well as its power to transform 
and adapt to different historical, social and religious contexts.2 Together with 
morality and theology, physics is indeed one of the main domains covered 
 1 See Nestle (1942, 2. ed.), Gigon (1945), Jaeger (1947), Cornford (1952 and 1957, 2nd ed.), 
Pépin (1958), Lämmli (1962), Detienne (1962), Fränkel (1962, 2. ed.), Bollack (1971), 
among the classics and, more recently, Dijck (1997), Morgan (2000) and Bottici (2007).
 2 Finley (1954), p. 24 and passim. See also Veyne (1983) and C. Ginzburg, Mito, in Settis 
a cura di (1996–2002), I.1, pp. 197–237.
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by mythology.3 Philosophy and mythology share the claim to account for the 
origins of the cosmos and its laws and to explain its functioning. However, like 
philosophy itself, myth is far from having a linear evolution that unfolds via 
the taming of its most primitive modes of thinking. Myth does not in any man-
ner lose its vitality across the centuries, and evidences a complex development 
that interacts with, rather than precedes, philosophy itself. Rather than the 
evolution from mythology to philosophy, thus, I believe it is more correct to 
speak about the non-linear transition of ideas between myth and logos.
Aristotle already recognises the proximity of mythologists and philosophers, 
and in particular the continuity between Hesiod’s thought and some early 
naturalists.4 A ‘thin partition’ separates mythical poetry from early cosmogonic 
philosophy.5 Some scholars think that such a membrane makes the whole differ-
ence between a fantastic and chaotic account of the universe on the one hand 
and its rational and ordered explanation on the other.6 Others believe, on the 
contrary, that early mythical thought, e.g. the genealogies of gods, is already a 
coherent form of philosophical thought.7
The complex stratifi cation of rationalising and mythical thought appears 
in early historiography as well as the extant works of geographers, and logogra-
phers like Akousilaos, Pherecydes of Syros, Hellanikos of Lesbos, Hecataeus 
of Miletus, Palaephatus and, of course, Herodotus. They share – in different 
degrees – a sensibility. Building their own domain of enquiry, they all indulge 
in curiosity about marginal, weird and unbelievable facts and bring these facts 
back within the boundaries of a rational explanation that refl ects the rational 
character of nature itself.
The wonders of nature appear constantly in Herodotus’s geographically 
extensive and ontologically inclusive enquiry across continents and natural 
realms. His θῶμα are often contiguous with the domain of the divine, and for 
him the τέρας is often religious.8 Yet he refuses the idea of an unnatural teratol-
ogy, consistently supporting his interpretation rationally.9 These two aspects 
should not be seen as in tension with each other, but rather as cooperating 
to strengthen Herodotus’s passionate construction of – in François Hartog’s 
words – a rhetoric of alterity.10
 3 Buffi ère (1956), p. 2 and passim.
 4 Arist. Metaph. I.2. 982 a 4, 983 a 23. See Untersteiner (1972, 2a ed.), p. 181.
 5 Cornford (1952), pp. 198 and passim.
 6 Reale (1975–80).
 7 Jaeger (1947).
 8 See Giannini (1963), pp. 254–5, Lachenaud (1978) and Morgan (1984).
 9 See e.g. Hdt. II.156, III.116, IV.23 and 105.
10 Hartog (1991, 2e ed.), p. 245 and passim. See also Thomas (2000), esp. ch. V.
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Herodotus helps establish long-lasting belief in the geographical remoteness 
of natural monstrosities. One of the most signifi cant examples is represented by 
the winged snakes of Arabia. In Herodotus’s words:
[. . .] the spice-bearing trees are guarded by small winged snakes of varied 
colour, many round each tree [. . .]. The Arabians also say that the whole 
country would be full of these snakes were it not with them as I have heard 
that it is with vipers. It would seem that the wisdom of divine Providence 
(as is but reasonable) has made all creatures prolifi c that are timid and 
fi t to eat, that they be not minished from off the earth by being eaten up, 
whereas but few young are born to creatures cruel and baneful. [. . .] were 
[the winged serpents of Arabia] born in the natural manner of serpents no 
life were possible for men; but as it is, when they pair, and the male is in 
the very act of generation, the female seizes him by the neck, nor lets go 
her grip till she has bitten the neck through.11
Underlining the importance of Herodotus’s explanation for the survival of 
certain species, Thomas suggests that such a causal principle can be seen as 
related to Darwin’s evolutionism. Accustomed to debates on the prolifi cacy of 
different species, Herodotus reads the phenomenon in terms of divine provi-
dence, which prevents the excessive reproduction of obnoxious and danger-
ous species. In other words, though he starts with the exotic tale of fantastic 
creatures, he is interested in discovering their causes, and intends to intervene 
in the biological and scientifi c culture of his time.12 Equally interesting, in my 
view, is the function Herodotus assigns to monstrosity in this causal expla-
nation, suggesting indirectly that, through the critical threat represented by 
monstrosity, one can see and praise the divine and its providence in helping 
nature self-regulate and avoid self-destruction.
The aetiological intent also reveals the proximity between early historiog-
raphy and paradoxography – an apparently minor yet infl uential and persistent 
literary genre. Palaephatus, one of the most infl uential Greek paradoxogra-
phers, reveals his interest in the traditional marvellous and monstrous phenom-
ena by connecting them to a rational explanation. Behind the mythical event, 
rationalism tries to unveil the historical and rationally grounded event that, 
misunderstood or not fully comprehended, gave rise to the myth. Palaephatus 
builds the opposition between truth (ἀληθής) and a series of terms that are 
11 Hdt. III.107–9. See also Romm (1992) and infra.
12 Thomas (2000), pp. 141–9. For both the winged snakes and the hornless cattle of IV.29–30, 
Thomas sees a parallel in Democritus, Empedocles, as well as the Hippocratic author of 
Nat.Puer. and Aër. On the winged snakes, see also Bianchi (1981), who has, however, too 
broad a concept of the monstrous.
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closely linked to the lexicon of monstrosity such as the incredible (δύσπιστος 
or ἀπίθανος) and the impossible (ἀδύνατος or ἀμήχανος). He sets out his 
methodological approach in the introduction of On unbelievable tales:
As for the many forms and monstrous shapes which have been described as 
once having existed, but which now do not exist – these, I believe, did not 
exist in the past either. For anything which ever existed in the past exists 
now in the present and will exist hereafter.13 
The constancy and consistency of nature recalls the Epicurean approach. 
Yet Palaephatus does not deny the active omnipotence of the Gods. Precisely 
because of that, however, things would not and could not have happened 
in the unbelievable or impossible ways seen in mythical tales: through their 
omnipotence, the Gods would have found a less marvellous and more rational 
way of making these events happen. These tales must therefore be rationalised 
to make the principle of the constancy and consistency of natural laws more 
evident.14 Whatever has not existed in the past will never be able to exist and 
thus whatever does not exist in the present has never existed. Nature, for 
Palaephatus, has one face, which it always reveals in its entirety. Whatever 
monstrosity is part of, it can and must be explained in a way that removes its 
incredible character and brings it back to the truthfulness of life. Whereas 
paradoxographers often expunge the causal explanation from their account of 
unbelievable tales, Palaephatus’s rationalising methodology remains aetiologi-
cal in principle, and thus closer to the early historiography.15
This complexity becomes more explicit when one does not limit the enquiry 
to mythographic works whose relation with philosophy appears more clearly, 
such as Homer’s and especially Hesiod’s Theogony, the only consistent source 
on the origin of gods that we have.16 The analysis should be extended to other 
domains, such as tragedy, historiography, paradoxography, novel and of course 
the visual arts. Myth and logos thus reveal their complicated connection. There 
are major implications for ideas concerning the creation of the cosmos, the origin 
and maintenance of the order of nature, divine and human justice, the principle 
of causality, as well as several other questions that constitute the core of both 
philosophy and mythology for centuries.
13 Palaeph, Introduction.
14 See J. Stern, introduction in Palaephatus (1996), A. Santoni, introduzione in Palefato 
(2000), Payón Leyra (2011), p. 165, and Hawes (2014), passim. See also Buffi ère (1956), 
p. 229, who underlines the proximity between paradoxography and the rationalising 
exegesis of early historiography, in particular in Strabo and Polybius.
15 C. Jacob, ‘De l’art de compiler à la fabrication du merveilleux. Sur la paradoxographie 
grecque’, in AA. VV. (1983), pp. 121–40 and Payón Leyra (2011), p. 31.
16 Gantz (1993), p. 3.
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Monstrosity in myth fully reveals this complexity and the stratifi cation of 
cosmogonic ideas. Of course, examples of a linear evolution could be made, 
especially in the fi eld under scrutiny here. Hershbell, for example, has philo-
logically reconstructed similarities that point to a direct infl uence of Hesiod’s 
monsters on Empedocles’ creatures spontaneously generated from the earth.17 
Empedocles employs the same language that the poet of the Theogony uses to 
describe giants, from whose shoulders a hundred limbs sprout.
The complexity and sometimes ambivalence of early philosophical sys-
tems, though, suggest that the advent of philosophy is not simply the prog-
ress of order and its affi rmation over the capricious and disordered vision of 
nature, as could be observed, for example, in moving from Homer to Hesiod, 
from myth to philosophy.18 Monstrosity powerfully reveals the tension within 
both the mythical account and the philosophical refl ection on nature and its 
order. Often, for example, one clearly recognises the infl uence in the opposite 
direction, from philosophy to tragic myth, such as that of Empedocles’ idea on 
Sophocles’ cosmogony.19
Ancient and modern ideas clash and are superimposed on each other, espe-
cially in domains that, like tragedy, are both infl uenced from the mythical sub-
stratum and oriented toward the elaboration of a new vision of the world. Both 
Pohlenz and Untersteiner have masterfully described the confl ict between old 
and new religiosity at the core of classical tragedy.20 This confl ict makes tragedy 
not only a domain full of monsters, but also a monstrous domain itself. In Attic 
17 Hershbell (1970), pp 150–2 and passim. Hesiod’s infl uence has been recognised on 
Pre-Socratic philosophers by Diller (1946). More specifi cally, Stokes (1962 and 1963) has 
analysed his infl uence on the Milesians, and Muñoz Valle (1969) on the whole develop-
ment of the idea of nature’s legality. Krafft (1971) has analysed the proximity of Anaxi-
mander’s and Hesiod’s ideas on several philosophical issues. Anaxagoras has been placed 
at the centre of the early dialectic between logos and myth, because of Homer’s infl uence 
on his system (Warden (1971)), and of his own infl uence on the great tragics, such as 
Aeschylus (Rössler (1970)) and Euripides (Guthrie (1957)). Homer’s proto-phylosophical 
ideas have also been underlined, e.g. by Buffi ère (1957) and Detienne (1962).
18 G. Lloyd, Images et modèles du monde in Brunschwig and Lloyd (1996), pp. 57–76.
19 Mugler (1970). On the concept of order, see Krings (1982, 2. ed.).
20 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.) and Untersteiner (1955, 2nd ed.). I do not discuss in this work 
the political and historiograpical questions that arise from Max Pohlenz’s proximity to 
the Nazi regime and, more broadly, his nationalism. However, this political dimension, 
as Bossina (2012) has masterfully illustrated, affects Pohlenz’s work. Many of his conclu-
sions are not only politically naive, but also ethically unacceptable and historiographically 
wrong. While careful archival research has shown Pohlenz’s efforts to protect his Jewish 
colleagues from the imposition of racist laws, his ideas were coherent with the regime’s 
ideology and his works refl ect its ideas. It is useful, in this context, to reread the criticism 
by Codino (1963), Mondolfo (1963) and Momigliano (1968). As his critics acknowledge, 
however, it is possible to fi nd useful conclusions in his work, particularly given its length 
and scope. I have found some of these conclusions useful for the present analysis.
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tragedy, values collide and collapse, norms are continuously challenged and 
boundaries blurred. Tragic being is δεινός, incomprehensible and disconcerting.21
Monstrosity thus reveals the ambivalent and non-linear relation between 
myth and logos that classical tragedy grasps and represents with so much 
intensity. Mythology refl ects the confl ictual relation between chaos and order. 
The latter’s shaping out of the former is everything but a linear and pacifi c 
process, as the uncanny presence of monsters suggests at different levels and 
in different manners throughout classical culture.
Order and Chaos
Every building of a new order must include the account of the defeat of the 
old order. Every order is the passage from the old to the new and, in Greece, 
the birth of the new order openly bears the mark of the old, in the form of the 
coexistence and transformation of ancient deities into the new Olympian pan-
theon. The antinomy between old and new, refl ected for example in the oppo-
sition between Dionysus and Zeus, seems to be well integrated in the Greek 
mentality.22 Yet the metamorphosis of the old into the new is far from being a 
peaceful and progressive process. On the contrary, the opposition between old 
chaos and new order survives with a striking vitality throughout the centuries 
to show the ambivalent and non-linear progress from one to the other.
Monsters are only old fi ctions, yet Xenophanes says that it would be better 
to forget them and their stories, since their battles are shameful reminders of 
the violent rebellion against the gods who, as guarantors of the cosmic order, 
deserve only our love and respect. But despite Xenophanes’ sharp judge-
ment, the role of monstrosity cannot be identifi ed with certainty as being 
aligned with the old chaos against the new order.23 Strauss Clay underlines 
how Hesiod’s monsters are reminiscent of Empedocles’ creatures, spontane-
ously generated from the earth and doomed to extinction, messengers of a 
world that is not, and that could have not come into being.24 Hesiod does 
not often name monsters. He deprives them of an individual identity and a 
defi nite place in the cosmic hierarchy. Monsters are failed experiments and 
negative exemplars. Yet they are not only so. The world of monsters is not in 
any way separate from the divine in ancient theogonies. It is not doomed to 
failure and extinction because of a pre-existing design. On the contrary, it is 
defeated after a fi erce struggle whose outcome is deeply aleatory. The clash 
reveals an ambivalent role for monstrosity, which is not only negative, but also 
21 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1972), p. 24.
22 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), p. 27 and passim.
23 Vorsokr. 21 B 1. (= Ath. Deipnosophistae XI.462C).
24 Strauss-Clay (2003), pp. 160–1.
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productive and positive, precisely like the creatures sprung from the earth in 
Empedocles’ cosmogony. Several literary examples illustrate this ambivalence, 
and the positive role played by monstrosity in building the new cosmic order.
Let us begin with the powerful account of Heracles’ dressing, in the pseudo-
Hesiodic Shield of Heracles. The poet of the Shield sings Heracles’ expedition 
against Kyknos, son of Ares. Kyknos is depicted as a bloodthirsty brigand, who 
attacks and kills travellers and offers his prey’s spoils to his father. Stesichoros 
knows that with the heads of his victims, Kyknos wanted to build a temple to 
Apollo.25 The poem imitates Homer’s description of Achilles’ shield in Iliad 
XVIII, whose philosophical and cosmogonic relevance did not escape Heracli-
tus and Eustathius. In the Iliad, where Homer gives one of the earliest personi-
fi cations of the death-bringing Ker, monstrosity makes a fl eeting appearance, 
with the Ker almost serving as a foil to the bucolic scenes.26 In the Shield, 
on the contrary, monstrosity conquers the centre of the stage and dominates 
almost the entirety of the weapon’s surface. The poet has the shield itself as a 
θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι, a wonder to behold, a lively enough depiction of horror with 
which Heracles fi ghts a real psychological warfare against Kyknos:
In the middle was Fear, made of adamant, unspeakable, glaring backwards 
with eyes shining like fi re. His mouth was full of white teeth, terrible, 
dreadful; and over his grim forehead fl ew terrible Strife, preparing for the 
battle-rout of men – cruel one, she took away the mind and sense of any 
men who waged open war against Zeus’ son. [. . .]
Upon it were wrought Pursuit and Rally; upon it burned Tumult and 
Murder and Slaughter; upon it was Strife, upon it Battle-Din, upon it deadly 
Fate [Κήρ] was dragging men by the feet through the battle, holding one 
who was alive but freshly wounded, another who was unwounded, another 
who had died. Around her shoulders she wore a cloak, purple with the 
blood of men, and she glared terribly and bellowed with a clanging sound.
Upon it were the heads of terrible snakes, unspeakable, twelve of them: 
they frightened the tribes of any men upon the earth who waged war against 
Zeus’ son. There was a grinding of their teeth whenever Amphitryon’s son 
fought. They were burning, these marvellous works: spots like marks were 
visible to see on the terrible serpents, dark along their backs, and their jaws 
were black.27
Against Kyknos, Heracles is the defender of humanity. He fi ghts with Apollo 
on his side, the good force and protector of true religion, against blind 
25 Stesich. 30 (= PMG 207). On the duel see also Janko (1986).
26 Il. XVIII.535.
27 Hes. Sc. 144–67. For a commentary, here and below, see C. F. Russo, in [Hesiod] 
(1965, 2nd ed.).
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violence and monstrosity. As Apollodoros notes, though, he is also a violent 
man.28 On his side, Heracles enrols monstrosity and employs it as a tool to 
smash the enemy. Through the shield, the frightful Gorgons fi ght with him, 
together with the black Keres, creatures of destruction (close to κηραίνω, 
harm or destroy) and even more terrifying goddesses of death:
gnashing their white teeth, terrible-faced, grim, blood-red, dreadful [. . .]. 
They were all eager to drink black blood. Whomever they caught fi rst, lying 
there or falling freshly wounded, she clenched around him her great claws, 
and his soul went down to Hades to chilling Tartarus. When they had sat-
isfi ed their spirits with human blood, they would hurl him backwards, and 
going forward they would rush once again into the battle din and melee. 
[. . .] Beside them stood Death-Mist, gloomy and dread, pallid, parched, 
cowering in hunger, thick-kneed; long claws were under her hands. From 
her nostrils fl owed mucus, from her cheeks blood was dripping down onto 
the ground. She stood there, grinning dreadfully, and much dust, wet with 
tears, lay upon her shoulders.29
The impact of the shield in the duel’s iconography is mixed. Heracles is mostly 
represented on the left side, holding the shield with the left arm, and thus 
hiding its threatening image. Sometimes he also fi ghts without the shield. 
However, in some versions, it is precisely the shield that Zeus grabs when he 
intervenes to divide Herakles from Ares, who intends to avenge his son, as 
if holding back the monsters meant to control and put an end to the fi ght.30
Thus justice, together with the true Delphic religion, defeats monstrosity 
by making use of monstrosity. Heracles, fi ghter for a new order, enters the 
struggle showing on his shield the most horrifi c monstrosities that the tradi-
tion is able to offer. As a tool, or a weapon, monstrosity is thus opposed to the 
enemy, chaos, and enrolled under the fl ag of order. Chaos here has a double 
status. It is the confused and unordered matter that represents the antith-
esis of the ordered universe, the chaotic horror of nothingness expressed by 
Medusa’s face.31 Chaos is also the primordial abyss, or non-being, preced-
ing the ordered universe. One can see the nuances of these interpretations 
comparing, for example, Hesiod’s with later cosmogonic accounts, such as 
Hyginus’s, Cicero’s or Ovid’s.32
28 Apollod. II.7.7 (155).
29 Hes. Sc. 249–69. On the κήρ’s iconography see LIMC VI, sub voce, Chantraine, sub voce.
30 LIMC sub voce. See also Vian (1945).
31 Frontisi-Ducroux (1995), pp. 65 ff. See also Clair (1989).
32 Hyg. Fab. prologue, Cic. ND III.44, Ou. Met. I.5–9. See also G. Guidorizzi, in Igino (2000), 
pp. 167–9. Tannery (1898–9), who underlines Ovid’s originality, is still useful. See also 
Solmsen (1950).
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   15 24/08/19   12:33 PM
16 M O N S T R O S I T Y  A N D P H I L O S O P H Y
Tragedy is also a domain in which the ambivalence of monstrosity clearly 
exhibits itself. Several metaphors, especially in Aeschylus, show the confl ict 
between chaos and order as one of the main themes, with a prominent dimen-
sion assigned to violent confl ict between opposed forces, inspired by Hesiod’s 
early cosmogonic account.33 Theogony, Moreau claims, is transgression and 
excess, from which monstrosity emerges. It is a transgression, though, highly 
creative and powerfully productive, without which humans and the world 
as we know them would not exist. Paradoxically, order defi nes itself against 
excess, but also comes into being through excessive transgression itself.34
Whereas order slowly but steadily establishes itself, especially in Aeschy-
lus’s later works, his metaphors reveal a powerfully ambivalent role assigned to 
chaotic forces. Like Hesiod’s chaos, this obscure domain cannot be interpreted 
only as a passive and almost absolute emptiness, plunged in the darkest night 
of indetermination in which everything is indistinct and undifferentiated. It 
can also be thought of as a threatening stock of active forces, an abyssal confu-
sion that bewilders the newly established order and challenges identities with 
an aggressive movement that blurs boundaries.
Aeschylus makes wide use of terms that speak about the indistinct con-
fusion between elements: μείγνυμι, mix or join or bring together, often in a 
hostile sense and in a context of violent hubris, and φύρω, confound and 
confuse, mix and mingle. This confusion is of course reminiscent of men’s 
primitive life, e.g. in Pr. 449–50, and more widely of ancient primitive chaos. 
It also puts forward, however, the threat that ancient chaos represents when, 
far from disappearing once and for all with the early cosmogonic generation,35 
it resurfaces in and through tragic crimes, such as in Agamemnon’s killing or 
in the monstrous feast of Glaucus’s mares.36
Many mythological monsters share an interesting genealogical element. 
They descend from Gaia or the Earth and belong to a pre-Olympic generation. 
They bring with them the ancient forces of chaos that the new order must defeat 
in order to establish itself.37 Although Gaia does not play a prominent role in 
Homer, it has a fundamental function in Hesiod. Interestingly for us, it embod-
ies the ambivalence implicit in the early concept of monstrosity. Gaia is fi rst and 
foremost a possibility, a substratum that makes possible the birth of every kind of 
being: from it, terrible monsters are generated and yet also noble and beautiful 
33 Moreau (1985), p. 9 and passim.
34 Moreau (2006). See also G. E. R. Lloyd, ‘Images et modèles du monde’, in Brunschwig 
and Lloyd eds. (1996), pp. 57–76.
35 See contra Jellamo (2005).
36 A. A. 996–7 and Fr. 38. See Moreau (1985).
37 Moreau (1985), p. 182 ff. and passim.
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creatures, such as Aphrodite and the nymphs Meliae.38 Increasingly, the Earth 
appears as an autonomous and fathomless power that transfers her force to her 
stock. Iconography, and Hellenistic sculpture in particular, powerfully refl ects 
this overfl owing force, such as in the Pergamon Altar.39
Through Phorcys ‘the monstrous’, and the mighty Keto, Gaia’s progeny 
includes Medusa and Gorgo, generated to help the giants, according to 
Euripides.40 Medusa is among the most ambivalent of the monstrous crea-
tures. She generates Pegasus, a positive heroic character. Gaia’s fecundity, 
which is both malignant and benign, appears in Medusa, and mythologists 
stress either of the two sides, depending on the different genealogies assigned 
to her.41 Her face is forbidden, not only to mortal gaze, but also to speech. 
Medusa is always described with vague and imprecise words, like a taboo, 
as if not only could the eyes not see her image, but also the mind could not 
bear its verbal description.42 Because of her nature, face-to-face contact with 
her is both necessary and impossible. She is always represented as a fully 
frontal fi gure, a visual ἀποστροφή.43 In the fi fth century, though, her image 
is humanised and paradoxically transformed into the image of the virulent 
beauty made monstrous because of Athena’s envy. Ovid still has it as the 
prodigious transformation of the deepest beauty into its opposite, the most 
frightful monstrosity. In Perseus’s words:
She was once most beautiful – for so I learned from one who said he had 
seen her. ’Tis said that in Minerva’s temple Neptune, lord of the Ocean, 
ravished her. Jove’s daughter turned away and hid her chaste eyes behind 
her aegis. And, that the deed might be punished as was due, she changed 
the Gorgon’s locks to ugly snakes. And now to frighten her fear-numbed 
foes, she still wears upon her breast the snakes which she has made.44
Gaia animates the movement of the universe throughout Ouranos’s, Cronos’s 
and fi nally Zeus’s age. It is thus in Gaia that the forces which fi ght against 
chaos and towards order fi nd their origin and strength. Once again, though, if 
Gaia’s monstrous progeny represents the heritage of a universe still deprived of 
harmony, it also embodies a tool toward that same harmony and order.
38 See Finazzo (1971), passim.
39 Moreno (1994), pp. 12–13.
40 E. Io 987–97.
41 A. Moreau, ‘Sur la race de méduse: forces de vie contre forces de mort (Hésiode, Théog-
onie, v. 270–336)’, in Jouan éd. (1986), pp. 1–15. On Medusa see Clair (1989).
42 Frontisi-Ducroux (1995), ch. 5.
43 Frontisi-Ducroux (1995).
44 Ou. Met. IV.794–803. See also Apollod. II.4.3.
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The monstrous forces that Gaia generates, passing across the epochs, 
do not perish or vanish forever.45 Ouranos, Cronos, the titans, the hecaton-
cheires, the Kyklops, the giants and many others: they are all earth’s creatures, 
and they are all tamed and constrained under the rule of a new universal 
order. Although they cease to act and impose their rules, they somehow 
remain incorrupted and survive beneath the new order. The latter reveals 
its always precarious nature that can be shaken by monstrosity every time its 
harmony is threatened by monstrous forces. These same forces, however, have 
also contributed to the order’s establishment. Here lies the productive ambi-
guity. Monstrosity is both the manifestation of the threat and the instrument 
to overcome it. If it is true that the whole theogonic process ends up with 
Zeus’s kingship, it is also true that neither is his reign uncontested nor is the 
process towards it teleological.46 Whereas one can say that monstrous forces 
are pre-harmonic and they are progressively overcome in the path towards 
order, I believe that such a path must not be interpreted with any teleology or 
providential scheme in mind.47
The ancients already project a providential intention onto Hesiod. Proclus, 
for example, claims that ‘the Theogony was composed by worthy Hesiod [. . .] 
because he wanted to hand down to later generations the principles of the entire 
providence of the gods towards the cosmic order as the ancestral tradition of 
the Greeks presents it. He thus composed that work on the basis of the myths 
that were told in the sanctuaries.’48 Such a projection, however, better serves 
Proclus’s providentialist argument than the interpretation of Hesiod itself, since 
the confl ictual dialectic of mythical forces laboriously stabilises itself before the 
existence of anything that can be called providence.
Gaia pushes for a new order. It does not have in mind, however, a precise 
design for it. Evil, confl ict, disorder, are the effects of necessary forces put into 
motion by Gaia through the generation of several terrifying monsters. They 
ambivalently destabilise and build order out of chaos, without any end in 
view. The new divine order, of Cronos vis-à-vis Ouranos, and of Zeus vis-à-vis 
Cronos, does not have the characteristic of a τέλος for the universe. The cos-
mos, throughout its stages, is the outcome of confl icts, of triumphs and defeats, 
of births and deaths to which divine and monstrous forces contribute together.
Mythical forces refl ect the relations between the pre-Hellenic and the 
Hellenic worlds. The latter overcomes the former, but does not completely 
45 Solmsen (1949), p. 72.
46 See contra Strauss-Clay (2003), p. 153.
47 Contra, see also Jellamo (2005).
48 Procl. ad.Hes.Op. Prolegomena I.1 (= Marzillo (2010), p. 3, en tr. Van den Berg (2014), 
p. 388).
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obliterate it. The theogony is the affi rmation of the Olympic gods over the 
pre-Hellenic divinities. Through theogony, Being is located in time and the 
birth of nature’s order is explained as the progressive stabilisation, through 
confl ict, of the primeval forces represented by monstrosity.49 Ambiguously, 
though, the νόμος manifests itself in the φύσις with the support of monstros-
ity, largely embodied by Gaia’s progeny. Rationality does not overcome irra-
tionality. Rather they coexist and remain in an antithetical and non-dialectic 
relation, without any idea of teleology.50
Through Gaia’s prominent and ambivalent role, early Greek thought has 
exploited in a powerful way the concept of monstrosity. Order is achieved 
through monstrosity itself, that is to say through the fundamental help of Gaia’s 
progeny in progressing towards, and fi nally establishing, the justice of Zeus. Zeus, 
the greatest god of the Pantheon, king of gods and men, is in charge of main-
taining order and justice in the cosmos. However, his rising to power has been 
achieved through, and supported by, the very same forces of chaos. Through the 
theomachies, a veritable work of construction of the cosmos, monsters fi ght on 
different sides, and without their help, order would not have been established.51
Mythical Battlefi elds: Monstrosity as a Weapon
When Zeus reaches adulthood and decides to seize Cronos’s power, he fi rst 
demands Metis’s help. Thanks to a drug, Cronos is forced to vomit the sons 
and daughters that he had previously swallowed to prevent their develop-
ment. Supported by his brothers and sisters, the future Olympian gods, Zeus 
makes war against Cronos and the titans. The titans represent unruliness 
(πλημμέλεια) and disorder (ἀταξία). However, in the beginning of Theogony, 
gods and titans already appear as two equivalent poles, both of divine nature: 
givers of good (δωτῆρες) the former, illustrious and nobles (ἀγαυοί) the latter. 
The fi ght is ten years long, and the balance is broken only by Gaia’s and the 
monsters’ intervention in favour of the Olympians.
To obtain victory over the titans, Zeus follows Gaia’s advice52 and sets the 
Centimanes free from Tartarus, in which Cronos had imprisoned them. Far from 
being unambiguously on the side of order, Zeus employs a monstrosity against 
49 Untersteiner (1972, 2nd ed.), p. 114 and passim.
50 See Nestle (1930–4) and Lo Schiavo (1983) for the specifi c contribution of Homeric 
works in this sense.
51 Such ambivalence has suggested the intrinsic diffi culty in interpreting the whole mean-
ing of Zeus’s myth vis-à-vis titans and giants. See for example Cornford (1952), p. 203.
52 Possibly, and alternatively, Prometheus’s advice, as one can understand through A. Pr. 
219–21.
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another monstrosity. Among them, a real contract is established: in exchange 
for the use of their force on behalf of Zeus, the hecatoncheires recover their lost 
freedom.53 The contractual nature of the exchange suggests, to some extent, the 
equivalence of the subjects. The dialectic between Zeus and Kottos is thus even 
more striking. Zeus imperatively calls the monsters to their duty to show their 
invincible force, ‘[. . .] how after so many sufferings you have come up to the 
light once again out from under a deadly bond, by our plans, out from under the 
murky gloom’.54 Although he knows that the monsters’ force is his only solution 
to win the war, Zeus puts himself on a plane of arrogant superiority. Excellent or 
blameless (ἀμύμων) Kottos, though, responds by reversing the order of Zeus’s 
argument, and promising fi delity before and outside any plan of subordination. 
Kottos brings the conversation back onto a plane of equality of pride, suggesting 
awareness of the role that his stock is about to play in the mythical struggle.55
A second intervention of monstrosity in favour of the new Olympian order 
is represented by the Kyklopes. Another contract is agreed to with these mon-
strous forces, which this time provide their skilful inventiveness (μηχανή):
And [Zeus] freed from their deadly bonds his father’s brothers, Sky’s sons, 
whom their father had bound in his folly. And they repaid him in gratitude 
for his kind deed, giving him the thunder and the blazing thunderbolt and 
the lightning, which huge Earth had concealed before. Relying on these, 
he rules over mortals and immortals.56
Zeus and the Olympians win their war and gain supremacy thanks to the 
Kyklopes’ weapons.57 They punish the titans by throwing them to the bot-
tom of Tartarus, a place as far from the earth as the earth itself is far from the 
sky. What was mixed and confused is thus separated and now the new order 
clearly distinguishes not so much the divine from the non-divine, but rather 
the winning gods from the defeated ones. The triumphant divinity, however, 
appears in an ambiguous light, since for its victory it had to employ the same 
measureless and monstrous force that its enemy represents. Rather than being 
dominated and obliterated,58 the monstrous power is negotiated and employed 
against the old order and in favour of the new one.
53 Calame (1985).
54 Hes. Th. 652–3.
55 Mazzocchini (2003). See also M. L. West in Hesiod (1966) ad loc.
56 Hes. Th. 501–6. On the pact between Zeus and the monsters see Solmsen (1949), pp. 17–18.
57 A.R. 730 ff.
58 Calame (1985).
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One can follow the multifarious nature of monstrosity in the specifi c fi gure of 
the Kyklopes, who enjoy a great fortune in mythology and art. The ambiguity lies 
fi rst and foremost in the borderline nature of their character, caught in the grey 
area between savagery and civilisation. The former is implicit in their nature:
[They] have very violent hearts (ὑπέρβιος ἦτορ), Brontes (Thunder) and 
Steropes (Lightning) and strong-spirited Arges (Bright), those who gave 
thunder to Zeus and fashioned the thunderbolt. These were like the gods 
in other regards, but only one eye was set in the middle of their foreheads; 
and they were called Kyklops (Circle-eyed) by name, since a single circle-
shaped eye was set in their foreheads. Strength and force and contrivances 
(ἰσχύς, βίη, μηχαναὶ) were in their works.59 
Here, Hesiod is the fi rst author to mention their single eye, a feature that remains 
remarkably rare in iconography. Together with the three gods mentioned by the 
poet of the Theogony, Hellanikos accounts for two more groups of Kyklopes: the 
builders of mythical walls, and the comrades of Polyphemus.60
Their connection to civilisation, however, is also problematically asserted 
by their skilful mastery of metallurgy and, more generally, the controlled use 
of fi re. Not only do they endow Zeus with the use of lightning and thunder-
bolt but, according to Apollodorus, they also provide Hades with his hel-
met and Poseidon with his trident.61 Their skills make their subsequent role 
as Hephaestus’s workers natural, notably in the forge under Mount Etna.62 
This idea develops in the vision of the Kyklopes as great builders of mythical 
defensive walls, like those of Mycenae and Tyrins.
Homer’s account of Odysseus in the Kyklopes’ land builds the image of a 
savage race, ἄγριοι ἄνθρωποι according to the Suda, who violate the sacred 
duty of hospitality and descend to cannibalism.63 Although in Homer, as in 
Hesiod, the Kyklopes are to some extent civilised, since they perform pastoral 
activities, they are the anarchists of the Odyssey and they live in a kind of 
59 Hes. Th. 139–46.
60 Hellanic. in FGH IV F 88.
61 Apollod. I.2.1.
62 Calame (1985) speaks about the Kyklopes’ mediating function between the untamed 
forces of the underworld and the higher domain of civilisation, of men and gods above 
them. See also Glenn (1978), Mondi (1983), Morgan (1984), pp. 242 ff., J. A. López Ferez, 
‘Les Cyclopes et leur pays dans la littérature grecque’, in Jouan and Deforge éds (1988), 
pp. 57–71, I. Aurenty, ‘Des cyclopes à Rome’, in Bianchi, Thévenez eds (2004), pp. 35–52.
63 See e.g. Finley (1954), p. 101 and Guthrie (1957), pp. 95 ff.
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anomie that is eventually preached by Cynicists, and in particular by Antis-
thenes.64 Heraclitus understands the ‘Kylops’ as the name of the brutal lack 
of consciousness, which rationality – notably Odysseus’s – must overcome.65 
Further scrutiny, though, suggests that they draw their features from their life 
apart from civilisation. They live in a remote part of the world. They are alien, 
both geographically and ontologically, and they inhabit the margins of civilised 
space.66 For this reason, and this reason only, they do not honour hospitality as 
a Greek would expect. Hospitality does not belong to their culture. They show 
more ignorance than lack of respect for the customs of Greek civilisation.67
The tension that emerges from the description of the Kyklopes’ race 
refl ects perhaps the narrative exigency of the poem. Polyphemus becomes in 
fact the only evil character, misunderstood and then ignored by the other 
Kyklopes, once he is fooled about Odysseus’s name. His fellows respond to 
Polyphemus’s cry for help that ‘sickness which comes from Zeus there is no 
way you can escape; you must pray to our father the lord Poseidon’.68 Not only 
do the Kyklopes recognise divine authority, but they also respect their own 
genealogy. Polyphemus is left alone. Blind, he cannot reach Odysseus with his 
stones, but only with his curse.
Polyphemus represents the solitude and powerlessness of monstrosity. In 
other versions of the myth, these characteristics are explored in different 
directions. Homer’s tale inspires Euripides’ satyr play. Here, the Kyklopes 
are not uncivilised shepherds, but savage and bloody barbarians that feed 
themselves with men and beasts, rather than milk and cheese as in Homer. 
It is as if the whole race had become Polyphemus, bloodthirsty and vicious. 
A marble statue at the Capitoline Museum in Rome represents a sitting 
Polyphemus with the corpse of a Greek in his left hand.69 Interestingly, the 
64 Buffi ère (1956), pp. 359 ff. See [Antisthenes of Athens] (2015) and SSR V A. Together 
with the Lestrygons’s, the Kyklops’s cannibalism is still an indirect proof, for Pliny, of 
the existence of practices that, had they not existed in the past, reason would typically 
rule out. See Pliny NH VII.9: ‘I have mentioned that there are Scythian tribes, a good 
number in fact, which eat human fl esh. This might well seem unbelievable were we not 
to bear in mind that in the centre of the world and in Sicily there once existed peoples 
equally bizarre, the Cycloped and the Laestrygones [. . .].’
65 Heraclit. All. 70.
66 The traditional association of fearsome otherness with remote geographical spaces and 
foreign lands lasts well beyond the classical age. See Delumeau (1978), pp. 62–5.
67 Brown (1996).
68 Od. IX.411–12.
69 LIMC, Kylops, Catalogue 31. On the representation of Polyphemus, especially in the 
Sperlonga’s group, see Andreae (1982). On Andreae’s interpretation, with a special focus 
on the aesthetic of monstrosity, see ‘Ulisse, i mostri e gli imperatori di Roma’, in Perutelli 
(2006), pp. 73–8. See also Garland (1995), pp. 91–6 and R. J. Clare, ‘Representing mon-
strosity: Polyphemus in the Odyssey’, in Atherton ed. (1998), pp. 1–17.
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iconography has not preserved any collective representation of the Kyklopes 
as a group.
Euripides imagines Silenus and the satyrs shipwrecked on Sicily, the Kyklopes’ 
island, and enslaved by them.70 Polyphemus claims a crass and impious mate-
rialism, unconditionally deserving the epithets of αἰσχρός by the satyrs and of 
θήρειος by Odysseus, which unambiguously set him in the domain of deformed 
and wild monstrosity.71 This impiety is also refl ected in Polyphemus’s challenge of 
Zeus’s omnipotence, even after being blinded by Odysseus. The Kyklops, unre-
pentant, threatens the king of Ithaca with the prophecy according to which he 
would wander many years before arriving at home.
A different picture emerges in poetry, in which the Kyklops reveals unex-
pected features of grotesque humanity and even inspires sympathy. Imagined 
fi rst by Philoxenus of Cythera, the Kyklops of Theocritus’s Idyll XI has lost his 
monstrous aspects and reveals rather his clumsiness than his wickedness. Poly-
phemus fi nds solace in song for his unrequited love for sea-nymph Galatea. 
Monstrosity is transformed into grotesque, no longer threatening, but rather 
suggesting tender feelings because of the monster’s ingenuity.72 On a wall 
painting, in Livia’s house in Rome, Eros makes fun of the Kyklops, bridling 
him while he offers an unhappy gaze to the naked Galatea. Elsewhere, the two 
are embracing, and Galatea responds with sympathy to the monster’s love.
A wholly different pictures emerges in Ovid, for whom Galatea’s disgust 
for the Kyklops is fully justifi ed by the monster’s wickedness, mirrored by his 
revolting aspect: ‘[. . .] savage creature, whom the very woods shudder to look 
upon, whom no stranger has ever seen save to his own hurt, who despises great 
Olympus and its gods [. . .].’73 Polyphemus pronounces a long monologue, try-
ing to justify his simple way of life, close to nature more than uncivilised, and 
attempting to make it – and himself – appealing to Galatea:
And now, Galatea, do but raise your glistening head from the blue sea. 
Now come and don’t despise my gifts. Surely I know myself; lately I saw 
my refl ection in a clear pool, and I liked my features when I saw them. Just 
look, how big I am! Jupiter himself up there in the sky has no bigger body; 
for you are always talking of some Jove or other as ruling there. A wealth of 
hair overhangs my manly face and it shades my shoulders like a grove. And 
don’t think it ugly that my whole body is covered with thick, bristling hair. 
A tree is ugly without its leaves and a horse is ugly if a thick mane does 
70 See their presence at Polyphemus’s blinding, on a Lucanian crater at the British Museum, 
LIMC, Kyklops, Catalogue 27.
71 E. Cyc. 625 and 670.
72 Phylox.Cit. 2–11 (= PMG 815–24) and Theoc. XI.
73 Ou. Met. XIII.760–2.
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not clothe his sorrell neck; feathers clothe the birds, and their own wool 
is becoming to sheep; so a beard and shaggy hair on his body well become 
a man. True, I have but one eye in the middle of my forehead, but it is as 
big as a good-sized shield. And what of that? Doesn’t the great sun see 
everything here on earth from his heavens? And the sun has but one eye.74 
This seemingly human attitude of the Kyklops is however suddenly turned 
upside down by Ovid, when the monster discovers his beloved with Acis and 
unleashes his murderous passion.
Eventually, Callimachus takes a different stance and depicts a tender 
Kyklops in his Hymn to Artemis. The young goddess visits the island of Lipari 
and encounters the Kyklopes intent on building a watering-place for Posei-
don’s horses. The nymphs that accompany the young Artemis are scared, not 
so much by the monsters’ aspect, but by the entire sight of their sooty, windy 
and noisy workshop. Artemis, on the contrary, boldly asks for the weapons 
she came for, and they immediately make the mythical bow for her. The poet 
evokes the goddess’s youthfulness, through a sweet image of tenderness that 
makes the monster deeply human:
[. . .] thou, Maiden, even earlier, while yet but three years old, when Leto 
came bearing thee in her arms at the bidding of Hephaestus that he might 
give thee handsel and Brontes set thee on his stout knees – thou didst 
pluck the shaggy hair of his great breast and tear it out by force. And even 
unto this day the mid part of his breast remains hairless, even as when 
mange settles on a man’s temples and eats away the hair.75 
Gentle or brutal, civilised or savage, skilled workers or simple shepherds: 
the ambivalence of the Kyklops’s monstrosity makes him a character able to 
embody very different roles and perform diverse functions, contributing to 
enrich the mythological economy of monstrosity.
The ambiguously productive role played by monstrosity also emerges in the 
gigantomachy, the second great confl ict that Zeus must face on his way towards 
the establishment of the Olympian power. The giants are similar to the Kyk-
lopes but their original representation is quite different. Giants are born out of 
the blood spilled by Ouranos’s castration on earth. Whereas the enemies of the 
Olympians are initially presented as an ordered hoplitic phalanx, by the fi fth 
century they become a horde of monstrous and savage beings,76 with γιγαντικός 
74 Ou. Met. XIII.840–53.
75 Call. Dian. 72–9, evoked on the frons scenae of the Hierapolis’s theatre. See LIMC, Arte-
mis, Catalogue 1262.
76 Vian (1952), passim and Moreau (1985), pp. 133 ff.
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felt to be a synonym of monstrous. Through their attack, Gaia’s sons intend to 
subvert the precarious domain of reason and civilisation.
The fi rst poet to offer an account of gigantomachy is Pindar, who intends 
to glorify the divine race. Pindar contrasts the giants’ ὕβρις with the gods’ βία 
(force), and introduces the theme of Heracles who, according to a version of 
the myth, supports the Olympians and makes their victory possible. Apollodorus 
describes their appearance:
[. . .] unsurpassable in size, unassailable in their strength and fearful 
to behold because of the thick hair hanging down from their head and 
cheeks; and their feet were formed from dragons’ scales. According to some 
accounts, they were born at Phlegrai, or according to others, at Pallene. 
And they hurled rocks and fl aming oak trees at the heavens.77 
Aeschylus also makes use of the evocative power of giants. He writes at the 
time of the metamorphosis of giants from hoplites into monsters, and contrib-
utes to this transformation through the powerful image of the Argive attack 
against Thebes in the Seven. The attackers, whose revolt assumes a cosmic 
dimension, are still warriors and yet limitless and monstrous, excessive to the 
point of blind folly. They are giants, because of their great size, and because 
they are enemies of the gods:
[Kapaneus] is a giant, bigger than the man previously mentioned, and his 
boasts show a pride beyond human limits [. . .]. As his device he bears a 
naked man carrying fi re: the torch with which he is armed blazes in his 
hands, and in golden letters he declares ‘I will burn the city.’ Against such 
a man you must send – but who can stand against him? Who will await 
without panic the onset of this braggart man?78 
Giants are initially anthropomorphic fi gures. By the sixth century, they 
become anguipede (snake-legged) fi gures, deriving from, and confused with, 
Typhoeus. Their monstrosity becomes thus more physically apparent, under-
lining the opposition between the anthropomorphic gods and the horrible 
creatures that threaten Olympus.
The most striking representation of gigantomachy in antiquity is in the 
fourteen east metopes of the Parthenon. The composition is polycentric and 
multidimensional. The viewer is pushed through the threatening space of 
the fi ght, whose physical impact – as Moreno puts it – counts more than 
the visual one. Corporeal masses lean out from the sides in a crescendo of 
77 Apollod. I.6.1–2.
78 A. Th. 423–36. See also E. Ba. 538–44 on Pentheus, and Moreau (1985).
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amazement.79 An original element of the Parthenon Frieze is the introduc-
tion of all the monstrous creatures supporting the Olympians in their fi ght. 
Excluding Kronos, Koios, Krios and Japetus, the four rebels, the artist of the 
Parthenon includes the titans that are integrated into the Olympic order.
The Hellenistic artists of the Parthenon inform the composition with a 
sensibility drawn from recent historical events, collapsing the myth of the 
Olympian origins with the reality of the consolidation of the power of Rome 
and its allies, the Pergamenian princes. The giants’ defeat echoes the real 
debacle of the Galatians in 189 BC. Like the giants, the barbarians are guilty of 
ὕβρις and παρανομία. Like Xerxes in Aeschylus’s interpretation, they attempt 
to violate the order of nature and, for this, they receive the ultimate punish-
ment by the Olympians.
Together with the gods, the giants reveal a careful and innovative study 
of anatomy, visible in the astonishing details that survive in some of the Par-
thenon’s fi gures. The giants alone, however, have been used to explore the 
edge of nature’s possibilities and the boundaries of normality, abnormality and 
monstrosity. The bull-man, the lion-man, the butterfl y-man challenge the 
viable form in a hybrid composition of animal and human features. Moreno 
defi nes the atmosphere of the battle as metaphysical, surreal and dreamlike. 
Its physical materialisation, though, seems to prevail over its psychic sugges-
tions. With and beyond Aristotelian physics of monstrosity, the Altar plunges 
the viewer into an aleatory cosmogony reminiscent of Empedocles’ primeval 
creatures. Beyond Empedocles, however, these monsters are not doomed to 
extinction, but rather destined to conquer the sky. Only a stronger fate pre-
vents their bold attempt by establishing at the same time the boundaries of the 
normal and the monstrous. The monsters that entered the battlefi eld could 
have been the new gods, our gods. Only an aleatory outcome makes them 
monstrously hybrid. Nature, as Moreno puts it, is still entropic and the human 
shape – as much as the divine – does not pre-exist the monstrous forms, but is 
rather educed from them, and it is what remains of that cosmic fi ght.80
Although giants are the chaotic opponents of the Olympian order, they 
strikingly preserve a link with positive forces that come from the earth for 
the affi rmation and defence of national culture. Γηγενής is the epithet 
applied to both the giants and the earthborn warriors, the Σπαρτοί or sow-
men generated by Kadmos, founder and fi rst king of Thebes.81 After slaying 
the dragon, Kadmos, the presumed son of Agenor and brother of Europa, 
follows Ares’ instruction and sows the ground with the monster’s teeth. Out 
79 Moreno (1994), p. 14. My reading is greatly indebted to Moreno’s interpretation.
80 Moreno (1994), p. 476 and passim.
81 Guthrie (1957). pp. 21 ff.
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of the earth, armed men spring up and, after a deadly fi ght with each other 
in some version of the myth, they become the ancestors of the Theban aris-
tocracy, while Kadmos, after a marriage with Harmonia, is consecrated as 
the founder and fi rst king of the mythical city.82 The Thebans, also called the 
Kadmeioi, are thus the offspring of a monstrous generation, or rather of an 
autochthonous generation whose seeds are the teeth of a monster defeated 
and tamed.83
The dragon’s role itself is ambiguous. It is sacred to Ares, in some versions 
of the myth, possibly because a descendant of the god himself, and its killing 
sparks Ares’ anger.84 The earth-born warriors represent the mythical defence 
of the country, for example in Sophocles’ Antigone, in which the serpent is the 
symbol of Thebes against the Argives’ eagle, which fl ies away.85 The idea of 
autochthony and resistance is reworked in the context of the struggle against 
the Persian invaders, with reference to Kekrops, mythical founder and fi rst 
king of Athens.86 A peaceful and wise king, he is also a monstrous hybrid, half 
man and half snake, because of his chthonian origin.87 After the fi ght between 
Poseidon and Athena for infl uence over the city, this monster is the author of 
enormous progression in civilisation, like the invention of writing, the build-
ing of cities and the burial of the dead.
The ambivalence of the link between the earth-born warriors and mon-
strosity is once again brought onto the negative side by Euripides, who makes 
Pentheus, the new king of Thebes in the Bacchae, the son of Echion, one of 
the Spartoi. The Bacchae’s chorus unambiguously puts forward Pentheus’s 
monstrosity:
[What anger]/He shows his earthborn/origin, that he was born from a 
dragon,/does Pentheus, son/of earthborn Echion,/a monster with visage 
wild [ἀγριωπός τέρας], no man of mortal frame/but one of the murderous 
Giants who opposed the gods.88
Vomited by the earth, Pentheus and his genealogy are entirely pushed, once 
again, onto the side of a negative, arrogant and limitless monstrosity.89
82 See Vian (1963).
83 See also the myth’s rational explanation in Palaeph. 3 (= Festa et al. eds. (1894–1902), 
III.II. pp. 8–10)
84 E. Ph. follows this version.
85 S. Ant. 125.
86 See Loraux (1993, 2nd ed and 1996).
87 LIMC, esp. Catalogue 2, 9, 11 and 16.
88 E. Ba. 536–44.
89 On Pentheus, see also Ou. Met. III.511 ff.
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From a similar stock comes also Typhoeus, the fi ercest of Zeus’s enemies. 
Typhoeus appears in the third and last major moment of theomachy and rep-
resents the ultimate and most dangerous fi ght against the Olympian order. 
After the attack of titans and giants, the most subversive power is now embod-
ied by an individual enemy. Although his force emerges from ancient chaos, 
Typhoeus’s victory would not have caused the fall of the cosmos back into the 
original abyss of nothingness. Typhoeus’s intention is clear in this sense: he 
fi ghts for a new and alternative order and to seize Zeus’s power: ‘si vellet . . . 
de regno certare’, in Hyginus’s words.90 Hesiod sets the tone for the cosmic 
dimension of the struggle:
The violet-dark sea was enveloped by a confl agration from both of them – of 
thunder and lightning, and fi re from that monster of typhoons and winds, 
and the blazing thunder-bolt. And all the earth seethed, and the sky and sea; 
and long waves raged around the shores, around and about, under the rush of 
the immortals, and an inextinguishable shuddering arose. And Hades, who 
rules over the dead below, was afraid, and the Titans under Tartarus, gath-
ered around Cronos, at the inextinguishable din and dread battle-strife.91
The cosmic dimension of the fi ght is also underlined by Apollodorus’s descrip-
tion of the monster as a creature superior to all Earth’s offspring, ‘of human 
shape and of such prodigious bulk that he out-topped all the mountains, and 
his head often brushed the stars. One of his hands reached out to the west and 
the other to the east, and from them projected a hundred dragons’ heads.’92 
Like a rising dark sun, the monster embraces the whole creation, occupying the 
space from the West to the East and from the bottom of the earth up to the sky.
Differently from the titanomachy, Zeus is here alone and engages indi-
vidually in this combat. It is for him the ultimate occasion to prove his own 
superiority, and only after Typhoeus’s defeat is Zeus able to distribute honours 
and provinces to the other gods, and fi nally inaugurate the Olympian order 
on a more stable ground.
Typhoeus is a son of the Earth and Tartarus. Interestingly, he is generated 
after Tartarus has received the titans for their perpetual punishment. After 
being defeated, monstrosity resurfaces once again, even more powerful and 
threatening. It literally germinates from Tartarus and the prodigious fecundity of 
Gaia, against the new victorious and yet precarious order. Even more dreadful 
is an alternative version that makes Typhoeus the son of Hera by parthenogen-
esis. Offended by Zeus’s autonomous generation of Athena, Hera implores the 
90 Hyg. Fab. 152. See also Ant.Lib. 28.2, as well as Seippel (1939) and Ballabriga (1990).
91 Hes. Th. 844–52.
92 Apollod. I.6.3.
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Earth, the sky and the titans for revenge. The Hymn to Apollo mentions twice 
her terrible gesture:
Eyes dark and wide as a cow’s, Queen Hera prayed and with down-turned 
palm struck the earth: ‘Now hear me Earth and wide Heaven above, and 
Titans, gods beneath the earth, dwelling around great Tartaros, from whom 
men and gods derive: all hear me and grant me a child apart from Zeus, in 
no way weaker in strength than he, a child greater than Zeus by as much 
as Zeus is greater than Kronos.’ And she struck the earth with her massive 
hand. Then life-bearing Earth shifted; Hera rejoiced in the sight, believing 
her prayer would be fulfi lled.93 
Hera demands a son who excels among gods and humans. Yet the Earth gives 
her a terrible creature, dissimilar from both. The monster’s image explored by 
the poet of the Theogony is conceptually dense. The poet makes use not only of 
visually horrible features, as expected, but also of sound-related characteristics:
His hands †are holding deeds upon strength,† and tireless the strong god’s 
feet; and from his shoulders there were a hundred heads of a snake, a ter-
rible dragon’s, licking with their dark tongues; and on his prodigious heads 
fi re sparkled from his eyes under the eyebrows, and from all of his heads fi re 
burned as he glared. And there were voices in all his terrible heads, send-
ing forth all kinds of sounds, inconceivable: for sometimes they would utter 
sounds as though for the gods to understand, and at other times the sound 
of a loud-bellowing, majestic bull, unstoppable in its strength, at other times 
that of a lion, with a ruthless spirit, at other times like young dogs, a wonder 
to hear, and at other times he hissed, and the high mountains echoed from 
below.94 
Surprisingly, both the myth’s iconographic and textual versions set Typhoeus 
and Zeus on the same level. The monster and the god sometimes seem to refl ect 
each other, bringing to its last consequences the individualisation of the clash 
between good and evil in the last episode of titanomachy. In Aeschylus, for 
example, the evil eye of the monster seems to refl ect in Zeus’s vigilant guard:
[Typhoeus] once rose up against the gods, hissing terror from his formidable 
jaws while a fi erce radiance fl ashed from his eyes, with the intention of 
overthrowing the autocracy of Zeus by force. But there came against him 
the unsleeping weapon of Zeus, the downrushing thunderbolt breathing out 
93 h.Ap. 332–43. For this method of invoking chthonian deities or ghosts, see T. W. Allen 
et al., in T. W. Allen et al. (1936, 2nd ed.) ad loc.
94 Hes. Th. 820–35. See Goslin (2010).
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fl ame, which struck him out of his haughty boasts – for he was hit right 
in the centre of his body, and his strength was thundered out of him and 
reduced to ashes.95
The iconography of Typhoeus, writes Touchefeu-Meynier, is surprisingly not 
impressive, compared to the verbal description and the daring sense conveyed 
by mythographers, persuaded that he really represents the ultimate danger to 
Zeus.96 Representations of the monster show quite traditional attributes of 
hybridity. A bearded character with snake’s tail and wings, armed only with 
snakes, Typhoeus lacks the savagery and violence that the tradition ascribes 
to him. Although sometimes bigger than Zeus, Typhoeus never seems to really 
threaten the king of the Olympians. It is in the two characters’ mirroring of 
each other, however, that the seriousness of the threat must be read, as if they 
were equivalent in strength, as if the title of king of gods were not to be recov-
ered, but rather to be newly established, after this ultimate combat.
Typhoeus is indeed defeated. According to Hyginus, once hit in the chest 
by Zeus’s lightning, the monster is enveloped with fi re.97 Less reassuring is the 
Theogony’s version, in which an immense fi re is generated from the monster’s 
corpse and spread around, melting everything on earth. The poet compares 
the effect of the fi re generated by Typhoeus’s mutilated corpse with Hephaes-
tus’s skilful art in melting metals, suggesting once again that while the furious 
forces of nature are tamed by the metallurgical technique, they nonetheless 
survive and cannot be defi nitively obliterated. Mount Etna, for Hyginus, 
covers the monster’s remains and still reveals a trace of that original fi re.98 
Zeus fi nally throws Typhoeus’s remains back into Tartarus. Even from there, 
however, the monster keeps producing his horrendous effects in the form of 
terrible winds and storms that affl ict men on both sea and earth.99
Zeus’s victory, however, is not so easily obtained in all versions of the myth. 
Apollodorus’s account is far less reassuring for the Olympians, and testifi es to 
the level of the threat posed by Typhoeus’s attempt. When the monster attacks, 
the gods evacuate Olympus and fi nd refuge in Egypt. Attempting a pursuit, 
Typhoeus forces them to metamorphosise into beasts. Zeus counterattacks but, 
according to Apollodorus, the monstrous creature overcomes the king of gods:
[. . .] seeing the monster sore wounded, [Zeus] grappled with him. But 
Typhon twined about him and gripped him in his coils, and wrestling the 
95 A. Pr. 354–62. See Moreau (1976–7), pp. 62–3.
96 LIMC, sub voce.
97 Hyg. Fab. 152.
98 See also Pindar’s powerful and colourful account in P. I.18–26.
99 Hes. Th. 855–80.
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sickle from him severed the sinews of his hands and feet, and lifting him on 
his shoulders carried him through the sea to Cilicia and deposited him on 
arrival in the Corycian cave. Likewise he put away the sinews there also, 
hidden in a bearskin, and he set to guard them the she-dragon Delphyne, 
who was a half-bestial maiden.100 
Only with Hermes’ and Aegipan’s help does the fi ght take a positive turn for 
Zeus. The two gods fi nd Zeus’s tendons and make possible a new counterat-
tack, fi nally victorious. The Library, thus, amplifi es the danger incurred by 
Zeus and shows how close the Olympian order came to actually ending.
In a classic study, Vian shows how the concept of a subversive character 
that threatens order, like a force of the past threatening the present order, 
belongs to Eastern cultures.101 The Eastern infl uence must have been clear to 
the Greek mentality. Vian explains, however, that the contact with Eastern 
elements occurred quite late in the process, and not ab origine. The Greek 
vision of the monster is thus infl uenced by exogenous factors but its origin is 
fully within Hellenic mythologems. The anguipede fi gure that characterises 
Zeus’s adversary is thus assigned a mythical function that it does not origi-
nally possess, in order to unfold the last and fi nal clash with the Olympian 
ruler.
Eastern infl uences are also revealed by the proximity of Typhoeus with 
Xerxes, a powerful tragic fi gure of otherness. His gaze is that of a dragon, 
which refl ects the ruinous hubris of barbarous nature.102 Xerxes is a monster 
that, like Typhoeus, defi es the order of the cosmos. His expedition against 
Greece is unnatural.103 It is contrary to nature’s order. Xerxes’ body becomes 
indistinguishable from the body of his army, terrifyingly multifarious:
The city-sacking army of the King has now passed over to the neighbour 
land on the other side of the water, crossing the strait of Helle, daughter 
of Athamas [i.e. the Hellespont], by means of a boat-bridge tied together 
with fl axen cables, placing a roadway, fastened with many bolts, as a yoke 
on the neck of the sea. [. . .] With the dark glance of a deadly serpent in 
his eyes, with many hands and many ships, driving a swift Syrian chariot, 
[Xerxes] leads a war-host that slays with the bow against men renowned 
for spear-fi ghting.104 
100 Apollod. I.6.3.
101 F. Vian, ‘Le mythe de Typhée et le problème de ses origines orientales’, in AA. VV. 
(1960), pp. 17–37. See also Burkert (1984) and G. Guidorizzi in Igino (2000), p. 427.
102 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), p. 54.
103 Untersteiner (1955, 2nd ed.), p. 187.
104 A. Pers. 65–86.
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The yoke on the sea testifi es to the unnaturalness of the Persian enterprise. 
To the dark army that defi es nature, nature opposes its luminous force. As 
Typheous had many heads, Xerxes has many hands and many ships. The 
inordinate and savage barbarians lack unity and cohesion. For this reason, 
they need one name – Xerxes – to keep together the multitude of otherwise 
heteroclite individualities, each of them named as to underlie their impos-
sible cohesion. The Greeks, on the contrary, are never named individually. 
They act like Greeks, they exist like Greeks. To their war paean, the Persian 
responds with a roar or a murmur, a ῥόθος which reminds once again of 
Typhoeus’s thousand voices.105 Aeschylus’s Xerxes and Typhoeus physically 
and morally resemble each other, since they embody the same destructive 
forces against the universe’s order.106
The fi ght between Typhoeus and Zeus is the battle between order and 
chaos, the neverending clash between chaos and cosmos. Aeschylus clearly 
perceives the meaning of this when he prolongs the fi ght under the walls of 
Thebes. The titanic warrior Hippomedon gives the assault to the fourth door, 
with Hyperbius in charge of its defence. Not only do they seem to be personal 
enemies, but they fi ght with the emblems of enemy deities on their shields. 
In the scout’s words:
I shuddered, I won’t deny it, to see [Hippomedon] brandish his great round 
threshing-fl oor of a shield. And it can’t have been a cheap artist who gave 
him that device on the shield, Typhon emitting dark smoke, the many-
coloured sister of fl ame, from his fi re-breathing lips; the round circle of 
the hollow-bellied shield is fl oored with coiling snakes. The man himself 
raised a great war-cry; he is possessed by Ares, and he rages for a fi ght like 
a maenad, with a fearsome look in his eye.107
And Eteocles’ response:
[. . .] a man has been chosen to face this man, Hyperbius [. . .]. And Hermes 
has brought them together appropriately: the man is an enemy of the man 
he will face, and on their shields they will bring together two antagonistic 
gods. One of them has the fi re-breathing Typhon and on Hyperbius’ shield 
resides Father Zeus, standing with his fl aming bolt in his hand. Such are 
their alliances with gods; and we are on the side of the winners, they of 
105 A. Pers. 406. Sommerstein has it as ‘a surge of Persian speech’, which neutralises Aeschy-
lus’s reference to animality and monstrosity.
106 Moreau (1985), pp. 112 and 147–50.
107 A. Th. 489–99.
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the losers, that is if Zeus is Typhon’s superior in battle. It is to be expected 
that the human opponents will fare likewise, and by the logic of Hyperbius’ 
emblem the Zeus he has on his shield should become his Saviour.108
Eteocles’ appeal to the past outcome of the fi ght between Zeus and Typoheus, 
as a warranty of his future victory, does not mitigate the sense of a specular 
confrontation that echoes the larger dimension of the war surrounding the 
city at its seven doors. Not only does Aeschylus umambiguously speak about 
the divinity of both mythical contenders, Zeus and Typhoeus, but also other 
deities are summoned around the imminent clash of the monstrous weapons: 
Ares and Dionysus with Hippomedon, Hermes and Zeus on Hyperbius’s side.
Monsters do not intervene in Zeus’s favour solely in exogenous confl icts, 
such as in the titanomachy. They are also summoned in support of Zeus when 
serious trouble within the Olympian order manifests itself, such as at the time 
of the threat posed by Hera, Poseidon and Athena’s secret plot described by 
the poet of the Iliad. Thetis offers providential help to save Zeus and thus 
legitimate his reign and his order. Without monstrosity, once again, Zeus 
would have been tied up and have succumbed to the three deities, all of them 
related to the pre-Olympian dimension. Achilles to Thetis:
Often I have heard you boasting in the halls of my father, and declaring 
that you alone among the immortals warded off loathsome destruction 
from the son of Cronos, lord of the dark clouds, on the day when the 
other Olympians were minded to put him in bonds, Hera and Poseidon 
and Pallas Athene. But you came, goddess, and freed him from his bonds, 
when you had quickly called to high Olympus him of the hundred hands, 
whom the gods call Briareus, but all men Aegaeon; for he is mightier than 
his father [sc. Poseidon]. He sat down by the side of the son of Cronos, 
exulting in his glory, and the blessed gods were seized with fear of him, 
and did not bind Zeus.109 
Besides the central role played by this myth for the Iliad, Thetis’s interven-
tion clearly reveals that divinity and the good order cannot survive without 
the active help of monstrosity. The myth has been interestingly connected 
to meteorological phenomena, and the winter’s chill overcome by the warm 
spring.110 Even more interesting, though, is the later exegesis by the Stoic Cor-
nutus and Heraclitus allegorista, who explain the myth through a cosmogonic 
108 A. Th. 504–20.
109 Il. I.396–406. 
110 Buffi ère (1956), pp. 173 ff.
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fi ght between the current order and the previous one that constantly threatens 
to resurface. With similar suggestions, both Cornutus and Heraclitus recog-
nise providence’s active intervention in support of Zeus. Heraclitus notes that 
‘Zeus’s rescue was more disgraceful to him than the conspiracy, for it was Thetis 
and Briareus who freed him from his bonds, and hopes of rescue that depend 
on such allies are disgraceful.’111 Cornutus fi nds a sophisticated interpretation 
and a providential function for Briareus:
[. . .] Thetis, disposing everything in due order, set ‘Briareos’ with his hun-
dred hands against the gods that were mentioned – perhaps because the 
exhalations of the earth are distributed everywhere, as it is through many 
hands that division into all the various forms occur. Or consider whether he 
is named ‘Briareos’ from raising up nourishment (so to speak) for the parts 
of the cosmos.112 
In both cases, Thetis’s providence acts and saves Zeus through Briareos’s 
monstrosity and his capacity to scare the other gods, including Poseidon.
Divinity itself carries with it ambiguous traits, in particular in the fi gure 
of Dionysus, the Eastern god that makes peace and merges with Apollo in 
the Hellenic spirit. Since the origin, though, Dionysus embodies ambivalence 
and contradiction, as the god of folly, which he transmits to his followers, the 
Bacchae.113
Dionysus’s ambivalence has never been forgotten. It seems, on the con-
trary, to affect his counterpart as well, namely the king of the Olympian gods. 
Aeschylus powerfully evokes the topic in The Eumenides. When Orestes and 
Apollo appeal to Zeus, the Erinyes’ chorus responds by accusing the king of 
gods himself:
On your account [sc. Apollo], Zeus sets a higher value on the death of a 
father. Yet he himself imprisoned his old father, Cronus. Isn’t your state-
ment in contradiction with that? [To the judges] I call you to witness that 
you have heard these words.114 
111 Heraclit. All. 21 ff.
112 Corn. ND 17. See also Palaeph. 19 (= Festa et al. eds. (1894–1902), p. 27) for whom 
Briareus and Cottus are only ‘Hundredarmers’ because they came from a city called 
Hundredarm, in Chaonia).
113 Untersteiner (1955, 2nd ed.), p. 90. On Dionysus’s ambivalence see mostly the clas-
sic literature: Rohde (1894), Otto (1933), Guthrie (1950), Dodds (1951) and, on this 
literature, McGinty (1978). See also Colli (2010).
114 A. Eu. 640–3. See also Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), p. 78 and passim, and E. HF 345–7 on Zeus’s 
injustice in Amphitryion’s words. On the Bacchae’s iconography see Philippart (1930).
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Interestingly, early texts speak little of Zeus’s justice and more of his prudence 
and cunning.115 The cosmos is ordered not through justice, but through force, 
and this force, once victorious, is called justice.116 It is also ordered by prom-
ises, as when Zeus summons the Olympians and builds his army by literally 
buying the gods’ support in his fi ght against Titans.117
Scholars have correctly stressed that Greek gods, and Zeus in particular, are 
subject to necessity.118 One can also see why Aeschylus’s Erinyes dare to challenge 
Zeus’s name: the necessity that rules even the gods is their necessity, which they 
summon as a universal and exceptionless principle. This is also Prometheus’s cry 
against Zeus’s κράτος.119 Nietzsche underlines that, for this reason, the problem 
of theodicy is not really a Greek problem, and the Apollonean harmony of the 
Pantheon hides the Dionysian horror of this insurmountable truth.120 Festugière 
reads this dialectic as the transformation of the old infl exible destiny, presiding 
over the Furies’ universe and based on crime and revenge, into the new and 
more human justice, based on correction, learning and the pedagogy of guilt.121 
I believe, however, that rather than a peaceful transformation, Aeschylus puts 
forward the endless and possibly unresolved confl ict between primitive forces, 
with justice not as the aim but as what is at stake.
This divine submission to necessity might be the cause of the ambiva-
lence under discussion. The Greek divinity is not miraculously omnipotent. 
Because he is submitted to necessity, he is thus the cause of everything, includ-
ing what is contradictory to him.122 Divinity bears contradiction in its own 
nature, revealing the duplicity of Apollonian and Dionysian, and the constant 
resurfacing of the dark side of their union. The contradiction also reveals the 
nature of the new order established against the old.
Causality and Monstrosity: Challenging Zeus
Causality, as discussed, is one of the ontological principles elaborated in early 
mythologems. Theogonies describe the affi rmation of a principle of causality 
115 G. S. Kirk, ‘The Structure and Aim of the Theogony’, in AA. VV. (1962), pp. 61–107.
116 On Zeus’s justice, Lloyd-Jones (1983, 2nd ed.) and, on Zeus’s despotism, Moreau (1985), 
pp. 205 ff.
117 Hes. Th. 390 ff.
118 See for example Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), pp. 73 and 78–9.
119 A. Pr. 516–9. See Untersteiner (1955, 2nd ed.), p. 418 and passim.
120 F. W. Nietzsche, ‘Die dionysische Weltanschauung’, in Nietzsche (1967–), III.2, pp. 
43–69. On a different ground, see also Gigante (1956), p. 90.
121 A. J. Festugière, ‘Réfl exions sur le problème du mal chez Eschyle et Platon’, in Festugière 
(1971), pp. 8–37. See also Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), p. 74.
122 Untersteiner (1955, 2nd ed.), p. 465 and passim.
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that at the same time explains and justifi es Being as it is, opposed to Being 
as it was or as it could have been. The concept of cause, αἰτία, has a juridi-
cal origin, meaning imputation or even indictment or retribution. The whole 
semantic area is linked to the legal idea of claiming (αἰτεῖν), of the accusation 
(αἰτιᾶσθαι) and the accused (αἴτιος). The juridical origin of the cause could 
be related to the act or action whose actor is or should be responsible for it. 
When projected on the mythological background of the philosophical and 
legal Greek culture, though, it should rather be interpreted, I believe, as the 
strenuous and laborious process of construction and interpretation of the idea 
of responsibility itself. The meaning of αἰτία is very ambiguous.123 There is no 
responsibility before the legal order is built, in the same way that there is no 
physical causality before the cosmogonic order comes into being, and there is 
no transgression before order itself can be named as such.
Philosophers eventually consider the cause as a synonym of principle 
(ἀρχή), namely that without which reality itself cannot be, or the ontological 
foundation of things themselves. Αἰτία and ἀρχή eventually go hand in hand, 
in the physical domain and beyond, to represent the causality that explains 
nature’s behaviour. Before the name itself, however, the principle already 
exists. Better, the mythologems contribute to the elaboration of the principle, 
and go through several transformations in order to become the causality that 
philosophers eventually exploit. Anaximander’s principle of universal justice is 
reminiscent of the cause’s original meaning of guilt. From the human domain, 
in particular the ethical and the legal, the concept is thus transposed onto the 
cosmic domain.
The divine principle struggles against the old order to produce the new 
one, which responds to, and reveals, a principle of causality. Elements are thus 
manipulated and composed to form new ontological realities. This is the wrong, 
or injustice, that is done to elements, or that elements reciprocally do to each 
other and that eventually fi nds a philosophical confi guration in Anaximander 
and Heraclitus. Because of a separation of elements, the cosmos’s formation 
is an ἀδικία, an offence and a damage, or an unjust violation.124 Whereas the 
Greek αἰτία preserves, through the etymology, its constitutive ambivalence, the 
translation suggests a justice that is violated or a law that is broken. However, 
no justice pre-exists the new order and no law is given before its causality is 
established by the new divinity. Attic tragedy represents this idea by the αἰτία 
θεοῦ, with the divine being at the same time cause of a success and guilty of a 
failure, as in Eteocles’ words in the Seven. As a survival of the old concept of 
123 Untersteiner (1955, 2nd ed.), p. 451.
124 Untersteiner (1972, 2nd ed.). See also Jaeger (1934–47), I, p. 220.
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the divine in the new one, of the old demonic moment into the Olympic one, 
the confl ict is inside god itself, cause of good as well as of evil.
Monstrosity is a failure, a disorder, a violation, and yet a kind of otherness 
that is threatening as much as it is constitutive. It is Being that becomes some-
thing else, and so transforms itself into what it has to be, the target or goal. 
Transgression, for example in the tragic domain, denounces the instability of 
the current metaphysical and ontological balance, laboriously reached and still 
precarious. The same transgression, however, through the many monstrous 
creatures of the mythological tradition, helps build the new order, beyond and 
against the old one.125 The ambiguity is already in Dionysus and, through him, it 
also extends to Zeus. Zeus remains dual. His justice, for example in Aeschylus, is 
both a blessing and a fault. Δίκη, justice, is double and ambiguous. Legal vocab-
ulary in mythology, Vernant and Vidal-Naquet suggest, is used not to obtain 
precision and consistency, but rather incertitude, incompleteness, incoherence 
and slippery meaning.126 Zeus τέλειος always catches the target, not because his 
act is always ethically right but, quite the opposite, because he is the cause of 
everything, of the good as much as of the bad. His justice resists the transpar-
ency of the new Logos, and this is what makes for the power and richness of the 
tragic. From the cosmogonic point of view, Zeus’s target is the union with Hera, 
the chthonic part of the divine. Only when he integrates the chthonian part, 
through that union, Zeus becomes τέλειος.
The order that emerges is certainly above Zeus himself. He would not trans-
gress it without causing the other gods’ anger, in the same way that he could 
not transgress a principle of causality. Yet in Homer, Hesiod and the tragedi-
ans, this order is precarious. Beginning with Ouranos’s violence on Gaia and 
his castration by Chronos, the affi rmation and maintenance of order, through 
long and painful confl icts, demand the use of violence.127 Zeus’s justice is noth-
ing more (and nothing less) than Zeus’s order and, as such, the outcome of a 
confl ict among forces: a confl ict that Zeus could not win without the help of 
monstrous creatures.128
Δίκη is fi rst and foremost what it has to be, with the normative or rather 
imperative meaning being prominent. For the Greeks, it progressively becomes 
more and more important to defi ne the essence of what is human and defi ne 
themselves as humans.129 As Allan suggests, following Benveniste, ‘order’ 
125 See Moreau (2006), pp. 188 ff.
126 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1972), p. 31. See also Stanford (1939).
127 See Girard (1972).
128 See Allan (2006), p. 8, 14 and passim.
129 Renehan (1992).
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would be a better translation for δίκη than justice, so as to leave behind the 
ethical sense that is foreign to its origin and inception in Greek thought.130 
Following Benveniste’s suggestion, thus, it is not the moral transgression but 
rather the ontological violation that better represents the jolts and the bumps, 
the confl icts and the resistances on the precarious pattern toward order and 
stability. Monstrosity is the ontological violation that makes this progress 
uncertain and constitutively precarious. It is also, however, the force that 
moves things forward towards that same progress.
As we have seen above, this ambivalence is omnipresent in early Greek 
culture. The order of Zeus is painfully reached through force and cunning, 
using several tools, including monstrosity, to achieve the goal. Possibly for this 
reason, such an order remains precarious and constantly challenged in mytho-
logical and tragic material. Several monstrous fi gures attack and destabilise 
cosmic order, revealing the precarity on which it is grounded.
One of the most serious attempts on Zeus’s authority is made by 
Prometheus. Son of Japetus and Klymene, Prometheus is a titan of the sec-
ond generation in Hesiod’s Theogony. Although his role in the titanomachy 
is unknown, he survives the cataclysmal event and fi nds himself next to Zeus 
once the Olympian order is established. Instead of patiently serving Zeus, as 
he is supposed to, Prometheus twice betrays the king of gods, fi rst deceiving 
him in the episode of the distribution of meat and bones, and then with the 
theft of fi re, which he brings back to men who had been deprived of it by 
Zeus.131 As a result, Zeus infl icts the famous punishment on Prometheus: he is 
chained to a column, where an eagle devours his liver, which grows again each 
night, rendering the painful punishment endless. Heracles eventually kills the 
eagle and, according to some readings, sets Prometheus free.
The clash that follows Prometheus’s treacherous attempt does not reach 
the magnitude of the earlier confl icts of the theomachy. It testifi es, however, 
to the fact that the struggle is not over for the king of the Olympians. His 
order is not seriously threatened, yet it is challenged, and this is enough to 
raise questions about the solidity of his victory and of the values that he has 
been trying to establish. Furthermore, if Prometheus’s attitude is not entirely 
clear in Hesiod’s account, in which the titan appears as a cheater and a thief, 
a whole different picture emerges from Aeschylus’s version of the myth, or at 
least from what has survived of a trilogy whose history, date and arrangement 
are far from clear to scholars.
130 Renehan (1992), pp. 10–11. See Benveniste (1969), II, p. 97 ff. See also Jones (1956), 
Gagarin (1973 and 1974), D’Agostino (1979) and Severino (2015).
131 Hes. Th. 507 ff.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   38 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 T H E M Y T H A N D T H E L O G O S 39
To begin with, as Reinhardt points out, Prometheus is not the son, but the 
brother of the titans in Aeschylus.132 He is the brother of the monsters who 
have shaken the very foundations of the Olympian regime and whose defeat 
is still recent. The titans do not forget him in Cratinus’ comedy The Gods of 
Wealth: after Zeus is dethroned by the people, the titans set Prometheus, by 
now weakened, free from his bonds.133
Prometheus is the worthy brother of Gaia, mother of archetypical mon-
strosities. He is thus close to Typhoeus, for whom he feels pity and whose 
struggle he understands, since the anguipede villain, in Prometheus’s words, 
intended to overthrow the autocracy of Zeus (Διὸς τυραννίς) by force.134 The 
term τύραννος initially designates nothing more than the holder of power, the 
one that embodies the absolute authority, conceived on the model of Eastern 
kingdoms. In this sense, it has a neutral sense and does not necessarily carry 
with it the negative meaning of ‘tyrant’ that involves an ethical judgement on 
the nature or even the legitimacy of power.135
In the Prometheus, however, Zeus does not establish his tyranny by replac-
ing a legal void. He crushes the old authority and usurps power. He punishes 
Prometheus because he dares to disclose the possibility of an alternative order. 
Zeus is indeed an autocratic ruler, who does not recognise any other law besides 
his own. God acts ἀθέτως or ἀθέσμως, lawlessly and despotically, and it is pre-
cisely this attitude that the titan denounces without ambiguity.
Prometheus is also close to the primeval forces that resist the establish-
ment of Zeus’s reign.136 The titanomachy that Aeschylus refers to, through 
Prometheus’s voice (195 ff.), was probably quite different from Hesiod’s. 
Aeschylus knows an alternative background story for the clash between 
Zeus and Prometheus, one that could have further reinforced the sympa-
thetic attitude toward the punished titan.
Prometheus’s story reveals once again the confl ict between the old and 
new worlds, which both have their legitimacy and values to oppose to each 
other.137 As underlined above, dissension and confl ict are within the divine 
itself. The whole trilogy probably showed a movement of Zeus, the victorious 
god, toward pardon and reconciliation, choosing wisdom and moderation over 
132 Reinhardt (1949). See also Solmsen (1949), ch. 2.
133 PCG IV, fr. 171–9.
134 A. Pr. 350–76.
135 See Berve (1967), Mossé (1969) and Di Benedetto (1978), who at least sees a negative 
meaning in A. Pr. 224–5.
136 Moreau (1985), passim.
137 Untersteiner (1955, 2nd ed.).
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force and violence.138 The Prometheus Bound itself, however, offers the clear 
picture of an arrogant monarch who punishes a subjugated god whose motiva-
tions appear not only understandable, but also reasonable. If one considers the 
lost material of the trilogy, it might be true that, accompanied by κράτος and 
βία, Zeus moved away from the latter toward the former in order to establish, 
on a more compassionate and reasonable basis, the new δίκη, the Olympian 
legality. The opposite, however, can also be claimed, to avoid watering down 
Aeschylus’s powerful accusation of the present order: even if moral and com-
passionate, the Zeus of the lost plays was irredeemably stained by the harsh 
image explicitly presented in the Prometheus Bound.
Κράτος and βία, upon which Zeus’s power ultimately rests, make a theatri-
cal entrance on stage, and are presented as monstrous fi gures themselves.139 
Their exterior aspects are frightening, and Hephaestus, who receives harsh 
and hateful orders from Power, underlines the similitude between the latter’s 
words and his appearance. Zeus’s violence can be εὐμενής, benevolent and 
directed toward the realisation of the good end, the true justice. Nonethe-
less, it remains βία and, as such, struggles with the image of a compassionate 
god. Violence is not in the hands of Zeus because it is just, but it is made just 
because it is exercised by Zeus, and by nobody else.140
The pre-Hellenic god Prometheus is often accompanied by Hephaestus, 
who also comes from the East.141 Hephaestus is monstrous in his own way and so 
is his progeny: he is the father of the mortal Palaimonius, one of the Argonauts, 
who is also lame, and of the monstrous Erichthonius or Erechtheus, sprung from 
the earth after Hephaestus’s semen was spread on Gaia by Athena. Athenians 
feel themselves to be sons of the earth-born Erechtheus, and thus generated by 
the lame god and Gaia.142 Hephaestus is far from happy to obey Zeus’s orders in 
the Prometheus Bound, and feels pain for the titan’s harsh destiny.143
The twisted creatures are united by their antipathy for the absolute sov-
ereign of the universe. Aeschylus’s tragic plot intends to challenge the undis-
puted rule of the king of gods. To do so, it provides Prometheus with a strong 
weapon. Neither force nor violence anymore, but rather a fate which is older 
and mightier than Zeus himself. This fate has been revealed to Prometheus by 
138 See P. Mazon, in Eschyle (1920–5) and Solmsen (1949), p. 147 and passim.
139 Solmsen (1949), p. 134. Βία is often represented as a monstrous Erinys. See the winged 
fi gure in LIMC, sub voce.
140 See contra Gigante (1956), pp. 196–201. On violence and justice in early Greek thought 
see also Agamben (1995).
141 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.).
142 Loraux (1996). 
143 A. Pr. 12–81.
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Themis, here identifi ed with Gaia herself: the mother of monsters reveals the 
identity of the female who is destined to bear a son stronger than his father 
and with whom, thus, Zeus cannot mate. Prometheus reveals his knowledge 
of the secret, without unveiling its content, notwithstanding the threat of 
harsher punishment. The prophecy is a weapon that keeps Zeus under threat 
and contributes to maintain the precarity of his order. Zeus can chain the 
last of the titans but is himself chained by his fate and by the prophecy: the 
titan resists and, with his knowledge and his undaunted character, opposes 
the unconditioned and unbridled rule of the cosmos’s tyrant.144
The Homeric Hymns remind us that Zeus takes power by subjugating 
feminine divinities.145 Several fi gures of the ancient myths associate mon-
strosity and femininity, as well as the establishment of the Olympian order 
with their defeat. As elsewhere, however, feminine monstrosity has a status 
and a function which establishes it as a constitutive force that is indispens-
able to the new order.
The Erinyes, for example, embody a feature of justice and law that reveals 
the problematic character of the transition from the old and pre-Hellenic val-
ues to the new Olympian world. The Ἐρινύεσ are born from the drops of 
blood spilled by Cronos’s castration of Ouranos. They are among the oldest 
divinities. Initially indeterminate, they progressively become three in number: 
Megaera, Tisiphone and Alecto.146 With their horrible aspect, they resist the 
instauration of the gods of the younger generation. They are often represented 
as winged demons, with snakes on their heads, holding torches or whips in 
their hands.147 Aeschylus powerfully conveys the image of this feminine mon-
strosity in the opening of the Eumenides:
[. . .] an extraordinary band of women, asleep, sitting in chairs – no, I 
won’t call them women, but Gorgons; but then I can’t liken their form to 
that of Gorgons either. I did once see before now, in a painting, a female 
creature robbing Phineus of his dinner; these ones, though, it is plain 
to see, don’t have wings, and they’re black and utterly nauseating. They 
are pumping out snores that one doesn’t dare come near, and dripping a 
loathsome drip from their eyes. And their attire is one that it’s not proper 
144 On the meaning of Prometheus’s struggle see also the classic work of Nestle (1934), and 
Trousson (1964).
145 See h.Cer. and h.Ven. as well as Allen (2006), p. 29 and passim.
146 Verg, Aen. VI.570–2 and VII.325–6, Apollod. I.1.4.
147 See Sancassano (1997) and, on the snake, Küster (1913). Patera (2015) studies other 
feminine fi gures such as Lamia, Mormo, Empousa and Gello.
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to bring either before the images of the gods or under the roofs of men. 
I have never seen the tribe to which this company belongs, nor do I know 
what country boasts that it has reared this race without harm to itself and 
does not regret the labour of doing so.148 
The Erinyes are creatures of the night and of the earth, and emerge from the 
underworld’s darkness to avenge the victims of crimes, and especially of con-
sanguineous homicides, by torturing their victims and making them descend 
into a painful madness. Demons usually lack a genealogy, while the Erinyes 
have one, and a noble one: they are noble and monstrous. This contributes to 
increase the violent force of their tragic role.149
Whereas the older generations of gods are progressively diminished and 
dispossessed by the Olympians, the Erinyes are able to maintain, thanks to 
their nature, a strong degree of autonomy and independence from the newer 
generations and from Zeus himself. Their force is the earth’s force in which 
they live and that once again reveals all its ambivalence as a generator of 
monstrous but also of powerful creatures, mother of death but also of life.150 
Like the Moirai, the Erinyes know only their own laws, and they are subject 
to them alone. To the Moirai they offer their faculties, and they execute their 
will.151 Even more interestingly, Zeus and the Olympians are also subject to 
them and cannot derogate their implacable decrees. A monstrous divinity, 
thus, resurfaces from the ancient mythological strata and resists the legality of 
the new beautiful and harmonious order created by Zeus.
The Erinyes, also called Furies, are primitive forces, often compared to 
the Keres, who devastate everything they touch, bringing war and death.152 
Hesiod names them the Κῆρες Ἐρινύες, νηλεόποινος or ruthless avengers.153 
The animal or savage side enters into the picture and overthrows values, roles 
and hierarchies. The nightmarish and infernal hunt of Orestes depicts a hero 
reduced to a beast, hunted and pursued by the monstrous creatures. Erinyes 
manage retribution. They incite vengeance, and then punish for the same 
acts that they have inspired, in an endless spiral. Every sign of a divine or 
benevolent order has disappeared from this gloomy picture, in which the only 
implacable law is the law of monstrous revenge.154
148 A. Eu. 46–59. See Rohde (1894), Krappe (1932), J. Toutain, ‘L’évolution de la conception 
des Erinyes dans le mythe d’Oreste d’Eschyle à Euripide’, in AA. VV. (1936), I, pp. 449–53, 
Brown (1983), Junge (1983), Heubeck (1986) and Zerhoch (2015).
149 Moreau (1985), p. 159 ff.
150 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), pp. 120–1.
151 Dodds (1951), pp. 6–8.
152 Reinhardt (1949), pp. 154 ff.
153 Hes. Th. 1055 and 217.
154 Moreau (1985), p. 83 ff. See also p. 101 ff. and Di Benedetto (1978), pp. 230–87.
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Aeschylus is the fi rst playwright who brings monstrous masks onto the 
stage. The Erinyes are the natural candidates for the introduction of this pro-
digious scenical innovation. The apparition of the gruesome chorus of the 
Erinyes, the tradition reports, is so shocking that causes audience members to 
faint and pregnant women to miscarry.155
The infl exibility of the Erinyes’ punishing nature has been related to the 
cosmic dimension. In this sense, the monstrous creatures represent the physi-
cal necessity that characterises natural processes and is again connected to 
the Moirai and the most ancient layer of the concept of fate.156 As fate allo-
cates to everyone what is due, Erinyes administer the punishment that comes 
with revenge. The monstrous creatures, thus, survive in the early cosmogonic 
refl ections, for example in Heraclitus, for whom they become the keeper of 
cosmic order, and thus a synonym of φύσις itself: ‘The Sun will not transgress 
his bounds, else the Erinyes, ministers of Justice, will fi nd him out.’157
The Erinyes are Δίκη’s ministers, and testify to the transposition of the 
human concept of justice into the physical universe. Interestingly, the justice 
that Heraclitus mentions is on the threshold between the pre-Hellenic and 
the Olympian worlds. Far from representing the complete achievement of this 
process, the Erinyes rather represent the inextinguishable nature of the primi-
tive clash, and bring the confl ict into the new order and at the heart of its legal 
and cosmic structure. Φύσις can be grasped here in all its ambiguity, just like 
the mythical Earth, symbol of fertility but also of death. In the same way the 
wind, with which the Erinyes are associated, is both a vital element that helps 
life and a destructive element that brings death and havoc.
Justice and the Erinyes are often invoked together, making the ambivalence 
come to light.158 The nature of the tragic contributes to blur the boundaries, 
since the monstrous and the divine intertwine in the hard path that leads from 
revenge as the only form of recognised retribution to its distinction from, and 
opposition to, justice. Justice cannot but make use of the monstrous female char-
acters for the retribution without which both cosmic and natural order would 
collapse. Pohlenz suggests that Plato’s mentality, for which the divine cannot be 
the origin of evil, is already at work in the Erinyes’ development.159 The Erinyes’ 
vengeance is not only for specifi c violations against men but also, and more 
importantly, for the general wrong made by men against the divine sphere.160 
155 TrGF III.A1 30–2. See also Frontisi-Ducroux (1995), p. 97.
156 Magris (1984). p. 16 ff.
157 Vorsokr. 22 B 94 (= LM [9] HER. D89c = Plu. De exilio 604 A). See also Untersteiner 
(1972, 2nd ed.), pp. 195 ff. and Gagarin (1974).
158 See e.g. S. El. 480, Ant. 1075, E. Med. 1389. See aldo Di Benedetto (1978), pp. 253–9.
159 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), p. 125.
160 Reinhardt (1933), passim.
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Such wrong is a monstrosity, to which the divine opposes another monstrosity, 
that of the avenging Furies.
Inevitably, thus, this feature of divine justice also appears as a dissension 
or a tension within the divine itself. The Erinyes reveal the fl uid status of 
Justice’s being, its lack of univocity that dramatically anticipates the δισσοὶ 
λόγοι, the contrasting discourses of the Sophists.161 Antithesis, which appears 
fi rst in tragedy and then in philosophy, dominates the reasoning. Orestes’ for-
mulation in the Coephore is the clearest and most impressive: ‘War-god shall 
encounter War-god, Right shall encounter right (Ἄρης Ἄρει ξυμβαλεῖ, Δίκᾳ 
Δίκα).’162 As Untersteiner claims, Aeschylus’s great and tragic discovery is 
that in order to achieve justice, justice itself must be violated.163 I would add 
that, in order to overcome monstrosity, monstrosity itself must be enrolled. 
The Olympian god and the demonic numen go hand in hand, but so do the 
divine and the monstrous, whose function is precisely to restore order and yet 
constantly reopen the battle for it, with aleatory and uncertain results.
The Oresteia attempts a composition of the confl ict between the ancient and 
the new concept of retribution through the invention of the Areopagus and the 
transformation of the Erinyes into Eumenides, or benevolent ones.164 A compo-
sition, however, that is not a solution, because the ancient forces of revenge and 
retaliation are not overcome but rather integrated within the new law. Several 
elements confi rm this reading. Firstly, the new law of the Areopagus is limited to 
the city.165 Outside of the city’s walls, the Erinyes continue to operate. The fear 
161 See Untersteiner (1949) and Cassin (1995).
162 A. Ch. 461.
163 Untersteiner (1972, 2nd ed.), p. 289 and passim, especially p. 521 ff. Mario Untersteiner’s 
point about Greek thought’s ambivalence about embracing every aspect of the real is 
particularly relevant for this study. Untersteiner’s reading, especially in the late 30s and 
early 40s when he clashes with and is practically ostracised by the Fascist government, 
is deeply infl uenced by his personal intellectual movement toward a strong laicism as a 
methodology with which to approach the classics. This approach shapes his conviction 
that, from its inception to the classical age, Greek thought reveals the effort of the logos 
to embrace even those aspects of human experience that appear irrational and diffi cult 
to grasp through reason. Although this thesis might appear reductive today, I believe 
that Untersteiner’s approach still offers an invaluable contribution to the reading of the 
monstrous I am trying to develop. In particular, his notion of the tragic as revealing the 
irreconcilable contrast between reason and that which appears absurd, contradictory and 
irrational offers an interesting characterisation of the ambiguous role of the monstrous in 
early Greek thought. On Untersteiner’s intellectual profi le, see Battegazzore and Decleva 
Caizzi a cura di (1989). Moreau (1985) reads Aeschylus’s extant fragments as a confi rma-
tion that the same scheme is repeated in the lost works. On the origin and meaning of the 
δισσοὶ λόγοι, see Cassin (1995).
164 P. Mazon, Introduction, in Eschyle (1920–5).
165 See Solmsen (1949), p. 202, Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1972), pp. 156–8, Lloyd-Jones 
(1989).
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of them, moreover, is not obliterated. It is rather embodied by the feelings that 
law itself must inspire. In Athena’s words:
Neither anarchy nor tyranny – this I counsel my burghers to maintain 
and hold in reverence, nor quite to banish fear from out the city. For who 
among mortal men is righteous that hath no fear of aught? Stand then 
in just awe of such majesty and ye shall possess a bulwark to safeguard 
your country and your government, such as none of mankind hath either 
among the Scythians or in Pelops’ realm.166 
Fear, or even terror (δεινόν), is useful to hold the citizens’ hearths. The good 
fear of the laws might not be the same as the old fear of the Furies. Yet it is the 
same feeling that must help prevent, for example, disasters like the civil war. 
The Erinyes abandon their complete autonomy and independence vis-à-vis 
the law. Yet they do so by being integrated into the law.167 The monster is not 
expelled by the norm but rather conquers it and fi nds itself at its heart. It is 
precisely the monstrous πρόσωπον of the Erinyes that must keep, according to 
Athena, the city in awe: ‘From these fearsome faces I see great benefi t coming 
to these citizens.’168
It is not surprising, moreover, that Euripides develops a testimony of 
Pherekydes of Athens in an interesting way.169 The tragic element, for Eurip-
ides, is not dialectically sublimated or overcome in any way. In Iphigenia in 
Tauris, the tension within the divine is brought to a new stage, and within 
the multiple body of the Furies itself. Only some of them, Euripides imag-
ines, follow Athena’s decrees, while others do not accept the outcome and 
the metamorphosis imposed upon them and continue to pursue Orestes. His 
fearful words give a sense of the abominable nature of the monstrous, and 
now also recalcitrant, goddesses:
They which consented to the judgement, chose nigh the tribunal for them-
selves a shrine: but of the Erinyes some consented not, and hounded me 
with homeless chasing eye, until, to Phoebus’ hallowed soil returned, fast-
ing before his shrine I cast me down, and swore to snap my life-thread, 
dying there, except Apollo saved me, who destroyed.170 
Reinhardt points out that the transformation of Erinyes into Eumenides is 
everything but natural. Their opposition is complete and only a real ‘miracle’ 
166 A. Eu. 696–703. On this passage see Reinhardt (1949). 
167 Following Axelos (1962), Moreau (1985), p. 290 ff. reads once again a convergence 
between this movement and the dialectic philosophy of Heraclitus. 
168 A. Eu. 990–1.
169 See Pherecyd. in FGH.
170 E. IT 969–75.
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performed by Athena can accomplish it. Not without irony, Reinhardt also 
notes that the metamorphosis accompanies a judgement that appears as a 
masterpiece of partiality and injustice. Like Zeus’s acts in the previous estab-
lishment of the cosmic order, Athena’s decision is built solely on her authority 
and does not have any other force than force itself.171
The Erinyes do not have a father and are on the mother’s, Clytemnestra’s, 
side. They come to clash with Apollo, who represents the father’s side and 
Olympian justice, administered by Athena, the motherless goddess.172 The 
relevance of the feminine character of monstrosity has been underlined, espe-
cially in the Oresteia. Only female monsters could have such an ambivalent 
power in the mythologems accounting for the birth of justice. They have this 
role, though, beyond the birth of Δίκη. In Greek mythology, and in tragedy in 
particular, femininity embodies monstrosity in several characters, both collec-
tive and individual.173
Amazons are of course the fi rst characters that come to mind in this 
respect. Women warriors who defy all schemes and norms of the gendered divi-
sion of labour, they enjoy a large success in both literature and art. Amazons 
are located in an indefi nite East and they are assimilated to eastern barbarians, 
until the celebration of the victory of Marathon against the Persians, on the 
West metopes of the Parthenon. Although they represent fi rst and foremost 
the victims of great enterprises of mythical warriors – Heracles, Achilles and 
Theseus – Amazons develop distinct features that make them rich characters in 
Greek mythology.174 According to the epic formula, the Amazon is ἀντιάνειρα, 
a match for man, equal to but also different from him. Her female body con-
tains a male θυμός, or ardour.175 When Palaephatus proceeds to rationalise the 
myth of the Amazons, his approach is simple: as women, they could not con-
stitute an army. Such an army has never existed; the so-called amazons were 
only barbarian men wearing women’s clothes that reached their feet. Excellent 
warriors, to be sure, but men.176
Their monstrous otherness is more metaphorical than real. Like Medusa, 
women are often represented frontally, so as to simultaneously display their 
171 Reinhardt (1949), passim. See in particular A. Eu. 490 ff. Here and infra, Reinhardt’s 
position should be read keeping in mind both his connection with Martin Heidegger and 
Heidegger’s relationship to Carl Schmitt.
172 Moreau (1985), p. 267 ff. More recently, Zeitlin (1996) and McClure (1999), pp. 105–11. 
See also Bachofen (1861) and Thomson (1941).
173 See Morgan (1984), pp. 187 ff.
174 See DuBois (1982), Blok (1995) and Mayor (2014).
175 Mayor (2014), passim. See LM, Glossary, sub voce.
176 Palaeph. 32 (= Festa et al. eds. (1894–1902), pp. 49–50).
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grotesque fragility and their closeness to barbarians and monsters, traditionally 
represented in the same way.177 Like barbarians and monsters, though, women 
also embody a threat, especially through their collective aggressiveness. 
Amazons’ otherness speaks less of their appearance than of their customs, 
which do not refl ect fragility but, on the contrary, show their fi erce value on the 
battlefi eld. They do not have any physical difference from other women besides 
their weapons and clothing, both variously depicted in a more or less barbarian 
fashion across the centuries. Blok underlines that their hybrid nature, differ-
ently from other kinds of hybridity such as that of the centaur, the hermaphro-
dite or even the Chimera, is not refl ected in their feminine body.178
From the artists’ interest in the beauty of the feminine body also comes one 
of the features that contributes to the Amazons’ monstrous heritage, namely 
the breast’s ablation. The idea, which was never a traditional mythologem, 
comes possibly from the depiction of the Amazons on the Parthenon frieze, 
in which the sculptor chose to extend and apply the pre-existing motif of the 
uncovered breast in order to stress the violence of the combat and the excite-
ment of the action.179 Amazons’ monstrous or barbarian character remains 
tangential. Greeks perceive Amazons to be far enough away from them to 
represent them as associated with people of colour.180 Yet they are hardly dis-
tinguishable from the Greek warriors against whom they fi ght, often with hop-
lite armor and in hoplite formation. They often help a wounded comrade, or 
carry the body of a dead companion. In a word, they are far from the image of 
savage warriors and refl ect another kind of civilisation, the otherness in which 
a female world was thought about, and that clashes with the male supremacy 
and normality of the Greek world.
Amazons’ monstrosity is mainly metaphorical. However, the echo of the 
otherness coming from their anomalous sexual status can be heard in sev-
eral other prominent examples of monstrosity, both collective, such as the 
Danaids, the Lemnian women and the Bacchae, and individual, such as 
Clytemnestra, Medea and Pandora.
The Danaids enter the scene, in Aeschylus’s Suppliants, dressed in barbar-
ian fashion. The contrast is immediately visible between the mild appearance 
that they want to give of themselves, and their threatening and impudent 
masks. Their dance, performed to implore the gods, is vehement and violent; 
they tear their dresses apart without masking their savage nature. Nor do 
177 Frontisi-Ducroux (1995), p. 248.
178 Blok (1995), p. 277.
179 See LIMC, sub voce. See also Delcourt (1957).
180 LIMC, sub voce, cat. 650 and 651.
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their words hide their nature. With their father Danaus, the Danaids seek 
refuge and protection in Argos from their cousins, sons of Aegyptus. They 
feel horror not only at the forced marriage, but also at men and the idea 
of belonging to one.181 In short, they rebel against the order of nature and 
make themselves monstrous against customs and male authority. The king 
of Argos himself, Pelasgus, struggles to comprehend the fi fty maidens among 
the civilised stock:
What you say, strangers, is unbelievable for me to hear, that this group of 
yours is of Argive descent. You bear more resemblance to the women of 
Lybia – certainly not to those of this country. The Nile, too, might nur-
ture such a crop; and a similar stamp is struck upon the dies of Cyprian 
womanhood by male artifi cers. I hear, too, that there are nomad women 
in India, near neighbours to the Ethiopians, who saddle their way across 
country on camels that run like horses; and then the man-shunning, 
meat-eating Amazons – if you were equipped with bows, I’d be very 
inclined to guess that you were them.182 
The Danaids appeal to civilisation, and yet their appearance brings them 
closer to the monstrous and mythical people that live at the edge of the earth 
and beyond the boundaries of civilisation. This female collective body repre-
sents the ancient order that resists the new Olympian religion. Κράτος against 
κράτος, they resist a different order through their hate for the other sex.183 
‘Unwedded and unsubdued’, they want to escape the yoke of men.184 The ten-
sion implicit in the tragic clash emerges through their monstrosity, intended 
not only as a barbarous appearance but also as a savage stance and resistance 
to what has to become natural and normal according to the new order.185 
The Danaids are eventually married to their cousins but, with their father’s 
help, they accomplish a bloody vengeance by killing all their husbands. All but 
one, since Hypermnestra spares her husband Lynceus, because he did not lack 
respect for her. Once again monstrosity is divided in itself and ambiguously 
presented in the tragic material.
Because of their nature, and most of all due to their collective murder, the 
Danaids are often compared to the Lemnian women. Aphrodite (or Medea, 
according to a different version) curses the women of the island of Lemnos by 
affl icting them with a bad smell, because of which they are abandoned by their 
husbands. The women organise themselves and take revenge by killing their 
181 A. Supp. 9–11. See P. Mazon, Introduction, in Eschyle (1920–5), pp. 7–8.
182 A. Supp. 277–88.
183 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1972), pp. 31–2.
184 A. Supp. 141–4.
185 Untersteiner (1955, 2nd ed.), p. 142 and passim.
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husbands and taking power on the island.186 As in the myth of the Danaids, 
only one of them, Hypsipyle, spares one male, her father and king of the island, 
Thoas. The Lemnian deed is eventually remembered as the crime of all crimes, 
generating a powerful mythographic tradition.187 Once again, women become 
monsters by revolting against male power and taking the place of men.188
A similar picture resurfaces in Euripides’ Bacchae, in which women embody 
once again the old Dionysian world that resists the new religious order. The 
collective body of women appears to repudiate humanity itself, against the 
Apollonean sense of order and measure.189 Pentheus, king of Thebes, intends 
to block and control this collective identity, bringing the ecstatic bodies back 
to reason. The women, however, claim in a simple way a different knowl-
edge, not necessarily based on reason and yet bringing them toward a kind 
of wisdom and harmony, both with nature and among them.190 Because of 
Pentheus’s attitude and claim of superiority, the maenads’s response becomes 
aggressive. With fi re and snakes in their hair, the Bacchae show their savage 
faces and respond violently to the violence that is prepared for them. They 
become a real prodigy, τὸ δεινὸν, and with hundred hands they fi ght back and 
bring an atrocious death to Pentheus:
They put their countless hands to the fi r tree and pulled it out of the earth. 
Pentheus from his high perch fell to the ground with many a scream and 
moan: he knew that his end was near.191 
Like a hundred-armed creature, the god-possessed women kill as a portentous 
multitude. In another atrocious scene, the countless hands of the feminine 
monster emerge again, in the darkness of Hecuba’s tent. Hecuba, the blessed 
woman, becomes inhuman, and unleashes the multifarious monstrosity of her 
women against Polymestor and his sons, to avenge the killing of her son Poly-
dorus. Blinded after the killing of the children, Polymestor himself relates the 
monstrous attack:
I sat in the middle of a couch, my legs bent in repose. Many of the daughters 
of Troy sat near me as if I were their friend, some on the left, others on the 
186 Dumézil (1924), Martin (1987). See also Jackson (1995) for Myrsilys of Methymna’s 
exploitation of the story.
187 In modern times, for example, Bachofen (1861) reads the Lemnian myth in the frame-
work of his monumental reconstruction of Gynecocracy.
188 Moreau (1985), pp. 190–1. N. Loraux, ‘Aristophane, les femmes d’Athènes et le théâtre’, 
in AA. VV. (1993), pp. 203–53, draws an interesting parallel between the Lemnians and 
Aristophanes’ rebel women, but interestingly stresses also the differences among them.
189 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), p. 25.
190 E. Ba. 395 and 685 ff.
191 E. Ba. 1109–13.
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right, and praised the weaving of Edonian hands, examining my clothing 
against the light. Others looked at my two Thracian javelins and stripped 
me of this equipment. All those who were mothers admired my children and 
dandled them in their arms, passing them from one pair of hands to another 
so that they would be separated from their father. Then after such peaceful 
talk – you can’t imagine – all of a sudden from somewhere in their clothing 
they produced swords and stabbed the children, while others, seizing me like 
a captured enemy, held my arms and legs. I wanted to rescue my children, 
but if I attempted to lift my face, they held me by the hair, and if I tried to 
move my hands, unhappy man that I was, I could do nothing because of the 
throng of women. Then as their crowning blow, woe greater than woe, they 
did a terrible thing: they took brooches and stabbed the pupils of my poor 
eyes and made them run with blood. Then they fl ed this way and that in the 
tent. [. . .] neither sea nor land breeds any creature like them.192
Feminine monstrosity reaches the acme of horror in the Bacchae and in Hecuba. 
With the image of a collective female body, either possessed by Dionysus or 
acting for a just vengeance, Euripides enriches the tradition of feminine mon-
strosity. This monstrosity, however, is also explored, and perhaps with more 
complexity, through individual mythical and tragic characters.
Several individual female characters present the traits of monstrosity in 
Greek tragedy. It is not always a physical deformity, nor is it merely a moral or 
metaphorical monstrosity. In tragedy, individual women often challenge the 
ethical roles and expected behaviours or redefi ne the boundaries of normal-
ity and abnormality so as to build the complex structure of tragic confl icts, 
between humans and gods as well as among humans themselves. Pohlenz 
argues that feminine psychology is one of the great discoveries of tragic the-
atre and, in particular, of Euripides. The feminine instincts were traditionally 
relegated to the private sphere but, with Euripides, they violently cross the 
boundary and take centre stage.193
Chained up so as to be conducted in front of Creon, Antigone is called by 
the chorus a fearful prodigy (δαιμόνιον τέρας).194 This prodigy translates the 
struggle between two humans – the man Creon and the woman Antigone – 
into the opposition between two incommensurable spheres, the divine justice 
of Zeus and δίκη, and the human justice of Creon, which now appears as 
ὕβρις. The ambivalence underlined by Heidegger in one of the most famous 
commentaries of this clash appears to give a cosmic meaning to the monstrous 
192 E. Hec. 1151–81.
193 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), pp. 248–9.
194 S. Ant. 376.
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and prodigious nature of the events: there are many fearful and wonderful 
things, but nothing more strangely wonderful than man (πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ 
κοὐδὲν ανθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει).195 The prodigious act of Antigone has 
transformed Creon’s stubbornness into something monstrous; it has brought 
into full light its character, limited, falsifi ed, and alienated from itself.196
Among the female characters who exhibit the most acute features of mon-
strosity there is certainly Clytemnestra. She is another fi gure of retaliation, 
who plunges into the deepest darkness of inhumanity to seek revenge against 
her husband Agamemnon, for the immolation of their daughter Iphigenia. 
In Aeschylus’s hands, Clytemnestra becomes a demon in human shape that 
Cassandra depicts as a monster:
[Agamemnon] does not know what kind of bite comes after the fawning 
tongue of that hateful bitch and the cheerful inclination of her ear. Such 
is the audacity of this female who murders a male; she is – what loathsome 
beast’s name can I call her by, to hit the mark? – an Amphisbaena, or 
some Scylla dwelling among the rocks, the bane of sailors, a raging, hellish 
mother, breathing out truceless war against her nearest and dearest. What 
a cry of triumph she raised, as if an enemy had been routed in battle, this 
woman who will stop at nothing! – though she pretends to be delighted at 
his safe return.197 
Rebel female, Clytemnestra fi ghts back against male power with cunning and 
duplicity. Comparing her to mythological creatures notoriously famous for 
their duplicity, Aeschylus invites Clytemnestra to join the monstrous stock 
and she gladly accepts the invitation. Underlying even further the ambiv-
alence of her monstrosity, so as to seal her tragic nobility, Euripides makes 
her unrecognisable vis-à-vis her previous evilness in Iphigenia in Aulis. The 
monster is now a compassionate mother and a devout spouse, who certainly 
does not imagine what she will have to undertake to re-establish her humanity 
against Agamemnon’s violation.
An even more striking and monstrous revenge, because self-destructive as 
much as destructive of the guilty enemy, is Medea’s. Woman and barbarian, 
Medea has twice the characteristics to be the outsider that destroys Greek 
values. However, it is not like a less-than-human monster, or as an animal, 
195 S. Ant. 332–3. See M. Heidegger. Die Bedeutung des δεινόν. (Erläuterung des Anfangs des 
Chorliedes), in Hölderlins Hymne “Der Ister”, in Heidegger (1975–), LIII, pp. 74–8.
196 Reinhardt (1933), pp. 75–105, but see also Paduano (1975) on Reinhardt’s Sophocles 
and, in particular, on the Hegelian infl uence on his interpretation of the Antigone.
197 A. A. 1228–39.
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that she strikes her enemy, Jason. Reason never abandons her, terrible and 
effi cacious until the conclusion that tradition has transmitted to us in many 
different forms. She is a monster, fi rst and foremost, because fearful and 
dangerous.198 Like Hecuba and Clytemnestra, the blessed woman becomes 
bloodthirsty199 and, because of her origin and customs, she does not hesitate 
to invoke Hecate and the obscure forces of evil for help, and to support her 
vengeance. Here monstrosity comes forward, since Medea’s is a terrible act 
(τὸ δεινόν).200
Euripides’ Medea openly acknowledges the feminine aspects upon which 
she builds her vengeance. She calls the Corinthian women for solidarity, for ‘of 
all creatures that have breath and sensation, we women are the most unfor-
tunate’.201 Yet a proud awareness of her status is thrown against the pale argu-
ments of men, who ‘say that we live a life free from danger at home while 
they fi ght with the spear. How wrong they are! I would rather stand three 
times with a shield in battle than give birth once.’202 Jason’s response that it 
would be better to have sons without women appears as the veritable hubris of 
this tragic clash.203 Hateful creature (μῖσος), Jason calls her, and more savage 
than Skylla. But again, after the monstrous and necessary deed,204 Medea fully 
embraces her monstrosity, gladly accepting to be called Skylla and she-lion, 
since she has fi nally hit Jason in the heart’s vital spot.205
Pohlenz suggests that Euripides has felt the positive value of instinct, 
although, once again, Medea’s monstrosity is perhaps instinctual, but never 
ceases to be rational and lucid until the very end.206 He uses the term 
μεγαλόσπλαγχνος, namely with strong internal organs, with a big abdomen. 
Before being called ἄλογον, irrationality was associated with physical features, 
and thus connected to a deformation that, in Medea’s case, hides within her 
body and only appears to the nurses’ eyes. The theatre of the tragic is displaced 
by Euripides to within the human’s interior, and opens up to the psychological 
drama. For this reason, Pohlenz claims, we understand and sympathise with 
Medea, who is not a monster.207 What if, however, we sympathised precisely 
198 E. Med. 44.
199 E. Med. 264.
200 E. Med. 395 ff.
201 E. Med. 230.
202 E. Med. 248–51.
203 E. Med. 574.
204 E. Med. 1244.
205 E. Med. 1358.
206 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), pp. 424–5.
207 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), pp. 252 ff.
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with her monstrosity, namely with her fi erce resistance, rational and instinctive 
at once, against a destiny of exploitation and unjust alienation?
The rational explanation of the myth is not at stake here, nor is its his-
torical development. It is not by chance, however, that the most ancient layer 
of the myth, as Pohlenz himself recognises, tells a different story: Medea’s 
children are not killed by their mother in an act of indirect revenge. They 
are killed by the Corinthian, to avoid a progeny of barbarian stock.208 The 
confl ict between the Dionysian and the Apollonean strikes back once again, 
as Pohlenz suggests: whereas for Socrates the knowledge of goodness is already 
an ethical virtue, Medea claims precisely the opposite. In Ovid’s words: video 
meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.209
Together with other characters, human and non-human, I believe that 
Clytemnestra and Medea epitomise particularly well the monstrous feminine. 
If one looked for its archetype, however, it is probably Pandora who should 
carry off the palm of monstrosity.210 Zeus’s poisoned gift to humanity, after 
Prometheus’s theft, she is the fi rst woman, and she brings evil to mankind. 
Pandora is given to Epimetheus, Prometheus’s brother, who falls in love with 
her, since she had been made with the beauty of the immortal goddesses. Once 
on earth, Pandora falls into the trap (Hesiod does not give full details on this 
part) and opens the jar in which all evils had been encased, spreading them on 
the earth for humanity’s misery.211
Pandora is an artifi cial being. Every Olympian gives her one quality, to hide 
her poisoned heart. She is modelled, out of clay, by Hephaestus, the lime god 
and protector of the artisan. A monster creates another monster and makes 
it available for all the other gods to add something to her.212 Hephaestus also 
forges a crown representing all monstrous animals, and when Zeus brings her 
in front of the other gods, the result is astonishing:
[. . .] wonder gripped the immortal gods and the mortal human beings 
when they saw the steep deception, intractable for human beings. For from 
her comes the race of female women: for of her is the deadly race and tribe 
of women, a great woe for mortals, dwelling with men, no companions 
of baneful poverty but only of luxury. As when bees in vaulted beehives 
nourish the drones, partners in evil works – all day long until the sun goes 
down, every day, the bees hasten and set up the white honeycombs, while 
208 Pohlenz (1954, 2. ed.), pp. 262–2. See e.g. a late account by Ael. VH V.21.
209 Ou. Met. VII.20–21.
210 Solmsen (1949), p. 47.
211 Hes. Op. 55 ff. and Th. 571 ff.
212 Delcourt (1957), p. 145. On Hephaestus see also Garland (1995), pp. 61–3.
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the drones remain inside among the vaulted beehives and gather into their 
own stomachs the labour of others – in just the same way high-thundering 
Zeus set up women as an evil for mortal men, as partners in distressful 
works.213 
Symbol of all women, Pandora is the punishment, both necessary and inevi-
table, for the attempted violation of Zeus’s absolute authority. The ancient 
scholia underline how Pandora is a real simulacrum, who hides her nature 
behind a somatic appearance of beauty, a demonic aspect that falsely embod-
ies human power, middle way between humanity and divinity.214 However, as 
usual, the myth’s elements bring with them a strong ambivalence. Because of 
her origin, Pandora is closely linked with Gaia, and thus also is a symbol of 
fertility and reproduction, which comes to her through Hephaestus’s fi re. The 
woman poisons humanity, but also brings life to it, revealing once again the 
ambiguity ingrained in mythical thinking.
This brief excursus in ancient myth has revealed the whole complexity 
and richness of the theme of monstrosity. Lying at the foundation of many 
ancient mythologems, monstrosity reveals at least three main characteristics 
of both early Greek thought and its heritage across antiquity. First, monstros-
ity speaks about ambiguity. Monsters are ambiguous characters, often rejected 
on the negative side and yet holding a position, in a story or a tradition, that 
is not only destructive, detrimental, pernicious or baleful. Monsters often play 
a constructive, foundational, valuable and even necessary role. Without them 
and the disorder that they bring, order and normality would not or could not 
exist. Second, and often due to its ambiguous nature, monstrosity can be both 
implicit and explicit. It can lie where one least expects to fi nd it. Not only 
frightening creatures or wicked villains, but also gods and heroes can be mon-
strous, or present monstrosity as their feature, or use it as their weapon. Third, 
although mythology is largely an account of the construction, establishment 
and stabilisation of order, out of chaos and against disorder, such a pattern is 
far from being a linear and progressive annihilation, or even simply a domes-
tication of monstrosity. Order is not a fatal necessity or a necessary outcome 
of the Greek cosmos. It is rather a precarious balance, aleatorily established 
through the fi re of countless battles, in which monstrosity constantly resur-
faces and not always or necessarily on the same side.
Whatever relationship one wants to read between the myth and the logos, 
the latter brings in it the mark of this threefold role played by monstrosity at 
213 Hes. Th. 588–602.
214 Procl. ad.Hes.Op. 60 ff. (= Marzillo (2010), pp. 37 ff.).
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the inception of Greek philosophy. Monstrosity’s ambiguous nature, its some-
times implicit position, its aleatory essence mark the philosophical discourse 
whenever it tackles the question of normality and abnormality. As in the 
mythological discourse, then, we will see in the next chapters how the philo-
sophical treatment of monstrosity bears the mark of its origin. In other words, 
philosophy also reveals the ambiguity of the concept of monstrosity, sometimes 
on the side of the negative, but often and unexpectedly playing a productive, 
explicative and foundational role. We will see how monstrosity appears also, 
and sometimes more interestingly, when philosophers do not explicitly deal 
with it, when they explore not the margins but the centre and the core of their 
system, such as when they speak about God, and perfection or providence, 
when they enquire into nature and life in all its beauty. Finally, we will see 
how the foundation of an ontological order remains almost invariably exposed 
to its contrary, to chaos and disorder, or rather to the aleatory nature of its 
threatening origin, not fully explained and always resurfacing. The struggle 
between materialism and idealism, for example, counts monstrosity as one of 
the most powerful weapons employed by both sides. Through such a weapon, 
one can support the foundation of the whole system, by explaining it and 
fully integrating it in a coherent science of nature. Through such a weapon, 
though, one can also destroy the enemy’s system, by showing its incapacty to 
explain or account for it.
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The Pre-Platonic Philosophers
Anaxagoras: A Material Origin for Life and Monstrosity
Our enquiry begins with Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, whose surviving frag-
ments and testimonies bring us some grounding principles through which the 
concept of monstrosity can be interpreted, and to which other pre-Platonic 
philosophers, and eventually Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, directly respond. 
Together with Empedocles and Democritus, Anaxagoras’s thought represents 
one of the strongest and most infl uential early attempts to explain the origin 
of cosmic order and, in particular, of life and its abnormal exceptions.
The two aspects, in fact, converge in Anaxagoras’s philosophy. One of his 
most original moves consists in thinking about the generation of animate and 
inanimate things according to the same principle. The core ideas of this prin-
ciple are explained in Vorsokr. 4, a composite of two extant fragments from dif-
ferent parts of the commentary to Aristotle’s Physics by Simplicius, one of the 
most important sources for our knowledge of Anaxagoras.1 Anaxagoras claims, 
according to Simplicius, that there are many different things, that is to say, many 
seeds, in all things, both living and non-living, which are thus natural com-
pounds.2 All is thus in all things, no matter their individual differences. These 
mixed things come from an original μεῖγμα or compound that, before the sepa-
ration, was homogeneous and prevented any individual qualitative difference. 
Not only is all in all but, in another way, all has always been in all.3
The true innovation of Anaxagoras’s language is the use of σπέρμα, seed 
or germ, as Gregory Vlastos has underlined in a highly infl uential article.4 
 1 See P. Curd in Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (2007), ad loc.
 2 Anaxag. B4a (= Simp. in Ph. 34.18–20).
 3 Anaxag. B4b (= Simp. in Ph. 34.20–7).
 4 Vlastos (1950), passim.
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Anaxagoras employs the seed not only for organic reality, but also for any 
other thing conceivable in nature. Whereas Parmenides and Empedocles after 
him think of a small number of immutable (and thus divine) principles, whose 
combination produces nature’s diversity, Anaxagoras withdraws any special 
status from the seeds and makes them a mutable entity like any other entity, 
since they are contained in everything that was as well as in everything that 
will be.5
This concept is crucial in understanding future ideas about monstros-
ity, since it is the implicit ground of both preformationist and panspermist 
theories of being. Since everything comes from everything and is in every-
thing, the original and qualitatively homogeneous compound is no different, 
from an ontological point of view, from the subsequent realities, which are 
qualitatively differentiated from each other and have in them the dynami-
cally and potentially changing nature of matter. The infi nite variety of being, 
in infi nitely diverse proportions, is present in everything as seed, which thus 
becomes synonymous with transformative power (δύναμις).6
An active principle, called νοῦς, operates on this homogeneous material, 
informing it and dynamically causing the splitting off of the different elements 
composing things. Differently from everything else, the νοῦς stands above 
other things, ontologically, if not chronologically:
The other things have a share of everything, but Nous is unlimited 
[ἄπειρος] and self-ruling [αὐτοκράτωρ] and has been mixed with no thing, 
but is alone itself and by itself [μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν]. For if it 
were not by itself, but had been mixed with anything else, then it would 
partake of all things, if it has been mixed with anything (for there is a share 
of everything just as I said before); and the things mixed together with it 
would thwart it, so that it would control none of the things in the way that 
in fact does, being alone by itself. For it is the fi nest [λεπτότης] of all things 
and the purest, and indeed it maintains all discernment [γνώμη] about 
everything and has the greatest strength. And Nous has control over all 
things that have soul, both the larger and the smaller.7 
Αὐτοκρατής means not only self-governed, but also the source of its own 
power. However, Anaxagoras does not present the Intellect as separated from 
 5 A mindful analysis of the different historiographical interpretations about the meaning of 
this theory is in Bailey (1928), pp. 537–56.
 6 See also Tannery (1930, 2e ed.).
 7 Anaxag. B4b (= Simp. in Ph. 156.13).
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or transcending the material mass of things or the cosmos. The Intellect is 
in itself, and it is this that makes it able to control and inform anything else. 
The Intellect can thus be interpreted as a cosmogonic principle; it resembles 
a divine force, theological and even teleological in principle, because of its 
knowing power.8 It can also be interpreted as a cosmological principle that 
resembles a natural force, impersonal and not teleological, because of its ratio-
nal nature. Though different, the interpretations are coherent, as they both 
contain the idea that the Intellect dominates both nature as a whole and 
every compound within it. Both readings leave open the question of either the 
responsibility for or the cause of nature’s imperfection, disorder and monstros-
ity, and therefore they have been scrutinised not only by modern scholars, 
but also by ancient philosophers interested in the question of normality and 
abnormality.9
Aristotle, for example, agrees with Anaxagoras on the νοῦς’s purity and 
unity, with an open reference to his unmoved mover,10 because only one 
principle of generation must exist.11 Eventually, Cicero is even more explicit, 
claiming that Anaxagoras is the fi rst philosopher to understand natural order 
as the result of the rational force of an infi nite intellect.12 Others, however, 
have denounced Anaxagoras’s ambiguity about the divine and transcendent 
nature of the Intellect, claiming that the obscurity of the doctrine reveals a 
poor understanding of nature and its becoming. Socrates’ dissatisfaction with 
Anaxagoras is possibly the most infl uential of these denunciations, which 
Plato uses to put order in the genealogy of true philosophy, namely Platonism 
itself. In Phaedo 97 b–98 c, Plato’s Socrates declares his initial satisfaction 
with Anaxagoras’s promising theory of an Intellect that ‘arranges everything 
and establishes each thing as it is best for it to be’. The best and most excel-
lent is, in Socrates’ view, the key to understanding nature and every part of 
it, vis-à-vis its ultimate end. Anaxagoras, however, ultimately reveals himself 
to be a bad teacher: after reading his books, Socrates confesses his deception, 
since he
[. . .] never imagined that, when he said they were ordered by intelligence, 
he would introduce any other cause for these things than that it is best 
for them to be as they are. So I [scil. Socrates] thought when he assigned 
the cause of each thing and of all things in common he would go on and 
explain what is best for each and what is good for all in common [but] 
 8 See Theiler (1924).
 9 See Furley, Allen eds. (1970–5).
10 Anaxag. A56 (= Arist. Ph. 256 b 24).
11 Anaxag. A45 (= Arist. Ph. 203 a 19).
12 Anaxag. A48 (= Cic. ND I.11).
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I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real 
causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether 
and water and many other absurdities.13
Physical explanation is nothing more than an absurdity if it is not subordi-
nated or functional to the real understanding of nature, namely what makes 
the difference between the best in it and the worst, imperfection, waste, all 
that is inferior.14
Indeed, Anaxagoras seems to be remembered for two different philosophi-
cal ideas, i.e. the purity and unity of the Intellect vis-à-vis natural reality, and 
the Intellect’s immanence to the same reality, as a sort of norm or ratio of 
its functioning: the two principles are not easily consistent with each other. 
The lack of consistency, however, emerges less from Anaxagoras’s attempt to 
explain nature’s origin and its diversity, and more in his followers’ systems, 
which need to relegate one of the two ideas to the margin in order to reinforce 
the other and support either an idealist or materialist reading of cosmogony.
When one focuses on monstrosity, the materialist reading comes to the fore. 
Anaxagoras is deeply concerned with the origin of life, and the testimonies 
offer something close to a materialist reading of it. Diogenes Laertius reports 
that, for Anaxagoras, ‘animals fi rst came to be from moist, hot, and earthy 
stuffs, but later from one another; and males from the right side and females 
from the left side [of the uterus]’.15 The material origin of life, with no other 
mention of any superior informing agent, is already remarkable. Equally strik-
ing, however, is the double stage of life’s formation: animals fi rst spring from the 
earth and then later, presumably after a selection, begin to procreate through 
sexual reproduction. Such a two-stage process is eventually at the heart of 
materialist oriented systems, and is very reminiscent of Empedocles’ and the 
atomists’ theory.16 Kucharski also stresses the proximity of Anaxagoras’s argu-
ment to some of the most explicitly quantitative and materialist layers of the 
Hippocratic corpus, particularly in the attempt to explain quality through 
quantity and the formation of organic tissues and membranes through differ-
ent proportions of earth and heat.17
13 Anaxag. A47 (= Pl. Phd. 97 b–98 c). Nietzsche is particularly impressed by Plato’s criticism 
of Anaxagoras. See ‘Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen’, esp. par. 19, in 
Nietzsche (1967–), III.2, pp. 293–366. See also Warden (1971), p. 14. Plato’s criticism is 
eventually shared by Ar. Metaph. 985 a 18 and Simp. in Ph. 327.26 (= Anaxag. A47).
14 See also Josephus’s critique in Anaxag. A19 (= I. Ap. II.265).
15 Anaxag. A1 (D.L. II.9). Hippolytus still knows this argument, in Hippol. Haer. I.8.12.
16 Aristotle, on the contrary, reads Anaxagoras against Empedocles. See Anaxag. A43 
(= Ar. Cael. 302 a 28).
17 Kucharski (1964), passim. See also Reeve (1980–1).
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The most important testimony on Anaxagoras, for the present enquiry 
into monstrosity, also associates Anaxagoras with a materialist epistemology 
and contrasts it with an idealist and religiously grounded approach. This 
testimony reported by Plutarch narrates the discovery of a monstrous ram 
in the time of Pericles, who is traditionally associated with Anaxagoras. The 
Athenian general, Plutarch claims, was driven out of ignorance and super-
stition by Anaxagoras’s materialist approach to the study and interpretation 
of nature, especially of those phenomena that, because of their unknown 
nature, traditionally drive people into fear and amazement. In Plutarch’s 
words:
It is said that once the head of a one-horned ram was brought to Pericles 
from the country; Lampon the soothsayer, when he saw that the horn had 
grown strong and fi rm from the middle of the forehead, said that, whereas 
there were two factions in the city, those of Thucydides and Pericles, 
sovereignty would pass to the one to whom the omen came. But when 
the skull was cut in two, Anaxagoras demonstrated that the brain had not 
fi lled out its space, but was pointed, like an egg, and had pulled away from 
the skull to the very spot from where the root of the horn had its start-
ing place. Then Anaxagoras was admired by all who were present. But a 
little later, when Thucydides had been overthrown and Pericles had taken 
charge of public affairs, it was Lampon who was admired. Nevertheless, 
there was nothing, I suppose, that prevented both the physical scientist 
and the soothsayer from being right; for the one rightly understood the 
cause and the other the purpose of the event.18 
I shall analyse later Plutarch’s interesting approach to monstrosity and the 
materialist attitude. It is interesting, however, that Plutarch, not without 
irony, follows Socrates’ and Plato’s reproach to Anaxagoras, and situates him 
on the side of a materialist, if not an atheist, explanation of nature’s mon-
strous manifestation. For Anaxagoras, although not for Plutarch, monstrosity 
is not caused by an immaterial force as a sign or a symptom of a higher, more 
anthropocentric reality. Instead, it is a spontaneous anomaly in the organisa-
tion of matter, possibly due to the abnormal composition and proportion of 
hot and earthy stuff in the ram’s body.
The cause and meaning of monstrosity and, more generally, of nature’s 
diversity in its full extent, lies at the heart of Anaxagoras’s ontology of 
homoeomeries. The difference between a normal and a monstrous ram, the 
18 Anaxag. A16 (= Plu. Per. 6).
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difference between normality, abnormality and monstrosity is only quantita-
tive. The difference reveals the organisation of homogeneous matter. It is not 
a qualitative difference due to extrinsic norms or criteria or boundaries that 
are set in order to differentiate matter and distinguish within it shapes that 
more or less resemble forms or paradigms. Normal or monstrous shapes mani-
fest themselves, Lucretius explains, by making more visible what is prominent 
among matter’s qualities, and making inconspicuous what is inferior and in 
smaller quantity: ‘Anaxagoras [supposes] that all things are hidden mingled 
in all things, but that alone appears which preponderates in the mixture and 
is more to be seen and placed right in the front.’19 Lucretius disagrees with 
Anaxagoras because, he claims, not all things but rather the seeds common to 
all things are in all things. Otherwise – this is Lucretius’s famous argument – 
fi re would burn even before rubbing the wood, and not after it.
More important than the disagreement, though, is that both Anaxagoras 
and Lucretius underline that it is the concept of similarity that explains the 
transformation of all things. Only the similar can produce the similar and, in 
this sense, all monstrously organised matter, of any degree, must be similar to 
the matter it originally came from. Aetius reads this principle in an anti-mate-
rialist sense, grounding it in Anaxagoras’s hypothesis of an ordering Intellect: 
‘the homogeneous stuffs are the matter, and mind is the creative cause setting 
all things in order. He begins like this: “all chrēmata were together, and Nous 
arrived and set them in order”; (by chrēmata, he means “things”). He is worthy 
of tribute then, because he linked the maker to the matter.’20 Simplicius too 
stresses the order and the ordering principle that applies itself to matter so as 
to make everything possible, but only according to a reason or a rule: ‘he saw 
that everything comes to be from everything, if not immediately then in order 
(for air comes from fi re, and water from air, earth from water, stone from earth, 
and fi re comes once again from stone) and [. . .] like is augmented by like’.21 
Monstrosity comes from normality or, better, from the homogeneous matter 
that contains different proportions of stuffs that make the monstrous and the 
normal equally possible, according to one and the same ordering principle.
Vlastos once again masterfully comments upon this passage, underlining 
that it is the concept of the infi nitesimally small that allows Anaxagoras to 
explain the difference between species as well as between individuals of the 
same species. Varying the proportions of stuffs, even infi nitesimally, causes 
the outcome and the offspring also to vary, so as to fall, one can add, either 
19 Anaxag. A44 (= Lucr. I.830 ff.). See also B12 (= Simp. in Ph. 156.13).
20 Anaxag. A46 (= Placit. I.3.5).
21 Anaxag. A45 (Simp. in Ph. 460.4)
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within the domain of normality or the realm of monstrosity, whereby the 
latter is only a variation of the former, possibly an infi nitesimally small one.22 
Vlastos argues that Lucretius has misinterpreted Anaxagoras and confused 
the variety of the proportions of the mix of powers in things with the variety 
of seeds themselves in order to explain the differences among things. Building 
on Vlastos’s interpretation, one can say that things do not differ because they 
have more of something (e.g. bones) or less of something else (e.g. blood) 
in them. They differ because of the different proportions of powers that lie 
below bones and blood. If one extends this argument to monstrosity, one 
can properly understand the argument of the origin of the similar from the 
similar. This interpretation explains not only why and how normality comes 
from normality and monstrosity springs out of monstrosity, it also reveals how, 
in the same framework, monstrosity can originate in normality, or normality in 
monstrosity. It makes it possible, in other words, to see how, according to the 
Anaxagorean ontology, everything comes from everything, and everything is 
possible, although – as Simplicius says and Lucretius eventually claims – only 
according to a certain order and norm, the norm of νοῦς.
What then is the difference between normality and monstrosity? If one 
adheres coherently to the Anaxagorean hypothesis, it is only a difference of 
quantity, of proportion, of organisation, a difference within homogenity and 
in accordance to the same ordering principle, immanent and material. This 
principle is not only the effi cient cause of both normality and abnormality, it is 
also their only cause. It does not require much effort for subsequent materialist 
authors to use this idea and clarify the ambiguities caused by obscure (because 
original) language. Within an idealist ontology, however, these ambiguities open 
the door to much more serious allegations. Commentators who build the unity 
and purity of the principle on a more religious and anthropomorphic ground, 
a Platonic and Christian framework, for example, put more emphasis on the 
ontologic difference between normality and abnormality, thus weakening the 
power of Anaxagoras’s Intellect. Clement of Alexandria’s comment is reveal-
ing in this sense: ‘Yet even if Anaxagoras were the fi rst to set Nous over things, 
not even he preserved the making cause; rather, he depicts some unintelligent 
whirls together with the inactivity and thoughtlessness of Nous.’23 Anaxagoras’s 
Intellect, for Clement, does not reach everywhere: the lower layers of reality 
remain untouched by it, and this is where monstrosity manifests itself.
Aristotle also gives an interesting perspective, from the point of view of his 
own theory, by claiming that Anaxagoras’s system would result in an unintelli-
gible muddle. Were everything in everything, Aristotle argues, not only actually 
22 Vlastos (1950), p. 45.
23 Anaxag. A57 (= Clem.Al. Strom. II.14).
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but also potentially, as Anaxagoras maintains, nothing could be distinguished 
from anything else. In matters of life generation and animal forms, for example, 
the normal individual could not be distinguished from the monstrous one, and 
the diversity of nature, which Aristotle sees as necessary and praiseworthy, could 
not be accounted for.24
Anaxagoras introduces powerful philosophical innovations that necessarily 
remain ambiguous for early readers as well as for modern scholars. Through 
such ambiguities, monstrosity makes its appearance within philosophy, creating 
room for radically different alternatives in the interpretation of nature and life 
within it, as will be seen in Empedocles and Democritus.
Empedocles: Wonders to Behold
A Sophist like Protagoras and a democrat like Pericles,25 Empedocles develops, 
in his poem Περὶ Φύσεως (On nature),26 one of the most striking pre-Platonic 
cosmogonies, to respond to some of the most urgent problems raised by thinkers 
such as Parmenides and Melissus. Empedocles’ initial concern is to respond to 
the Eleatic aporia on the permanent and immutable nature of Being vis-à-vis the 
changing and unstable reality of its Becoming, as it is experienced by men in the 
real world. For the unique matter of Ionian naturalism, he substitutes multiple 
elementary determinations, that he calls the roots of all things,27 and to which he 
assigns divine names (Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis), prolonging Homer’s 
personifi cation of the cosmic elements.28 These roots are infi nite in number, 
immutable in time and space, and eternal. The universe is continuous and full, 
i.e. emptiness does not exist and therefore nothing is born from nothing, since 
nothingness does not exist in the fi rst place. Death and birth – the Becoming of 
things – consist of the composition and dissolution of the composites of eternal 
roots, fi re, water, air and earth, that, as substances, always remain themselves. 
Thus, Empedocles connects the older mythical dimension of Greek cosmogony 
with a new interest in physical explanation of the phenomenal world.29
The unchangeability of the four roots makes Empedocles’ philosophy an 
early version of atomism, despite its differences with Democritus’s atomism. 
24 Anaxag. A61 (= Arist. Metaph. 1069 b 15 ff.).
25 See Bollack (2009), p. 8. On the democratic character of Empedocles’ theogony see also 
Jaeger (1947), p. 139 ff.
26 Although Empedocles’ second poem, The Purifi cations (Καθαρμοί), has to be read 
together with the Περὶ Φύσεως (see Bignone (1916)), I will deal with it only insofar as 
it is directly relevant to the discussion on the idea of monstrosity.
27 Vorsokr. 31 B 6 (= LM [22] EMP. D57 = Inwood 12, p. 209).
28 Buffi ère (1956), pp. 81–2.
29 See supra, as well as Schuhl (1947, 2e ed.), Cornford (1952), Hershbell (1970), Mugler 
(1970).
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Empedocles’ roots are uncreated and do not change qualitatively. Becoming 
and change in the universe happen only by means of changes in the com-
binations of different quantities of different roots, following processes of 
mechanical composition and dissolution within a homogeneous space; 
Empedocles thus paves the way for a purely mechanical explanation of the 
physical world. More importantly, rather than regarding the One as the 
fundamental element,30 Empedocles considers the multiplicy of the roots 
ontologically and physically prior to the One and, as Bollack beautifully 
puts it, as ‘l’origine de leur propre origine’.31
In order to conceive movement within this universe without emptiness, 
Empedocles needs a further principle of explanation. He describes this principle 
in anthropomorphic terms, as the reciprocal and opposite work of two forces, 
νεῖκος (Strife or Discord) and φιλότης (Love or Friendship). The latter pushes 
multiplicity toward unity, while the former works toward reality’s disjunction 
and toward plurality.32 Between the two extremes of absolute unity and immo-
bility and absolute plurality and chaotic movement, the two forces incessantly 
unfold their action and manifest their power in the world: one on the other, one 
against the other.
Fragment 27 describes Love’s victory, when harmony is at its apex in what 
Empedocles calls the Sphere, the perfect unity of all things.33 But then Discord 
attacks it from the edges, dissolving the Sphere’s purity. The movement is 
infi nite and necessary. No individual thing, no world as we experience it, can 
possibly exist at either extreme – in the perfect immobility of the Sphere or 
in the perfectly formless chaos of the cosmos. Creation and destruction take 
place between the extremes, and our world is part of this process, our time a 
tiny portion of the Strife-governed part of the cycle.
The richness – or the essential ambiguity – of Empedocles’ thought is visible 
in the distinct natures of his two masterpieces: the Περὶ Φύσεως, more scien-
tifi cally oriented and compatible with a mechanist explanation of the universe, 
and the Καθαρμοί, more religious and compatible with a magic and orphic 
vision of nature. This rich ambiguity is perhaps even clearer in the role that 
30 Τὸ ἓν στοιχεῖον: see Arist. GC 315 a 23. Empedocles’ relationship between the One and 
the Many implies a contradiction with Aristotle’s view, as, for Empedocles, ‘the Many 
are more “elementary” than the One and by nature prior to it’. (315 a 3–25).
31 Bollack (1965–9), I, p. 33.
32 Vorsokr. 31 B 17 (= LM [22] EMP. D73, R68 = Inwood 25, pp. 215–17).
33 Daughter of Ares and Aprhodite, i.e. war and beauty, Harmony symbolises the unity of 
antitheses. Zeus gives her as a wife to Kadmos for his role in fi ghting the monster Typhoeus, 
representing the primordial chaos. On harmony see Lalande, p. 401, Auroux, pp. 1116–17, 
Ritter, Gründer hrsg. (1971–2007), III, c. 1001, RAC XIII, pp. 593–618 (Harmonie 
des Sphären), HRW, III, cc. 1297–1304, NDHI III, pp. 960–4. See also Nietzsche, ‘Die 
dionysische Weltanschauung’, in Nietzsche (1967–), III.2, pp. 43–69, Buffi ère (1956), 
pp. 467–81, Spitzer (1963) and Caye et al. a cura di (2011).
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he assigns to necessity (ἀνάγκη) and chance (τύχη). Empedocles’ cosmic cycle 
operates under strict necessity. Within it, however, it is the stringent logic of 
chance that rules.
Empedocles seems to have made a huge effort to keep together aspects 
of his thought that were (and will be) traditionally seen as incompatible. 
Thinkers such as Anaxagoras or Hippocrates, for example, disapprove of his 
ideas regarding necessity and chance and the mechanical vs magical inter-
pretation of nature. The most infl uential and authoritative denunciation of 
Empedocles’ thought, however, is certainly Aristotle’s, and it is largely based 
on Empedocles’ treatment of monstrosity.
Monstrosity comes into the picture with Empedocles’ zoogony. There is 
hardly any other Greek philosopher for whom monstrosity occupies such an 
important place in the process of formation and development of life. Chance, 
as I said, rules the inner development of the cosmic cycle, and this is particu-
larly clear when Strife prevails, as it does in the time that precedes our age. 
Developing in four stages, as recorded by Aetius, the origin of life appears 
to Empedocles as ‘a wonder to behold’ (θαῦμα ἰδέστθαι).34 Initially, isolated 
members appear, rising from the earth:
as many heads without necks sprouted up
and arms wandered naked, bereft of shoulders,
and eyes roamed alone, impoverished of foreheads.35
These members randomly wander around, and fortuitously encounter each 
other, joining with one another to form all sorts of monstrous beings, such as the 
βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρῳρα, the man-headed oxen.36 Separate limbs and monsters 
34 Vorsokr. 31 B 35 (= LM [22] EMP. D75, R70 = Inwood 61, p. 236). See Bollack (1965–9), 
II, p. 69: ‘La chose merveilleuse à voir [. . .] qu’est l’homme, ou le soleil se levant au matin, 
fut d’abord un exploit.’ On Empedocles’ zoogony see also Morgan (1984), pp. 90 ff., 
D. Sedley, Empedocles Life Cycles, in Pierris ed. (2005), pp. 331–71 and M. L. Gemelli 
Marciano, Empedocles’ Zoogony and Embriology, in Pierris ed. (2005), pp. 373–404.
35 Vorsokr. 31 B 57 (= LM [22] EMP. D154, R75 = Inwood 64, p. 245). 
36 Vorsokr. 31 B 61 (= LM [22] EMP. D152, D156 = Inwood 66, p. 247). Man-headed quad-
rupeds eventually constitute one of the paradigmatic forms of hybrid monstrosity in classical 
culture and beyond. See N. Icard-Gianolio, A.-V. Szabados, Monstra, LIMC, Supplementum 
2009, 1, pp. 339–59. See also J. König, Bestiarium, HRW, I, pp. 1513–23. At the dawn of 
modernity, Piero di Cosimo evokes them in the astonishing panel The Forest Fire, at the 
Ashmolean Museum of Oxford. Modern scholarship, following Erwin Panofsky’s seminal 
interpretation, has associated it with Lucretian reminiscence. See ‘The Early History of Man 
in Two Cycles of Paintings by Piero di Cosimo’ in Panofsky (1939), pp. 33–67. Lucretius, 
however, denies the existence of such creatures precisely in opposing these Empedoclean 
phantasies. What Piero seems to have in mind, although vaguely, seems to be closer to the 
Empedoclean oxen. See Bacci (1976) and Whistler, Bomford (1999), who also suggest the 
name of Empedocles. See below on Empedocles’ infl uence on Lucretius.
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are thus the fi rst creatures to appear on earth, driven by the increasing force of 
Love, but with Strife being more powerful than it is now. Monstrous creatures – 
but of a whole different monstrosity – also characterise the other part of the 
cycle, when homogeneous and undifferentiated (οὐλοφυής) creatures appear 
from the earth, driven by the increasing force of Strife, but with Love being still 
more powerful than it is now.
Empedocles’ zoogony of Love, according to O’Brien, is paradoxical, 
because monsters are less harmonious creatures than men and women, but 
they are also ‘put together’ by Love’s force, when Love’s power is increasing.37 
This is paradoxical, however, only if the creatures’ harmony is seen as depend-
ing absolutely on which force (Strife or Love) is currently increasing in power, 
and if the ultimate destination of this part of the cycle (chaos or unity) is 
seen as already dominating the zoogonic process. I would argue, however, that 
the increasing harmony of creatures can be seen only by comparing succes-
sive generations of creatures: Love or Strife controls the direction of change, 
rather than imposing absolute harmony or chaos on every creature that devel-
ops during the cycle.38
The ἀνάγκη to which any part of the cycle responds works as an end or 
τέλος only at a general level. At a particular level, on the contrary, i.e. at 
the level of each creature’s production, only τύχη operates. That is why the 
οὐλοφυής creature is to be described as homogeneous in itself, depending on 
the way it happened, and also undifferentiated, vis-à-vis the process of differen-
tiation which will only be visible in the subsequent production of creatures 
from the earth. When O’Brien says that ‘monsters are an advance upon sepa-
rate limbs, even though they are a decline compared with men and women or 
οὐλοφυῆ’,39 this is true from a global point of view, but certainly not from the 
point of view of the individual creature, whose monstrosity is perfectly normal 
and in fact constitutive of the zoogonic cycle itself: no zoogony and no cycle 
would be conceivable without monstrosities.40
Men and women are born from both kinds of monstrosities and during 
both segments of the cycle: after the existence of separate limbs in the cos-
mic cycle, and resulting from the separation of οὐλοφυῆ in the period which 
begins in the Sphere. The relevant point for the present discussion is that the 
37 O’Brien (1969), pp. 205–6.
38 See also J. Wilcox, ‘“Whole-Natured Forms” in Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle’, in Preus 
(2001), pp. 109–22.
39 J. Wilcox, ‘“Whole-Natured Forms” in Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle’, in Preus (2001), p. 207.
40 My reading does not contradict O’Brien’s main thesis, which is to demonstrate that not 
every kind of monstrosity is born at every stage, but rather that separate limbs rise under 
Love’s increasing power, while homogeneous and undifferentiated creatures rise under 
Strife’s increasing power.
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two sequences are symmetric and that normal and viable creatures are gener-
ated from monsters with increasing or decreasing success, depending on the 
relative chronological position within the cycle. There is nothing that specifi -
cally keeps humans apart from monstrosities (despite the readings of Eduard 
Zeller and many other scholars).41
Monstrosity inhabits both sequences of the cycle, and humans and ani-
mals as we know them are related to both kinds of monstrosities considered 
by Empedocles – separated limbs on the one hand, and homogeneous and 
undifferentiated creatures on the other. Οὐλοφυῆ, precisely for this reason, 
must be considered a kind of monstrosity and, at the same time, a kind of 
perfection.42 Again, this is not a paradox if we are able to grasp the simultane-
ously teleological and mechanical nature of the cycle.
O’Brien gives a thoughtful account of this productive ambiguity. Nonethe-
less, when he wants to clarify its meaning, he associates Empedocles’ system 
with the holistic approach of Teilhard de Chardin and his concept of the  point 
as the point of convergence of all of humanity in God.43 Elsewhere, O’Brien 
stresses the anti-materialist character of Empedocles’ philosophy, suggesting a 
convergence with the later emanatist thought of Neoplatonism.44 I believe that 
both conclusions betray the productive ambiguity and richness of Empedocles’ 
visionary cosmogony and that in fact, the philosopher’s zoogony offers a strong 
ground for future generations of philosophers to criticise fi nalism.45
Finalism and providence are indeed ruled out by Empedocles’ system. 
Nature, as Bollack has underlined, does not accomplish forms that pre-exist 
the individuals and determine their development.46 Although generation 
41 Zeller (1856), I, pp. 537–8. For a complete literature review, see O’Brien (1969), pp. 196 ff.
42 As O’Brien (1969) does, opposing though the idea of monstrosity and the idea of perfection.
43 O’Brien (1969), pp. 199–200: ‘It is indeed only in the most recent times, so far as I am 
aware, that Empedocles has found those who would to some extent agree with him, 
notably the late Teilhard de Chardin.’
44 O’Brien, Empedocle, in Brunschwig, Lloyd eds. (1996), p. 643.
45 Empedocles’ theory of monstrosity, in this sense, is far from being ‘ridiculous’. See contra 
Schadewaldt (1978), p. 452. See also Girard’s interpretation in terms of double mon-
strosity in Gerard (1972).
46 Bollack (1965–9), II, p. 63. See also Solmsen (1963), pp. 478–9 and, contra, Cuny-Le 
Callet (2005), p. 215, who argues that the whole argument of the generation from the 
earth, which later appeals to Lucretius, is in fact teleological and theological: ‘[. . .] 
contrairement à Lucrèce qui s’oppose à tout fi nalisme, Empédocle développe une vision 
téléologique de l’origine des êtres: il affi rme que chaque détail de l’organisme a été créé 
par la divinité – appelé Aphrodite ou Cypris – selon un projet préconçu, pour remplir 
une fonction précise’. Cuny-Le Callet grounds her claim on Vorsokr. 31 B 73, 75, 86 and 
87 (= LM [22] EMP. D199, R70, D200, R70, D213, R70 and D214, R70). I do not see 
in these texts anything that could support her conclusion concerning ‘chaque détail de 
l’organisme’, the ‘projet préconçu’ and the ‘fonction précise’.
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from the earth might seem quite an extravagant account of the formation of 
beings,47 it in fact opens up the space for a mechanical and anti-teleological 
process of generation of life based on chance encounters and endless trans-
formation of beings: a conception that will echo in atomism. Becoming is, for 
Empedocles, a ceaseless and multifarious series of attempts. Perfection is not 
a τέλος, but rather the aleatory outcome of encounters generating individuals 
of all shapes. Some of them are non-viable and perish, some of them are viable 
and live. The former are more numerous in the beginning, and then give place 
to the latter, which become prevalent as the cycle continues.
Franz Lämmli has argued that some form of order must be found in every 
beginning, in order for it to be the beginning of something.48 Yet this is not 
Empedocles’ hypothesis, in which order is born from chaos, in the same non-
teleological manner in which viable beings follow monsters. The very concepts 
of order and disorder, like normality and monstrosity, exist only ex-post and not 
as aims, or ends, or criteria guiding action or evolution towards any order.
Being is not accomplished at once, but incrementally, as a result of innu-
merable encounters. In Empedocles’ philosophy and its heritage, the word 
encounter (τυχεῖν), Bollack claims, does not have the meaning that Aristotle 
gives to it. Far from expressing the accident and the exception, it means the 
success.49 Harmony and perfection are not the adequacy of a pre-existing form. 
They are this particular form, or rather this particular shape in which the eter-
nal movement of composition and decomposition of roots has stabilised itself 
in a viable being.
Monstrosity thus becomes the key to moving beyond the aporias of those 
philosophers who had been looking for a unique and unifying principle, beyond 
and above worldy phenomena. Being, for Empedocles, is neither beyond nor 
above Becoming. It is not simpler or richer than what exists or has existed or 
will exist at the various stages of the cycle: monstrosity is not less than normal-
ity, it is not different from it:
But come! Gaze on this witness to my previous words,
if anything was in my previous [remarks] left wanting in form:
47 With the limbs born ready to be assembled. See Bollack (1965–9), II, p. 69. The Berlin 
red-fi gure vase mentioned by Bollack, however, narrates mythical events, thus taking 
place in a highly civilised setting. See Beazley (1963, 2nd ed.), p. 400 and G. Zimmer, 
‘Trinkschale. Namensgebendes Werk des Erzgießerei-Malers’, in Scholl, Platz-Horster 
hrsg.(2007), pp. 68–9. See also Guthrie (1957), pp. 44–5.
48 Lämmli (1962).
49 Bollack (1965–9), I, p. 68. Chantraine, p. 1142: τυγχάνω, aor. τυχεῖν, for ‘atteindre, toucher, 
rencontrer’ and ‘reussir [opposé à σφάλλειν], se trouver, se produire par hasard, se rencon-
trer’. Fontanier, p. 704: τυγχάνω = adsequor.
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the sun, bright to look on and hot in every respect,
and the immortals which are drenched in heat and shining light,
and rain, in all things dark and cold;
and there fl ow from the earth things dense and solid.
And in wrath all are distinct in form and separate,
and they come together in love and are desired by each other.
From these all things that were, that are, and will be in the future
have sprung: trees and men and women
and beasts and birds and water-nourished fi sh,
and long-lived gods fi rst in their prerogatives.
For these very things are, and running through each other
they become different in appearance. For the blending changes them.50 
Jackie Pigeaud has stressed how Empedocles’ attitude depends on a wider 
convergence between natural and artistic thinking in the Greek world.51 
Early philosophers and artists – and Empedocles among them – are inter-
ested in, and aim at, defi ning the concept of norm and normativity. The 
norm, Pigeaud powerfully argues, is nothing but the outcome of the essays 
incessantly made by Aphrodite ‘the Lifegiving’ in her workshop,52 whereby 
life is created according to a logic and a vocabulary both biological and 
aesthetical – by painting, fi xing, riveting, gripping or cooking.53 The result 
is the astonishing role that monstrosity plays in defi ning the norm, at once 
biologically and aesthetically: the monster is not defi ned by the norm, ‘the 
monster is the norm’.54
50 Vorsokr. 31 B 21 (= LM [22] EMP. D58b, D77a, R68 = Inwood 26, p. 219).
51 Pigeaud (1988), p. 197: le ‘rapports entre la pensée de la physis, ou pensée de la produc-
tion spontanée, et la pensée de l’art, ou pensée de l’artefact’.
52 Vorsokr. 31 B 151 (= LM [22] EMP. D64 = Inwood CTXT–64, p. 120): ‘ζείδωρον 
[‘Αφροδίτην].’
53 Pigeaud points to Vorsokr. 31 B 19, 32–4, 73, 75, 87 (= LM EMP. D62, R93, D259, D72, 
D71, D199, R70, D200, R70, D214, R70).
54 Pigeaud (1988), p. 203: ‘Le beau n’est pas autre chose que l’effort des éléments pour se 
rencontrer; le beau constitué c’est le chevillage de ce rencontre. L’artiste colle, cheville, 
durcit ce qu’il pense fait pour aller ensemble. Mais le monstre guette l’artiste. Ou plutôt, le 
monstre précède la forme défi nitive. Il est l’ébauche, et l’ébauche précède l’œuvre comme 
un tâtonnement. Des ces essais naîtra l’œuvre. En quelque sorte, pour Empédocle, le 
monstre est la norme, il est même la seule norme; puisque c’est à le voir que l’artiste jugera 
de son travail. Il n’est pas d’œuvre sans monstre préalable; et il arrive parfois à l’artiste de 
sanctionner le monstre, c’est-à-dire de prendre la norme pour le normal.’ One can hardly 
guess the effects that such an ontology would produce when coherently applied to politi-
cal and legal thought. Given Empedocles’ explicit engagement with politics, it is a matter 
for enquiry. On monstrosity in early Greek art, see Winkler-Horaček (2015).
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Although the metaphor of nature as an artist is powerfully evocative, 
Pigeaud probably pushes it too far, even if only because of the risk of anthropo-
morphisation and teleologisation. Empedocles’ teratogeny – Pigeaud argues – 
is antithetical to both Aristotle’s and Lucretius’s theories, which would be 
allied against the idea that every kind of monstrosity, without limit, could 
happen during the zoogonic process. The opposition, in my view, is rather 
between Aristotle’s fi nalist approach, in which such limits are of transcendent 
and external origin, and the anti-teleological approach, with immanent limits 
arising internally, on which, I believe, Empedocles and Lucretius converge, as 
I will show later on.55
Monstrosity is of paramount importance in Empedocles’ philosophy. 
Through the monstrous creatures, Empedocles is able to coordinate the nec-
essary movement of the cycle of Love and Strife in one specifi c course with the 
necessary movement of life’s expansion in multiple and undetermined direc-
tions. Monstrosity thus allows the coexistence of mechanism and teleology at 
different ontological levels, thus connecting Empedocles’ philosophy with the 
more genuine materialism of the early atomists.
In the next paragraph, I present the position of the leading fi gure of early 
atomism, Democritus of Abdera. As we will see, if early atomism has a con-
nection with the attitude of the physicist Empedocles, Democritus’s contribu-
tion implies a thorough and unconditional rejection of any and every form 
of teleology, and it is his ideas about monstrosity that reveal the paramount 
importance of this shift.
Democritus: Agonism within Matter
Is the idea of monstrosity, as described in Empedocles’ zoogony, a powerful 
conceptual tool to help overcome the Ionian aporias on the relation between 
the One and the Many, as well as Being and Becoming? Or is monstrosity 
actually neutralised by Empedocles, by introducing it within a cycle governed 
by necessity, and necessarily unfolding in the cosmic movement from and 
towards the One? By imagining a plurality of elements, Empedocles responds 
to Parmenides’ One. Nevertheless, atomists argue, it is still unclear how multi-
plicity can be explained. The plurality of στοιχεῖα, they claim, does not resolve 
in itself the aporias of the relation between the One and the Many. It does not 
matter whether the elements are two or four. What counts, for atomists, is 
that these elements are rigorously composed of homogeneous, eternal, uncre-
ated particles, and thus still unfi t to explain multiplicity. A real multiplicity 
55 See, contra, Warden (1971), p. 14.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   70 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 T H E P R E-P L AT O N I C P H I L O S O P H E R S  71
must be the origin and the beginning of everything. It must not be based on, 
but rather moving against the unity of the Parmenidean Being-One.56
Multiplicity is thus the starting point of Democritus and his master Leucip-
pus, and this starting point is made possible by the concept of atom. I will not 
distinguish the doctrines of atomism’s father, Leucippus of Miletus (or Elea), 
and his brilliant scholar Democritus of Abdera.57 It is of paramount impor-
tance, though, to remember that Democritus is not a pre-Socratic philosopher, 
as the historiographical tradition, already created by Aristotle, has too often 
presented him.58 He is on the contrary Socrates’ contemporary. Like Empedo-
cles, he is linked to the origins of democratic thinking.59 He outlives Socrates 
by at least three decades, and he offers an alternative system that strongly 
counters Socratism on many vital points. It is indeed for this reason that Plato, 
as well as many ancient and modern scholars after him, is interested in pre-
senting atomism as a pre-Socratic system, when not as an anti-Socratic one. 
Democritus is, for Plato, only one of the many old philosophers whose sys-
tems have been once and for all surpassed by Socratism. Didn’t Plato himself, 
according to Aristoxenus’s anecdote, try to burn all of Democritus’s works?60
His system is too dangerous for Plato’s idealism. The whole cosmos, for the 
atomists, is based on the concurring and dialectic presence of a Being, which is 
full (πλήρης) and something (δέν), and the non-Being, which is void (κενός) 
and nothing (μηδέν). These two principles are immutable and correspond to 
an infi nite number of not furtherly divisible bodies (ἄτομα), on the one hand, 
and the vacuum on the other hand.61
The indivisible bodies differ from one another in three characteristics: 
shape (ῥυσμός or σχῆμα), position (τροπή or θέσις) and order or arrangement 
(τάξις or διαθιγή). Joined together, they form atomic masses whose qualitative 
56 Salem (1996a), p. 47. 
57 In this I follow Aristotle as well as Robin (1923). On Leucippus’s early development of 
a principle of causal explanation, see Klowski (1966).
58 See D. O’Brien, Démocrite d’Abdère, in Goulet, éd. (1989–) II, pp. 655–77 and Salem 
(1996a).
59 See Ferguson (1965) and Farrar (1988).
60 See D.L. II.9.40, and Wehrli (1967–9, 2. ed.).
61 Discussing Karl Marx’s Doktordissertation and his early reading of Democritus, Mehring 
(1923), p. 31, summarises the fundamental thesis of atomistic physics as follows: ‘Out of 
nothing nothing can come. Nothing that is can be destroyed. All change is nothing but 
the joining and separation of parts. Nothing happens fortuitously and everything that 
happens happens with reason and necessity. Nothing exists but the atoms and empty 
space, everything else is opinion. The atoms are endless in number and of an infi nite 
variety in form. Falling eternally through infi nite space, the larger atoms, which fall more 
quickly, collide with the smaller atoms and the material movements and rotations which 
result are the beginning of the formation of worlds. Innumerable worlds form and pass 
away co-existently and successively.’ See also Salem (1996a), p. 31.
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differences are only secondary and subjective, or by convention, depending 
on the primary and objective differences of shape, position and order. Against 
eleatism, atomists maintain that movement can happen only in the void, 
which is thus its condition, rather than its cause.62
Democritus’s atomism is the fi rst coherent and consistent form of mate-
rialism: a principle of explanation of the whole purely based on the primary 
ontological reality of atomic matter. In this sense, its character emerges as a 
powerful alternative to a philosophical explanation of nature based on abstract 
and ideal principles, an alternative that Plato eventually fi ghts with all his 
strength. The very nature of nature, as well as the possibility of its philosophi-
cal and scientifi c investigation, is at stake and depends on the conception 
of Being, of matter and of atom itself. No surprise, then, that philosophers, 
ancient and modern, have tried to neutralise the revolutionary doctrine of 
Leucippus and Democritus, trying to claim that a universe conceived exclu-
sively as atoms in motion is in fact an unthinkable monstrosity, because it 
dispenses with a norm to imitate and end to pursue.63
One might object that Democritus himself has ultimately framed his natu-
ralistic explanation of the origin and life of the cosmos idealistically: does not 
Democritus, after all, employ the word ἰδέα to describe the indivisible material 
substances of his universe?64 Since Homer, though, and through Anaxagoras and 
the Hippocratic Corpus, the ‘idea’ has been nothing more (and nothing less) 
than shape, or form in its morphological and exterior appearance. The original 
62 Aristotle, on the contrary, will object that vacuum would make motion impossible. See 
Arist. Ph. IV.8.
63 H. Wismann, Realité et matière dans l’atomisme démocritéen, in Romano (1980), pp. 61–74, 
for example, has argued that only the form is, properly speaking, a characteristic of the 
atom itself, while order and position make sense only once atoms are combined together 
with other atoms. See also Wiśniewski (1973). More acutely, J. Bollack, La cosmogonie 
des anciens Atomistes, in Romano (1980), pp. 11–59, develops the idea that the atom 
acquires its weight only when it enters into relations with other atoms, and not before. 
Atoms, Bollack maintains, do not possess, but rather acquire their physical characteristics 
once they enter the cosmogonic vortex, collide with each other and form the bodies. 
Salem (1996) has convincingly criticised Wismann’s and Bollack’s conclusions, arguing 
that their consequences imply the de-materialisation of atoms, and thus the negation of 
the physical reality of matter itself.
64 We do not have any surviving defi nition, by Democritus, of the εἶδος or the ἰδέα. It 
might of course be lost. Even if he did not give one at all, however, can one blame him, 
knowing that not even Plato himself ever bothers to defi ne ideas? Lur’e argues that since 
the idea is one of its distinctive features, Democritus sometimes calls the atoms them-
selves ideai. See Lur’e (1970), also quoted by Salem (1996a). Interestingly, Clement of 
Alexandria associates Democritus and Plato in their common interest for a higher divine 
reality. See Clem.Al. Prot. VI.59P.
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concept of ‘idea’ is altogether material, and it will only be bent and transformed 
by Plato in order to distinguish the superior from the inferior, the higher reality 
of forms from the lower reality of bodies, particularly in Timaeus. Democritus’s 
idea resists, however, such idealistic appropriation and diversion of the concept. 
His ‘idea’ is the physical shape of the atom, a real characteristic upon which a 
materialist universe can be conceived, without transcendence, and in a necessary 
way. And this is where the concept of monstrosity comes to the fore, related to 
the major question that Democritus leaves to us as a legacy, namely the question 
of necessity and chance.
Democritus’s theory is the fi rst to be able to describe nature, its formation 
and its phenomena without requiring any transcendental, external or superior 
principle of explanation.65 For example, Empedocles, after having introduced 
the four elements in a full universe, needs the forces of Love and Strife to put 
them in motion. In Democritus’s universe, the void provides the same result. 
The void is the condition, necessary and suffi cient, that allows the atoms’ 
motion with no external and, even more importantly, no anthropomorphic 
force acting upon them. The scandal of such a bold approach to the explana-
tion of φύσις vibrates through the wonderful parody of Aristophanes’ The 
Clouds, in which ‘Vortex reigns, and he has turned out Zeus.’66
If no anthropomorphic force operates throughout the universe, then how 
do things happen? How can order, the order that we experience every day in 
the world, be explained? How do things happen the way they happen, if no law 
is established and no authority is there to impose them from above, but every-
thing is left to itself and happens randomly? This is precisely what Democritus 
is accused of. Democritus, ‘who assigns the world to chance’,67 inaugurates 
atheism, since it reduces the universe to a self-moving machine, which does 
not need a machine-maker to be formed and to continue functioning.68
At the same time, it is known all too well that Leucippus and Democritus 
have been accused of submitting everything to an absolute and unconditional 
necessity. The allegation comes not only from the atom’s opponents but also, as 
I will show later, from inside the atomistic fi eld as well: Epicurus and Lucretius 
eventually introduce substantial innovations in the atomic system precisely to 
avoid the consequences of a too strict necessity. If this is the case, however, 
65 Contra Reale (1975–80), I, p. 181.
66 Ar. Nu. 828 ff.
67 Dante Alighieri (1996), Inferno, IV.136, p. 77.
68 See Berryman (2009), especially pp. 37–8, who, contra, underlines how little use of the 
machine analogy ancient atomists made, because of the necessity of implying a machine 
designer. On the idea of atheism see Drachmann (1922), Ley (1966–89), vol. I for Greek 
and Roman atheism, Fahr (1969) and Winiarczyk (2013).
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how can necessity (ἀνάγκη) and chance (τύχη) be both and at the same time the 
pillars of Democritean physical and cosmic causality? The question is highly 
relevant to monstrosity. In fact, within a universe governed by chance, order 
appears either inexplicable, or constantly threatened by its opposite, disorder: 
monstrosity reveals itself as the always-possible threat to an ever-too-precarious 
normality. In a universe of strict necessity, however, what then is the meaning of 
monstrosity which must also be, in its own manner, necessary?
The term employed by Democritus is αὐτόματον, ambiguously translated 
either as ‘chance’ or as ‘spontaneity’. Spontaneous things happen, according 
to Democritus, by themselves and by virtue of their own causal development, 
without any external infl uence. The spontaneous happens, in a word, by its 
own nature, which also means necessarily. Corresponding to the Latin sponte, 
the idea of spontaneity is particularly relevant here, because it rules out not 
only external forces that might compel an event to be produced or to happen 
in a specifi c way (e.g. the water of the river to be constrained to fl ow within 
the riverbanks), but also any kind of external or transcendent principle, like 
the one implied by the Aristotelian ‘cause for the sake of which’ (τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα).
The coexistence of necessity and chance appears paradoxical only from a 
teleological point of view, endorsed by Aristotle. In fact, as Salem and other 
modern scholars explain (against many ancient and modern scholars who 
have perpetuated this conceptual confusion), the paradox is non-existent: 
chance is nothing else than necessity, under a different name.69 Everything 
happens spontaneously in Democritus’s universe, according to the immanent 
causality that is opposed to every kind of teleology as well as to its monothe-
istic version, providence.70 Eventually, Plato strongly clashes with this vision, 
subordinating the αὐτόματον to the intelligent cause.
On this ground, one can easily understand why Democritus’s universe, 
ordered by unconditional necessity, is absolutely without εἱμαρμένη (fate or 
destiny), whether in its ontological, ethical or religious sense. Monte Ransome 
69 See Salem (1996a), p. 77 ff.: the hasard is nothing but ‘a nickname for universal Necessity’.
70 See Zeller (1856), II, p. 1078, n. 3: ‘not the accidental [Zufällige], but what is necessary 
by nature’, and Salem (1996a), p. 81: ‘[. . .] automaton – the Greek word that we trans-
late with “chance” – does not mean the “accidental” (das Zufällige) for Democritus. 
It rather means “what produces itself,” that is to say “what is necessary by nature” 
(das Naturnotwendige). This is because [. . .] the school of Abdera denied the existence 
of chance, but it also made use of the concept and the word automaton. Differently from 
Aristotle’s use, the school of Abdera does not consider the automaton as opposed, but 
rather as essentially identical to the ananke.’
  On Aristotle’s concept of chance see below, and Johnson (2005 and 2009). See also 
Morel (1996), pp. 71–2. On the origin of the concept of teleology see Theiler (1924), 
Festugière (1949–54) vol. II, and infra.
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Johnson has underlined the ethical consequences of such a vision, explaining 
how Democritus’s conception of spontaneity and necessity is not only com-
patible with, but also fosters, ethical freedom and individual responsibility.71 
Far from being a universe of resignation and passive acceptance of necessity, 
Democritus’s human world is based on the accomplishment of individual 
freedom and responsibility. Determinism, Johnson argues, is not a threat, but 
rather a condition for moral responsibility. One could say that the space left 
empty by the gods is now available for human freedom, and fi lled by individual 
responsibility.
What happens to monsters? When gods are withdrawn from the world, how 
are order, disorder and monstrosity to be explained? Except for Empedocles, 
Democritus is the only philosopher before Plato whose opinion on physical 
monstrosity has reached us: pangenesis explains monsters’ formation and devel-
opment.72 Democritus is committed to a pangenetical theory, namely the belief 
in the production of the seed (σπέρμα or γονή) not by one single organ, but 
by the whole body and its most important parts (ἀπο παντὸς τοῦ σώματος).73
Herman De Ley has interpreted the difference between Democritus’s pan-
genesis and Aristotle’s panspermia (πανσπερμία) in terms of preformation-
ist vs epigenetic theory.74 Aristotle’s commitment toward epigenesis is well 
known. What is at stake, for him, is the possibility of denying the ‘ambosper-
matic’ theory (which holds that both parents’ semen contribute to the fetus’s 
formation) as well as explaining the regularity in the succession of generations 
(i.e. why humans come from humans, and apples from apple trees). Democri-
tus, on the contrary, develops the theory of ἐπικράτεια, distinctly illustrated 
in three different and closely related Hippocratic texts: Generation, Nature of 
the Child and Diseases IV.75 According to this theory, the seed comes from the 
whole body of both parents, weak from the weaker parts and strong from the 
stronger parts. The mother’s and father’s seeds thus mix together, and from 
the mix, the offspring results.
71 Johnson (2009).
72 Pangenesis is a word coined by Charles Darwin and eventually employed to describe 
several different theories of heredity. See especially the Variation of Animals and Plants 
under Domestication [1875, second edition], in Darwin (1986–9), vols XIX and XX. The 
preformationist theory holds that the seed already contains a miniature version of the 
mature organism; epigenetic theory, that the mature organism develops from a simple, 
undifferentiated seed.
73 See Vorsokr. 68 A 141 (= LM [27] ATOM. D165 = Placit. V.3.6), and Vorsokr. 68 B 124 
(= LM [27] ATOM. D164 = Gal. d. defi n med. 439).
74 De Ley (1980).
75 See Hippocrates (2012). On Democritus’s infl uence on this specifi c section of the Corpus 
Hippocraticum see Salem (1996a).
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The word ἐπικράτεια has political and military senses, referring to domin-
ion, empire, sovereignty; in Democritus’s usage, it refers to the competition 
in which either the female or the male seed dominates to produce a specifi c 
hereditary characteristic in the offspring. Democritus and the Hippocratic 
authors put forward a strictly mechanical theory, perfectly compatible with the 
atomistic paradigm. It explains the offspring’s diversity of sex (which depends 
on the relative strength of the mother’s or the father’s seed), as well as all 
other kinds of diversity (e.g. colour, shape, etc., that is to say all secondary 
qualities). Every characteristic of the offspring results from a strictly immanent 
process of production, epigenetic rather than preformationist.
The ἐπικράτεια also explains physical monstrosity and abnormality, as a 
result of the process of composition of the fetus from the mix of male and 
female seed. Vorsokr. 68 A 146 reads as follows:
Democritus said that monsters [τέρατα] are produced by the confl uence of 
two successive discharges of semen. The later one is also emitted and fl ows 
into the uterus, so that the parts are fused and interlocked. And since in 
birds copulation occurs quickly, he says that eggs and their colours always 
get interlocked and confused.76
Mixing, confusion, disorder, heterogeneity, excess: Democritus’s teratology is 
based on these concepts. The union of different seeds is always a struggle, 
whose outcome is uncertain and precarious.77 Monstrosity is a fundamental 
threat to normality: the difference between the two is only one of degree, and 
not of nature; the difference is contingent and not essential, since both result 
from the normal mixture of male and female seed, in and through the confl ic-
tual process of generation (i.e. the only one conceivable). It is also a funda-
mental threat because, without confl ict and without the resulting ἐπικράτεια, 
there would not be any generation at all, and thus no normality. As I will show 
later, Aristotle is also committed to an agonistic process of formation, which 
is also the necessary condition of Being’s development. For him, however, the 
agonism is between form and matter. For Democritus, on the contrary, only 
matter exists, and the confl ict is all internal to it. Monstrosity, as a specifi c 
case of diversity and differentiation in nature, allows Democritus to banish all 
teleology from nature.
The importance of this theory and of these different approaches to life’s 
generation will appear in the following chapters. The vitality and originality 
76 Taylor (1999), 140, p. 130 (= LM, ATOM D.168 = Arist. GA IV. 4, 769 b 30–6).
77 Salem (1996a), p. 242: ‘un combat douteux’.
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provided by the theory of ἐπικράτεια, for example, can imply an infi nity of 
atomistic production in the universe,78 which in turn suggests the existence of 
an innumerable number of κόσμοι springing out of the atomic components. 
Metrodorus of Chios puts it blatantly: when the causes are infi nite, infi nite are 
also the effects.79 Aristotle draws the same consequences:
There can be no absolute limit, for nothing can be limited except by some-
thing else beyond its limit. [. . .] the imagination can always conceive a 
‘beyond’ reaching out from any limit, so that the series of numerals seems 
to have no limit, nor mathematical magnitudes, nor the ‘beyond the heav-
ens’. Moreover, it seems to follow from the ‘beyond’ being unlimited, that 
‘body’ must be unlimited, and that there must be unlimited worlds.80 
Democritus’s thought, together with that of Empedocles, is the most powerful 
attempt to coherently explain nature and the world on a mechanical basis, 
without any transcendent principle guiding it from above. The production 
of monstrous life, put on the same ground as normal life, plays a fundamen-
tal role in Empedocles’ and Democritus’s system. Monstrosity is a powerful 
conceptual tool that strengthens ancient materialism vis-à-vis the alterna-
tive idealistic discourse put forward by the ‘defi ning fi gures’ in the subsequent 
development of Greek thought, Plato and Aristotle, which I will explore in 
the following chapters.
78 See Mondolfo (1956).
79 Vorsokr. 70 A 6 (= Placit. I.5.4).
80 Arist. Ph. III.4, 203 b 20 ff.
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Plato
Plato does not develop a consistent study of physical monstrosities. Plato is, 
nevertheless, interested in the problem, so much so that one could explain the 
absence of a specifi c discourse on monstrosity in his philosophy by saying that 
the general problem is disseminated throughout the entire system. Besides the 
explicit mention of monstrosity in some passages of his works, the question 
of evil, corruption, degradation, anomaly, disorder is at the core of the myths 
that he presents. Such myths are the foundation for the rational explanation 
that Plato gives to build his idealism – the most powerful reaction against the 
naturalism of the Ionian philosophers, and Democritus’s materialism.
Plato represents the philosophical ideas he intends to fi ght as monstrosi-
ties, and, through his Socrates, condemns such irrational monstrosities in 
the name of a normal and rational philosophy. But he also actively uses the 
monster as an ideological tool that supports, illustrates and explains his phi-
losophy. Monstrosity emerges as the unavoidable problem of philosophy, one 
which even the authors who intend to ban it, at least from the core of their 
systems, are forced to address. The concept of monstrosity is at the heart of 
Plato’s philosophy, through the question of matter and form, the soul and its 
parts (in particular the human soul and its relation to the body on the one 
hand, and to the cosmic order on the other hand), the meaning of provi-
dence and the role of the demiurge.
Matter (ὕλη), in Timaeus, is used in its original sense of wood, ‘ready for 
the joiner’ (Ti. 69 a), rather than in the Aristotelian sense of raw material of 
any process of construction.1 In Democritus’s account, matter was the only 
 1 It is worthy to note that Plato often prefers the ὑποδοχή, the receptacle or space in 
which things are created (e.g. Ti. 49 a, 51 a), and that the full identifi cation of ὑποδοχή 
with ὕλη is only Aristotelian. See Ph. 209 b 11–12 or Cael. 306 b 17–19. See also Taylor 
(1928), p. 493.
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existing material, self-ordering; Plato introduces it in a theological framework 
as the passive object upon which the divine craftsman acts.2 As a cause, matter 
is called necessary (ἀναγκαῖος) and posited as secondary to the divine cause 
(θεῖος);3 matter and necessity itself are thus subordinated, and not only inferior 
but also recalcitrant and dangerous to the order and harmony of the universe. 
The necessary cause is the πλανωμένη αἰτία or the errant (Bury, Cherniss), 
rumbling, and aimless (Taylor) cause, the kind of cause from which monstrosity 
could rise.
Plato explicitly associates the errant cause with anomalous, singular and 
irregular phenomena. In this sense, as a cause, it has an active role, but a threat-
ening one, associated in Plato with ταραχή (trouble, disorder and confusion), as 
well as with ἄνοια (derision, folly and unintelligence), in turn related to ὕβρις 
(violence and insolence) and opposed to φρόνησις (wisdom and intention). 
Plato is thus setting the stage for the opposition of what is good and positive 
to what is bad and negative, namely the monstrous anomaly, the exception.4
Plato’s necessity, though, must not be seen exclusively as what is evil or 
irrational. His attitude towards it is more an ambivalence, and a fruitful one 
after all, since matter is indeed a cause, required by the craftsman to perform 
his work and organise the world. Such a powerful ambiguity surfaces through 
the concept of χώρα, the spatiality or place and receptacle where things are. 
Necessity is truly opposed to reason,5 but it also participates, as χώρα, in 
the intelligible.6 Necessity is required: it makes possible both the teleologi-
cal cosmogonic movement, and the purposiveness ascribed to the craftsman’s 
 2 On the demiurge as a craftsman see Auroux, pp. 577–8, Lalande, pp. 214–15, Ritter, 
Gründer hrsg. (1971–2007), II, cc. 49–50, BNP IV, PP. 262–63, RAC III, PP. 694–711, 
Solmsen (1963), Reydams-Schils (1999) and O’Brien (2015).
 3 Pl. Ti. 68 e–69 a.
 4 See Ast (1835–8) and des Places (1989), passim. See also D. Frede, ‘Grund’, in Schäfer 
(2013, 2. ed.), pp. 141–5. Taylor (1928), p. 300, convincingly argues that ‘it is not the 
“necessary” but the “contingent,” the things for which we do not see any suffi cient rea-
son, the apparently arbitrary “collocations” in nature which are the contribution of that 
which Plato calls here ἀνάγκη. [. . .] There is in the world a good deal of what we may 
call “brute” fact. We know it is there but we do not see “what the good of it” is, though, if 
we think with Timaeus and Plato, we feel satisfi ed that it subserves some good end. Take 
for instance the apparent anomalies of the planets. [. . .] what Timaeus means to put 
down to the score of ἀνάγκη [. . .] is specifi cally those “conjunctions” for which we can 
see no justifi cation in the form of a valuable result, and have to accept simply as “given 
fact”.’ A similar and coherent example would be that of monstrosities.
 5 Pl. Ti. 47 e–48 a. 
 6 Pl. Ti. 52 b. See also Festugière (1949–54), II, pp. 110–16 and Réfl exions sur le problème 
du mal chez Eschyle et Platon, in Festugière (1971), pp. 8–37.
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work itself. Within this theist vision,7 ἀνάγκη is opposed to νοῦς, and thus it 
becomes a tool to undermine Ionian naturalism and atomistic mechanicism. 
Socrates leads the charge in Phaedo 97 d–99 b, with his ironically bitter disap-
pointment for Anaxagoras, whom he believed to be a true philosopher but 
who in fact ‘made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes 
for the ordering of things’.8 The Athenian Stranger in The Laws follows up, 
rebuffi ng those who believe that νοῦς, θεός and τέχνη (design) do not play any 
role in the cosmogony.9
Heraclitus had already recognised that guilt, injustice, contradiction and 
pain exist only from the limited point of view of men, but from the divine 
point of view of the whole they result in the ultimate harmony. Plato appro-
priates Anaxagoras’s concept and turns it upside down, making it a principle 
of transcendence. Plato’s universe becomes entirely theological and thor-
oughly teleological.10 Its craftsman purposively works to produce it with a 
τέλος in mind:
All things are ordered systematically by Him who cares for the World-all 
with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole, whereof also 
each part, so far as it can, does and suffers what is proper to it. To each of 
these parts, down to the smallest fraction, rulers of their action and passion 
are appointed to bring fulfi lment even to the uttermost fraction; whereof 
thy portion also, O perverse man, is one, and tends therefore always in its 
striving towards the All, tiny though it be. But thou failest to perceive that 
all partial generation is for the sake of the Whole, in order that for the life 
of the World-all blissful existence may be secured, – it not being generated 
for thy sake, but thou for its sake.11
Every part or individual in the universe, no matter how minute or imperfect, 
is thus thought of as a part of the universal and divine teleology.
Plato’s theological and teleological cosmogony has important implica-
tions for the nature of the body, in particular the human body, and its relation 
with the soul. Because perfection and divinity are above, and act from above, 
 7 Taylor (1928), p. 299: ‘Henceforth νοῦς and ἀνάγκη are the regular names used for what 
have hitherto been distinguished as the true αἰτία or the αἰτία which is an ἔμφρων φύσις 
and its “accessory” or “accomplice”.’
 8 See Warden (1971), p. 14.
 9 Pl. Lg. X.889 b–d.
10 See Festugière (1949–54), II, pp. 100–32 on Timaeus’s teleology. See also J. Müller, ‘Ziel/
Zweck’, in Schäfer (2013, 2. ed.), pp. 340–3.
11 Pl. Lg. X.903 b. E. B. England, in Plato (1976), II, p. 49 thinks of this passage in connection 
with Ti. 41 a ff.
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all the universe’s parts are hierarchically and vertically ordered, disposed from 
the more to the less perfect as in a great chain of being.12 The further down 
this chain one moves, the more disorder and evil one fi nds. Evil, in Plato’s 
view, depends precisely on the distance that separates it from the superior 
sphere. Everything material is confi ned below, while everything ideal and 
immaterial is raised above. Being, in its bodily nature and existence, is thus 
inferior and subordinated to its psychic essence. What is, though, the relation 
between the two?
The ψυχή, ungenerated and indestructible, moves itself (Phdr. 245 c); it 
is the cause of life (Cra. 399 d) and, equally important, it is fi rst in order of 
Becoming and has superior authority over bodies.13 Despite its priority, though, 
the soul actually inhabits the body, as if imprisoned in it, in order to expiate its 
faults. ‘I once heard one of our sages say,’ Socrates says in Grg. 493 a, ‘that we 
are now dead, and the body is our tomb [σῆμα],’ and he also explains in Cra. 
400 c 1 that ‘the Orphic poets gave this name [σῆμα] with the idea that the 
soul is undergoing punishment for something; they think it has the body as an 
enclosure to keep it safe, like a prison, and this is, as the name [σῶμα, body] 
itself denotes, the safe [σῶμα] for the soul, until the penalty is paid, and not 
even a letter needs to be changed.’14 Thus, Plato suggests that evil, undeni-
ably present in the phenomenal world, must be explained through the relation 
between the soul, or the incorporeal, and the body, or the material.15
On the one hand, only ideas are perfect and perfectly real entities 
(Ti. 52 a–c), thus constituting the model and paradigm, whereas everything 
that inhabits the phenomenal world is by defi nition less perfect, a copy or 
a refl ection. Ideas and objects thus face each other, like the Same and the 
Other, the positive and the negative, good and evil. On the other hand, 
nothing corporeal can be the cause of its own motion, but rather needs to be 
moved by the soul, which also exclusively exhibits reason and purposiveness 
(Ti. 46 d 5 – e 2).16 The soul is therefore the origin and the cause of every 
motion including the one that produces imperfect or evil or monstrous things.
12 See Lovejoy (1942).
13 Pl. Lg. X.892 b and Ti. 34 d–35 a. Taylor (1928), p. 105 explains that ‘“fi rst in order of 
becoming” need not mean fi rst in order of time; it means fi rst in the ontological order, 
the order of dependence’. See also W. Brinker, ‘Seele’, in Schäfer (2013, 2. ed.), pp. 
253–8.
14 See also Grg. 525 a. On the theme of the body as a tomb and the false etymology σῶμα-
σῆμα see Courcelle (1966) and A. J. Festugière, ‘Réfl exions sur le problème du mal chez 
Eschyle et Platon’, in Festugière (1971), pp. 8–37. On the non-Orphic origin of this idea, 
see Dodds (1951), ch. V. For its infl uence on Middle and Neoplatonic thought see below.
15 See C. Schäfer, ‘Böse’, in Schäfer (2013, 2. ed.), pp. 63–7.
16 See Taylor (1928), pp. 292–3.
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This ambiguity surfaces once again in the Laws (book X), where Plato 
explicitly holds that evil too, no differently from good, has its origin in the 
soul – or souls:
ATH. Must we not necessarily agree, in the next place, that soul is the cause 
of things good and bad, fair and foul, just and unjust, and all the opposites, 
if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things? [. . .] One soul, is it, or 
several? I will answer for you – ‘several’. Anyhow, let us assume not less 
than two – the benefi cent (εὐεργετικός) soul and that which is capable of 
effecting results of the opposite kind. [. . .] Soul drives all things in Heaven 
and earth and sea by its own motion [. . .] both when, in conjunction with 
reason, it runs aright and always governs all things rightly and happily, 
and when, in converse with unreason, it produces results which are in all 
respects the opposite.17 
Scholars have extensively debated the possible Oriental infl uences on Plato’s 
theory of the soul. This text is extremely infl uential for the dualist interpreta-
tion of Platonism, claimed by several Middle and Neoplatonic authors in the 
following centuries.18 The origin of evil and imperfection comes threateningly 
close to the same principle that generates goodness and order. Plato must have 
felt this problem less intensely than his Platonic followers who would eventu-
ally have to face Gnosticism. He must have been well aware, though, of the 
alternative at stake, as well as of all its nuances: discharging the demiurge 
from the responsibility of generating evil ends up making the principle of evil 
itself dangerously autonomous. Conversely, recognising only one principle at 
the origin of everything means making it responsible for both good and evil.
The ψυχή seems thus to be assigned an ambiguous status,19 being at the 
same time the victim as well as the artifi cer of evil, to some extent related to 
the ὕλη and, more in general, to everything that is visible (ὁρατός), corporeal 
(σωματοειδής) or tangible (ἁπτός). This ambiguous status is of primary impor-
tance to Plato’s heritage in the interpretation, understanding and justifi cation 
of monstrosity both in the world and in the soul. The monist and the dualist 
interpretations of Plato have confronted each other on this ground. Insofar as 
17 Pl. Lg. 896 d 3–897 b 4. E. B. England, in Plato (1976), II, p. 476: ‘[effects] are orderly 
and happy if νοῦς is ψυχή’s guide, and quite the reverse if it allies itself with ἀνοία.’
18 See infra.
19 The classical opposition in scholarship is between Festugière (1947), who locates the 
evil’s source in matter, and Cherniss (1954), who maintains that evil has a plurality of 
sources in Plato’s thought, claiming that matter is passive and that evil is a necessary 
consequence of the action of soul upon the body. See also Hager (1962) and Sambursky 
(1956 and 1962).
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the soul is considered as victim, monstrosity is seen as otherness, threatening 
the soul and its order from outside. When the soul, on the contrary, is consid-
ered as the only mover acting upon matter, Being itself is dangerously polluted 
by a sort of inner monstrosity at every level of its expression, including its 
highest and divine dimension.
Plato insists on keeping together the ethico-political, aesthetical and onto-
logical aspects of this analysis, denouncing the deleterious consequences of an 
evil soul in the Sophist: ‘We must say that there are two kinds of evil in the 
soul. [. . .] The one is comparable to a disease in the body, the other to a defor-
mity. [. . .] we must regard a foolish soul as deformed and ill-proportioned.’20 
Ignorance and foolishness are analysed through the category of deformity 
(αἶσχος) and disproportion (ἀμετρία), and thus linked to monstrosity. This 
deformity can be normalised and corrected through a gymnastic – that is, the 
proper way of reasoning – after which the monstrous sophist will have been 
ultimately defeated.
One of the most striking metaphors in Plato’s works speaks openly of the 
dangerous implications of the soul’s multiple nature: the image by which 
Socrates describes the soul. It occurs in book IX of the Republic, where Plato 
deals with injustice, contrasting Thrasymachus’s and Glaucon’s infamous posi-
tion on the utility of injustice for the unjust human. Plato wants the sophists 
to see what the implications of such a position are. In order to do so, Socrates 
forges an ‘image of the soul’, linking together the city and the individual (that 
is, politics and morality) in the most monstrous vision in all of Plato’s work:
One of those like the creatures whose nature is recorded in ancient myth 
[. . .] such as Chimera, Scylla, and Cerberus, and the numerous other cases 
where many forms are said to have grown into one. [. . .] put together a 
single form of a complex many-headed animal, but with a circle of heads 
of both tame and wild beasts, capable of changing and growing all these 
parts out of itself.21 
20 Pl. Sph. 227 d 5–228 d 2.
21 Pl. R. 588 c. Note the active and growing character of this beast’s monstrosity. It is 
in fact able to multiply and produce new heads, like the Lernaean Hydra, which will 
become the paradigmatic symbol of rebellion and revolt in modernity. Plato humorously 
explores the theme of the hydra, which he compares to a female sophist, in Euthd. 297 
c: by cutting off one of the sophist’s arguments, new ones proliferate threateningly. On 
Plato’s image see also Cherniss (1944), I, p. 254, n. 262 and Walter Leszl’s commentary 
in Aristotele (1975), pp. 139 ff. On the hydra μυριόκρανος RE IX.1, pp. 44–52, BNP VI, 
pp. 598–99, RAC XVI, pp. 904–15, Roscher (1884–90), Grimal (1951), Grimal (1965) 
and Gantz (1993). On the enormous iconographic success of this subject see LIMC 
IV–V, Reid (1993), I, pp. 553–4. See also Oriol-Boyer (1975).
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Plato fi nds inspiration, of course, in the traditional image of the chimera. In the 
Iliad, it has the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and a serpent for a tail. Hesiod 
also speaks about a three-headed creature in the shape of lion, goat and snake.22 
Plato’s monster seems closer to Homer’s than to Hesiod’s. It is, however, stun-
ningly original, since Plato not only refers to a tradition but also reshapes it in 
view of the precise and detailed moral meaning that he intends to assign to the 
allegory. Socrates does not simply describe an existing monster but, as if the 
monstrous animals of the tradition were insuffi cient to convey a philosophical 
meaning, actually forges an image under the reader’s eyes, as if the constructive 
process were more effective and rhetorically powerful.23 He continues:
Now put together another in the shape of a lion, and one in the shape of a 
human being: let the fi rst one be by far the biggest and the second one sec-
ond in size. [. . .] now join these three into one so that they are somehow 
fused together. [. . .] now put the fi gure of a single creature on the outside 
of them, the image of a human being so that to someone who can’t see 
what’s on the inside, only the covering on the outside, it looks like a single 
creature – a human being [. . .].24 
Traditional chimeras did not have any human part. Not only does Plato inno-
vate the human part of the monster; he also sets the human in contrast to the 
monstrous within the same body. The balance of the individual parts of the 
soul is carefully described by Plato, underlining that the monstrous part is big-
ger than the animal one, which is bigger than the veritable human part of it, 
precisely as workers are more numerous than warriors, which in turn are more 
numerous than philosophers in Plato’s best city.25 The stage is thus ready for 
the ultimate confl ict between humanity and monstrosity, whose function is to 
rebuke the sophist’s claim about justice.
Plato’s deployment of the mythical chimera is striking, considering that 
he openly condemns myths and their allegorical use. He blames Homer and 
Hesiod in particular, since myths cannot be used to educate or convey truth.26 
The myth corrupts the mind, especially the young minds, and cannot refl ect 
the higher truth that only philosophical speculation can attain. Phaedrus’s 
22 Il. VI.180–3. Hes. Th. 321–2. See also supra.
23 See Louis (1945).
24 Pl. R. 588 d–e. J. Adams, in Plato (1963, 2nd ed.), II, p. 363: ‘[. . .] according to Plato, 
the true unity of the individual is realised only through the subjection of the two lower 
“parts” of the soul to the highest [. . .].’ On the confl ict within the soul in Plato see 
Dodds (1951), ch. VII.
25 See Marignac (1951), pp. 111–15.
26 Pl. R. 376 e–377 c.
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Socrates blames the chimera explicitly: giving a rational explanation for 
Oreithyia’s rape by Boreas, he censures the false images that corrupt the spirit, 
such as ‘Centaurs, [. . .] Chimaera, [and] the whole crowd of such creatures, 
Gorgons and Pegas, and multitudes of strange, inconceivable, portentous 
natures.’27 Once used, such images should be corrected, amended, improved 
and restored to their correct meaning, for which Plato uses ἐπανορθόω: with 
a medical, ethical and political sense, it is a veritable remedy (φάρμακον), 
which would be needed against the perversion of such imaginary monsters to 
bring them back to what is knowable, likeable and plausible (the εἰκός). It is 
better, thus, to avoid them and turn to the philosophical enquiry about the 
true nature of things. Beyond and against the rationalisation of myths, which 
produces solely a plausible knowledge, Plato offers the only true philosophical 
enquiry.28
Poets and artists are capable of creating only ghosts and appearances, and 
their work never approaches reality. Every representation is condemned to 
such a destiny because of the necessary distance from the highest ontological 
reality, that of ideas, as explained in R. 595 a–608 b. Plato himself, however, 
paradoxically makes use of a plethora of such images, myths and allegories 
throughout his work.29 Their strategic role is essential to Plato’s argumenta-
tion and they cannot be dismissed as pure rhetorical ornaments. The image of 
the tripartite soul is of this kind, and Plato establishes this monstrous image at 
the core of his theory of the soul:
Let’s say [. . .] to the speaker who argues that it’s profi table for this person 
to do wrong and there’s no advantage in doing just deeds, that he means 
nothing more than that it’s profi table for him to feed the compound crea-
ture well and make it strong, as well as the lion and what’s related to it, 
but to starve the man and make him weak, so that he’s dragged about 
wherever either of them leads him, and not to get either of them used to 
each other and become friends, but leave them to bite each other, fi ght, 
and eat each other [. . .]30 
27 Pl. Phdr. 229 d. See Reinhardt (1927), Jaeger (1947), Buffi ère (1956), C. Ginzburg, Mito, in 
Settis a cura di (1996–2002), I, pp. 197–237, Morgan (2000), Janka, Schäfer hrsg. (2014).
28 Following Nestle (1942, 2. ed.), Untersteiner (1955, 2a ed.), p. 352 suggests that Plato 
is criticising Palaephatus here, since the list of mythical monstrosities appears in the 
paradoxographer’s work. On paradoxography see Giannini (1963 and 1964).
29 See e.g. Brochard (1926, 2e ed.), Les mythes dans la philosophie de Platon, pp. 46–54, 
Frutiger (1930), Schuhl (1947a), Pépin (1957), Bollack (1971), Morgan (2000), Moreau 
(2006), pp. 65–100, Collobert, Destrée, Gonzalez eds. (2012) and Destrée, Edmonds III 
eds.(2017).
30 Pl. R. 588 e–589 a.
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The mythical image is prodigiously set in motion, and it starts living its life, 
made of the confl ictual dynamic among the soul’s different parts. It is a veri-
table dialectic, in which the exclusively human part of the soul must make use 
of its affective dimension, while at the same time taming the monstrous part 
and preventing its growth. Who or what is the real human? And if it has to 
make the νοῦς prevail over the other faculties, how would it overcome its own 
irrational components?
And on the other hand does this mean that he who claims that justice is 
profi table would say that one must do and say those things from which the 
man within the man will be the strongest and will look after the many-
headed beast, like a farmer, by feeding and domesticating the tame animals 
and preventing the wild ones from breeding, and, making an ally of the 
lion’s nature, and, caring for them all in common, will bring them up in 
such a way as to make them friendly to each other and himself?31 
The ‘man within the man’ personifying reason and logic has, in particular, 
puzzled interpreters. Is this man also only a human shape, enveloping in 
turn a monstrous creature? A human form (ιδέα ἀνθρώπου) represents the 
intelligence (λογιστικόν). However, it hides, in an ambiguous manner, the 
potentially monstrous reality of an untamed passionality. This reveals Plato’s 
diffi culty in representing human psychology, since only reason seems to be 
really human but, at the same time, reason needs affectivity, which is indeed 
part of the human. Even worse, reason itself possibly hides something impure, 
precisely as the human does.32
Notwithstanding Plato’s effort to hide the savage beast inside the soul, 
and tame it with the force of reason, the outcome is nonetheless deformed, 
even though wrecked by a different kind of monstrosity. This is Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s reading of Socrates and his hyper-intellectualism. Socrates becomes 
31 Pl. R. IX.588 b–c. See S. Gastaldi, ‘L’immagine dell’anima e la felicità del giusto’, in 
Vegetti (1998–2007), VI, pp. 593–633.
32 Annas (1981), p. 145: ‘The more Plato insists that reason is responsible for the welfare 
of the soul as a whole, the more he expands its capacities until it threatens to become 
not just a homunculus but a bogeyman.’ Rosen (2005), p. 349, has also noticed the 
ambiguity, without however underlining the diffi culty that might arise from it: ‘We see 
at once that the human being inside the outer shell is supposed to stand for the intellect, 
whereas the lion represents spiritedness and the remaining bestial heads are the vari-
ous desires of the part of the soul that loves gain. There is of course no point-by-point 
analogy; to mention only the obvious, the inner human being presumably has a soul 
with three parts of its own. But the soul is more like a fantastic mélange of human and 
nonhuman loves and desires than it is like a ratio of numbers and geometrical forms.’
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in Nietzsche’s reading an atrophic being, or rather a monstrous defectus.33 
Nietzsche identifi es the rationalist response to instinctivity as a monstrosity 
opposed to another monstrosity in Greek culture. Whereas, though, the mon-
strosity of irrational instinct is openly named, the monstrosity of the hypertro-
phic reason is hidden under the surface of the new Greek man.
Socrates develops – one should rather say invents – a moral psychology, in 
order to claim the happiness of the just. Justice, however, needs to be defi ned 
vis-à-vis injustice, which in turn reveals its monstrously unobliterable pres-
ence. The sudden and chimeric appearance of the monstrous creature, the 
θηρίον, testifi es not only to Plato’s great inventiveness in forging powerful 
metaphors, but also to his serious concern in explaining and dealing with the 
confl ict between the superior and the inferior, between good and evil, between 
the perfection and the imperfection that inhabit the world.34
The θηρίον is the savage beast, the lion, the bear or the boar, and has 
been used as a legendary monster by Homer, Aeschylus and Herodotus.35 
It is not irrelevant that Plato chooses a rare term, as well as one around which, 
as Chantraine underlines, a whole family of Greek words has arisen related to 
hunting, fi shing and, in a more fi gurative sense, chasing.36
33 Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie. Oder: Griechenthum und Pessimismus, in Nietzsche 
(1967–), III.1, par. 13, p. 86: ‘Einen monstrosen defectus jeder mystischen Anlage 
[. . .], so dass Sokrates als der specifi sche Nicht-Mystiker zu bezeichnen wäre, in dem die 
logische Natur durch eine Superfl ötation eben so excessiv entwickelt ist wie im Mystiker 
jene instinctive Weisheit [a monstrous defect of every mystical talent, so that Socrates 
can be considered a specifi c case of the non-mystical man, in whom the logical nature 
has become simply too massive through an excessive use, just like instinctive wisdom in 
the mystic].’ Socrates was harshly ridiculed even in his own time, for example by Aristo-
phanes. The mask representing him was intended to be close to his actual appearance, 
thus collapsing the distance between the physical reality and the grotesque caricature 
that would be expected. Ael. VH II.13 reports how fi ercely Socrates responds to this 
public attack – he stands up in the theatre to draw attention away from the scene being 
presented and toward him, confronting the play’s authors and actors and claiming his 
reality in the face of the play’s caricature.
34 See Heidegger (1961 [1942/7]), p. 226 and passim, Bernhardt (1971), passim, K. A. Morgan, 
‘Theriomorphism and the Composite Soul in Plato’, in Collobert, Destrée, Gonzalez eds. 
(2012), pp. 323–42, Tsagdis (2016), and D. Cairn, The Tripartite Soul as Metaphor, in Destrée, 
Edmonds III, eds. (2017), pp. 219–38. On the θηρίον see Chantraine, p. 435. 
35 TGL sub voce.
36 Chantraine, p. 435. Plato also employs the image of the yoke of the idea, whose explicit 
violence should not be undermined. See R. VI, 507 e 5–508 a 2: ‘It is by no insignifi cant 
notion that the sense of sight and the ability to be seen have been yoked together by 
a more valuable yoke [ζυγόν] than all other combination, unless light has no value’ 
[translation modifi ed].
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The allusion to hunting and fi shing brings the reader to the struggle against 
the sophist once again, as Umberto Curi has suggested.37 The term διαιρέω 
(dividing) in Plato’s philosophical method refers to the choice and the dis-
tinction between arguments, but is also built on the αἵρεσις, the conquest or 
the taking of someone else’s power and belonging. The αἱρέω ambivalently 
suggests the grasping of something with the intellect, but also with the hands. 
It is a polemical notion that leaves little space to the pacifi c confrontation of 
opinions. The necessity of catching the monstrous beast of the tripartite soul 
resonates in Plato’s choice of words, especially the θήρα, referring to the mon-
strous sophist: ‘It is now our business not to let the beast get away again, for we 
have almost got him into a kind of encircling net of the devices we employ in 
arguments about such subjects, so that he will not now escape the next thing’ 
(Sph. 235 a 10 – 236 b 3).38 Facing the monstrous sophist, the true philosopher 
must employ the same means one employs with lions and boars: to constrain 
(βιάζο), and even torture and torment (βασανίζο), to arrive at the truth. The 
inner confl ictual dimension of the soul is thus connected with the external, 
and equally confl ictual, relation between the bearer of knowledge and the 
malevolent liar.
This confl ict also refl ects the opposition between the material and ideal 
which constantly challenge the order of the universe and make it essentially 
and dangerously precarious. Νοῦς and ἀνάγκη face each other in a never-
ending struggle, evidenced by the evil and monstrosities, thus revealing the 
unstable character of the demiurge’s work.
Plato makes a huge effort to depart from the superstitious and vulgar con-
ception of deity.39 Matter is in God’s hands and he necessarily operates for the 
sake of the good; this is his τέλος:
God desired that, so far as possible, all things should be good and nothing 
evil; wherefore, when He took over all that was visible, seeing that it was 
not in a state of rest but in a state of discordant and disorderly motion, 
He brought it into order out of disorder, deeming that the former state is 
in all ways better than the latter. [. . .] He constructed reason within soul 
and soul within body as He fashioned the All, that so the work He was 
executing might be of its nature most fair and most good. Thus, then, in 
accordance with the likely account, we must declare that this Cosmos has 
37 Curi (2000).
38 See Curi (2000), pp. 61–2. Such a polemical attitude, as well as the conception of the 
search for truth as a battle, was indeed shared by the Sophists themselves. See Untersteiner 
(1949), pp. 26–7.
39 Pl. R. II, 378 e ff. See also Babut (1974).
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verily come into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and 
reason owing to the providence of God.40 
The universe’s order, supposedly beautiful (καλός) and good (ἀγαθός) because 
of the demiurge’s action, which is necessarily positive, is continually chal-
lenged by everything that is bad and evil (κακός and φαῦλος), defective and 
perverse (πονηρός), but also monstrous and bestial (θηριώδης, associated with 
the savage [ἄγριος], irrational [ἄλογος] and unknowable [ἄγνωστος]).41 The 
process of ordering of matter, moreover, is far from being peaceful: the demi-
urge must use violence (βία) to harmonise it.42 The demiurge’s providence 
(πρόνοια) and care (ἐπιμέλεια) for the universe are thus caught between their 
foundational role for the entire cosmogonic account and their powerlessness 
to fully achieve the end of goodness.
Another famous myth perfectly illustrates the absence of linearity in the 
movement that brings chaos to order. In the Statesman, Plato claims that it is 
not possible to hold a coherent discourse on the origin of the universe, given 
the ignorance of it to which we are forever condemned.43 He thus employs 
once again the myth describing the double origin of the world and the cosmo-
gonic movement. God directly guides the universe for a certain time, keeping 
it in order and caring about every aspect of life. Once this cycle is accom-
plished, God leaves the world to itself, and the world revolves back, with no 
guidance from the divine. The former is the age of Chronos, and the latter the 
age of Zeus, in which we live and die.
In our (Zeus’s) age, we know the reproduction of living beings one from 
the other, ancestors producing offspring. In Chronos’s time, though, generation 
happened in a completely different way:
First the age of all animals, whatever it was at the moment, stood still, 
and every mortal creature stopped growing older in appearance and then 
reversed its growth and became, as it were, younger and more tender; [. . .] 
40 Pl. Ti. 29 e 1–30 c 1. See also R. 379 b–c and Lg. 900 d 2–3. Does god produce the world 
out of his will or out of necessity, given that he is necessarily good? This question will 
deeply affect the early Christian reception of Platonism, and is extremely relevant for 
every future theodicy, since two very different principles become available to explain the 
presence of evil, imperfection and monstrosity in the world.
41 See R. Schönberger, ‘Gute, das’, in Schäfer (2013, 2. ed.), pp. 145–50. See also W. 
Mesch, ‘Demiurg’, in Schäfer (2013, 2. ed.), pp. 74–6. More in general, on the κακός in 
the ancient world, see Sluiter, Rosen eds. (2008).
42 Pl. Ti. 35 a. See Bernhardt (1971), p. 196 and J. J. Porter, The Disgrace of Matter in 
Ancient Aesthetics, in Sluiter, Rosen eds. (2008), pp. 283–317.
43 Pl. Ti. 29 c–d.
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being begotten of one another was no part of the natural order of that 
time, but the earth-born race which, according to tradition, once existed, 
was the race which returned at that time out of the earth; and the memory 
of it was preserved by our earliest ancestors, who were born in the begin-
ning of our period and therefore were next neighbours to the end of the 
previous period of the world’s revolution, with no interval between.44 
After a short overlapping, then, one age gives place to the other, in an end-
less succession of cycles. With respect to Chronos’s time, Plato tackles the 
question of spontaneous generation that had been at the heart of ancient 
cosmogonies, e.g. of Empedocles and Anaximander, in whose work one fi nds 
its earliest mention.45 However, no monster comes out of the earth in Plato’s 
version. On the contrary, in the age of Chronos, such generation from the 
earth is not spontaneous (αὐτόματος) at all. It is directly guided by God and 
cared about in its minutest details. There is no attempt to generate different 
species through monstrosities, but rather, perfection is brought forth, from the 
earth, at once. Plato can thus turn upside down the mechanist explanation of 
the ancient cosmogonies and, through the absence of monstrosity, build the 
hypothesis of a caring divinity directly responsible for the production of life.
The Statesman is not the only work in which the duality of the creative 
movement is explored. Another myth, that of the androgyne in the Symposium, 
reinforces the idea of a double process of generation. This time, it happens to 
a creature which is indeed monstrous, and through a process reminiscent of 
the trial-and-error development of creatures posited by ancient cosmogonies.
[O]ur original nature was by no means the same as it is now. In the fi rst 
place, there were three kinds of human beings, not merely the two sexes, 
male and female, as at present: there was a third kind as well, which had 
equal shares of the other two, and whose name survives though the thing 
itself has vanished. For ‘man-woman’ [ἀνδρόγυνος, hermaphrodite] was 
then a unity in form no less than name, composed of both sexes and shar-
ing equally in male and female; [. . .] the form of each person was round 
all over, with back and sides encompassing it every way; each had four 
arms, and legs to match these, and two faces perfectly alike on a cylindrical 
neck. There was one head to the two faces, which looked opposite ways; 
there were four ears, two privy members, and all the other parts, as may be 
imagined, in proportion.46 
44 Pl. Plt. 270 e. See Schuhl (1947a).
45 Kirk, Raven (1960, 2nd ed.), 136–9.
46 Pl. Smp. 189 d–190 c.
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These original monsters are once again the opposite of the early creatures of 
the ancient cosmogonies. Whereas Empedocles’ monsters died for their lack 
of adequacy to the environment, Plato’s original androgynes are very nimble 
and vigorous, to the point that, self-confi dent enough, they decide to assault 
the gods, like the giants their predecessors.
The gods are perplexed, since they wish to avoid the same outcome of the 
gigantomachy and the complete destruction of the androgynes. Zeus thus sug-
gests to only diminish their strength, slicing them in two parts so as to make 
them weaker and more useful at once. He also promises to keep slicing them 
in two, should it be needed, to fraction their strength even further. With the 
help of Apollo, Zeus accomplishes the task. Although the living beings are 
perfectly functional, the division impacts their behaviour as well. Unexpect-
edly, they irresistibly tend to reunite with each other and embrace their mate 
until they starve. Zeus is thus forced to quickly fi nd a remedy, before the whole 
race becomes extinct. He therefore moves the genitals so as to create men and 
women as we know them.
The fi nal outcome is far from being the refi nement of a coherent project, 
or the accomplishment of the best shape, guided by a rational design. Men and 
women, contrarywise, shamefully bear the mark of their genealogy, in the ugli-
ness of their present conformation: ‘Each of us, then, is but a tally [σύμβολον, 
also a “portent” and an “omen”] of a man, since every one shows like a fl at-fi sh 
the traces of having been sliced in two; and each is ever searching for the tally 
that will fi t him.’47 The human is tentatively crafted by Zeus, from its origi-
nal powerful monstrosity, to its current and no less ugly shape. Its weakness 
refl ects its tortuous genealogy, whose beginning and end is equally monstrous.
In this chapter, I have outlined the main areas in which we can discern 
monstrosity directly and indirectly in Plato’s philosophy. Monstrosity surfaces 
in his account of the world’s order and its formation as a testament both to 
the superiority of ideas over matter and the rational design through which 
the demiurge has shaped the cosmos. As we have seen, Plato’s main target 
is ancient materialism, particularly Democritus’s atomism. Monstrosity also 
emerges in Plato’s psychology as a polemical metaphor whose normative func-
tion is to point to the model of a rational creature that has to tame the irra-
tional and instinctual dimension that is dangerously hidden in each and every 
human. Prodigious myths and monstrous metaphors are thus at the core of the 
idealist construction that fundamentally shapes Attic Greek thought.
47 Pl. Smp. 191 d.
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Plato’s language and metaphorical approach make it easy to integrate 
monstrous beings into his philosophical framework. As we will see in the 
next chapter, however, a different attitude arises in this period – a less meta-
phorical, more scientifi c approach to the study of nature developed outside 
the Academy, initially by Aristotle, Plato’s most brilliant pupil, and later by 
new philosophical systems such as Epicureanism and Stoicism. Platonism, as 
we have seen, was decisive for the depiction of a vertical and transcendental 
concept of nature and for its axiological ontology, in which the inferior and 
monstrous beings are pushed to the bottom of the scale. As we will see in 
the next chapter, Aristotelianism somehow fl attens this ideal concept of the 
universe without completely renouncing either transcendence or axilogy.
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Aristotle
Plato’s effort to counter the materialism of early natural philosophers in gen-
eral, and of atomists in particular, is pursued by Aristotle, his most brilliant 
pupil in the Academy. Far from repeating his master’s steps, fi rmly anchored 
in the mythical explanation of nature and its origin, Aristotle develops one of 
the most extraordinary philosophical systems ever conceived. Aristotle’s idea 
of nature and, within it, of normality, abnormality and monstrosity, becomes 
the reference for generations of scholars and represents, with important varia-
tions, the mainstream philosophical and scientifi c conception for centuries.
In this chapter, I will show how Aristotle’s causal theory functions as a 
framework to interpret monstrosity and rework the conclusions reached by the 
materialists and idealists who came before him. If monsters deserve scientifi c 
analysis, it is because they must be accommodated within the normal regime 
of production of being in nature. Only a complex causality that subordinates 
every aspect of being to its end or purpose satisfactorily explains, in Aristotle’s 
view, apparently abnormal phenomena. I will next show how this approach 
brings Aristotle to completely re-evaluate the notion of chance and neces-
sity, beyond and against ancient materialist theories. Although Aristotle also 
intends to overcome Plato’s radical realism, his main targets are Empedocles 
and Democritus, whose theories remain potent, nourishing the Hellenistic 
renaissance of materialism that comes with Epicurus. This struggle, as I will 
show in the last part of this chapter, is also refl ected in the internal debates 
of the school Aristotle founded, the Lyceum, in which leading fi gures such as 
Theophrastus and Strato rework the master’s doctrines, including the notion 
of monstrosity.
Aristotle’s is both a philosophical and a scientifi c enterprise. Not only 
because no clear distinction is really possible between science and philosophy, 
but also because, more specifi cally, Aristotle is interested in developing, within 
his philosophy, a proper scientifi c attitude toward the enquiry into natural 
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phenomena, thus developing an approach that many modern investigators 
of nature, including the anti-Aristotelians, regard with respect. While a few 
words, sometimes cryptical and hermetic, were often enough for the earlier 
mythographers and philosophers, and even for Plato, to evoke the basic prin-
ciples of an entire metaphysics, Aristotle insightfully explores, with rich and 
original prose, every aspect of reality without sparing details and digressions. 
He questions every aspect of a problem and tackles issues of all sorts, including 
the systematical analysis and critique of his sources, within whose works he is 
capable of recognising not only faults, but also merit.
While the earlier philosophers had aimed, fi rst and foremost, at identifying 
a founding principle upon which every aspect of reality could be grounded, 
without necessarily detailing every aspect, Aristotle is on the contrary keen to 
cover the whole of reality, explicitly developing different scientifi c discourses 
for the different parts of the universe, from the highest to the lowest. Thus, 
the former, i.e. the skies and the celestial bodies, lose their traditional onto-
logical primacy and priority. Or, in other words, this primacy and priority is 
valid only within the metaphysical discourse, but not absolutely, when one 
analyses the physics of the universe. Every aspect of reality has its own dignity 
and its own priority within its specifi c domain, and especially in the biological 
one. Every angle of reality is thus worthy to be studied:
So far as in us lies, we will not leave out any one of them, be it never so 
mean; for though there are animals which have no attractiveness for the 
senses, yet for the eye of science, for the student who is naturally of a philo-
sophic spirit and can discern the causes of things, Nature which fashioned 
them provides joys which cannot be measured. [. . .] Wherefore we must 
not betake ourselves to the consideration of the meaner animals with a bad 
grace [ἀτιμοτέρων ζῴων], as though we were children; since in all natural 
things there is somewhat of the marvellous [ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς 
ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν].1 
People, and scientists in particular, speak about the ἄτιμος, what is not hon-
ourable or deemed worthy of any esteem and consideration. Nevertheless, no 
such thing exists in nature for Aristotle, since even the lower beings partici-
pate in and convey the marvellous nature of the universe.
I fi nd particularly important here Aristotle’s suggestion of joining together 
the ἄτιμος and the θαυμαστός, the unworthy and the wonderful, admirable 
and excellent. Aristotle is not only stimulating the reader’s attention with a 
 1 Arist. PA I.5, 645 a 7 ff.
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striking paradox. He is also drawing the reader’s regard to the fact that what 
is usually despised and considered as worthless, at least in the physical world, 
conduces on the contrary toward the highest spheres of knowledge, and in 
some sense toward the divine.2
There is something seminal in this new attitude toward the marvellous 
character inherent in inferior things. Wonder, for Aristotle, fuels the atti-
tude toward knowledge in general and philosophy in particular, as stated in 
a famous page of Metaphysics, which reiterates a Platonic idea: ‘It is through 
wonder (θαυμάζειν) that men now begin and originally began to philoso-
phise; wondering in the fi rst place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual 
progression raising questions about the greater matters too.’3 Θαυμάζειν 
leads to curiosity and curiosity awakens the desire to understand. It is not the 
perfection of the heavenly bodies, Aristotle argues, that leads men toward 
knowledge, but rather the amazing character of nature as a whole, includ-
ing (especially) its supposedly unworthy phenomena. That these phenomena 
occur only in the terrestrial realm and not in the superior world must be 
taken as an invitation to connect the two domains and focus on the unity 
of metaphysics, physics and biology.4 As Heraclitus invites his puzzled guests 
to join him in his house’s less worthy place, since ‘there are gods even in 
the kitchen’,5 similarly, Aristotle invites his reader to join him in the animal 
world, the authentic ‘kitchen’ of the universe, worthy of the most honourable 
visitor, in which one can fi nd both φύσις and καλός.
The presence of the gods in the kitchen goes far beyond the simple anec-
dote. In the Christian revaluation of Aristotle’s thought, everything regarding 
the divine must be seriously considered as a contention against the enemies 
of faith. In this sense, Pierre Aubenque correctly underlines the importance 
of this passage for every future attempt to connect the physical world with 
the divine domain and, in particular, of every theodicy. Aristotle’s gods in 
the kitchen certainly transfer their divine character to the lower world. 
However, by doing so, they also present themselves as somehow responsible 
for the cooking and, beyond the metaphor, for everything that is produced in 
the world. The divine and the natural are thus intertwined once and for all, 
and the problem of theodicy has its roots precisely in this revolutionary aspect 
of Aristotle’s attitude.6
 2 See P. Pinotti, ‘Aristotele, Platone e la meraviglia del fi losofo’, in Lanza and Longo a cura 
di (1989), pp. 29–55.
 3 Arist. Metaph. 982 b 11–983 a 25.
 4 P. Pellegrin, ‘Taxinomie, moriologie, division’, in Devereux, Pellegrin éds. (1990), pp. 37–48.
 5 Arist. PA I.5, 645 a 19–23.
 6 See Aubenque (1962), p. 502.
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According to Aubenque, the anecdote of the gods in the kitchen testifi es 
not only to Aristotle’s belief that everything is worthy to be studied in nature, 
but also to the result that, in practice, the knowledge of the lower things para-
doxically becomes more certain and desirable that the knowledge of higher 
beings.7 Catherine Wilson has suggested that Aristotle expands on Plato’s 
conception and prepares the Stoic’s view of the hierarchy of perfection, for 
which the lower the reality enquired into by the philosopher, the more uncer-
tain and degraded his knowledge.8 Without underestimating the evolution of 
Aristotle’s thought, I believe on the contrary that Aristotle’s effort is increas-
ingly directed toward a revaluation of the knowledge coming from the lower 
reality, and the realm of inferior bodies and things.
PA’s reference to Heraclitus is thus a key text for interpreting Aristotle’s 
evolution toward the more scientifi c character of his whole philosophical 
enterprise. The older opposition between what is immutable and pure on the 
one hand and what is mutable and impure on the other loses its importance. 
Not only the former, but also the latter fully acquires the status of an object 
worthy of scientifi c investigation. As Gotthelf has underlined, although 
heavenly bodies are worthier than living beings, the latter have the priority 
within the scientifi c enterprise because knowledge of them is more solid and 
complete.9
The universal beauty of nature that Aristotle emphasises also suggests 
how to interpret his conception of abnormality and monstrosity, as well 
as his position vis-à-vis his predecessors. Geoffrey Lloyd links Aristotle’s 
conception of beauty to what tends to unity, immobility and superiority, as 
opposed to what is moving and changing.10 This is the reason why, in Lloyd’s 
view, Aristotle’s biology, in modern terms, is fi xist and opposed to that of 
Empedocles, who already holds a transformist view of life. This also suggests 
why monstrosity holds a central place in Empedocles’ process of nature’s 
unending transformation, while it is peripheral to Aristotle’s view of a stable 
and immutable nature. Whereas the monster is part and parcel of the cycle 
of normality for Empedocles, it is, on the contrary, a tendentially unique 
event for Aristotle.11
 7 Aubenque (1962), p. 27.
 8 C. Wilson, ‘From Limits to Laws: The Construction of the Nomological Image of Nature 
in Early Modern Philosophy’, in Daston, Stolleis eds. (2008), pp. 13–28, esp. p. 15.
 9 See A. Gotthelf, ‘First principles in Aristotle’s Parts of Animals’, in Gotthelf, Lennox eds. 
(1987), p. 170. See also Johnson (2005), p. 229.
10 See Lloyd (1996), p. 113.
11 See also Morgan (1984), pp. 124 ff. and A. Jaulin, ‘Aristote et la pathologie politique’, in 
Ibrahim ed. (2005), pp. 29–45.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   96 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 A R I S T O T L E  97
Beauty is thus the character of normal nature, of its ontological as well as 
its logical status.12 Beauty offers the scientist not only an aesthetic satisfac-
tion in its contemplation; it also suggests to him nature’s order, coherence 
and consistency. It would be diffi cult to overestimate the importance of this 
aspect of Aristotle’s refl ection. Nature’s worthiness and beauty are the key to 
understanding the deep transformation that Aristotle imposes upon the Greek 
conception of the relation between the divine and the terrestrial domain. In 
order to accomplish this, Aristotle needs a powerful new theory of causality, a 
theory that joins together what is good with what is ordered and beautiful. It 
is the study of inferior things, of the abnormal and even monstrous ones, that 
makes us able to grasp nature’s unity and consistency.
One of the most remarkable achievements of Aristotle’s new philosophy is 
his theory of causes, developed in particular in book II of the Physics. This the-
ory is central to our discussion, since it also involves one of the most impressive 
refl ections about the concept of monstrosity, which Aristotle brings to a new 
level of cogency and relevance for any future scientifi c enterprise. Aristotle’s 
point of departure is a sound critique of his predecessors: the idealists on the 
one hand, and the mechanicists on the other.
The exponents of the philosophy of ideas, in Aristotle’s view, fall into 
error because they do not well enough distinguish mathematical and physi-
cal entities. Whereas the former can be abstracted, the latter cannot, at least 
not in the same way. When the idealist thus considers the idea of physical 
entities, his abstraction depends on the illegitimate operation of separating 
the idea of the thing from the thing itself. While Aristotle’s aim is to criti-
cise the excessive abstraction involved in Plato’s philosophy, as delineated 
for example in Prm. 130 b 2–3 and Phd. 74 b–c, one should not read this 
passage of Ph. II.2 as a full commitment to some form of radical realism 
or nominalism. As Charlton clearly explains, even Aristotelian forms are 
‘separable in account’ from things.13 Precisely this separation in account, 
I believe, is the ground for Aristotle’s original treatment of monstrosity as 
something formally separable, distinguished from and subordinated to nor-
mality, according to the Physics.
12 As Gilson (1971), p. 40, has remarkably noted, for Aristotle, pulchrum index ueri. Gilson 
claims Aristotle’s modernity, matching his attitude, specifi cally on the point of nature’s 
beauty, with Darwin’s perspective. I believe, on the contrary, that Lloyd’s considerations 
on Aristotle and Empedocles are also true for what concerns Aristotle and Darwin, 
and that their idea of nature’s beauty suggests the opposition rather than the analogy 
between them.
13 Charlton (1970), p. 94: ‘[. . .] that is, an account can be given of the form of a thing 
which is separate from, does not involve, the account of its matter’.
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A further proof of Aristotle’s interest in the formal possibility of the separa-
tion of ideas from things or, in other words, in the identifi cation of something 
essential and distinguishable from things themselves, is his criticism of the 
physicists’ position. Falling into the opposite error, the physicists’ only concern 
is matter, as is testifi ed by Empedocles or Democritus, who ‘have remarkably 
little to say about kinds of things and what is the constituent essence of them.’14 
The mechanicists consider only matter and its composition, because they lack 
any interest in what is above it and shapes it according to an essential principle.
Both idealists and physicists thus miss the point, in Aristotle’s view, by 
focusing respectively on too high and abstract a level or on too low and con-
crete a level of nature. They all lack an appropriate theory of causality because 
they miss the proper distinction between the different genres of cause and 
their correct interaction. These genres must all be considered by the investiga-
tors of nature, without leaving any of them aside.
More importantly, Aristotle introduces a concept that, although recognised 
by previous philosophers, did not fi nd its proper place as a pillar of the theory 
of causality, namely the end or goal of things themselves. Things, in fact, must 
be studied in motion. More precisely, they must be studied according to the sys-
tematic and continuous motion that is part of the whole and unending trans-
formation of nature itself. Nature’s movement – this is Aristotle’s strong point 
– is directed toward a goal or an end: ‘The [. . .] enquiry must embrace both the 
purpose or end and the means to that end. And the “nature” is the goal for the 
sake of which the rest exist; for if any systematic and continuous movement is 
directed to a goal, this goal is an end in the sense of the purpose to which the 
movement is a means.’15
Whereas the idealist erroneously concerns himself with abstract ideas, and 
the mechanicist fallaciously focuses on matter alone, the physicist who fol-
lows the correct method, i.e. the Aristotelian one, fi nds his middle ground 
by reintroducing the form within a process of transformation of nature that 
allows him to grasp every aspect of nature’s causality, the multiplicity of its 
components and, more importantly, the proper priority and hierarchy among 
them. The philosopher, in fact, ‘[is concerned] with the form primarily and 
essentially [. . .], with the material up to a certain point [. . .]. For his main 
concern is with the goal, which is formal; but he deals only with such forms 
as are conceptually, but not factually, detachable from the material in which 
they occur.’16
14 Arist. Ph. II.2, 194 a 20 ff.
15 Arist. Ph. II.2, 194 a 28.
16 Arist. Ph. II.2, 194 b 11.
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Having established the correct ground of a theory of causality, Aristotle can 
now move to properly defi ne its multiple components which, with little varia-
tion, are repeated in other major texts, such as Metaph. I.2, 983 a 24 ff. These 
are the material cause (ὕλη, ὑποκείμενον), the formal cause (οὐσία, τί ἧν εἶναι, 
εἶδος, παράδειγμα), the effi cient cause (ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως) and the fi nal cause 
(οὗ ἕνεκα καί τἀγαθόν), which the Scholastics eventually call respectively the 
causa materialis, formalis, effi ciens and fi nalis. These principles cover, in Aristo-
tle’s view, all the many senses in which because can be said of all things for which 
why can be asked: to the question of why something is what it is, several answers 
can be given. This is true of every natural thing. If it is relevant for normal things, 
however, it is even more relevant for abnormal and monstrous ones. Moreover, I 
think that if a new treatment of what is abnormal and monstrous becomes pos-
sible in Aristotle’s physics, it is precisely on account of his original and powerful 
approach that he is able to grasp the many becauses of monstrosity.
The fi rst dimension of causality to consider is the material one, i.e. ‘the 
existence of material for the generating process to start from [. . .].’17 The ὕλη 
is an immanent and inherent (ἐνυπάρχω) kind of αἰτία. Aristotle stresses its 
essentiality and necessity to the phenomenon in question. He also stresses, 
however, its distinction from another causality, which is not inherent but 
external, and moves the process forward from the outside.18 The material 
cause is not suffi cient for anything to be what it is.19 The formal αἰτία brings us 
closer to the defi nition of the thing, and what is essential for it.
The relation between the material and the formal introduces the dimen-
sion of Becoming, which Aristotle had used in particular to criticise his ideal-
ist predecessors. Things should not be conceived only for what they are, but 
rather what they become, how they become what they are, and all this vis-à-
vis what they should be. The form, thus, speaks of the thing’s essence more in 
the sense of what it has to be than what it actually is.20
This normative dimension of the causal principle is, on the contrary, com-
pletely absent from the third αἰτία that Aristotle speaks about, namely the 
effi cient one, the moving factor that induces the transformation and acts as 
an engine toward it.21 This is the main, possibly the only causal principle rec-
ognised by the earlier mechanicists, certainly within atomism, and Aristotle’s 
point is that, although necessary, the effi cient agent is far from being suffi cient 
17 Arist. Ph. II.3, 194 b 24–7.
18 See also Metaph. XII.4, 1070 b 22.
19 Arist. Ph. II.3, 194 b 27–9.
20 Cornford, in Aristotle (1980), p. 128: ‘[the thing] must have actually “arrived” and real-
ized its “being-what-it-had-to-be”’.
21 Arist. Ph. II.3, 194 b 29–33.
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for any thing to become what it has to be, namely what one can call its form 
or its essence.
To the form and essence, Aristotle adds a last and fourth causal principle, 
namely the τέλος: ‘the end or purpose, for the sake of which the process is ini-
tiated [. . .].’22 Although sometimes diffi cult to distinguish from the form itself, 
the τέλος really epitomises Aristotle’s pivotal argument in his original theory 
of causality. The four genres are all essential, and yet the end acts as a unifying 
principle that gives its ultimate sense to the causal process in its full complex-
ity, a complexity that, once again, was lacking in all previous philosophical 
accounts: ‘[T]he goal or end in view, [. . .] animates all the other determinant 
factors as the best they can attain to; for the attainment of that “for the sake 
of which” anything exists or is done is its fi nal and best possible achievement 
(though of course “best” in this connexion means no more than “taken to be 
the best”).’23
In this passage a crucial principle surfaces, a principle that is pivotal for 
our entire discussion on monstrosity. Aristotle explicitly suggests that the 
becoming-what-something-should-be happens, following the end, in the best 
possible manner, but not always perfectly. After having criticised Plato for 
the excessive abstraction and the separation between the absolute perfec-
tion of ideas and the actual reality of things, Aristotle is somehow forced to 
reintroduce this hiatus in the ontological structure of reality – not anymore 
on a transcendent ground, though, but rather on the immanent pattern that 
brings things to what they are, or rather to what they should be.24 Perfection 
in general exists. Yet, individual things in particular are far from being per-
fect, in their becoming what they are. They tend to their perfection, and this 
is their end or goal. The more they achieve it, the more perfect they are. Yet 
the complexity and intricacy of the causal factors might interfere with this 
goal, and make the processs only as effective as the best it can do. Here lies 
our question: In a system grounded on ends and goals, what is the specifi c 
τέλος of monstrosity?
Kept at the margin by Aristotle, monstrosity infi ltrates the core of his 
system in these pages of the Physics, setting itself at the very centre of his 
theory of causality. The notion of τέλος resolves many problems that Aristotle 
ascribes to predecessors, and in particular to mechanicists. Yet it also raises 
new questions for him, especially in the fi eld of biology and the generation of 
22 Arist. Ph. II.3, 194 b 33–5.
23 Arist. Ph. II.3, 195 a 23–6.
24 Solmsen (1963), p. 487, insists on the immanent character of nature’s craftsmanship 
and its capacity to produce the best.
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life. I believe that this is the crucial point of Aristotle’s system and that around 
this point the question of monstrosity will be tackled in future centuries. No 
surprise, then, that the τέλος has attracted so much attention in scholarship, 
in recent and less recent times.
In his seminal Geschichte des Materialismus, Lange explains the Socratic 
origin of the reaction against ancient materialism.25 This reaction is grounded 
in a radical separation between matter and form, on which both Plato and 
Aristotle follow Socrates. This origin is religiously based in the desire of seeing 
the gods present, and actively working, in the world. The religious approach 
fi nds an early support in the scientifi c one, and in particular in the concept of 
teleology. Anthropomorphic and providential at the same time, the Socratic 
explanation is fully compatible with the more scientifi c one of Aristotle. His 
opposition between the material and the formal principle of causal explana-
tion is, in Lange’s view, a development of the Socratic approach, paradig-
matically presented in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, in the conversation between 
Socrates and Aristodemus:
Do you [sc. Aristodemus] not think then that he who created man from 
the beginning had some useful end in view [ὠφέλεια] when he endowed 
him with his several senses, giving eyes to see visible objects, ears to hear 
sounds? Would odors again be of any use to us had we not been endowed 
with nostrils? What perception should we have of sweet and bitter and 
all things pleasant to the palate had we not tongue in our mouth to dis-
criminate between them? Besides these, are there not other contrivances 
that look like the results of forethought [πρόνοια]? Thus the eyeballs, being 
weak, are set behind eyelids, that open like doors when we want to see, and 
close when we sleep: on the lids grow lashes through which the very winds 
fi lter harmlessly: above the eyes is a coping of brows that lets no drop of 
sweat from the head hurt them. The ears catch all sounds, but are never 
choked with them. Again, the incisors of all creatures are adapted for cut-
ting, the molars for receiving food from them and grinding it. And again, 
the mouth, through which the food they want goes in, is set near the eyes 
and nostrils; but since what goes out is unpleasant, the ducts through which 
it passes are turned away and removed as far as possible from the organs of 
sense. With such signs of forethought in these arrangements, can you doubt 
whether they are the works of chance [τύχη] or design [γνώμη]?26 
25 Lange (1873–5), ch. III.
26 X. Mem. I.4.5–6. On Xenophon’s divine providence as part of the elaboration of the 
concept of nature as a craftsman, see Solmsen (1963), p. 479.
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This text, widely read for centuries, testifi es to the strength of Socrates’ idea 
which, without directly addressing biological issues, reverberates through 
Aristotle’s more scientifi c and less anthropomorphic theory of fi nal causality. 
When Aristotle criticises his materialist predecessors, in Lange’s view, he is 
merely developing the Socratic and Platonic origin of the theological, teleo-
logical and providential view.27
Ancient philosophers explain nature by intellectually decomposing it into 
pure basic and material elements, such as fi re, water, etc. This is the right 
pattern, in their view, to approach the real nature of Being. For Aristotle, on 
the contrary, such decomposition of nature means moving away from Being 
and its essential understanding, which lies fi rst and foremost in the formal and 
teleological reality. Preus goes as far as maintaining that matter itself is intel-
ligible only through form and organisation.28 Matter would not really exist as 
absolutely independent from its formal reality, without a given form. Matter 
is necessarily conditioned to the process of teleological formation, and thus 
ontologically subordinated to it.
Although a ‘mere’ development of previous Socratic positions, the core 
of Aristotle’s teleology is nonetheless fundamentally important to his philos-
ophy. Causality as a whole could not be understood, for Aristotle, without 
a strong idea of teleology. Monte R. Johnson has reconstructed the modern 
debate around Aristotle’s fi nalism, in particular for authors as important as 
Hegel, Gomperz and Wieland.29 Johnson elucidates the proper place, aim and 
27 Simplicius already underlines the agreement between Aristotle and Plato’s Socrates. 
See Simp. in Ph. 308.25–33: ‘For all knowledge which stems from the causes is most 
appropriate for a proper understanding, but that which stems from the fi nal cause is the 
most important of all.’ Aristotle seems to be agreeing with Socrates in the Phaedo when 
he tells the natural scientist to press his enquiry into cause as far as the fi nal cause. For 
in the Phaedo [Phd. 97 c] Socrates says, ‘If anyone were to want to fi nd the cause of each 
thing, how it comes-to-be, is detroyed and exists, he should discover this about it – how 
it is best for it to exist or to affect something else or to be affected itself – in other words 
he should discover for the sake of what each thing comes-to-be or exists.’
28 Preus (1975), pp. 256 ff.
29 Johnson (2005), pp. 182: ‘Some hold that teleological explanations are appropriate only 
where reduction to so-called mechanical forces (material-effi cient causes) is impossible. 
Kant originally formulated this position in the Critique of Teleological Judgement. He distin-
guished and opposed “mechanism” (effi cient causes) and “teleology” (fi nal causes), and 
argued that mechanical causes should be determined so far as possible, and that it is only 
when something remains unexplained (which always and only happens in organic con-
texts) that it is right to invoke “fi nal causes”. [. . .] Hegel, but not Kant himself, pointed 
out the similarity of what Kant was arguing for and Aristotle’s teleology.’ Johnson refers 
to section 204 on Teleologie of Hegel’s Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. See 
Hegel (1969–71), VIII, pp. 359–61. On Aristotle’s teleology see also Berti (1989–90), 
D. Charles, ‘Teleological causation in the Physics’, in Judson (1991), pp. 101–28.
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scope of the teleological argument within Aristotelianism by showing that too 
often fi nalism has been undermined by modern historians and interpreters. In 
particular, Aristotle’s teleological argument has been weakened by consider-
ing it an additional principle of explanation of phenomena.30 Only when the 
effi cient principle reveals itself insuffi cient to explain things, the majority of 
scholars since Kant have maintained, does Aristotle bring the fi nal cause into 
the picture. Gotthelf, for example, claims that although Aristotle sincerely 
believes in ends, he considers them only when material and effi cient elements 
do not exhaust the explanation of phenomena.31 Johnson is adamant, on the 
contrary, in explaining that fi nalism is a pillar of Aristotelianism, and that the 
fi nal cause should not be subordinated or postponed to other causal principles 
of explanation.
Teleology, thus, is not an auxiliary principle that fi lls the gap of the episte-
mological insuffi ciency of other explanatory principles. Following Johnson, I 
believe that the relation between the end and the other causes must be turned 
upside down: because matter is functional and subordinated to teleology, even 
the effi cient cause cannot be considered separately and independently from 
the end. The teleological explanation is not reducible to any other explana-
tion, and it is on the contrary the framework within which all other causes 
acquire their meaning, without being separable from them. The four causes 
should thus be seen not so much as organic components that add to each 
other, as parts of a single whole, to defi ne causality. They should be seen as 
individual and distinct aspects of the causal principle, irreducible to each other 
and contributing to explain different sides of causality, with different degrees 
of clarity and cogency depending on the phenomenon under scrutiny.32
Johnson, however, claims that not everything is teleologically explicable 
in nature, as for example rainfall in the meteorological domain or waste as a 
residue of nutriment’s concoction in the animal realm.33 Although not expli-
cable, I believe that everything is at least teleologically conceivable, even if 
effi cient causes alone give us a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon, 
e.g. of rainfall, or if, at the opposite end, they fail to do so, because we do not 
teleologically see what something, e.g. waste, is for the sake of. We can certainly 
say that the end does not have the same explanatory strength in every case 
or domain. And this is precisely where monstrosity comes to the foreground: 
monsters and monstrous phenomena challenge the teleological principle and 
30 This is the main thesis of Wieland, who argues against scholars such as Zeller and Hart-
mann. See Wieland (1962), p. 256.
31 Gotthelf (1976–7), also included, in a slightly revised version, in Gotthelf, Lennox eds. 
(1987).
32 See also Quarantotto (2005), esp. p. 342.
33 Johnson (2005), p. 186.
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strain it to its highest degree, assuming a central position in Aristotle’s bio-
logical works. Aristotle is aware that only by succesfully taming the concept 
of monstrosity can his system acquire the necessary strength, coherence and 
consistency.
Let us now take a step back to Xenophon’s account of Socrates’ praise 
of teleology. In his dialogue with Aristodemus, as we have seen, Socrates 
insists on universal purposefulness, which depends on the intelligent design 
of the creator, whose forethought (πρόνοια) is clearly readable in the works of 
nature. Can anyone doubt – Socrates ironically asks – whether such a work 
has to be ascribed to chance (τύχη) or to design (γνώμη)? The opposition 
between chance and design, as well as the concept of πρόνοια,34 are crucial 
for our discussion, not only because Xenophon’s Socrates is challenging the 
ancient mechanicists’ theories, and in particular the atomists’, but also because 
Aristotle himself develops the most extraordinary criticism of chance in his 
age, by introducing it within his theory of causality. It is also crucial because 
Aristotle explicitly draws his argument on monstrosity from this theory. Are 
monsters chance events in nature?
Ph. II. 4–6, in which Aristotle develops his critique, remained the refer-
ence for centuries in the debate on necessity and chance. In these topical 
chapters, Aristotle sets out to give a full and exhaustive account of whether 
or not chance exists, and how chance should be understood. Against his 
predecessors’ theories, Aristotle aims at clarifying a traditional discussion by 
granting the fact that we all regularly ascribe events to fortune or luck (τύχη), 
and accident (αὐτόματον); that is, we consider luck and accident as real 
causes of things and events.35
Aristotle aims at emphasising the inconsistency of his main polemical tar-
gets, namely Leucippus and Democritus, by stressing that, on the one hand, they 
question the existence of chance by declaring that everything exists for a defi nite 
cause. They attribute, on the other hand, ‘our Heaven and all the worlds to 
chance happenings, saying that the vortex and shifting that disentangled the 
chaos and established the cosmic order came by chance’. Empedocles’ cosmogony 
34 Which already has the sense, in Xenophon, of prouidentia and cura, πρόνοιας diuinae 
ἔργον. See Sturz (1964), III, p. 688. On providence see Auroux, pp. 2098–2900, 
Di Berardino a cura di (1983), cc. 2942–5, Lalande, pp. 847–8, Ritter, Gründer 
hrsg. (1971–2007), XI, cc. 1206–18, RE XXIII.1, p. 747 and Suppl. XIV, pp. 562–5, 
Daremberg, Saglio éds. (1877–1919), IV, pp. 715–16, Betz et al. hrsg. (1988–2005), 
VIII, cc. 1212–20 (= Betz et al. eds. (2007), X, pp. 477–81), EK III, cc. 1705–10 
(= Fahlbusch et al. eds. (1999), IV, pp. 402–4), DTC XIII.1, cc. 935–1023, TRE 
XXXV, pp. 303–27, Lacoste, pp. 946–52, Fahlbusch et al. eds. (1999), X, cc. 219–24.
35 Arist. Ph. II.4 195 b 30 ff.
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is also targeted here, insofar as he says that the members of animals are haphaz-
ardly formed: ‘τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων ἀπὸ τύχης γενέσθαι τὰ πλεῖστά φησιν.’36 The 
main inconsistency that Aristotle sees at work here is the distinction between the 
heavenly bodies and the terrestrial domain, which corresponds – according to 
this account – to different logics and should thus be treated differently.
It is indeed strange that earlier philosophers, in Aristotle’s view, deem that 
the heavens had a random origin, when they also recognise that ‘neither ani-
mals nor plants are, or come to be, by chance, but are all caused by Nature or 
Mind [φύσιν ἢ νοῦν] (for it is not a matter of chance what springs from a given 
sperm, since an olive comes from such a one, and a man from such another)’. 
Aristotle here introduces the argument of the regularity of events, which plays 
a pivotal role in his treatment of monstrosity. The aim is not so much to deny 
chance, but rather to redefi ne it and reintroduce it into the new theory of cau-
sality. An olive tree gives olives, and humans give a human: no monstrosity, in 
the ordinary process of natural generation, and thus no chance. Only in the 
ordinary processes though, since Aristotle is too well aware of the existence 
of monstrosities both in the vegetal and the human realm. Regularly, though 
– that is to say for the most part – one can observe a Mind acting in nature, 
precisely as Xenophon’s Socrates had taught to Aristodemus.
The regularity of events is the tool that Aristotle employs to narrow down 
this diffi cult fi eld of enquiry: when things always or almost always happen 
in the same way, chance is not concerned in any possible manner.37 If things 
repeat themselves with infl exible regularity, there must be a cause, even if that 
cause is unknown or diffi cult to grasp. Still, an enormous number of phenom-
ena and events question the philosopher about the existence of chance. There 
are things that happen exceptionally, or occasionally. There are also things 
that can be considered recognisable ends for a particular agent, yet were not, 
however, within the initial plan of action of that same agent, and therefore are 
36 Arist. Ph. II.4 195 b 30 ff. In Philoponos’s view, however, Aristotle blames Democritus 
more than Empedocles. See Phlp. in Ph. 261.26–262.2: ‘[Empedocles] says the parts of 
animals, most of them, came to be in this way in accordance with chance as though 
they had come to be from forethought, the front teeth sharp and suitable for tearing and 
the molars for grinding. So that [the ancients] are worthy of accusation because they 
say that some things exist altogether by chance but have specifi ed nothing concerning 
chance. But Empedocles ascribes [only] certain small-scale things to chance, and if he 
has given no discussion of it might be worthy of less accusation; but there are some, 
[Aristotle] says, meaning Democritus and his followers, who thought it to be a cause of 
this heaven and of the divinest among the things that are manifest, but did not discuss 
it even slightly.’
37 Arist. Ph. II.5, 196 b 10 ff.
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reached accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός);38 they are unintended consequences. 
Aristotle points out the purposive character of such actions in Ph. II. 5, i.e. 
even if the end is accidentally reached, a purpose must be involved in the 
initial plan. Furthermore, although the name of τύχη is used, this is not a 
cause, either in the causal or in the fi nal sense of the term. A result reached 
κατὰ συμβεβηκός is rather an effect of the complex web of causes and effects 
accumulated in the process or action under scrutiny.
The necessity of the purposive nature of actions, even when we speak about 
chance or luck, is again underlined in II. 6, in which Aristotle claims that neither 
inanimate things nor beasts and infants can accomplish anything whatsoever by 
τύχη, precisely because they do not exercise any deliberate choice, and thus 
their action is, by defi nition, not purposive in nature. Aristotle, however, recalls 
here the category of αὐτόματον, which was central for Democritus. Aristotle 
also intends to explain once and for all its meaning, a meaning that remains 
obscure, in his view, in previous authors. The etymology that Aristotle gives is 
wrong. His mistake, though, makes his argument exceptionally interesting for 
our present discussion. He claims the term comes from μάτην, i.e. ‘for nothing’ 
or ‘to no purpose’, meaning that the end or purpose is not realised, but only the 
means to it: ‘αὐτόματον, as the form of the word implies, means an occurrence 
that is in itself (αὐτό) to no purpose (μάτην)’.
Aristotle’s false etymology becomes directly relevant for our discussion on 
monstrosity. It would be inappropriate, Aristotle claims, to speak about τύχη 
in cases where Nature’s production is παρὰ φύσιν (contrary to nature). In this 
case, we may instead attribute it to αὐτόματον. But then the question resur-
faces: what would be monstrosity’s purpose in nature? If nature is teleological, 
although not infl exibly so, how can monsters fi t into it?
Aristotle is adamant in explaining that being ‘to no purpose’, as an 
αὐτόματος event is, does not mean being without a τέλος. A τέλος always 
exists, and in this sense a teleological dimension always operates in any and 
every causal determination, although sharing its place with other kind of 
causes, as illustrated above. ‘To no purpose’ only means, in this sense, that the 
τέλος has not been properly reached, that it has not been achieved according 
to the essential and formal nature of the thing in question.
The failure to reach the proper end is particularly evident in the biological 
realm, as we will see. Before moving to the analysis of the biological works, 
however, it is important to highlight something that has remained implicit in 
38 This is sometimes translated as incidental. Although there is a slight difference, both 
accidental and incidental depends on cado and refers to the same contingent way of 
happening.
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the exposé of the causal theory, namely the confl ictual nature of every single 
causal process, in which different forces act one upon the other, and collide 
against each other. Within this confl ict, Aristotle takes a stand, unambigu-
ously, in favour of teleology as the principal dimension of causality: everything 
that resists teleology must be deemed abnormal and monstrous. Αὐτόματον 
and τύχη, Aristotle clarifi es, have to be related to effi cient causality, for they 
are always attached to the multiple and complex web of effi cient causes. They 
must also be subordinated, though, to the teleological principle which is now 
presented as ontologically prior and superior to the others:
Since there is nothing incidental unless there is something primary for it to 
be incidental to, it follows that there can be no incidental causation except 
as incident to direct causation. Chance and fortune, therefore, imply the 
antecedent activity of mind and Nature [νοῦν καὶ φύσιν] as causes.39 
Teleology has the priority. The τέλος commands the process, whereas the 
αὐτόματον sometimes resists it. The random happening of the latter is the fail-
ure of the former. This priority is confi rmed in Ph. II. 7, in which the specifi c 
skills required of the natural philosopher are precisely those that make her 
able to recognise the purposeful character of nature (as well as the reasons of 
its failure), namely its capacity of constituting each thing’s proper end.40 This 
is why the natural philosopher needs a specifi c starting point for the enquiry. 
Not every beginning would put her on the right track. Here, Aristotle can 
exploit another original and innovative aspect of his theory, namely the ques-
tion of potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια).
By decomposing Being into these two different categories, potentiality 
and actuality, Aristotle is able to account for Becoming, which denotes not a 
type of creation but rather a passage – a passage from one mode of Being to 
another; from the conditions that make something possible, i.e. potentiality, 
to the actual realisation of the thing itself, i.e. its actuality.41 The δύναμις is 
39 Arist. Ph. II.6, 198 a 7–10. In other texts, the order seems to be different: how things 
are, by necessity or by chance, is the starting point, which is later framed in a teleological 
structure. See PA III.3, 663 b 22, the famous passage on the deer’s horns: ‘The necessary 
nature [ἀναγκαίας φύσεως] being what she is, we must now describe how the rational 
nature [λόγον φύσις] takes advantage from what she fi nds available to her.’ First comes 
their necessity, and eventually the explanation of how nature takes advantage of them.
40 Arist. Ph. II.7, 198 b 3 ff.
41 Arist. Metaph. V.7, 1017 a 35 ff. On δύναμις and ἐνέργεια see Auroux pp. 2122–7 and 
23–4, Lalande, pp. 859–61 and 16–19, Ritter, Gründer hrsg. (1971–2007), I, cc. 134–42, 
RAC IV, pp. 415–58 and RAC V, pp. 4–51. On the various uses in Aristotle see Bonitz, 
pp. 206–7 and 251. See also TGL III, cc. 1706–9 and IV, cc. 1064–5.
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chronologically prior to the ἐνέργεια, but the ἐνέργεια has the ontological 
priority, with respect to the question of perfection, and explains the δύναμις, 
not vice versa. In order to explain how this relation works in the universe, 
but especially in the terrestrial and biological domain, Aristotle makes use of 
a comparison that will be extremely infl uential for centuries, namely the anal-
ogy between nature and art.
The physicist needs a starting point to analyse and comprehend Being qua 
Becoming. Depending on it, her enquiry will be correct or faulty:
We ought surely to begin with things as they are actually observed to be 
when completed. Even in building the fact is that the particular stages of 
the process come about because the Form of the house is such and such, 
rather than that the house is such and such because the process of its for-
mation follows a particular course: the process is for the sake of the actual 
thing, the thing is not for the sake of the process [γένεσις ἔνεκα τῆς οὺσιας 
ἐστίν, ἀλλ’οὐκ ἡ οὐσία ἔνεκα τῆς γενέσεως].42 
That the fi nal result and the outcome should be used as a starting point both 
to judge the perfection of something and to produce it is self-evident in the 
domain of art and construction. The same is true in nature, in which things 
are produced, and should be studied, following the same pattern, from what is 
ontologically prior to what comes chronologically fi rst.
One may see here how much Aristotle has learned from his predecessors, 
but also how he chooses his place in the battle between fi nalism and mech-
anicism. Whereas Preus claims that Aristotle acknowledges Empedocles’ and 
Democritus’s achievements, and prefers them even to Plato, Taylor suggests 
that, precisely in this introductory passage of PA, Aristotle shows where he 
stands: against the mechanicists; he entirely follows Plato’s fi nalism. Although 
Aristotle is most of the time fair when he presents his predecessors’ opinions, 
I think that here he makes the development of Plato’s fi nalism against the 
mechanicists one of the major pillars of his philosophical system.43
Aristotle draws on Plato’s presentation of the opposition between γένεσις, 
production, generation, coming into being, and οὐσία, stable being, immu-
table reality, substance, essence (also opposed to non-being, τὸ μὴ εἶναι, or 
to affections, πάθη, or to accidents, συμβεβηκότα). Plato’s most relevant text 
is the Philebus, in which Socrates asks Protarchus whether γένεσις should be 
considered for the sake of οὐσία, or the opposite. Protarchus is puzzled by the 
apparent naivety of Socrates’ question. His ironical answer is used to introduce 
42 Arist. PA I.1, 640 a 12 ff.
43 See Preus (1975), pp. 28 ff. Contra see Taylor (1928), p. 302, and Wieland (1962), p. 273.
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the interesting parallel between nature and art that Aristotle also makes use 
of. It is like asking – Protarchus responds to Socrates – whether shipbuilding 
is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of shipbuilding! It is true, Socrates 
confi rms, in the same manner that, in general, one can say that ‘every instance 
of generation is for the sake of some being or other, and generation in general 
is for the sake of being in general’.44
Aristotle follows Plato in fi rmly establishing teleology within nature, as 
the analogy with art and crafts best reveals. What Aristotle draws from Plato, 
though, is no less important than what of his he rejects. As we have seen 
above, Plato’s natural teleology has a strongly transcendent character, whereby 
nature becomes the artefact of a demiurge whose mind, i.e. an exterior and 
transcendent power, orders elements otherwise left to chaos. The good and 
the best implied in Aristotle’s teleological nature, on the contrary, are intrinsic 
and inherent to natural beings.45 As Pierre Aubenque has rightly underlined, 
similar things serve different purposes in Plato and Aristotle.46 The scien-
tist and the philosopher, thus, must still look for things’ models – but within 
nature itself, not in the sky of ideas nor in the demiurge’s mind – and must, on 
that model, ground every further enquiry. This is Aristotle’s basis for his severe 
criticism against the mechanicists, in which he makes use once again of what 
he certainly considers his strongest argument regarding generation, namely 
the analogy with art and the regularity that one observes in nature:
So Empedocles was wrong when he said that many of the characteristics 
which animals have are due to some accident in the process of their for-
mation, as when he accounts for the vertebrae of the backbone by saying 
‘the fetus gets twisted and so the backbone is broken into pieces’:47 he is 
unaware (a) that the seed which gives rise to the animal must to begin with 
have the appropriate specifi c character; and (b) that the producing agent 
was pre-existent: it was chronologically earlier as well as logically earlier: 
in other words, men are begotten by men, and therefore the process of the 
child’s formation is what it is because its parent was a man.48 
Thus the process of generation depends on the fi nished and perfect product, 
and not the other way around. Mechanicists like Empedocles have wasted 
their time in looking for material causes, because the ‘formal’ nature is of more 
44 Pl. Phlb. 54 a–c. See also supra.
45 See D. M. Balme, ‘The place of biology in Aristotle’s philosophy’, in Gotthelf, Lennox 
eds. (1987), pp. 9–20, who quotes several different texts to support this thesis.
46 Aubenque (1962), pp. 332–3. See also Johnson (2005), p. 81.
47 Vorsokr. 31 B 97 (= LM [22] EMP. D177, R20).
48 Arist. PA I.1, 640 a 20 ff.
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fundamental importance than every other aspect of individual things (ἡ γὰρ 
κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν φύσις κυριωτέρα τῆς ὑλικῆς φύσεως).49 The methodology 
thus proceeds from above or, if one wants to distinguish between Plato’s tran-
scendence and Aristotle’s immanence, it proceeds backwards, namely from 
the end towards the beginning, from the actuality to the potentiality, from 
the fi nished to the unfi nished, from the cause ‘for the sake of which’ to every 
other kind of cause:
Whenever there is evidently an End towards which a motion goes forward 
unless something stands in its way, then we always assert that the motion 
has the End for its purpose. From this it is evident that something of the 
kind really exists – that, in fact, which we call ‘Nature’, because in fact we 
do not fi nd any chance creature being formed from a particular seed, but 
A comes from a, and B from b; nor does any chance seed come from any 
chance individual.50 
In the same way that the actuality comes ontologically before the potentiality, 
the fi nished organism comes before its seed. No chance creature exists that is 
formed by a specifi c seed whose characteristics we know. This experience rules 
out chance and the mechanistic encounters of material and effi cient causes 
as a principle of explanation of the cosmos, as in the theories of Empedocles 
and Democritus. It does not rule out, however, the question of monstrosity. As 
we have just read, in fact, Aristotle’s explanation is that a process reaches its 
evident end unless something stands in its way: ἐμποδίζω, ‘to be a hindrance to 
or interfering with something’, and also ‘to thwart’. Because the process toward 
perfection can be hindered, chance and its power within the generating process 
are reintroduced into the picture.51 Seeds do not produce randomly. They can, 
however, produce monsters.
Along the line of monstrosity, once again, Aristotle develops his critique 
of mechanicism. If one starts from the potentiality, the process is left open to 
modifi cations and to every possible outcome. This is Empedocles’ transform-
ist solution. If, on the contrary, one starts from the actuality and the end, the 
process is closed. No random outcome is possible and, most of all, no transfor-
mation is going to happen vis-à-vis what one already knows and already sees. 
The mechanicist conceives of the transformation, because she does not have 
49 Arist. PA I.1, 640 b 28–9.
50 Arist. PA I.1, 641 b 24–9.
51 Ancient commentators already read the end, i.e. ‘that for the sake of which’, as being 
potentially hindered by some obstacle. See for example Phlp. in Ph. 235.18–20: ‘He has 
in mind, [it seems] to me, change which goes forward in an unhindered fashion and is 
limited by itself, with no outside cause bringing it to a halt. For if it is interrupted, that 
state of stability [which results] from its being interrupted is not an end of the change.’
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   110 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 A R I S T O T L E  111
any perfection to guide the process. The fi xist, on the contrary, rules out the 
transformation, because there is a superior perfection that, although sometimes 
hindered, guides the whole process. For the mechanicist and the transformist, 
monstrosity is an essential part of the process. For the formalist and the fi xist, 
on the contrary, it is an anomaly that the system will soon correct by eliminat-
ing the less fi t to survive, such as the Empedoclean man-headed oxen.52
Here, Aristotle fi rmly establishes the opposition between the mechani-
cist’s and the fi nalist’s methodologies. After Aristotle, ‘how and for the sake 
of what’ things are what they are will not be one and the same question any-
more. The how and the what for questions will be perceived, on the contrary, 
as two different issues, polemically opposed one to the other, corresponding 
to different logics and methods of enquiry. The consequents will be seen not 
only as following the antecedents, but also opposed to them. What commands 
the process, the former or the latter? There is no doubt that, for Aristotle, the 
consequent – i.e. the end – dominates the antecedent. In terms of anatomy 
and physiology, for example, the organ perfectly formed explains its function 
as well as the process of its formation. Animals have eyes and are able to see 
not because of how the eye is, but rather because of what the eye is for, since 
sight belongs to and is part of animals’ essence.
Although Aristotle is faithful to his grounding principle that nature 
does not make anything in vain, but everything is in view of some end,53 his 
investigation of this principle is particularly pregnant with implications in 
his Generation of Animals in which, together with the Physics, he deals with 
monstrosity. Again, Aristotle makes clear that an accurate theory of causal-
ity is essential. Causes are the main theme of the book.54 Together with their 
defi nition, it is fundamentally important to grasp their order, relationship 
and hierarchy, in order to understand nature’s offspring in general, and their 
perfection in particular. Although all animals are worthy of study, as we have 
previously seen, not all of them are equally worthy when compared to one 
another. On the contrary, Aristotle’s biology is unfolded as a real science of 
hierarchical differences, both among and within individuals and species:
The object which [. . .] takes shape may be more valuable in kind or less valu-
able; and the differences herein depend upon the envelope which encloses 
the soul-principle; and the causes which determine this are the situations 
where the process takes place and the physical substance which is enclosed.55 
52 Darwin’s erroneus attribution of this theory to Aristotle is remarkable. See Darwin 
(1887), III, p. 252, C. Darwin to W. Ogle, 22 February 1882. See also Lerner (1969), p. 87 
and passim.
53 See again de An. III.12, 434 a 31–2.
54 Arist. GA I.1.
55 Arist. GA III.11, 762 a 24–7.
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Aristotle employs the concept of τίμιος/ἄτιμος to suggest that things are all 
distributed on a scale, from the worthiest to the less honorable. The reader is 
thus brought to the edge of monstrosity, though rigidly within the framework 
of normality: although of different value, one vis-à-vis the other, animals and 
plants are never exceptions to nature. As Aristotle says elsewhere, anything 
can be ἀνάπηρος, lame and mutilated, or πήρωμα, deformed, imperfect, as 
opposed to τέλειος, fully grown, accomplished, perfect in its kind.56 He rules 
out the idea of a break between a normal inside and an abnormal outside of 
nature, by introducing hierarchy and differences within it. As a result, the 
concept of monstrosity becomes central to his description. It is now time for 
him to explain the very meaning of the τέρατα.
Aristotle’s argument on monsters follows from his theory of causality and, 
in particular, from the teleological character of nature developed in his Meta-
physics and Physics, but also – and perhaps especially – visible in the animal 
world. Monsters exist, and they can be explained by the relationship that 
the theory of causality has established between matter and form, the mate-
rial and the formal cause. When matter is not ‘mastered’, Aristotle argues, 
the offspring presents monstrous features. The examples that Aristotle uses, 
e.g. a calf with a child’s head or a sheep with an ox’s head, unsurprisingly 
recall Empedocles’ monsters.57 In fact, Aristotle intends to seriously treat 
and explain the phenomenon of monstrosity, at the same time denying cer-
tain kinds of monstrosity, and in particular a kind of causal theory that could 
explain them as Empedocles himself and Democritus had attempted to do:
In no case are they what they are alleged to be [i.e. real calves with real chil-
dren’s heads], but resemblances only [. . .]. It is [. . .] impossible for monstros-
ities of this type to be formed (i.e. one animal within another), as is shown by 
the gestation-period of man, sheep, dog, and ox, which are widely different, 
and none of these animals can possibly be formed except in its own period.58 
56 From τέλος: see Chan., 1063. On this category, see Lloyd (1996), p. 120.
57 Arist. GA IV.3–4, 769 b 11 ff. 
58 Arist. GA IV.3–4, 769 b 11 ff. The τραγέλαφος also does not exist. For Aristotle, this 
half goat (τράγος), half deer (ἔσαφος), rooted in a mythical background, is nothing but a 
word, a composite name that refl ects a mental representation of something that does not 
exist and thus cannot be connected to any substratum. Sillitti (1980) has analysed the 
treatment of the τραγέλαφος in early Greek commentators on Aristotle, showing the cru-
cial role this concept, because of its coherence, possibility and comprehensibility, whether 
scientifi c or conjectural, played in the discussion of being and non-being. However, it is a 
mistake to consider this through the lens of the monstrous. While modern readers might 
conceive this animal as a monster because of its composite nature, Greek commentators 
do not speak about the τραγέλαφος as a τέρας, but instead as a species, some of them an 
actual one, others only as an imaginary one.
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While for Empedocles and Democritus,59 and because of their mechanical 
theory of causality, these monsters were real possibilities, for Aristotle they 
only resemble the animals whose names are given them to describe their mon-
strosity. In fact, they are coherent, and yet deformed. They are unachieved 
and imperfect beings that happen because matter has not been properly mas-
tered by the formal principle.
Aristotle has thus come to the point in which he needs to either acknowl-
edge monsters’ naturalness, or rule it out. His explanation is original and 
groundbreaking, and its importance could hardly be overestimated for future 
debates:
A monstrosity [. . .] belongs to the class of ‘things contrary to Nature’ 
[παρὰ φύσιν], although it is contrary not to Nature in her entirety but 
only to Nature in the generality of cases [ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ]. So far as concerns 
the Nature which is always and is by necessity [ἐξ ἀνάγκη], nothing occurs 
contrary to that; no; unnatural occurrences are found only among those 
things which occur as they do in the generality of cases, but which may occur 
otherwise.60 
Nature’s unity is not questioned here. Nevertheless, the reader learns, nature 
must now be considered from two different points of view, precisely in order to 
grasp monstrosity’s naturalness: nature in the generality of cases, and nature by 
necessity. Whereas the latter does not know any monstrosity at all, the former 
is where monsters are born. I think that one has to resist the idea of treating 
the two concepts of nature that Aristotle speaks about as distinguished and 
complementary domains. I think that Aristotle emphasises two different ways 
of considering the natural domain in its unity, and within which things must 
be considered at the same time monstrous (i.e. when they are grasped vis-à-vis 
nature in the generality of cases) and normal (i.e. when they are considered 
from the angle of absolute necessity). Aristotle is, once again, trying to embody 
the peculiar kind of exceptionality that characterises monstrosity within the 
normality of nature ἐξ ἀνάγκη.
Aristotle’s striking and powerful description has a twofold aim: to offer, 
on the one hand, a scientifi c description of monstrosity at least as clear as the 
one previously offered by the (much simpler) mechanicist hypotheses, and 
59 Whereas the examples clearly recall Empedocles’ monsters, Aristotle is also describing 
Democritus’s explanation. See Vorsokr. 68 A 146 (= LM [27] ATOM. D168 = Arist. 
GA IV.4, 769 b 30): ‘Two semens fall into the uterus, one of them having started forth 
earlier and the other later, and the second when it has gone out goes into the uterus with 
the result that the parts grow on to one another and get thrown into disorder.’
60 Arist. GA IV.4, 770 b 10.
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to neutralise, on the other hand, the threat that monstrosity presents for the 
principle of a purposive nature. Aristotle makes it clear in what follows:
Why, even in those instances of the phenomena we are considering, what 
occurs is contrary to this particular order, certainly, but it never happens 
in a merely random fashion [τυχόντως]; and thus it seems less of a mon-
strosity because even that which is contrary to Nature is, in a way, in 
accordance with Nature (i.e. whenever the ‘formal’ nature has not gained 
control over [κρατέω] the ‘material’ nature). Hence, people do not call 
things of this sort monstrosities any more than they do in the other cases 
where something occurs habitually [. . .]61 
Nature, thus, is sometimes wrong after all. But what is its fault due to? At 
stake, in the fi rst place, is matter’s nature or rather the kind of resistance 
that matter is capable of opposing to the formal cause. Is this a sort of action? 
In this case monstrosity is an active inner resistance of nature to be what it 
is supposed to be. Is it only a lack of something, i.e. an insuffi ciency? In this 
case monstrosity rather falls under the category of incompleteness. Dudley has 
recently claimed that nowhere does Aristotle suggest an active role played by 
matter.62 Dudley can do so, however, only by downplaying the context and, in 
it, the meaning of κρατέω, which, he claims, does not refer to any struggle or 
confrontation between the formal and the material cause. However, I believe 
that Aristotle has precisely in mind Democritus’s ἐπικράτεια and, as a con-
sequence, the idea of both an active character of matter63 in response to its 
being informed, and of a resistance of one causal principle to the others.64
The attempt in Generation of Animals to explain monstrosity within nature’s 
necessity must not be read in a theoretical vacuum, but rather in connection 
with other texts, and in particular the Physics, whose importance I have already 
underlined. Here, Aristotle asks how nature can be considered a purposeful 
cause and how things happen by necessity in it. Would it not be an option, 
Aristotle rhetorically asks, to recognise only necessary causes and explain 
everything, even what seems to be purposeful, by necessity and chance, as the 
mechanists had previously done?
So why should it not be the same with natural organs like the teeth? Why 
should it not be a coincidence that the front teeth come up with an edge, 
suited to dividing the food, and the back ones fl at and good for grinding it, 
61 Arist. GA IV.4, 770 b 10.
62 Dudley (2012), p. 165 and passim.
63 Happ (1971), p. 753, underlines the active character of matter. See also Pacchi (1976).
64 Canguilhem (1981), p. 125.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   114 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 A R I S T O T L E  115
without there being any design in the matter? And so with all other organs 
that seem to embody a purpose. In cases where a coincidence brought about 
such a combination as might have been arranged on purpose, the creatures, 
it is urged, having been suitably formed by the operation of chance, sur-
vived; otherwise they perish, as Empedocles says of his ‘man-faced oxen’.65
Through this rhetorical question, Aristotle claims that material and mechanical 
causes alone are not suffi cient to explain what we see in nature. The answer can 
be based, once again, only on the observation of the striking regularity of natural 
events, which would be inexplicable, in Aristotle’s view, without a causal prin-
ciple above and beyond the mechanical and the fortuitous one.66
At stake is Aristotle’s interpretation of chance, as well as the one that he 
ascribes to Empedocles and Democritus. Whereas Gotthelf thinks that Aristotle 
is clear and consistent in his use of the notion of chance,67 Cherniss speaks about 
an ‘ambiguous use of the term fortuitous’.68 I agree with Cherniss’s reading, if 
one intends for ‘ambiguous’ not so much a voluntarily misguiding or dishonest 
presentation, but rather an incompatibility of Aristotle’s predecessors’ theories 
with his own system. This incompatibility calls for a redefi nition of chance: a 
redefi nition that Empedocles and Democritus would not have recognised them-
selves, and would have deemed not only unfair but also incomprehensible.
The distinction between the usual and the exceptional, to use Cherniss’s 
language, or between what happens for the most part and what happens always 
and by necessity, to use Aristotle’s own terms, would have not made any sense 
65 See the whole passage, Arist. Ph. II.8, 198 b 10–32. See also Phlp. in Ph.: ‘[Empedocles] 
said that the parts of animals were not ordered for the sake of something, but it hap-
pened that they were so related by chance as if they had come to be for the sake of this; 
and in this way, too, he says, those too [speak] who say that nature does not produce 
[things] for the sake of something, because all those things that it produces so as to be as 
if it had produced [them] for the sake of something – these are preserved, but all those 
that are not [so produced] – these perish, as Empedocles says “the man-prowed oxen-
kind” [do]. For these, since they did not come to be as if they had come to be for the 
sake of some good, because of this are not even preserved. So they take the examples of 
monsters given by Empedocles, because he himself says that the monsters which came 
to be in the original state of affairs are not preserved.’
66 Arist. Ph. II.8, 198 b 33–199 a 7: ‘All [. . .] phenomena and all natural things are either 
constant or normal, and this is contrary to the very meaning of luck (τύχη) or chance 
(αὐτόματον). No one assigns it to chance or to a remarkable coincidence if there is 
abundant rain in the winter, though he would if there were in the dog-days; and the 
other way about it, if there were parching heat. [. . .] There is purpose, then, in what is, 
and in what happens, in Nature.’
67 A. Gotthelf, ‘Aristotle’s conception of fi nal causality’, in Gotthelf, Lennox eds. (1987), 
p. 224.
68 Cherniss (1935), p. 252 and passim.
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before the new defi nition of natural teleology that is being offered in book II 
of the Physics. The incompatibility lies in the meaning of mechanical causal-
ity. Subordinating mechanism to the teleological principle not only reduces 
its scope, but changes its nature. As Cherniss suggests, Aristotle’s reduction 
of mechanicism to only its material cause brings him to identify necessity and 
chance, ‘under the infl uence of his own doctrine which traces necessity, as 
“resistance,” and chance, as “indeterminateness,” to the material:’69 a doctrine 
– Aristotle is adamant – that subordinates every other causality to teleology. As 
Cherniss brilliantly and clearly concludes:
Aristotle himself admits that the fortuitous birth of monsters is contrary 
to nature not in the sense that it does not proceed from natural causes but 
only because the form fails to master the matter completely; the whole doc-
trine rests upon a circular argument, for when the variations are frequent 
they can no longer be called monsters. Consequently, the various forms of 
the Empedoclean monsters would have to be called natural as proceeding 
from the same order of cause and effect which produced the variations that 
managed to survive; and, if on Aristotle’s narrower concept of nature they 
were unnatural because the matter had not been fully shaped by a form as 
yet indeterminable, they could not be called fortuitous either for they did 
not fall within the scope of purposive action.70 
Empedocles and Democritus only recognise one order of cause. Aristotle plays 
against them his quadripartite system, and only as such he is able to consider 
their monstrosities to be fortuitous and unnatural. I disagree, though, with 
Cherniss’s qualifi cation of Aristotle’s concept of nature as ‘narrower’ vis-à-vis 
the Empedoclean one. On the contrary, it seems to me at least as wide, rich and 
complex as Empedocles’, and perhaps more complex than any previous one.
I touched already on the analogy between art and nature. Aristotle uses 
it to strengthen his contention and this also has a strong infl uence in future 
centuries. Nature’s purposiveness is visible, one can read in the Physics, because 
of art’s purposiveness, i.e. because it functions as in the artifi cial productions. 
Provided that no impediment obstructs the process – this must be reiterated – 
nature proceeds from stage to stage, like the artisan who produces an artefact:
If a house were a natural product, the process would pass through the same 
stages that it in fact passes through when it is produced by art; and if natural 
products could also be produced by art, they would move along the same 
69 Cherniss (1935).
70 Cherniss (1935). See contra Preus (1975), p. 105, who is not convinced by Cherniss’s 
argument on circularity.
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line that the natural process actually takes. We may therefore say that the 
earlier stages are for the purpose of leading to the later. Indeed, as a gen-
eral proposition, the arts either, on the basis of Nature, carry things further 
than Nature can, or they imitate Nature. If, then, artifi cial processes are 
purposeful, so are natural processes too; for the relation of antecedent to 
consequent is identical in art and in nature.71 
Teleological action presupposes a precise relation between the antecedent 
and the consequent, whereby the former depends on the latter, which com-
mands the process’s direction. The fi nal cause is the privileged point of view 
both for the artisan/artist and for the physicist/scientist. This is why Aristotle’s 
analogy helps build the idea of convergence between beauty and order. 
Harmony is at the same time an ontological and an aesthetical concept that 
describes the human and the natural world alike. As Gilson puts it, Aristotle 
thinks that nature’s truth is grasped through its beauty. Not so much the aes-
thetical beauty, but rather its intelligible one. In the animal realm, admiring 
nature’s beauty and recognising its purposive order are one and the same.72
Everything happens with an end in view, namely a form.73 This principle 
is clear in animals and plants alike, whose marvellous purposiveness progres-
sively discloses itself to the acute observer of nature, able to focus on it step by 
step, from the superior to the inferior order that embraces all kinds of Being, 
monsters included. They are all just nature’s attempts at fulfi lling the proper 
end. Most of them are fulfi lled, some of them are not: the latter, we call τέρατα:
If in art there are cases in which the correct procedure serves a purpose, and 
attempts that fail are aimed at a purpose but miss it, we may take it to be the 
same in Nature, and monstrosities will be like failures of purpose in Nature. 
So if, in the primal combinations, such ‘ox-creatures’ as could not reach an 
equilibrium and goal should appear, it would be by the miscarriage of some 
principle, as monstrous births are actually produced now by abortive develop-
ments of sperm. Besides, the sperm must precede the formation of the animal, 
and Empedocles’ ‘primal all-generative’ is no other than such sperm.74 
Aristotle is so self-confi dent that now he can even attempt to absorb Emped-
ocles’ explanation in his own hypothesis, as if no other theory except his own 
could really be possible. Midway between the wrongly done (ἀδίκημα) and the 
misfortune (ἀτύχημα), Aristotle’s ‘failure and fault’ (ἁμάρτημα) draws from 
71 Arist. Ph. II.8, 199 a 8–21. See also b 15–32.
72 See again Gilson (1971), pp. 37–8.
73 Arist. Ph. II.8, 199 a 32–3.
74 Arist. Ph. II.8, 199 a 33–b 9.
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both ideas, conveying a message that is much more complex than the simple 
‘mistake’.75 To do this, however, Aristotle must invent a tradition that does 
not exist in the texts. Nature’s regularities, whose frequency guarantees the 
possibility of Aristotle’s taxonomy by allowing him to attempt the appropria-
tion of Empedocles, do not exist in the Empedoclean hypothesis itself.76 The 
Empedoclean monsters, which, unfi t, do not survive, could have certainly been 
more numerous than the individuals who do survive and which, for this reason 
and this reason only, i.e. for nothing that they intrinsically possess, eventually 
become normal. Moreover, Aristotle’s monster can be such only vis-à-vis an 
actuality, i.e. another group of individuals already existing in fact, when poten-
tiality is unable to reproduce once again the existing normality. Now, such an 
actuality simply does not exist in Empedocles. The actual normality does not 
exist by defi nition; it becomes such only as a result of a transformation which is 
not confronted by any pre-existing actuality. Whereas for Empedocles potenti-
ality precedes actuality, for Aristotle the opposite is true.77
What kind of necessity, then, is Aristotle able to speak about and use in 
his argument? Employing again a striking formula, Aristotle develops the 
concept of accidental necessity. It is the task of Generation of Animals, once 
again, to explain that monstrosities are not necessary as far as the fi nal cause 
is concerned, but rather per accidens (κατὰ συμβεβεκός),78 for example ‘when 
75 Louis (1975), p. 283, underlines that, in this sense, the mistake is not and can not ever 
be complete. No monster denounces nature’s total failure.
76 See Simplicius’s hesitation in following Aristotle’s attempt to appropriate Empedocles’ 
theory, in Ph. 382.2–21: ‘Aristotle points out that Empedocles himself appears to mean 
that the seed is produced before the animals. The phrase spoken by Empedocles, “the 
whole-natured shape that came fi rst,” was the seed, which did not yet display “the desir-
able form of limbs” because it was liquid in actuality, being fl uid, but the form of man in 
potentiality. But perhaps it was impossible for either the animal to exist before the seed, 
or the seed before the animal. For just as each plant and animal is born from its own 
particular seed, so each seed is produced by its own particular animal or plant. Aristotle 
might have pointed out that Empedocles does not say that the seed always exists before 
the animal. And it is clear that the animal does exist before the seed. He confi rms his 
observation by concluding that “‘the whole-natured shape that came fi rst’ was the seed,” 
since even Empedocles himself realised that the seed must exist before the birth of the 
animal. If it is the seed, then it seems to me remarkably suitable to attribute the term 
“whole-natured” to it. For strictly speaking it is whole-natured because it is that which 
is, throughout itself, entirely what it is if no differentiation has yet taken place within it. 
For every part of the seed is all the parts of the body, but no part of the body is the other 
parts once the differentiation has taken place in them and the whole nature has been 
dispersed.’ See also Thomas Aquinas (1963), book II, lecture 14 (= Sancti Thomae 
Aquinatis [1954], pp. 128–31).
77 On the weaknesses of Aristotle’s treatment of Empedocles, see also Cherniss (1935), 
p. 255.
78 Arist. GA IV.3, 767 b 13–15.
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a female is formed instead of a male [. . .] since it is possible for the male 
sometimes not to gain the mastery [κρατέω] either on account of youth or 
age or some other such cause, female offspring must of necessity be produced 
by animals’.79 This idea has profound consequences for Aristotle’s system. It 
is, on the one hand, the best solution that Aristotle fi nds to maintain the 
naturalness of every event, including monstrosities. It is also, on the other 
hand, what shakes the whole system from the bottom, casting a shade on the 
concept of necessity itself and its possible meanings.
Pierre Aubenque has underlined how crucial this passage is in posing the 
necessity of accident, and the essentiality of contingency. Nature’s mistakes are 
paradoxically constitutive of the material world itself. Without them, the world 
would collapse into the nothingness of absolute identity with its perfection. In 
order to really exist, on the contrary, it must be different from its perfection, and 
this happens thanks to nature’s failures: ‘a world without failures would be a 
world in which Being would be everything it can be, where there would not be 
any matter, or power, or movement, or multiplicity; such a world would melt 
into its principle: pure act, immaterial, motionless and one like its principle, 
this world would be, in the end, undistinguishable from it.’80
The contingent and the accidental strike back at Aristotle’s attempt to tame 
them. The unintended consequence of Aristotle’s endeavour to naturalise mon-
strosity within a teleological framework is that monsters become necessary not 
only because of the way they are produced in nature, but also for nature itself 
to be what it is. Without questioning the consistency, coherency and ultimately 
the argumentative force of Aristotle’s system, what is pivotal for the present 
discussion is that monstrosity produces the clash and the collapse of terms that 
are normally taken as opposite to one another, necessity and the accidental.
As Louis has emphasised, παρὰ φύσιν cannot be intended as something 
fully outside nature. Rather, it occurs at or across nature’s edges. This, I 
think, makes it possible for Aristotle to develop his concept of accidental 
necessity. The edge, paradoxically, takes centre stage and becomes the ter-
rain on which monstrosities are analysed. Nonetheless, can they really be 
analysed, i.e. scientifi cally studied? If one grants absolute pre-eminence to 
the assumption of the Metaphysics that no science of irregularity is possible, 
then the answer must be negative.81 This is Dudley’s conclusion, for whom 
79 Arist. GA IV.3, 767 b 10–13.
80 Aubenque (1962), pp. 388–90.
81 Arist. Metaph. VI.2, 1026 a 32 ff. in fact establishes that ‘since the simple term “being” 
is used in various senses, of which we saw that one was accidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), 
and another true (not-being being used in the sense of “false”) [. . .] it must fi rst be said 
of what “is” accidentally, that there can be no speculation (θεωρία) about it. [. . .] no 
science (ἐπιστήμη), whether practical or speculative, concerns itself with it.’
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monsters are natural irregularities, and thus cannot be foreseen or studied.82 
The accidental necessity, however, is still a kind of necessity, and one must 
acknowledge Aristotle’s careful, although striking, choice of terms. It must 
be possible, thus, to scientifi cally study objects and phenomena falling under 
this kind of necessity, as Johnson has argued. Johnson translates τέρας with 
‘freak’. I wonder whether the term ‘monster’ better suggests something that 
is not an ‘abnormally developed individual’: although rare, its development is 
indeed normal and necessary.83
Preus discusses in detail the question of accidental necessity. He claims 
that monsters must be considered in the same way as the unnecessary by-
products of necessary processes, such as the production of bile in the human 
body. Precisely because of this, they do not survive. Just as part of the matter 
composing food does not have any use and is discarded,84 part of the mat-
ter produced by copulation is of inferior quality and is discarded by nature, 
preventing it from reproducing itself and creating a new race.85 Preus seeks to 
explain a diffi cult concept through what is clearer and causes less of a problem 
in Aristotle’s thought. Of course, this methodology has certain advantages, 
such as avoiding projecting meaning from an outside point of view. Yet it also 
prevents one from seeing the tensions that might permeate this theory, which 
can also be productive and rich for future debates. Not only the process of 
producing monstrosity, I think, but the monster itself as its offspring must be 
considered as necessary by accident in Aristotle.
Preus calls the monstrous production in Aristotle’s system ‘dysteleological’.86 
We should consider necessity and accidental necessity as two opposed concepts 
for Aristotle, and we should not attempt to save Aristotle from himself by 
neutralising his most inconvenient conclusions,87 as doing so would make it pos-
sible to see him as a precursor of modern mechanism. I agree with Preus’s view: 
Aristotle’s system is the negation of mechanicism in different ways. Yet it seems 
to me that Preus himself is trying to save Aristotle’s system from the incon-
sistencies and ambiguities that mechanicists see in it, in particular concerning 
monsters and accidentally necessary phenomena. The accidental necessity is still 
a necessity, encompassing all aspects of the phenomenon, and thus qualifying all 
its causal determinations together. Aristotle himself makes it clear, against the 
possibility of an interpretation like Preus’s, that chance is an accidental cause 
82 Dudley (2012), pp. 192–3.
83 Johnson (2005), pp. 198–9.
84 Arist. PA III.7, 670 a 30.
85 Preus (1975), pp. 200 ff.
86 Preus (1975), pp. 205–6.
87 As Charlton (1970) does, in Preus’s view.
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(ἡ γὰρ τύχη τῶν κατὰ συμβεβεκός αἰτίων) opposed to both the invariable and 
the usual necessity of natural phenomena.88
These are Aristotle’s topical points regarding nature and its accidentally 
necessary anomalies, such as monsters. Their importance, in future centuries, 
is proportional to the importance of his system in the history of philosophy 
overall. The points that Aristotle has made are clear. Both his disciples and 
opponents show, besides the differences, that they have clearly understood 
his heritage. The crucial question for them is whether to use and reuse Aris-
totelianism either as a polemical target to be destroyed to introduce new and 
revolutionary ideas, or as a tool to give authority and support to old and more 
traditional views. The history of the idea of monstrosity constantly refers to 
the Aristotelian attempt of founding, although paradoxically, a new science 
of monsters.
This is already visible, I believe, in the early history of Peripateticism 
with Aristotle’s immediate successors, Theophrastus of Eresos and Strato of 
Lampsacus. Scholars have underlined the originality of Theophrastus vis-à-
vis Aristotle, in part because of his important contribution to the understand-
ing and acceptance of the teleological principle. Theophrastus carries out his 
analysis at the same time Aristotle does, and consideration of Theophrastus 
has focused on the degree of the pupil’s faithfulness toward the master’s doc-
trine. Theophrastus’s reworking of fi nalism offers a new understanding of 
lower and imperfect, or apparently random, phenomena; without discarding 
Aristotelian teleology, he nevertheless sees it differently than Aristotle. The 
key text here is book IX of the Metaphysics, which is particularly diffi cult to 
reconstruct, but which underlines the problems of the idea that everything is 
in view of something and nothing is in vain (τοῦ πάνθ’ ἕνεκά του καὶ μηδὲν 
μάτην).89 In considering this, Theophrastus tackles the principle of teleology 
in its entirety and tests its heuristic power even vis-à-vis phenomena that 
seem to escape its domain.
He writes:
With regard to the issue that all things are for the sake of something and 
nothing is in vain, the delimitation required is not easy anyway [. . .], and 
88 In other words, the invariable and the normal achievements of natural events stand on 
the same side, vis-à-vis what happens by chance. See Ph. II.8, 199 b 23–6: ‘As we have 
explained, chance is an incidental cause (ἡ γὰρ τύχη τῶν κατὰ συμβεβεκός αἰτίων). 
But when the desirable result is effected invariably or normally, it is not an incidental 
or chance occurrence, and in the course of Nature the result always is achieved either 
invariably or normally, if nothing hinders.’
89 Thphr. Metaph. IX.10 a 22.
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some things in particular <are diffi cult> because they do not seem to be 
such; but some of them coincidentally, others by some necessity – as in the 
case both of the heavenly bodies and of the majority of things on earth.90 
Theophrastus sounds the alarm about a naive or acritical acceptance of 
fi nalism in every domain, since there are phenomena that appear to evade 
a teleological explanation. Whether Theophrastus is criticising his master’s 
theory or trying to save it from the attacks of its adversaries is not important 
for the present enquiry. What is more important is that monsters, though 
generally absent from Theoprastus’s extant works, can clearly be conceived 
as being among these unexplainable phenomena.
In their notes complémentaires, Laks and Most explain that, for partisans 
of teleology, the admission that anything happens without an end wrecks the 
entire principle.91 With this in mind, we see that Theophrastus is trying to avoid 
this problem and save teleology by assigning a less negative status to facts and 
things that seem to lack any end. However, as Laks and Most add, the expres-
sion τοῦ πάνθ’ ἕνεκά του καὶ μηδὲν μάτην echoes a panglossian argument 
that not even Aristotle ever held. Such optimism is more typical of the Stoics. 
Theophrastus’s criticism thus would not be addressed to his master. This is also 
Luciana Repici’s claim; she sees a strong continuity between Theophrastus and 
Aristotle on the consistency and coherency of the teleological principle.92
The question at stake for Theophrastus, as for Aristotle, seems to be not so 
much whether teleology can unambiguously explain everything, but whether 
those things that seem inexplicable through ends can still be conceived within 
a teleological framework. As Most and Laks point out, Theophrastus’s expres-
sion can be seen as an early attempt to separate what is in view of something 
and what is in view of the better:
one should try to grasp some limit [ὅρος], both in nature and in the being 
of the whole, both of the <explanation of things as being> ‘for the sake of 
something’ and of the impulse towards the better. For this is the starting-
point of the study of the whole, in what things really consists and how they 
relate to one another.93 
The distinction between a purely functional teleology (ἕνεκά του) and an 
axiological one (εἰς τὸ ἄριστον) can be seen as Theophrastus’s contribution 
90 Thphr. Metaph. IX.10 a 22–8.
91 Théophraste (1993), p. 74.
92 Repici (1991). Contra, see e.g. J. G. Lennox, who correctly points out that a debate on 
the legitimacy of Aristotle’s teleological explanation already existed in his time.
93 Thphr. Metaph. IX.11 b 25–7.
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to establishing a more solid ground for the principle and its scientifi c cogency. 
At the same time, however, once teleology needs limitations in order to 
retain its coherence and usefulness, one can surely ask if it has in fact been 
supported or undermined. However, one cannot undermine the strength of 
Theophrastus’s idea of a boundary or a limit (ὅρος) that teleology requires to 
reinforce its cogency.
In this sense, van Raalte concludes that this part of the Metaphysics speaks 
less to a continuity between pupil and master than to teleology’s inability to con-
ceive of, rather than just explain, phenomena.94 There are things, Theophrastus 
seems to argue, that simply are not guided by ends or, more clearly, things that 
fall outside the boundaries of the dominion of teleology itself:
[. . .] the very possibility that [some phenomena] have no explanation 
is problematic, and especially for those who do not suppose this <to be 
the case> in other things, prior and more worthy <than these>. This is 
also why the account that it is by spontaneity and through the rotation of 
the whole that these things acquire certain forms or differences from one 
another seems to have some plausibility.95 
Laks and Most underline that this is a diffi cult and perhaps corrupted 
passage. Their reading of it is that even lower and less noble phenomena 
(indubitably including monstrosities) must be explainable in the superior 
reality, without that reality being their direct cause. It thus becomes pos-
sible to establish an indirect link between the two levels of reality, a link that 
Theophrastus calls mechanic (τῷ αὐτομάτῳ).96 Laks and Most’s interpreta-
tion is convincing. However, given the paramount effort Aristotle puts into 
opposing the mechanist explanation and the intention that seems to guide 
Theophrastus in devoting so much attention to his master’s theory, the read-
ing of the spontaneous as a mere indirect link between a fi nalist principle 
and its abnormal and monstrous phenomena seems perplexing, or at least 
reductive. Theoprastus is certainly aware that the αὐτόματον had been the 
fl ag of the mechanist explanation since Democritus, and that Aristotle had 
built his teleology largely against it as he continued, not without originality 
and substantial changes, the efforts of Socrates and Plato.
94 See van Raalte’s entire commentary to book IX in Theophrastus (1993). On Theophras-
tus’s teleology see also A. Jaulin, ‘Le meilleur et les contraires: De la nécessaire limitation à 
l’impulsion vers le meilleur’, in Jaulin, Lefebvre eds (2015), pp. 135–48 and J.-B. Gourinat, 
‘Les limites du fi nalisme chez Aristote et Théophraste’, in Jaulin, Lefebvre éds (2015), 
pp. 149–77.
95 Thphr. Metaph. IX.10 b 24–11 a 1.
96 Laks and Most, ‘Notes complémentaires’, in Théophraste (1993), ad loc.
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In this sense, the treatment of monstrosities in Theophrastus’s work is sig-
nifi cant. Monstrosity was a pillar of Aristotle’s analysis of natural phenomena 
and Theophrastus continues the Aristotelian effort to give monstrosity a fully 
natural explanation, to free it from religious and superstitious implications. This, 
I believe, is the meaning of Theophrastus’s applications of limits and boundaries 
to teleology. They are efforts not to limit the conceptual domain of fi nalism, but 
rather its potential use to support superstitious explanations of strange or appar-
ently unnatural events.97 Things always happen with a cause, but often cannot 
be explained through an end. They happen coincidentally or inevitably, by some 
kind of necessity, τὰ μὲν συμπτωματικῶς, τὰ δ’ἀνάγκῃ τινί.98 In the Meteorology, 
as Mansfeld suggests, Theophrastus goes even further, saying that the divine 
can only be conceived as the cause of order, never disorder, which arises from 
the natural movement of the cosmos itself.99 By extending this coincident and 
necessary character to celestial bodies, Theophrastus is pushing the boundaries 
of Aristotle’s teleology while limiting its scope and domain.
This is also refl ected in Theophrastus’s writings on plants, in which the 
abnormal and the monstrous are not presented as a challenge to the teleologi-
cal explanation, but rather framed within it so as to exclude amazement or 
belief in anything besides natural causes. In book V of De causis plantarum, 
Theophrastus explains that every seemingly unreasonable thing can in fact be 
explained: they are doubtful or poorly accounted for or due to natural causes 
that an ignorant observer does not recognise as such.100 Regarding unnatural 
sprouting, for example, Theophrastus writes that they occur:
when the generative power collects in [boughs or trunk]: when a starting-
point has become fi xed, the food that fl ows to it becomes assimilated, just as 
in the other parts, to the thing that is to be produced. The formation of such 
a starting-point is not unreasonable, if the tree has acquired in some part a 
tempering that is favourable, but is a good deal more reasonable than the for-
mation that occurs in animals, as when a horn grows from the chest or some-
thing else of the kind occurs, since here the departure is greater than that in 
plants to the extent that plants are more undifferentiated than animals.101
 97 See Mansfeld (1992), who exploits the rediscovery of Theophrastus’s Meteorology in the 
fragmentary Syriac version published and translated by Hans Daiber in Fortenbaugh, 
Gutas eds. (1992), pp. 166–293.
 98 Thphr. Metaph. IX.10 a 26–7.
 99 See e.g. Thphr. Meteorology 6, on the thunderbolt, in Fortenbaugh, Gutas eds. (1992), 
pp. 263–6. Mansfeld correctly argues that the same principle can be extended to 
monstrous births.
100 Thphr. CP V.1.2 ff.
101 Thphr. CP V.2.1.
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The vegetal domain appears to be more resistant to monstrosity than the ani-
mal one, a fact Theophrastus explicitly evoked with regard to Aristotle’s GA.102 
Theophrastus seems less interested, however, in the distinction between the 
animal and the vegetal domain, but in rationalising the approach that, without 
fear or superstition, should characterise scientifi c enquiry in both domains, just 
as Aristotle taught. When Theophrastus states that ‘these cases perhaps fall 
outside the realm of a natural cause’,103 he is not recognising the existence of 
supernatural or unnatural causality, but of unusual facts whose origin is exter-
nal to the inner nature of the plant itself, but certainly not outside nature as a 
whole, since Theophrastus’s last word seems to be that there is hardly anything 
abnormal in nature.
A similar and perhaps even more ambiguous relationship with Aristot-
le’s position can be found in Theophrastus’s successor, the third scholarch of 
the Lyceum, Strato of Lampsacus. The situation with Strato’s works is even 
more problematic than with Theophrastus’s, as only a very limited number 
of doxographic texts are extant. This, however, has not prevented ancient 
and modern scholars from seeing in Strato’s thought another interesting step 
in the debate about teleology, a position extremely relevant to the study and 
conceptualisation of monstrosity in the ancient world.
Partisans of divine providence and, in particular, of Christian providence 
have seen Strato as an enemy. Lactantius denounces the scandal of those who 
do not put God at the origin of the universe:
[They] say either that it was composed of fi rst-principles that came 
together at random or that it was brought into existence by nature in an 
unlooked-for way; [they suppose that] nature indeed, as Strato says, has 
in itself a power of producing generation, growth and decay, but it has no 
consciousness or shape, so that we may understand that all things have as 
it were been produced spontaneously, not by any craftsman or originator. 
Both of these [positions] are idle and impossible.104 
Strato is thus associated with those who support the random or spontane-
ous formation of the universe and its parts, namely the mechanicists and 
Epicureans. They are the most horrible intellectual and human monsters in 
the history of philosophy, ‘[. . .] going astray in what they see, deceived by 
what they hear, castrated in their souls, unreasoning, sterile and barren, like 
102 In particular to GA 769 a 10–771 a 14. See also S. Amigues in Théophraste (2012–17), 
ad loc.
103 Thphr. CP V.4.7.
104 Lact. De ira dei X.1 (= Desclos-Fortenbaugh, fr. 19C).
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a lion without courage, a bull without horns or a bird without wings [. . .]’, 
or so says Maximus of Tyrus.105
The association of Strato with the Epicureans has also been made by modern 
scholars including Georges Rodier, who, although claiming a continuity between 
Aristotle and Strato, reads the only extant fragment that deals with monstrosity, 
the doxographic testimony of the Placita, through an Epicurean lens:
How do monstrous births occur? . . . Strato [says that they result from] addi-
tion or removal or transposition [of certain parts] or infl ation by pneuma.106 
Extremely important, as we will see, is the idea of ἐμπνευμάτωσις, or infl ation, 
to explain monstrosity. Grounding his reading on this fragment, Rodier joins 
the ancient authors who generally see a break between Strato and Aristotle on 
the fundamental question of teleology and, as a consequence, on a mechani-
cal and materialist explanation of monstrous births. Plutarch, for example, 
explicitly contrasts Strato and Aristotle on the role of chance:
Indeed the leader of the rest of the Peripatetics, Strato, in many things 
disagrees with Aristotle, and holds opposite opinions to Plato concern-
ing motion, mind, soul and generation, and fi nally he says that the world 
itself is not a living creature and that what is natural follows from what 
is according to chance. For what is spontaneous gives the lead, and then 
each of the natural processes is brought to completion in this way.107 
The opposition also seems unproblematic to Cicero, who rebukes both Strato 
and Theophrastus, clarifying, though, their differences:
Nor is Theophrastus’ inconsistency tolerable; at one moment he gives the 
divine supremacy to mind, at another to the heaven, and then again to the 
constellations and stars in the sky. Nor should we listen to his pupil Strato, 
the one who is called ‘the naturalist [physicus]’, who holds the view that all 
divine power is located in nature, which is responsible for generation, growth 
and decay, but is without any consciousness and without any shape.108 
105 Max.Tyr. XI.5 (= Desclos-Fortenbaugh, fr. 21).
106 Placit. V.8.2, 905 F–906 A (= Desclos-Fortenbaugh, fr.74). See Rodier (1890), p. 91 n. 
2. Both W. Capelle, Straton in RE, 310–11 and Wehrli hrsg. (1967–9, 2. ed.), V, esp. pp. 
47, 57–8 and 69, agree on this point. See also Gatzemeier (1970), p. 143 and passim. 
On Strato through a more prudent reading of Rodier see P. Pellegrin, ‘La physique de 
Straton de Lampsaque. Dans la lignée de Georges Rodier’, in Desclos, Fortenbaugh eds. 
(2011), pp. 239–61.
107 Plu. Moralia. Adversus Colotem 14.1114 F–1115 B (= Desclos-Fortenbaugh, fr. 20).
108 Cic. ND I.35 (= Desclos-Fortenbaugh, fr. 19A). See also Minucius Felix 19.8 (= Desclos-
Fortenbaugh, fr. 19B).
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   126 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 A R I S T O T L E  127
In the eyes of the ancients, Strato seems to go much further in revising and 
criticising Aristotle’s theory. Teleology is not necessary to explain natural 
phenomena, and nature is described as a spontaneous force that is not guided 
by a divine mind or by any end directed toward what is better or most accom-
plished. In the end, Aristotle’s teleology fades away and the fragment on 
monsters, despite its incompletion, seems to suggest that monsters could well 
have played a signifi cant role in Strato’s reconception of teleology.
Another passage from Cicero, however, clarifi es something equally impor-
tant, namely that in reconsidering the role and status of teleology in nature, 
Strato does not join the mechanicists and explicitly rejects Democritus’s 
atomism. In Cicero’s words:
You [Stoics] say that nothing can [come to be] without god; look, here 
unexpectedly is Strato of Lampsacus, who gives this god a release from a 
great task, indeed; but seeing that the priests of the gods have no holiday, 
how much fairer is it that the gods themselves [should do so]. He says that 
he makes no use of work by the gods in constructing the world, and teaches 
that whatever there is is all brought about by nature, and not in the same 
way as he who says that all these things are composed of rough and smooth 
and hooked and barbed bodies interspersed with void; he says that these 
are the dreams of Democritus, who does not teach but [indulges in] wish-
ful [thinking], while he himself, investigating the individual parts of the 
world, teaches that whatever is or comes to be is brought about or has been 
brought about by natural weights and movements.109 
Cicero’s testimony is of great importance in clarifying the ambiguity that 
several ancient authors have seen in Strato’s mechanicist turn. Reappraising 
Rodier’s and Wehrli’s interpretation, Repici and Pellegrin have clarifi ed that 
Strato openly rejects fundamental points of atomism. As with Theophrastus, 
Strato’s exact position vis-à-vis Aristotle is not in itself central to the present 
enquiry. What is important is that Strato must have had an extensive interest 
in teratology, and could have used it to clarify his position on fi nalism, given 
how important monstrosity is to Aristotle’s theory of fi nal causes.
109 Cic. Acad. II.121 (= Desclos-Fortenbaugh, fr. 18). Cicero stresses Strato’s ethical con-
cerns in line, as we have seen above, with Theophrastus and close, at least in this sense, 
to the Epicurean and Stoic enterprises. See again Acad. II.121: ‘To be sure, [Strato] both 
sets god free from great toil and sets me free from great fear. For who, thinking that he 
is of concern to god, can fail to shudder at the divine power both by day and by night, 
and, if something bad has happened (to whom does it not?), can fail to be terrifi ed that it 
happened justly? However, I do not agree either with Strato or with you; now this [view] 
seems more worthy of approval, now that.’
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This is why the teratological fragment of the Placita is of paramount impor-
tance. Both Torraca and Repici suggest that the fragment’s meaning is that 
monsters have an addition or removal of parts and that the anomalies can 
be explained by an excess of air or pneuma.110 Although pneuma recalls the 
material nature that the Stoics assign to the principle pervading the whole 
universe, Strato does not believe it has a teleological and divine nature. The 
ἐμπνευμάτωσιν, as Repici explains, suggests a non-teleological process of the 
body’s transformation that is connected to the πνεῦμα, a term Aristotle uses 
precisely in relation to monstrous bodies.111 Repici thus claims against Rodier, 
Wehrli and Gatzemeier that one can read Strato’s text as the attempt to con-
nect the mechanical with the teleological explanation rather than as a rejec-
tion of fi nalism as a whole. This, Repici adds, is possible if one separates the 
teleological and the providential or, much as Laks and Most have suggested 
about Theophrastus, the functional and axiological within teleology itself.
Repici’s reading is grounded on the idea that Aristotle’s theory is already 
capable of absorbing a mechanist point of view against the excesses of Platonic 
or Stoic fi nalism, the nature and aim of which is more religious than scien-
tifi c. It seems to me, however, that Strato is trying to build an original position 
that rejects both Democritus’s atomism and Stoic teleology. I believe that our 
knowledge of Theophrastus and, most of all, of Strato, is too lacunary to estab-
lish whether there was a serious challenge to Aristotle’s theory from inside the 
Lyceum.
We have seen in this chapter how, implicitly or explicitly, monstrosity chal-
lenges the Aristotelian system. If, on one hand, Aristotle pursues Plato’s effort 
to undermine earlier materialism, on the other, his effort goes beyond what 
Aristotle perceives as the shortcomings of radical idealism, opening new ways 
of understanding the norm and its monstrous exception. Monsters exist and 
deserve the attention of the scientist and the philosopher who, in their attempt 
to include these monsters in a systematic understanding of the world, must 
understand their causes and function. This, in turn, requires a new theory of 
causality. Aristotle’s treatment of monstrosity depends on the application of his 
new theory of the four causes – the material, the formal, the effi cient and the 
fi nal – to events that seem to represent exceptions to nature’s normal course.
As we have seen, though monsters are exceptional, their inclusion in the 
normal scheme of causality is an antidote against their apparent incompre-
hensibility or lack of meaning: for Aristotle, nothing happens without nature 
requiring it. The phenomenology of the monstrous, no matter how varied and 
110 See Torraca’s translation in Diels (1961) and Repici (1988), esp. ch. IV, ‘La teratologia: 
sulle tracce di una teoria’.
111 Arist. GA IV.4, 772 b 26–31.
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diverse, is part of the causal pattern of normal events. Aristotle achieves this 
by giving a privileged status and encompassing role to the fourth and highest 
kind of cause, the end or τέλος. The normative achievement of the end – for 
all natural phenomena, but especially biological ones – becomes the key to 
defi ne and comprehend monstrosity. The material cause, the only one that 
counted for physicists, remains important, yet as we have seen, Aristotle sees 
the material cause as a potential disrupting factor that comes to be consid-
ered an obstacle to the full, perfect accomplishment of the individual τέλος 
of every being.
This innovative approach sees monstrosity as the result of a process that 
has been hindered by an unfavourable dynamic of the causes that prevents the 
realisation of a perfect end. Aristotle develops the opposition between nor-
mal and abnormal development through the concept of accidental necessity, 
namely the necessity at stake in processes that do not always happen the same 
way. Monsters are pivotal here because of their paradoxical ambiguity. They 
are the sign and symptom of a resistant nature that opposes itself to Aristotle’s 
major ontological invention, the form and the fi nal cause. At the same time, 
without this hiatus between formal perfection and actual reality, nature would 
not exist in the way we experience it. In fact, nature would not exist at all: 
there would be no diversity, no individuality or multiplicity, no better or worse, 
no similarity or difference, no normal and monstrous. Perfection destroys 
actuality. Monstrosity is thus necessary because it lets Aristotle explain nature 
and its ontological structure based on the substitution of dynamic forms and 
ends for both Plato’s static ideas and the atomists’ exclusively material reality.
In the last part of this chapter we have seen how the debate is pursued by 
Aristotle’s successors in the Lyceum, particularly Theophrastus and Strato. 
Although our understanding is limited by the limited and fragmentary nature 
of the extant works (especially for Strato), it is safe to say that the debate 
around normality, abnormality and monstrosity must have been one of the 
main preoccupations during and after Aristotle’s life. Aristotelianism was a 
response to ancient materialism and to the Socratic–Platonic idealism, but as 
new challenges arose, his followers had to adapt to the Academy’s develop-
ment after Plato’s death as well as to the development of other major systems, 
i.e. Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism, during the Hellenistic period. 
These are discussed in the next chapters.
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Epicurus and Lucretius
An Immanent Causality for an Infi nite Universe
I will analyse in this chapter Epicurus’s and Lucretius’s treatment of monstros-
ity. Not only do they share a great number of theoretical elements, but they 
have often been read together, and their philosophical systems are consid-
ered as constituting, together, the core of the atomist response to Platonism 
and Aristotelianism. Τέρατα are not part of the Epicurean language, in which 
one only fi nds the τερατεία, the wonderful and the amazing that are used 
to make an impression on common people and strike their imagination.1 
Epicurus seems more interested in the superstitious use that can be made 
of monsters than in understanding their ontological meaning and biological 
presence in nature. Monsters are indeed present in the atomist account of the 
early zoogonies, but not much is available to speculate on, since the only sur-
viving text of Epicurus on zoogony is a fragment mentioned by Censorinus.2 
Most of Epicurus’s works have been lost, and in particular the thirty-seven 
books of his Περὶ φύσεως, together with the very many other books that this 
prolifi c author wrote, according to Diogenes Laertius’s account.3 It is thus 
diffi cult to believe that Epicurus was not interested in monstrosity, given how 
important it is for both his polemical targets, such as Plato and Aristotle, and 
his sources, such as Democritus.4
 1 See Epicur. Ep.[3], 114 (= Usener, Ep. 53.114), Arrighetti in Epicuro (1973, 2a ed.) and 
Usener (1977), pp. 663–4.
 2 Epicur. Fr. 333. See Spoerri (1997).
 3 D.L. X.26.
 4 Moreau (1975), p. 475, shows that Democritus and Epicurus share the same principles, 
even if they understand them differently. It is hardly conceivable that Epicurus, in the now 
lost parts of his treatise on nature, did not take the chance to discuss a topic so important 
from a materialist and atomistic point of view. On the early atomists in Epicurus, see P.-M. 
Morel, ‘I primi Atomisti nel II libro “Sulla Natura” di Epicuro’, in Guadalupe Masi and 
Maso a cura di (2015), pp. 55–66.
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It is not a surprise, then, that monstrosity occupies a large part of Lucre-
tius’s De rerum natura, directly inspired by Epicurus. Lucretius probably had 
access to a larger amount of Epicurean text than we have.5 Scholarship has 
proved, however, that the relation between the two authors is quite com-
plex and one cannot immediately use a work taken from a later context to 
directly supplement an earlier and lost source. Whereas some scholars tend to 
neglect Lucretius’s originality and deem that the Latin poet only repeats the 
Greek master’s theories,6 others openly recognise the evolution that naturally 
takes place across centuries within atomist philosophy.7 This awareness of the 
historical development, even within the same philosophical school, makes it 
impossible to immediately use Lucretius to reconstruct Epicurus’s theory of 
nature and, in particular, of monstrosity. In this light, other authors, such as 
Empedocles, appear as important as Epicurus himself for Lucretius.8 It is pos-
sible, however, to delineate the core arguments of what is perceived over the 
following centuries as the atomist philosophy, beyond the differences among 
individual contributions.
The general principles of Epicurean physics are in the Letter to Herodotus 
and in the fragments of the Περὶ φύσεως, later reworked in Latin by Lucretius 
in the De rerum natura. The fundamental ground of the Epicurean theory is that
nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything 
would be created out of everything with no need of seeds. And again, if that 
which disappears were destroyed into that which did not exist, all things 
would have perished, since that into which they were dissolved would not 
exist. Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will 
be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the uni-
verse there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change.9 
 5 See Arrighetti in Lucrezio (1973, 2a ed.), contra Woltjer (1877), for whom Lucretius 
basically repeats Epicurus and Campbell (2003), p. 101. See also the discussion in Spoerri 
(1997), ‘Appendice: deux excursus sur les sources de Lucrèce’.
 6 Woltjer (1877) and Boyancé (1963). 
 7 Usener and De Lacy (1948). See Bollack’s reconstruction of this debate in Bollack 
(1978), pp. 96 ff.
 8 See Arrighetti in Epicuro (1973, 2nd ed.), p. 493, Gale (1994), pp. 59 ff., Sedley (1989, 
1998), D. Sedley, ‘The Empedoclean Opening’, in Gale (2007), pp. 48–87, L. Piazzi, 
‘Atomismo e polemica fi losofi ca: Lucrezio e i presocratici’, in M. Beretta, F. Citti a cura di 
(2008), pp. 11–25. It is also important that the question of Epicurus’s infl uence on Lucretius 
assumes a theoretical dimension beyond the merely historiographical one: early Christian 
authors such as Lactantius and Arnobius, for instance, tend to save Lucretius from the 
impious infl uence of the atheist Epicurus. While Lactantius is ready to accept that Lucretius 
has been infl uenced by Empedocles, he tries to break the link with Epicurus, on whom the 
whole blame is to be put. See De opifi cio Dei VI.1 and Bollack (1978), pp. 118–19.
 9 Epicur. Ep. [2], 38–9 (= Usener, pp. 5–6).
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As Bailey underlines, this fi rst set of principles, already known by Anaxagoras 
and Democritus, implies immediately the crucial idea that ‘every material object 
has a material cause’, and that ‘every creation of which we have cognizance 
implies a previous seed’.10 The whole treatment of monstrosity by Lucretius and, 
more generally, within the atomist perspective is developed within this frame-
work, according to which transformation and constancy characterise the whole 
universe with no exception, offering the possibility of understanding it and rul-
ing out every transcendent and mysterious explanation of natural phenomena, 
even the most curious, strange or monstrous ones. They too happen according 
to the principles ruling the universal transformation, but they will be confi ned 
within the limits of the absolute constancy of the universe itself, because noth-
ing exists outside of the universe that can act upon it.
Lucretius powerfully echoes this idea, by making the combat against tran-
scendentalism even more explicit: ‘No thing is ever by divine power produced 
from nothing (nullam rem e nilo gigni diuinitus umquam).’ Otherwise everything 
could and indeed would have been produced from all things, and there would 
be no need of seeds. Moreover, when things perish individually, they do not fall 
into nothingness, but are rather transformed into their composing elements 
(in sua corpora rursum | dissoluat natura neque ad nilum interemat res).’11
The universal constancy and transformation constitute the theatre of the 
ceaseless activity of the entities composing the whole (πᾶς), namely bodies 
(σώματα) and space (τόπος), or void (κενός).12 The atoms or corpora are 
indivisible,13 they move constantly,14 and they have many different shapes.15 
Both Epicurus and Lucretius subscribe to Leucippus and Democritus, but they 
also introduce important modifi cations and new ideas.
Atoms’ features, from which all the composite bodies and their variety 
depend, are the shape (σχῆμα), the weight (βάρος) and the greatness or magni-
tude (μέγεθος). With these elements Epicurus, and Lucretius after him, sets out 
to counter Aristotle’s philosophy by thinking together, and in a non-paradoxical 
way, the permanence and the mutation of phenomena alike. The existence 
of immutable but microscopic elements of matter’s components cannot, of 
10 Bailey, in Epicurus (1926), p. 179.
11 Lucr. I.150, 159–60, and 215–16.
12 Epicur. Ep. [2], 40. Lucretius closely follows the demonstration in Lucr. I.418 ff.
13 Lucr. I.265 ff. The indivisibility of atoms plays a strong role in denying the anti-materi-
alist consequences of the dialectic developed by the Eleatic school and, in particular, by 
Zeno, whose infi nite divisibility of matter nullifi es Being itself. See Plu. Adversus Colotem 
16.1116C in Usener, p. 202, fr. 282.
14 Lucr. II.62 ff.
15 Lucr. II.333 ff.
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course, be detected or experienced by our limited senses. Nevertheless, follow-
ing another basic principle posed by Epicurus, namely the faith in sensation,16 
the immutability of atoms refl ects itself at the macro level of composed bodies 
in many ways. In particular, and this is utterly important for our enquiry, the 
constancy of living species, their consistency and regularity, are precisely the 
signs that immutable elements constitute natural reality. In a strategic passage 
of book I of De rerum natura, Lucretius insists that
since a limit has been fi xed for the growth of things after their kind and 
for their tenure of life, and since it stands decreed what each can do by 
the foedera naturae,17 and also what each cannot do, and since nothing 
changes, but all things are constant to such a degree that all the different 
birds show in succession marks upon their bodies to distinguish their kind, 
they must also have beyond a doubt a body of immutable matter. For if the 
fi rst-beginnings of things could be changed, being in any way overmastered 
[si primordia rerum commutari aliqua possent ratione reuicta], it would also 
now remain uncertain what could arise and what could not, in a word in 
what way each thing has its power limited [fi nita potestas] and its deep-set 
boundary mark [ratione atque alte terminus], nor could the generations so 
often repeat after their kind the nature, manners, living, and movements 
of their parents.18 
From the constancy and consistency universally experienced at macroscopic 
level, one can induce the existence of immutable elements at the microscopic 
one. Such constancy and consistency, however, are far from being universal 
and without exception, as many inexplicable phenomena such as abnormali-
ties and monstrosities prove. It is thus extremely important for the atomists to 
frame and interpret them within the boundaries of what is possible and impos-
sible: the very structural understanding of the universe depends on this task.
The terminus, or boundary, thus becomes a central concept in the atom-
ist physics. It represents the range within which atoms can vary in shape, 
16 See Epicur. Ep. [2], 50 (= Usener, p. 12 = Epicurus (1926), p. 29: ‘[. . .] every image 
which we obtain by an act of apprehension on the part of the mind or of the sense-organs, 
whether of shape or of properties, this image is the shape <or properties> of the concrete 
object [. . .]. Falsehood and error always lie in the addition of opinion with regard 
to <what is waiting> to be confi rmed or not contradicted, and then is not confi rmed 
<or is contradicted>.’)
17 I have left this expression untranslated for the time being. I will show below why the 
translation is crucial for the interpretation and understanding of this central concept of 
atomist physics.
18 Lucr. I.584–98.
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magnitude and weight. This is why atoms must have parts, in order to differ 
from each other, and yet parts that are not separable from each other, in order 
to constitute the material ground for nature’s consistency. Epicurus calls this 
minimal part or minimal possible variation ἐλάχιστον.19 The boundary also 
represents the limits of nature’s possibilities. These limits have not been posed 
by a demiurge, nor do they come from outside nature itself. These limits are 
closely related to the foedera naturae. They are the limits that we can observe 
in nature and that make it a familiar realm that we can study and understand, 
without fearing the unknown.
The limit or boundary also has a crucial role in the epistemological enter-
prise. Humans, and philosophers in particular, can successfully overcome 
their ignorance and understand nature. Their understanding is also subject 
to all kinds of boundaries, for example those imposed by the limitation of 
their perceptive faculties. However, nature’s theatre and its components, as 
they have been outlined by Epicurus, make philosophers part of this same 
spectacle. In other words, their limits do not come from the outside and do 
not transcend humans’ possibilities. The atoms and the void provide every-
thing that is necessary for the philosopher to obtain the knowledge of nature.
Due to its incorporeal nature, the void cannot act or endure anything 
whatsoever in itself. These are exclusive features of bodily reality. As a conse-
quence, concepts that occupy a central role in different metaphysical systems, 
such as incorporeal entities, ideas, divine intelligences or incorporeal souls, 
are wiped out as absurdities, incompatible with the fundamental elements of 
nature. Atomists read every phenomenon as nothing less and nothing more 
than a determined confi guration of void (inane) and bodies (corpora), without 
a third nature ever being conceivable. These confi gurations of matter and 
space help us to identify what is essential in things, and what is not. Lucretius 
translates Epicurus’s concepts of συμβεβηκότα and συμπτώματα with coni-
uncta and euenta: ‘For whatsoever things have a name, either you will fi nd 
them to be properties [coniuncta] [of void and bodies] or you will see them to 
be accidents [euenta] of the same.’20
19 See Verde (2013).
20 Lucr. I.449–50, developing Epicur. Ep. [2], 40 and 68–73. Bollack (1978), p. 157, notes 
the important shift introduced by Lucretius’s choice of translation. According to Bollack, 
Lucretius does not translate the Epicurean concepts of συμβεβηκότα and συμπτώματα 
with terms having the same prefi x. Coniunta translates the qualities strictly attached 
to the thing (I.449), while euenta translates its accidents. Whereas Epicurus brings the 
two concepts close to each other, Lucretius does not translate the terms, but the ideas, 
and distinguishes the two orders, that of the solid background (coniunctum) on the one 
hand and that of the punctual and transitory event (euentum) on the other. Below I will 
indicate another important aspect of the idea involved in this choice of translation and, 
in particular, in the concept of coniunctum.
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Nature recognises only properties and accidents, necessarily constituted 
according to the general principles of physics and necessarily contained within 
physical boundaries (thus alien to any intervention of metaphysical forces). It is 
curious, however, that the most important innovation introduced by Epicurus 
in ancient physics has been seen as contrasting with the very same foundation 
of the atomists’ principles. In order to explain the actual dynamic of bodies in 
the void, beyond what he sees as the major limitation of Democritus’s and 
Leucippus’s physics, Epicurus introduces the concept of παρέγκλισις, swerve 
or deviation. And this has been seen as the Achilles’ heel of the whole system.
Atoms incessantly move in space. Whereas ancient atomism conceives a 
chaotic, manifold and multidirectional movement, Epicurus and Lucretius 
draw the consequences of having introduced weight as one of the atom’s basic 
properties. Weight uniformly drags atoms toward the bottom. The universe, 
although homogeneous, is thus oriented.21 Such orientation, however, is in 
no way an anthropomorphic or merely empirical representation.22 It rather 
means the necessity of an ordered movement that atoms pursue. Vis-à-vis the 
Democritean originally chaotic space, Epicurus has in mind a ‘perpendicular’ 
conception of space, within which the formation of composite bodies from 
indivisible atoms must be explained.23
During their fall, atoms encounter other atoms, due to the minimal devia-
tion in their parallel downward motion.24 The παρέγκλισις or clinamen has a 
double function: to explain the physical contact of atoms, which then aggregate 
and form composite bodies, but also to avoid the rigid necessity that Epicurus 
sees in Democritus’s account of original cosmogony, whose consequences are 
for him unacceptable.25 The clinamen should not be seen as a movement – or 
a cause – without a cause, but rather as a kind of spontaneous movement that 
obliterates every external cause in the beginning and at the time of the universe’s 
generation. The fact of a movement being the cause of itself is of course unac-
ceptable only if the causal theory rests on the ontological and chronological pri-
macy of a τέλος, i.e. a direction that supposedly guides, more or less successfully, 
that same movement. Now, it is precisely to fi ght against a teleological vision of 
the origin of the universe that atomists conceive the swerve as an autonomous 
movement that has its origin in, and produces effects on, matter in the void.
21 See Epicur. Ep. [2], 60 (= Usener, p. 18).
22 See contra Alfi eri (1953), p. 82, who claims Epicurus’s subordination to the Aristotelian 
idea of an absolute orientation of the space, with its high and low.
23 DeWitt (1954), p. 168.
24 Lucr. II.216–24. See Fr. 281 (= Usener, pp. 199–201) in Cic. Fin. in particular.
25 See Epicur. Ep. [4], 134. (= Usener, p. 65). See Marx, Doktordissertation: Differenz der demokri-
tischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie nebst einem Anhange, MEW, Ergänzungsband, erster 
teil, pp. 278 ff.
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Cicero’s argument against Epicurus is enlightening in this sense. Epicurus 
invents the swerve ad libidinem and sine causa.26 Not even if one granted this 
(wrong) premise to Epicurus, however, would our universe result and, Cicero 
adds, likewise for Democritus, whose system relied upon the absence of cause. 
Only causality rightly intended can explain ‘the ordered beauty of the world 
we know’.27 The ornatus mundi is for Cicero the mark of causality properly 
intended. Without the former, the latter also disappears. On this point, the 
difference between Epicurus and Democritus is, for Cicero, irrelevant. The 
swerve, in fact, corresponds to assign ‘to the atoms their different spheres of 
action [quasi prouincia atomis dare]’, and thus to reintroduce that autonomous 
character to matter in motion that also Democritus had postulated, and that 
so many philosophers had been criticising.
Epicurus and Lucretius are thus brought within the traditional critique of 
the absence of causality that had already been directed against ancient atom-
ists. Freedom and necessity, as well as spontaneity and causality, go hand in 
hand in both versions of atomism. Their original sin is to have fl attened the 
universe within an immanent causal and ontological dimension. So, it is true, 
as Cicero claims, that Epicurus’s swerve lacks a cause, but only in the sense of 
a teleological causality, the only cause that is able to constitute, for Cicero and 
many others, the ordered beauty of the world, and that the turbulenta concursio 
of atoms, in Cicero’s view, would never be able to create.
The swerve, pace its detractors, confi rms nonetheless the atomists’ aim 
to rule out every form of transcendence, including the one implied in the 
teleological conception of the universe. The swerve is the autonomous and 
spontaneous cause that characterises Epicurus’s matter in motion. It excludes 
every fi nal cause and brings all causality on the same plan of immanence. 
Being without a τέλος, as Epicurus claims, does not mean being without a 
ratio, a state Cicero deplores.
Epicurus and Lucretius also mobilise a theory of the infi nite. Atoms have 
not been completely exhausted, Epicurus explains to Herodotus, for the pro-
duction of this world. Thus, nothing prevents us thinking that the number of 
worlds can be infi nite.28 Lucretius makes clear that the world of atoms resists 
its limitation by a spatial boundary, as much as by an ontological principle 
of transcendence: ‘Nothing can have an extremity unless there is something 
26 Cic. Fin. I.19. See again Marx, Doktordissertation: Differenz der demokritischen und epiku-
reischen Naturphilosophie nebst einem Anhange, MEW, Ergänzungsband, erster teil, p. 282 
and Usener, p. 200, fr. 281.12–13.
27 Cic. Fin. I.19.
28 Epicur. Ep. [2], 45.4–11 (= Usener, p. 9). See also Epicurus (2012), the recent edition of 
the On Nature’s book II by G. Leone, coll. 1–7 and Leone’s commentary, pp. 497–506.
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beyond to bound it.’29 This nihil ultra is at the same time physical and ethical. 
More importantly, it is linked to chance as an autonomous cause of produc-
tion, a cause that does not exhaust itself in one world: as long as there is 
matter and space, there will be occasions for swerving atoms to encounter 
each other and form new composite bodies, and thus new worlds.30
It is not by chance that neither Plato nor Aristotle accept the idea of an 
infi nite world. Rejecting the existence of anything beyond bodies and space, 
as Epicurus does, has not only physical but also ontological consequences. It 
means, in fact, the rejection of separate planes of being, the same separation 
that both Plato and Aristotle, although in different ways, pursue. The Epicurean 
whole is infi nite and unlimited, thus nothing exists beyond it. The infi nite takes 
everything, and does not leave anything. It becomes, in the hands of Epicurus 
and Lucretius, a prodigious war machine against transcendence, as Plutarch has 
correctly remarked.31
Next to the quantitative infi nity of the Epicurean cosmos, the atomists 
also develop the idea of a chronological infi nity. Not only matter and space 
are endless, but so is time, which is therefore capable of hosting an infi nity of 
encounters, aggregations and disaggregations of bodies and worlds. Together 
with matter and space, the idea of infi nity of time is of paramount importance 
for the mechanistic hypothesis, and for the development of non-teleological 
explanation of natural phenomena. Unlimited time, in fact, means an endless 
reserve of attempts that nature might have made in order to achieve its pres-
ent confi guration. Nature and its order, Lucretius explains, come ex infi nito:
For certainly neither did the fi rst-beginnings [primordia rerum] place them-
selves by design in their own order with keen intelligence, nor assuredly 
did they make agreement what motions each should produce; but because, 
being many and shifted in many ways [multa modis multis mutata], they are 
harried and set in motion with blows throughout the universe from infi n-
ity, thus by trying every kind of motion and combination, at length they fall 
into such arrangements as this sum of things consists of.32 
We know today how important this idea is in Darwinist evolutionism. Ancient 
atomism, however, had already realised its potentiality, to counter the idea of 
29 Lucr. I.958 ff.
30 Lucr. II.1048 ff.
31 Fr. 76 (= Usener, p. 345). See Mondolfo (1956), pp. 497 ff. Although praising the atom-
ist conception of infi nity, Mondolfo (p. 507) shares the feeling that the swerve somehow 
contradicts the Epicurean premise, by introducing an incongruous element.
32 Lucr. I.1021–7. See Moreau (1975), pp. 472–3.
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a superior intelligence creating what – providentialists argue – nature alone 
could never be able to produce without a design, namely order and beauty.
Usener includes, in his collection, an interesting fragment from Jerome’s 
Commentary on Ecclesiastes, criticising Epicurus on the infi nity of time: signs 
and prodigies are sent by God – Jerome claims – and one should not believe 
that they are the simple repetition of events that already happened in the past 
or will happen again in the future, as the impious philosopher claims. These 
events are indeed exceptional and new, and thus worthy of our astonishment.33 
The believer should never cease to be amazed at the wonders created by God. 
It is thus clear the social function played by physics in supporting a religious 
system of beliefs or, as Epicurus and Lucretius put it, superstition.
Atomists’ philosophy revolves around the justifi cation of the ethical func-
tion of knowledge. Knowledge is always employed to set men free from fear 
and awe, caused by the ignorance of nature. The observation of nature’s 
regularity and consistency, on the contrary, makes them confi dent and frees 
mankind from fear, as Epicurus explains to Pythocles: ‘We must not suppose 
that any other object is to be gained from the knowledge of the phenomena 
of the sky, whether they are dealt with in connexion with other doctrines or 
independently, than peace of mind and a sure confi dence, just as in all other 
branches of study.’34
The ἀταραξία (imperturbability of the mind), the pillar of Epicurean ethics, 
can be reached fi rst and foremost by changing one’s attitude toward nature and 
its spectacle. This is the main aim of science. Lucretius often repeats his unlim-
ited gratitude toward Epicurus for this paramount achievement.35 By opening 
the gate of knowledge, the science of nature also closes the door to fear:
As children tremble and fear everything in the blind darkness, so we in 
the light sometimes fear what is no more to be feared than the things that 
children in the dark hold in terror and imagine will come true. This terror, 
therefore, and darkness of the mind must be dispersed, not by rays of the 
sun nor the bright shafts of daylight, but by the aspect and nature’s ratio.36 
The fi rst consequence is a real revolution in the conception of gods. Both 
Epicurus and Lucretius rule out the superstitious idea of a divinity that acts 
upon the world as if it were a man.37 This is not an atheist position, as one 
33 Fr. 307 (= Usener, p. 215).
34 Epicur. Ep. [3], 85 (= Usener, p. 36).
35 Lucr. I.62–79 and passim.
36 Lucr. III.87–93. Munro in Lucretius (1891, 4th ed.) and Rouse in Lucretius (1975) has 
‘law of nature’ for naturae species ratioque.
37 Grant (1952), p. 83.
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might think. On the contrary, Epicurus and Lucretius believe in the existence 
of something that can be called divine. Because nothing exists beyond bodies 
and space, however, gods too must be of the very same bodily nature, although 
at its highest degree of perfection. Still, they are not of a different nature, and 
do not stand above nature. Imperturbable, gods live their own perfect exis-
tence without ever entering into contact with the human realm.38 Moreover, 
they did not produce the world for the sake of men and will not in any possible 
way be moved by our devotion or prayers.39 The basis of traditional religious 
practice and superstition is thus undermined,40 and a new approach toward 
the study of nature – and toward a free life – can begin.
Plato and Aristotle, possibly the exoteric Aristotle rather than the one 
we have access to, as Bignone has maintained,41 form the polemical target. 
For the atomists, they form the target for both the ethical and the physical 
arguments upon which their systems are based.42 The end of physics is to set 
humankind free from fear and superstition. End and means, however, go hand 
in hand; one is the symptom and the cause of the other. The largest sec-
tion of Usener’s collection is devoted to these aspects. Epicurus’s texts on this 
doctrine, preserved by its most fi erce detractors, speak about the necessary 
implications of atomist physics on ethics and religion. Lucian honestly praises, 
through the powerful irony of his work, this attitude.43 Simplicius, Cicero, Plu-
tarch, Plotinus, Galen and Lactantius fi ercely attack him. The ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, 
the material necessity that Epicurus sees working in the universe, wipes out 
all anthropomorphic images of God.44 Yet the sin has been committed. Lucre-
tius boldly rehearses the fully immanent origin of everything: nature and the 
world are explained without providence, without God and without design. 
The world, infi nite, is left to itself and to men’s curious exploration of its phe-
nomena, their causes, their effects.45
38 Lucr. V.146.
39 Epicur. Ep. [2], 76–7 (= Usener, p. 28).
40 Epicurus makes clear that the tranquillity of men is the most important aim, and his 
purpose is not, in this sense, to move men toward rebellion against authority. See Epicur. 
Ep. [2], 77 (= Usener, p. 28).
41 Bignone’s thesis has been criticised too many times and with too many good arguments 
to be repeated here. See Bignone (1936) and Caratelli (1983). An esoteric Aristotle, 
however, has existed, and it contained most certainly the kind of arguments that Epicurus 
and, subsequently, Lucretius, are thinking about.
42 See contra Reale (1995), III, p. 217. Marx explains the strategic role played by the principle 
of multiple explanations in Doktordissertation: Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen 
Naturphilosophie nebst einem Anhange, MEW, Ergänzungsband, erster teil, p. 301.
43 Fr. 368 (= Usener, p. 246).
44 As Simplicius claims. See Fr. 377 (= Usener, p. 254).
45 Lucr. V.419–31, which substantially repeats I.1021–7.
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Zoogony, Monstrosity and Nature’s Normativity
Once the general atomistic principles have been established, the account of 
the origin of the universe has to be unfolded, so as to give the necessary details 
that will accomplish the ethical and scientifi c task that Epicurus and Lucretius 
are pursuing. Epicurus’s traces fade away here, as most of his writings are lost. 
Lucretius, however, masterfully develops the topic of the world’s origin in book 
V of De rerum natura, in which one also fi nds the account of the role and status 
of monstrosity.
Verses 772–836 of book V contain the essence of the Lucretian zoogony. 
Once the earth is formed, according to the composition of atoms described 
above, it starts producing living beings. The earth is in its youth, and thus it is 
powerful and abounds in life. Mother of all things, it spontaneously produces 
larger and smaller animals, initially out of wombs growing from the earth, and 
eventually nourished by it. That time is now gone and the earth, although still 
producing small creatures spontaneously, is not mighty enough to produce the 
bigger ones any more. Nevertheless, life has been born and perpetuates itself 
autonomously, as Lucretius explains in the following section.46
The fi rst striking contention of Lucretius is the total absence of any 
anthropocentrism. Nature creates all sort of creatures in many ways and fol-
lowing different processes (multis modis, varia ratione). No distinction is made 
between humans and animals, and this is another polemical argument against 
the traditional accounts of the initial creation, guided by a theological and 
teleological rationale, centred upon the special status recognised to humans 
vis-à-vis animals.47 Lucretius is echoing Empedocles, whose Περὶ φύσεως he 
46 Paradoxographer Phlegon of Tralles explicitly connects the earth’s force of production 
in its youth and the progressive exhaustion of this force to monstrosity. In his Book of 
Marvels, XIV and XV, Phlegon relates how, after earthquakes, buried giant bones resur-
face: ‘One should not disbelieve in these bones [. . .], considering that in the beginning 
when nature was in her prime she reared everything near to gods, but just as time is 
running down, so also the sizes of creatures have been shrinking (XV.2 (= FGH 257 
F 36.XV).’ The earth’s senescence is a well-known theme in antiquity, employed to 
explain the present diminution of her vital force. Phlegon, however, goes further, using 
this theme to explain the appearance of vestiges of monstrously giant creatures. See 
Lovejoy and Boas (1935), pp. 98–102 and Guthrie (1957), passim. Following Mayor 
(2001), Payón Leyra (2011), pp. 152 ff. reads Phlegon’s argument as a confi rmation that 
the Greeks knew about fossils. He uses the argument in his reading of a famous icono-
graphic manifestation of monstrosity, namely the Boston mixing bowl (column krater). 
The painter shows the Trojan princess Hesione, next to Heracles, throwing stones at a 
threatening dragon. According to the Il. XX.144–8, this is a sea monster (κήτος), yet 
the giant head clearly resembles a fossil skull emerging from the earth.
47 See Schrijvers (1974). See also Casini (1963), pp. 200 ff.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   140 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 E P I C U R U S A N D L U C R E T I U S  141
certainly knew.48 According to Empedocles, during the epoch of Love, count-
less types of creatures (ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν), which are a wonder to behold 
(θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), have been created from the earth.49
Gordon Campbell has intelligently remarked on the ethical implications 
of the plurality of modes of production as well as the communality of the pro-
cess for animals and humans alike.50 Against Plato’s demiurge and the Stoics’ 
providence, Lucretius’s aim is thus to remove every teleological idea by dis-
solving the wonder traditionally attached to the early zoogony, including that 
of Empedocles. Whereas to Empedocles the early creatures were wonders to 
behold, for him they are simply the result of atomic combinations, produced 
with no design or rationale, but only following their own bodily necessity.
Lucretius’s metaphor of the earth as magna mater of all creatures seems 
to contrast with his anti-teleological stance.51 There is of course a danger in 
presenting nature as a creative personifi ed entity, amplifi ed by the idea of a 
‘feminine nurturing force’ opposed to the Stoic ‘masculine controlling universal 
force’.52 However, Lucretius employs here a powerful rhetorical strategy to 
appropriate the enemy’s language and turn it upside down by infusing a purely 
material process into an apparently teleological idea.53
Terrestrial creatures, Lucretius argues, cannot have fallen from the sky or 
have come out of the sea. Nature has boundaries according to which not 
everything can happen in any possible manner. The bodily necessity is fi rst 
and foremost a necessity, namely something that discriminates between the 
impossibilis and the possibilis. Creatures and events falling under our senses 
depend on their material constitution, and thus respond to what such a con-
stitution allows to happen. It is a fi xist argument, widespread in antiquity, 
48 Waszinsk (1954). See also Morgan (1984), pp. 102 ff.
49 See Vorsokr. 31 B 35 (= LM [22] EMP. D75, R70 = Simp. in Cael. 528.30) and supra. 
See also Ernout and Robin (1925–8), I, pp. 146–7, Spoerri (1959 and 1997) and Kranz 
(1944), p. 44. Contra Jones (1993).
50 Campbell (2003), pp. 56–7.
51 Campbell mentions Lovejoy and Boas, ‘Some Meanings of Nature’, in Lovejoy, Boas eds. 
(1935), pp. 447–56.
52 Campbell (2003), p. 82.
53 See Fowler (2002). It is interesting to note that even Charles Darwin has to defend himself 
from the accusation of personifying nature, an accusation that often comes from those 
who believe in a personifi ed entity. See C. Darwin, The Origin of Species, IV, in Darwin 
(1986–9), XVI, on his concept of natural selection: ‘Everyone knows what is meant and 
is implied by such metaphorical expressions; and they are almost necessary for brevity. So 
again it is diffi cult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but I meant by Nature, only the 
aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as 
ascertained by us. With a little familiarity such superfi cial objections will be forgotten.’ See 
also Pievani (2014).
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that Lucretius develops along the lines of his foedera naturae and alte terminus 
(deep-set boundary mark).54
Thus, the earth changes its status. Powerful and young once, it is now 
weak and incapable of producing the same variety of animals that it once pro-
duced. An important idea emerges from verses 828–36, namely the balance 
between constancy and change. Everything changes ceaselessly but accord-
ing to a certain regularity. This regularity, expressed by the foedera and the 
termini, is neither imposed on nature from above, nor established by nature 
in its realm. As I will show later, it is rather the result of the fl ux of events 
or, better, what humans perceive of it, from their limited point of view. This 
point of view is limited by the boundaries of our senses, incapable of grasp-
ing the exact nature of bodily necessity and, even more importantly, by the 
boundaries of our mortal existence, vis-à-vis the endless nature of time, that 
ceaselessly shapes nature’s appearance. What are, thus, the regularities that 
we recognise in nature, in the everlasting change of the balance between 
different parts of the universe?55 And, beyond such regularities, what are the 
anomalies and monstrosities that we both see and imagine?
Verses 837–54 narrate the immediate aftermath of the origin of life:
Many were the portents [portenta] also that the earth then tried to make 
[creare conatast], springing up with wondrous appearance and frame: the 
hermaphrodite, between man and woman yet neither, different from 
both; some without feet, others again bereft of hands; some found dumb 
also without a mouth, some blind without eyes, some bound fast with all 
their limbs adhering to their bodies, so that they could do nothing and go 
nowhere, could neither avoid mischief nor take what they might need. So 
with the rest of like monsters and portents [monstra ac portenta] that she 
made, it was all in vain [nequiquam]; since nature banned their growth 
[natura absterruit auctum], and they could not attain the desired fl ower 
of age nor fi nd food nor join by the ways of Venus. For we see that living 
beings need many things in conjunction [multa rebus concurrere debere], so 
that they may be able [ut . . . possint] by procreation to forge out the chain 
of the generations: fi rst there must be food, next there must be a way for 
the life-giving seeds throughout the frame to fl ow out from the slackened 
body; and that male and female be joined, they must both have the means 
to exchange mutual pleasures. 
54 Campbell (2003), p. 59. See infra on the foedera naturae.
55 For the relationship between the constant fl ux of matter and the foedera naturae see 
Long (1977) 81ff.
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Monsters and portents are born by the earth in the beginning of the world, 
in different shapes and constitutions. Some of them are produced in vain 
(nequiquam) because, being unable to fi nd food, or consume it, or copulate, 
they do not reproduce themselves and do not last. Many things are needed for 
these early beings to stabilise themselves on earth and produce progeny. Only 
some of these things are actually available, and only a few fortunate beings 
are actually able to fi nd them all, and that is how they survive. Without 
any design or divine providence presiding over the world, this is how certain 
beings have been able to reproduce, while others simply died out without 
progeny.56
Although many things are necessary for the survival of a species, Lucretius 
lists some qualities that appear to be the proper feature of certain species: 
courage for lions, cunning for foxes, swiftness for stags. Others had the chance 
to prove their utility for men, who in turn protect animals such as dogs or 
sheep, and allow them to survive.57 However,
those to which nature gave no such qualities, so that they could neither 
live by themselves at their own will, nor give us some usefulness for which 
we might suffer them to feed under our protection and be safe, these 
certainly lay at the mercy of others for prey and profi t, being all hampered 
by their own fateful chains [uincla fatales], until nature brought that race 
to destruction.58 
In this passage, much more than when he speaks about the magna mater, 
Lucretius dangerously approaches the anthropocentric language that he so 
carefully intends to avoid. For this account already places the reader at the 
time when humans claim superiority over animals, at least a superiority in 
deeds, if not in principle. Humans are already able to survive, defend them-
selves and propagate their genus. More importantly, they show what appears 
to be the exclusive ability to protect other genera, namely those that they fi nd 
useful, whose work they can exploit, and that they can use for their purposes. 
While other creatures are still struggling for survival, on the edge of extinc-
tion, humanity has already acquired a special position, although factual and 
not ontological, in nature.
56 This, Bailey suggests, is the passage from individuals to species. See Bailey, in Lucretius 
(1947), III, p. 1465: ‘When chance has developed an appropriate kind of animal, then 
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What are then the uincla fatalia of V.876? Is it nature that guides some ani-
mals toward survival, while pushing others toward extinction? Is it destiny? The 
choices that translators have made are revealing. Ernout, Costa and Flores all 
stress the role of a quasi-personifi ed fate, acting upon creatures and bringing 
them to extinction.59 I believe, however, that one should completely avoid such 
a personifi cation. Interestingly enough, fatalia appears only once in the whole 
De rerum natura.60 It should be read, I believe, as a disastrous, harmful and 
deadly limitation, rather than the intervention or even the effect of Fate, which 
is wholly at odds with the atomist mentality.61
Alluding to Empedocles’ account of the origin of the world, Lucretius nev-
ertheless moves out of the myth. While Ackermann focuses on the surface of 
Lucretius’s language, thus claiming that the Latin poet is still imbued with an 
old mythical mentality,62 Casini claims that beyond the surface of the zoogonic 
account, Lucretius brings atomism towards what modern philosophers eventu-
ally see as a scientifi c study of nature, or at least fi nd useful for developing it.63 
Lucretius is not only attempting to develop a concept of nature alternative to 
the Aristotelian one. He is also showing how natural regularities have been 
shaped and forged, immanently, within nature.
Nature does not receive laws, nor does it implement them. Early living 
beings are Nature’s attempts or, even better, efforts. The choice of the verb 
conari is extremely important. Lucretius certainly echoes Empedocles’ account, 
as several scholars have already pointed out. Munro suggests that Lucretius at 
the same time refutes Empedocles’ theory, as he would have deemed absurd the 
idea of wandering limbs, looking for each other.64 Munro, however, focuses on 
the outcome of nature’s production rather than on the process of production 
itself. Lucretius is not in line with Aristotle and his commentators here. By 
seeing the process as a spontaneous series of attempts, or multiple efforts, 
59 Ernout in Lucretius (1924): ‘chaînes de leur destinée’; Costa in Lucretius (1984): ‘chains 
of fate’; Flores in Lucretius (2002–9): ‘ceppi voluti dal fato’.
60 Paulson (1911) and Wacht (1990).
61 Bailey in Lucretius (1947) and Rouse and Smith in Lucretius (1975) are closer to this 
reading, with ‘fateful chains’. Munro (1873, 3rd ed.) pertinently avoids all reference to 
fate with ‘death-bringing shackles’. See Campbell (2003), p. 138, for a fair compromise, 
i.e. Lucretius does think about Fate, yet he turns its meaning upside down: ‘The “bonds 
of fate” are perhaps the closest L.’s language sails to the teleological wind in this whole 
passage (see [also 811]). All such ideas are fair game for L.: not even the hateful notion of 
predestined doom can escape his remorseless appropriation and recontextualization [. . .].’
62 Ackermann (1979).
63 Casini (1963). See the discussion in Spoerri (1997).
64 Munro (1873, 3rd ed.). Also absurd, for Munro, is the concrete example of the βουγενῆ 
ἀνδρόπρωρα, the man-headed oxen, which had already been refuted by the champions 
of the fi nal cause, like Aristotle and his commentators Themistius and Simplicius.
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with no end in view, Lucretius moves away from teleology, following precisely 
Empedocles’ intuition.
Bailey recognises Empedocles’ infl uence in Lucretius’s account of the pro-
cess of nature’s production, not only that of its actual outcomes.65 Besides 
moving the account beyond the myth and making it more ‘scientifi c and con-
sistent with the general theory’, Bailey regards it as paralleling the account 
of the creation of the worlds in books I.1021–8 and V.419–31.66 More impor-
tantly, Bailey suggests that laws do not come before nature’s efforts, but rather 
they are outcomes of those attempts, once they stabilise themselves and prog-
enies become possible. In this respect, however, I fi nd problematic Bailey’s 
reference to ‘perfection’. Only the more ‘perfect’ creatures, he writes, became 
viable ‘after many failures’. Perfection, in fact, refers to the impossibility of 
further improvement, full possession of essential characteristics, completion, 
correspondence to a pre-existing pattern of principle, accurateness in repro-
ducing a model, full development and normality, conformity to laws: all these 
views, I believe, are alien to Lucretius’s concept.
Lucretius is on the contrary ruling out any achievement or perfection that 
must be reached by creatures in order to survive. The ut . . . possint of V.850 has 
a consecutive and not a fi nal sense, as has often and correctly been noted.67 
It is true, as Schrijvers claims, that monsters are found within nature for both 
Lucretius and Aristotle alike.68 They are within it, however, in opposite ways 
for the two philosophers. A convergence between Lucretius and Aristotle has 
also been urged by Jackie Pigeaud. Pigeaud claims that Aristotle and Lucretius 
share the necessity of proving the impossibility of mixed monsters, such as cen-
taurs or chimaeras.69 Following a botanical model, both authors are concerned 
with the problem of the impossible graft, for example the graft of a human 
65 Bailey in Lucretius (1947), III, p. 1461: ‘The idea of nature’s experiments had already 
been expressed by Empedocles, though many of his fantastic notions, such as the cre-
ation of parts of the body themselves, which went about seeking for union, and the 
creation of creatures of mixed species, were rightly rejected by Epicurus.’
66 Bailey in Lucretius (1947), III, p. 1461: ‘Here, as there, all sorts of combinations were 
produced which could survive. Once again what was produced by contingency then 
acquired the government of “natural law”.’
67 Bailey in Lucretius (1947), III, p. 1464. See also Campbell (2003), p. 115: ‘The portenta 
are not variations from a norm, since no norm could exist until sexual reproduction took 
over from spontaneous generation and fi xed creatures into discrete species.’
68 Schrijvers, Un chapitre de l’histoire de l’humanité: Lucretius, De rerum natura V 837–854, 
in Giannantoni, Gigante a cura di(1984), pp. 841–50. Schrijvers develops his thesis on 
the similarity between Aristotle’s theory that monsters are more frequent in multiparae 
and Lucretius’s idea that the Earth is the multiparous being par excellence.
69 Pigeaud (1988), p. 205: ‘C’est lui qui met en péril l’ordre de la nature, en proposant une 
logique de la tératologie. Il n’y a pas de térato-logie.’
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onto a horse, or a snake onto a goat and the goat onto a lion. In his brilliant 
article, Pigeaud shows how Columella’s argument on grafts in De re rustica is a 
direct response, proudly based on his successful grafting, to the authors claim-
ing the impossibility of joining together different and supposedly incompatible 
plants. Pigeaud suggests that Columella has in mind Aristotle and Lucretius, 
united by their common aversion towards the composite monster and to the 
older Empedoclean arguments.70 I think that Pigeaud’s hypothesis dismisses 
too quickly the striking and clear contrast between Lucretius and Aristotle.
The regularity of forms always pre-exists individual beings for Aristotle, 
while Lucretius sees regularities only as the outcome of individuals’ effort to 
survive their birth.71 This effort, close to the verb conari chosen by Lucretius, 
must be referred less to nature as a whole and more to the multiplicity of its 
individual creatures, all striving to survive. Beings are born: some live, oth-
ers die. The latter are the exception, vis-à-vis the former which become the 
norm. They do so because they reproduce themselves, because their effort 
to preserve their life is successful (the success of their effort is not due to any 
adherence to or respect for the norm).72
The striving and confl ictual dimension of the relation between creatures is 
not all that Lucretius has in mind, though it is too often emphasised by schol-
ars discussing its similarities with Darwin’s theory of natural selection.73 Just 
as important as the selection are the cooperation, the concurrence and the 
agreement between creatures. The regularity of shapes, as Vittorio Morfi no 
puts it, does not pre-exist the encounter between individuals. It is rather the 
outcome of the encounters and the union of necessary and suffi cient condi-
tions. It is a concurrere multa rebus that transforms the conjunction into a 
conjuncture, and a happy one, favourable to the survival of a species.74 As 
soon as they are created, one could say, all animals are monstrous (something 
that Aristotle would have deemed absurd).75 They do not fi ght to become 
70 On grafts in Virgil see Ross (1987), pp. 104–9, and A. Deremetz, The Marvellous in the 
Georgics’, in Hardie (2009), pp. 123–5.
71 See Campbell (2003), p. 114: ‘Earth produces random creatures to no avail since natura, 
here “physical necessity” or simply the physical make-up of the creatures, prevents them 
surviving.’ On Lucretius’s dialogue with his sources see Spoerri (1997), Appendix.
72 Nineteenth-century fi nalism, in some sense, still responds to this question and to the 
priority to assign to the norm vis-à-vis the exception and the abnormality. See Janet 
(1876), pp. 184–5 and p. 340 in particular.
73 See for example Bailey in Lucretius (1947), III, p. 1462. See also infra on vv. 855–77; 
Guthrie (1957), pp. 203 ff.; Casini (1963), who claims that because Lucretius follows 
Empedocles, he cannot be considered evolutionist; Campbell (2003), pp. 101 ff.; Costa 
in Lucretius (1984), pp. 102–3.
74 Morfi no (2013).
75 See Campbell (2003), p. 115.
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normal. They fi ght to survive and thus they create normality. They need each 
other more than they need to fi ght against other animals. Monsters, as Michel 
Serres has beautifully written, are the losers of a competition which is against 
themselves rather than against the others:
The earth, recently formed, begins to produce. Wombs grow in the soil, fi xed 
by their roots. Then monsters are born. Their features or limbs are strange. 
Now, this strangeness is always negative. The androgynous, for example, is 
not both sexes at the same time. It is neither one, nor the other, and it does 
not belong to any of them. Teratology constitutes itself by the rule determina-
tio est negatio. The unnamed and innominable monsters are deprived of feet, 
of hands. They are mute, with no mouth, blind, with no sight, they cannot 
do anything, neither move nor avoid dangers, nor take care of their needs, 
nor grow up, nor fi nd food, nor mate through Venus’s act. These negative 
determinations defi ne them as closed systems: the monster does not have 
ways, because it does not have a way out [either literally or fi guratively]. It is 
without doors or windows. Lucretius’s monster is Leibniz’s monad. Without 
hole or door, without mouth or vagina. As if, precisely, life was possible only 
through the capacity of combining oneself, that is to say through the open-
ing. Life is an open system. The monster is in itself and for itself, autistic and 
dead. Nature eliminates them, it abandons them as prey for animals selected 
through their positive attributes.76 
Beyond Serres, however, one could say that determinatio is both and at the 
same time negatio and affi rmatio, because it is only by determining itself, by 
entwining and intertwining relations with others, more or less similar to itself, 
that the individual acquires a chance to survive.
This, as I will show more clearly later on, discussing the translation of 
foedera naturae, brings the argument toward the meaning and status of a ‘law’ 
of nature, a term that I have carefully avoided so far in order to keep away from 
the interpretation, common in scholarship, that something like a ‘law’ is acting 
in Lucretius’s theory. Alain Gigandet, for example, has correctly insisted on 
Lucretius’s anti-teleological stance by focusing on the role played by concurrere 
as the verb that epitomises the many initial attempts made by nature.77 These 
attempts clash, for Gigandet, with the boundaries of nature, i.e. the limits of 
what is possible and impossible. The metaphor of the boundaries might suggest 
their being external to the phenomena that they would have to prevent and 
76 Serres (1977), pp. 175–6.
77 Gigandet (1998), p. 137: ‘multa videmus enim rebus concurrere debere (v. 849): concours, 
an encounter without any fi nalist presupposition, and depending on statistic chance’.
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select. Boundaries would act as a fi lter or a net, that let some phenomena pass 
through, while preventing some other from moving ahead.78
It is certainly true that Lucretius is developing here a dialectic between 
the possible and the impossible.79 This dialectic, Gigandet claims, is grounded 
on the structure of nature, obeying three laws of atomic combination: 1) only 
certain combinations are possible, 2) no combination is unique, and 3) every 
combination traverses a cycle of creation and destruction that brings it from 
its origin to its dissolution.80 As discussed above, however, the atomic com-
binations at the microscopic level are tuned with the macroscopic combina-
tions that can be seen at the physical level. They are the causes, as much as 
the effects, of what we experience and observe in nature. In other words, laws 
of atomic combination certainly exist. Where do they come from, though? 
Neither from a superior intelligence, nor from an inner intelligence of mat-
ter itself. They rather are the regularities that matter has acquired through, 
and not before, nature’s attempts. The concept of limits is indeed essential to 
comprehending nature.81 Nonetheless, I believe that the limits of variation do 
not explain nature’s Being, but rather they are explained by, because they are 
shaped through, nature’s Becoming.
As Gigandet has pointed out, chance plays here a fundamentally impor-
tant role. Not so much, however, within the boundaries of laws, but rather in 
creating and defi ning those same boundaries. The initial chance, Gigandet 
maintains, creates its own necessity.82 Borrowing Bailey’s language, Gigandet 
speaks about the opposition between the viable organisms’ perfection and the 
unviable monsters’ imperfection – a formula that implies an axiological posi-
tion and a substantial difference between normal beings that will survive and 
abnormal ones that are doomed to extinction. The former’s only perfection, 
in my view, is that they actually have survived, nothing more, and nothing 
less. Gigandet recalls the metaphor of the iactus veneris, a winning throw of 
four dice in which each of them has a different number on its face. This image 
can, however, be a misleading image of what Lucretius is arguing. For this 
to be the winning combination, in fact, a rule must have been established 
78 Gigandet (1998), p. 137: ‘In this perspective, Lucretius contrasts earth’s attempts and 
nature’s prohibitions (vv. 845–6) which essentially concern growth and reproduction. 
Ultimately, the pacts of nature (foedera naturae) manifest themselves here in the 
form of a negative condition, of limits imposed to the profusion of forms effectively 
accomplishable.’
79 Gigandet (1998), p. 136. On such a dialectic see also Courtès (1968).
80 Gigandet (1998), pp. 146–7.
81 See De Lacy (1969) and infra.
82 Gigandet (1998), p. 143: ‘Les monstres primitifs sont indissociables des origines de la vie, 
c’est-à-dire des “tentatives” de la terre, entendues comme “coups” successifs du hasard, 
essais aveugles fi nissant par produire des composés viables, créant leur propre nécessité.’
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before the game is played. No confi guration of the dice’s upper faces, in itself, 
is more or less perfect, more or less probable than any other.83 Thus, I think 
that although chance is indeed the ground – and the only ground – for atoms’ 
encounter, the metaphor of the winning throw might be confusing, because 
I see the rules of the game, in Lucretius’s mind, as being perpetually remade.
Let’s try to clarify further Lucretius’s assumption that not everything can 
happen in nature, and not in just any possible manner. This is clearly stated, 
already, in book II.700–29 of De rerum natura:
It must not be thought that all can be conjoined in all ways: for then you 
would commonly see monstrosities come into being, shapes of men arising 
that would be half beasts, lofty branches at times sprouting from a living 
body, parts of terrestrial creatures often conjoined with creatures of the sea, 
Chimaeras again, breathing fl ame from noisome throats, pastured by nature 
over the lands that produce everything. But that none of these things hap-
pen is manifest, since we see that all things bred from fi xed seeds by a fi xed 
mother [seminibus certis certa generatrice creata] are able to conserve their 
kind as they grow. Assuredly this must come about in a fi xed way. For in each 
thing, its own proper bodies are spread abroad through the frame within 
from all its foods, and being combined produce the appropriate motions; but 
contrariwise we see alien elements to be thrown back by nature upon the 
earth, and many, beaten by blows, escape from the body with their invisible 
bodies, which were not able to combine with any part nor within the body to 
feel the life-giving motions with it and imitate them.
But do not think that animals only are held by these laws [legibus], for 
the same principal holds all things apart by their limits [ratio disterminat 
omnia]. For just as all things made are in their whole nature different one 
from another, so each must consist of fi rst-beginnings differently shaped; 
I do not say that very few are endowed with the same shape, but that 
commonly they are not all like all. Since, further, the seeds are different, 
different must be their intervals, passages, connexions, weights, blows, 
meetings, motions, which not only separate animal bodies asunder, but 
keep asunder the earth and the whole sea, and hold back all heaven away 
from the earth. 
83 Gigandet (1998), p. 143. Gigandet mentions Cic. Div. I.13 and II.21. Cicero’s use of the 
metaphor, however, shows how problematic its use would be for the atomist. See Div. 
I.23: ‘You ask, Carneades, do you, why these things so happen, or by what rules they may 
be understood? I confess that I do not know, but that they do so fall out I assert that you 
yourself see. “Mere accidents [casu],” you say. Now, really, is that so? Can anything be 
an “accident” which bears upon itself every mark of truth [numeros veritatis]? Four dice 
are cast and a Venus throw results – that is chance; but do you think it would be chance, 
too, if in one hundred casts you made one hundred Venus throws?’
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Animate and inanimate things respond to the same leges and rationes. Lucretius 
seems particularly concerned, here, with explaining why shapes do not mon-
strously collapse into each other, as well as why elements do not mix together 
and dissolve in the same undistinguished chaos. We regularly observe the 
reproduction of animal shapes and the separation of different elements. All 
this is rooted in the atomic principle of combination that, for animals, takes the 
form of reproduction by a certa mother with certa seeds. This is also why we do 
not see mythical monsters being grown on earth. Unlike the zoogonic account 
of book V, monsters are here the exception, the impossibilia that nature’s prin-
ciples rule out.
We have seen above how Aristotle refl ects on the same question of nature’s 
regularities. The difference, however, is striking. Whereas Aristotle explains 
regularities through forms that also act as causes for the sake of which some-
thing is (or is not) what it has to be, Lucretius excludes every end from the 
process. Lucretius’s leges and rationes are strongly opposed to Aristotle’s ἀνάγκη 
φύσεος. Within a teleological framework, the regularity of forms rules out any 
atomic explanation, and a τέλος is needed to avoid the undistinguished chaos 
of forms. Within Lucretius’s framework, on the contrary, the regularity of forms 
confi rms the atomist explanation, and speaks against the teleological idea.84
Léon Robin reads an inconsistency in Lucretius’s thought, as if the same laws 
and principles that allowed the initial formation of monstrosities, although unvi-
able, were eventually used by Lucretius to deny the possibility of some monsters, 
notably the mythological ones, such as chimeras or centaurs.85 How to explain 
this apparent inconsistency? Bailey claims that Lucretius speaks about two differ-
ent kinds of monstrosity, one possible but extinguished, the other utterly impos-
sible, thus establishing a sort of legal principle of impossibility.86 Nevertheless, 
I think that the impossibility is not based on a principle. The legality that Lucre-
tius speaks about, using the terms lex and ratio, has its origin in itself, as its material 
ground proves, rather than disproves. Without doubling the causes, as well as the 
kinds of monstrosities, in order to avoid the inconsistency, one can argue that 
Lucretius is indeed speaking about the same set of causes and the same kind of 
monstrosities, but in different moments and circumstances.
Time is infi nite, and so are space and possible worlds. The initial natural 
efforts could have given birth to different creatures that could have found a 
way of surviving, even if this has not actually happened (i.e. it has proven 
impossible) in this world. There are not, in other words, two kinds of impos-
sibility. It is indeed impossible, for an animal, to spit fi re, because fi re and 
84 See Moreau (1975), passim.
85 Ernout and Robin (1925–8), III, p. 122 on Lucr. V.878 ff.
86 Bailey in Lucretius (1947), III, p. 1468. See also Gigandet (1998), pp. 140–1.
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animal fl esh are incompatible. In the same way, it is impossible for a chicken to 
fl y, even if it has wings, or for oxen to have human heads, or for men to have 
equine bodies, or for a soul to be immortal. It is a physical impossibility that, 
as such, has a specifi c origin in time and space and does not contrast with the 
idea of the changing character of nature: ‘Time changes the nature of the 
whole world, and one state of the earth gives way to another, so that what she 
bore she cannot, but can bear what she did not bear before.’87
When Lucretius fully unfolds the consequences of his cosmogony and zoog-
ony, he once again puts forward the argument that monstrosities are impossible. 
He explains that ‘centaurs never existed, nor at any time can there be creatures 
of double nature and twofold body combined together of incompatible limbs, 
such that the powers of the two halves can be fairly balanced’.88 Different genera 
have different rhythms of growth and maturity. They also have different com-
patibilities and incompatibilities with foods and thus among themselves. They 
cannot be joined together because this implies contradiction, both anatomical, 
or physiological, and behavioural, since they could not even agree in habits.89
If mythical creatures such as centaurs and chimeras, which play such a large 
part in superstitious beliefs, have to be destroyed on a rational and physical 
basis, then their explanation must be the same, or at least compatible with, 
the same rational and physical contentions used to explain monstrosities in 
the earliest age. Munro thus argues that this passage derives from refutation 
of Empedocles’ ideas and, in particular, his man-faced oxen.90 However, we 
have already seen how Empedocles’ thought is positively present in Lucreti-
us’s account of early zoogony. Schrijvers has underlined a possible source of 
Lucretius’s argument in the rationalist critique of myths in Palaephatus.91 Like 
87 Lucr. V.834–6.
88 Lucr. V.878–82. 881 is uncertain and its interpretation is not without consequences. For 
a full discussion of this crux see Bailey in Lucretius (1947), III, p. 1468.
89 Lucr. V.833–900.
90 Munro in Lucretius (1891, 4th ed.), ad loc.: ‘This passage is extremely well and acutely 
reasoned out: he covertly refutes Empedocles’ notion of the βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα and 
the ἀνδροφυῆ βούκρανα which are as impossible as the centaurs Scyllas and chimeras 
of the poets. The man-woman or hermaphrodite is possible enough, because the natures 
of man and woman are not incompatible; and doubtless it and other monstrous things 
tries at fi rst to continue existence; but the creatures here described never could begin to 
come into being.’
91 Schrijvers in Caratelli (1983). See Palaeph. 1 (= Festa et al. eds. (1894–1902), III.II, pp. 
1–2): ‘What is said about the Centaurs is that they were beasts with the overall shape of a 
horse – except for the head, which was human. But even if there are some people who believe 
that such a beast once existed, it is impossible. Horse and human natures are not compatible, 
nor are their foods the same: what a horse eats could not pass through the mouth and throat 
of a man. And if there ever was such a shape, it would also exist today.’ On Palaephatus’s 
historical exegesis see supra. See also Grant (1952), pp. 47–8, and Hawes (2014), ch. 1.
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Palaephatus, Lucretius has both an interest in the impossibilia and the psycho-
logical attitude that can be used to rationalise the myth.92 Against Schrijvers, 
however, Gigandet argues that it is precisely the psychological attitude that 
marks the difference between the two authors: whereas Palaephatus believes 
that the myth can be amended to remove its unbelievable and unacceptable 
features,93 Lucretius intends to destroy the myth and substitute for it a physical 
explanation.94 It is thus more appropriate, Gigandet suggests, to focus on the 
nature of the insuperable limits in order to grasp the originality of the physical 
boundaries that constrain all animals and monsters alike. Lucretius insists:
[H]e that supposes that such animals could have been born when earth was 
young and heaven new, depending upon this one empty word ‘newness’, may 
with equal reason babble on without end, saying that then rivers of gold used 
commonly to fl ow over the earth, that trees used to have jewels for fl owers, 
that man was born with so great expanse of limbs that he could set his stride 
across the deep sea and with his hands turn the whole sky about him. For 
although there were many seeds of things in the soil at the time when fi rst 
the earth poured forth the animals, that is nevertheless no proof (signi) that 
creatures of mixed growth (mixtas animantum) could be made, and limbs of 
various kinds of plants and the corn and the luxuriant trees, which even 
now spring in abundance from the earth, nevertheless cannot be produced 
interwoven together, but each thing proceeds after its own fashion, and all by 
foedere naturae preserve their distinctions (certo discrimina servant).95 
Lucretius, Gigandet argues, accepts the Empedoclean theory of nature’s 
attempts, but at the same time he establishes limits to it, and makes it depen-
dent on the possible combinations of atoms, carefully distinguished from the 
impossible ones. Not everything can happen in nature, not even in its initial 
stage, because atomic combinations are given within a ‘cadre délimité (certus)’.96 
Lucretius, thus, rules out Empedocles’ idea of individual limbs looking for each 
other. Not so much because earthly wombs produce individuals and not limbs, 
but because ‘looking for each other’ implies some form of intentionality and 
teleology. Individuals do not look for the conditions that will allow them to 
92 See also Pigeaud (1988), p. 208.
93 Palaeph. introduction: ‘[. . .] some people are too credulous and believe anything [. . .] 
others [. . .] totally disbelieve that any of these tales ever happened. My own belief is 
that there is a reality behind all stories. For names alone without stories would hardly 
have arisen: fi rst there must have been deeds and thereafter stories about them.’
94 Gigandet (1998), pp. 44–5.
95 Lucr. V.907–24.
96 Gigandet (1998), p. 140.
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survive, but they survive because they meet those conditions. The certus dis-
crimen mentioned by Lucretius, however, does not function, in my view, as a 
boundary or a net, and far less as a law. The discrimen is rather the outcome 
or effect of the foedera naturae, an outcome that is immanently realised rather 
than being given or determined by any other force.97 It is certus – an adjective 
repeated more than one hundred times in De rerum natura – in the sense of 
being univocally related to its causes: certain causes produce certain effects and 
no others, as if everything could happen indistinctly.
Bollack calls attention to the similitude between the atoms that compose 
the world and the letters of the alphabet (the elementa) that compose words.98 
Moreau emphasises the same argument, to stress that, as the letters of the 
alphabet must be different, in order for words to have a sense, so the atoms 
must be different for the physical beings to differentiate from each other and 
have their specifi c and recognisable characteristics.99 Now, this differentiation 
must of course be limited, otherwise words would be infi nite and language, 
in a sort of Babylonian and Borgesian scenario, would become unintelligible. 
Likewise, beings must have regularities and their forms be limited, in the same 
way that the diversity of their shapes and magnitudes must be limited. The 
similitude is penetrating, and I suggest extending it to the process of formation 
of these regularities: words are not fi xed; they acquire their meaning through 
their use, through being spoken by people, or disappear by being abandoned 
and forgotten. In the same manner, living beings acquire their meaning, i.e. 
their ontological consistency, not as a condition, but as a consequence of their 
existence. Beings exist because they reproduce themselves in the world and 
because, in some sense, they ‘speak’ themselves in nature.
Concourses of Nature
The foedera naturae is one of the most important expressions used by Lucretius. 
They have been seen as the archetype of a law of nature,100 as it is proved by the 
quasi-overwhelming consensus among translators.101 In my view, however, the 
translation ‘law of nature’ is misleading not only because of the anachronism 
 97 Morfi no (2013).
 98 Bollack (1978), pp. 246–59.
 99 Moreau (1975), p. 477.
100 On natural laws in the ancient culture see Grant (1952), Chroust (1963), Koester 
(1968), Martens (2003).
101 Just a few examples: Munro in Lucretius (1873, 3rd ed.), Ernout in Lucretius (1924), 
Bailey in Lucretius (1947), Rouse and Smith in Lucretius (1975), Flores in Lucretius 
(2002–9).
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of projecting the early modern idea of lex naturalis on Lucretius,102 but also 
because Lucretius’s argument itself does not suggest the idea of a law that binds 
or constraints natural phenomena.103
The expression appears six times in the meaning under scrutiny: I.586, 
II.302, VI.906 and three times in book V at verses 57, 310 and 924. I have 
discussed at length the passage in book I. Here one may discern, perhaps 
more clearly, that the foedera naturae are quite different from ‘ordinances of 
nature’,104 or even ‘compact of nature’.105 The ordo that the acute observer 
discerns in nature is the regularity and the consistency of a series of events 
over time,106 and not a superior order imposed on phenomena. The expres-
sion, Ernout and Robin argue, seems to come from πλατὺς ὄρκος [broad or 
fi rm-based oath] in Empedocles,107 with its idea of a compact and a strong 
oath. It is close to the occurrence in III.416, in which Lucretius speaks about 
the foedus between the mind and the soul: no law then, unless one wants to 
project the hierarchical kind of relation between the soul and the body that is 
implied, for example, in the Platonic view.108 Given the atomic nature of every 
natural entity, Lucretius rather suggests the agreement, the conjunction and 
the union between natural elements. But let us analyse the six occurrences of 
the term in De rerum natura, as each of them reveals a particular aspect of the 
question of its meaning and relevance for Lucretius’s philosophy.
102 In this sense Boyancé (1963), p. 86.
103 See Reich (1958), p. 126, Milton (1981), pp. 176–7, and C. Wilson, ‘From Limits to Law: 
The Construction of the Nomological Image of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy’, in 
Daston and Stolleis (2008), pp. 13–28.
104 Rouse and Smith, in Lucretius (1975).
105 Proposed by Grant (1952), p. 24. Grant suggests considering an important text for the 
tradition that I have been discussing, namely Minucius Felix’s Octavius, a dialogue 
between a pagan sceptic and a Christian. Grant underlines that Minucius makes use of 
the concept of natural law, the ‘compact of nature’ that corresponds for him to Lucreti-
us’s foedera naturae, in the sceptic and Christian argument alike, by giving it an opposite 
meaning. See also Minucius Felix 17.7–9 e 34.2–3. In contrast, I believe that precisely 
because this concept does not correspond to the modern idea of lex naturalis, it is in fact 
wide enough to be fi lled in with both providentialist and anti-providentialist arguments. 
See also Reich (1958), p. 125.
106 As suggested by Ernout and Robin, in Lucretius (1925–8), I, p. 129.
107 Lucretius (1925–8), I, p. 128. See Vorsokr. 31 B 30 (= LM [22] EMP. D94, R74 = Inwood 
35, p. 225 = Arist. Metaph. III.4, 1000 b 12) and Vorsokr. 31 B 115 (= LM [22] EMP. D10, 
D11, R48, R50, R89 = Inwood 11, p. 207 = Hippol. Haer. VII.29). See also Boyancé 
(1963), p. 87 and, contra, G. Droz-Vincent, ‘Les foedera naturae chez Lucrèce’, in Levy éd. 
(1996), pp. 191–211, who claims the Lucretius’s philosophy is alien to the anthropomor-
phic character of the Empedoclean compacts.
108 On Lucretius’s use of animus/anima see Bailey, in Lucretius (1947), II, p. 1006.
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Let us begin with the last occurrence, in VI.906. When Lucretius explains 
the foedera naturae for which ‘it comes about that iron can be attracted by 
that stone which the Greeks call magnet from the name of its home’, the 
reader is no longer struck by the use of the expression. The foedera appear 
here in their more neutral sense, as synonym of ‘reasons’ or rationes,109 those 
that explain this phenomenon, traditionally ascribed to nature’s strangeness. 
Notwithstanding the translators’ choice, the reasons are here far from being 
laws that compel the iron and the magnet to attract each other. They are 
rather the clarifi cation of something traditionally held as obscure and myste-
rious, the description of a fully natural phenomenon that links two different 
matters in a peculiar manner.
The fi rst occurrence of the foedera naturae is in I.586, in which, as I 
explained above, Lucretius connects the microscopic level of atomic composi-
tion with the macroscopic level of physical phenomena: the latter’s constancy 
and consistency precisely depends on the former’s regular dynamic. Thus, cer-
tain things are or are not able to behave in certain ways, or produce certain 
effects. Knowing and observing nature, Lucretius argues, allows humans to 
understand what things are and are not able to do. De Lacy has pointed out 
how Lucretius’s poem is a direct response to Platonism: knowing nature means 
grasping the ‘formal aspect of the cosmic process, what can happen and what 
cannot, what the limits are’.110 The foedera naturae, De Lacy argues, are thus 
laws of nature, and ‘to that extent they are the Epicurean equivalent of the 
eternal and unchanging forms glimpsed by the soaring soul in Phdr. 247 c–e.’ 
In line with De Lacy’s thesis, however, I would rather say that they are the 
equivalent insofar as they claim the same role and status within the system, 
but also that they turn upside down the very nature and meaning of Platonic 
forms and contrast with them in the strongest possible way. Lucretius’s natural 
phenomena do not draw their reality from above, namely from their participa-
tion in forms or norms.
The foedera naturae, in this sense, sometimes represent for Lucretius the 
general and universal principle within which every phenomenon takes place, 
rather than the laws that guide them, as it is the case in II.294–309, in which 
Lucretius explains that
nothing increases [the mass of matter] nor does anything perish from it. 
Wherefore in whatsoever motion the bodies of fi rst-beginnings are now, in 
that same motion they were in ages gone by, and hereafter they will always 
109 One of the most frequent terms in the poem, less frequent only than corpus, terra and 
natura. See Wacht (1990).
110 De Lacy, ‘Lucretius and Plato’, in Caratelli (1983), p. 293.
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be carried along in the same way (simili ratione), and the things which have 
been accustomed to be born will be born under the same conditions (eadem 
condicione); they will be and will grow and will be strong with their strength 
as much as is given111 to each by the foedera naturai (quantum cuique datum 
est per foedera naturai). Nor can any power change the sum total of things; 
for there is no place without into which any kind of matter could fl ee away 
from the all; and there is no place whence a new power could arise to burst 
into the all, and to change the nature of things (naturam rerum mutare) and 
turn their motions. 
Here, once again, one should not personify the foedera naturae as anthropo-
morphic and normative principles that grant or concede or accord something. 
The foedera naturae are rather the manifestation of what things can or cannot 
be, depending on the features, nature and atomic constitution that they have 
been capable to reproduce.
That Lucretius is thinking about the general principle that describes all 
phenomena alike is supported by the reading of Epicurus, whom the Latin poet 
is here repeating.112 Even more important, as Ernout and Robin emphasise, is 
the fact that the foedera naturae are here opposed to the fati foedera.113 Nature’s 
foedera are not infl exible laws imposed by fate, but certa ratio that expresses 
nature’s regularity, in the total absence of a personifi ed lawgiver Fate.
In V.55 one can read one of the most important occurrences of the foedera:
I teach in my poem by what foedere all things are created, and how they 
must needs abide by them, strong laws of time that nothing could annul 
(nec ualidas ualeant aevi rescindere leges). 
Foedera and leges are here close, both relating to the natural domain, and to 
the conditions114 and features according to which everything has been created 
and reproduces itself by confi rming the constancy and consistency of nature 
seen above.
Although the concept of law of nature does not exist in ancient culture, 
Lucretius makes use of the lex for the natural domain. Lex appears ten times in 
the poem,115 seven times to speak about human laws or laws specifi cally con-
cerning the legal sphere, and only three times referring to nature and natural 
111 Rouse and Smith: ‘granted to each of them’.
112 Ep. [2] 39. See Ernout and Robin (1925–8), I, p. 255.
113 Ernout and Robin (1925–8) and Morfi no (2013).
114 Flores ad loc., translates foedera by ‘condizioni’.
115 Vis-à-vis, once again, the 222 occurrences of ratio. See Wacht (1990), ad loc.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   156 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 E P I C U R U S A N D L U C R E T I U S  157
things. In II.719 lex is a synonym of ratio, and holds things apart by their limits.116 
In III.687 Lucretius mentions a specifi c law that infl exibly applies to all things, 
namely the ‘law of death’, or lex leti. The occurrence of V.55 should be read, I 
think, in this light, namely to refl ect the constancy of events throughout the 
ages, with no change possibly appearing within the same given conditions.
It is utterly important, I think, that Lucretius associates here leges and 
foedera. Ernout and Robin point to two relevant examples: Virgil’s Georgics 
I.60: ‘continuo has leges aeternaque foedera certis | imposuit natura locis’ 
and Lucan II.2: ‘Iamque irae patuere deum, manifestaque belli signa dedit 
mundus, legesque et foedera rerum praescia monstrifero vertit natura tumultu 
indixitque nefas.’117 Lucan’s reference is strikingly important for the pres-
ent enquiry, for the role played by monstrosity in breaking the foedera rerum 
legesque, and the universe thus showing its being at war.118 Lucretius, however, 
takes a very different direction in claiming the unchangeable nature of the 
foedera. Striking, once again, is that this unchangeability does not proceed 
from above, as if Lucretius were simply turning upside down Lucan’s inten-
tion: whereas for Lucan the universe’s laws can be overturned, Lucretius sees 
nature’s immanent constancy.
De Lacy suggests Polystratus as another Epicurean source for Lucretius’s 
concept of foedera.119 Its meaning, however, is grounded in the Epicurean 
attempt to give an immanent foundation to nature by setting apart things that 
are possible (δυνατὰ) and impossible (μὴ [δυ]νατὰ). Salem also agrees with this 
reading, highlighting the idea that the variation of natural phenomena, the 
παραλλαγή, can only happen within determinate limits that are physical and 
unchangeable.120 Every natural phenomenon can happen only between a mini-
mum and a maximum, beyond which physics is limited by ‘bornes ontologiques’, 
or metaphysical impossibilities.121 An example of possible variation would be the 
child’s resemblance to her parents, either one of them, when the mother’s or the 
father’s seed has prevailed, or both of them, utriusque fi gurae, when neither of 
the seeds has conquered the other.122
116 Lucr. II.718–20: ‘Do not think that animals only are held by these laws (legibus), for the 
same principle (ratio) holds all things apart by their limits.’
117 Ernout and Robin (1925–8), ad loc.
118 See infra.
119 And in particular the Περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως. See Polystratus (1905) and De 
Lacy (1969), p. 104 and passim. The concept of limits is, for the Epicureans, the most 
powerful tool to contrast transcendency.
120 Salem (1994), pp. 83 ff. Following De Lacy (1969), p. 107, Salem also quotes Philodemus’s 
Περὶ σημείων καὶ σημειώσεων. See Phld. Sign.
121 See Courtès (1968).
122 Lucr. IV.1209–17.
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The argument of the child’s resemblance had also been used by Aristotle 
as an example of minor monstrosity: within the teleological scheme, the chil-
dren should resemble their parents. Whenever this does not happen, children 
are to some extent monstrous.123 The Epicureans, I believe, frame the same 
contention within a completely different pattern, materially and physically 
determined by the mechanical dynamics of seeds’ mixture, and avoiding all 
references to teleology. Once again, thus, the limits should not be seen as 
laws governing from above, or far less metaphysical boundaries, but rather the 
expression of what nature becomes, following only its mechanical dynamic, 
and no other normative principle.
De Lacy underlines that these limits also allow a certain freedom of varia-
tion within them, that is to say within the maximum and the minimum, and 
link them to the clinamen. ‘But even the swerve,’ he adds, ‘has a limit; it can be 
no more than the minimum (Lucr. 2.244). Its consequences must not disrupt 
the fi xed limits of natural processes but must only add variety within those 
limits.’124 The swerve surely has limits, as everything else in nature. Who set 
these limits, though? What does it mean that it must be in a certain way and 
not another one? Not a lawgiver Nature, I believe, but matter itself, spon-
taneously organised in the origin of this world, and thus now operating in 
a certain determinate manner. The word ‘laws’ does not clarify, but rather 
confuses, the sense of radical immanence that Lucretius consciously opposes, 
carefully choosing the foedus, to the transcendent normativity of alternative 
philosophical systems.
This is why even fate can now be transformed in Lucretius’s hands: ‘Do 
you not see that even stones are conquered by time, that tall turrets fall and 
rocks crumble, that the gods’ temples and their images wear out and crack, 
nor can their holy divinity carry forward the boundaries of fate [fati fi nis], or 
strive against naturae foedera?’125 Fate and foedera stand here on the same side, 
an irresistible boundary against religious superstition: metaphorically, against 
its claimed sanctum numen, and physically, against the material resistance of its 
temples, whose rocks, like everything else, will one day fall apart.
It is following this pattern that Lucretius brings the reader to the argument 
of monstrosities in V.907–24. Only some of them, as we know, have been pro-
duced by the earth, but not the mixed ones, inter se complexa, such as centaurs 
and chimeras. All animals, even those produced by the earth in the beginning, 
proceed suo ritu and distinguish themselves from the others, according to the 
foedera naturae: immanent principle of distinction, regularity and combination.
123 See Arist. GA IV.3, 767 b 10–13 and supra. De Lacy (1969), p. 109.
124 De Lacy (1969), pp. 108–9.
125 Lucr. V.310.
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The idea of ‘law’ or ‘limit’ imposed by nature or by fate seems to me too 
strict for the foedera naturae, and the possibility, or rather the necessity, of 
monstrosities in the beginning of the world testifi es to it. The most signifi cant 
meanings mentioned by the OLD suggest the idea of a criterion defi ning moral 
violations, such as the one implied by suicide according to Cicero, follow-
ing Plato and Pythagoras,126 or that of a decree voluntarily established by the 
Parcae in Ovid.127 Manilius’s use of the term foedus is also quite interesting: 
‘I shall sing of God,’ he writes, ‘silent-minded monarch of nature, who, per-
meating sky and land and sea, controls with uniform compact [aequali foedere] 
the mighty structure [. . .].’128 Foedera are laws given by nature’s monarch. 
Moreover, Manilius opposes such divine laws to the Epicurean spontaneous 
organisation of the cosmos: ‘Who could believe that such massive structures 
have been created from tiny atoms without the operation of a divine will, and 
that the universe is the creature of a blind compact [caeco foedere]?’129 The 
foedus is thus employed by the Stoic Manilius in an explicit teleological polemic 
against Epicurean chance and the Lucretian idea of the necessary concourse of 
different things, of different conditions, necessary and suffi cient for events to 
happen, or for living beings to survive.
Multa videmus rebus concurrere debere, Lucretius says.130 These are the foedera 
naturae: not the conditions imposed by nature, but the concourse itself of the 
multa rebus, with its natural effects. The Lucretian concept of foedera is thus 
enlightened by the ideas of agreement, convenience, even cooperation of natu-
ral things from which the regularities stem. Their origin is in the atomic clashes, 
their concursus. Before these clashes and the possible agreements that come out 
of them, no law exists, not even in principle, because no lawgiving entity exists. 
Nature is the outcome of multiple concursus and the stabilisation131 of the mul-
tiple agreements and cooperations among things, some of which last, while oth-
ers do not. If not everything was possible, it is only because not everything has 
actually happened. Regularity and natural necessity include rather than exclude 
chance. They only come after chance, they are chance’s result.132 ‘Law of nature’ 
126 Cic. Scaur. 5: ‘Even these teachers, though they praise death, forbid us to fl y from life, 
asserting that such conduct is a violation of nature [contra foedus legemque naturae].’
127 Ou. Met., V.532. It is often clear, in Ovid, the meaning of a command or an order con-
veyed by the concept.
128 Manil. II.62. See also infra.
129 Manil. I.492–3.
130 Lucr. V.849.
131 Moreau (1975), p. 474, interestingly speaks about Nature’s habit of reproducing itself in 
a regular way. Nature ‘gets used to’ something (and gets rid of something else), and this 
is its only rule.
132 See also Costa, p. 104.
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is thus a misleading translation. I prefer the idea of concourse/concursus, the con-
junction or concurrence, and even the encounter or the assemblage, closer to 
the Greek σύνοδος.
Boyancé claims that the foedera naturae can be considered natural laws 
only if one stresses the negative and limitative character of a law, rather than 
its positive and prescriptive nature. Laws, he claims, allow Lucretius to point 
toward what the fables’ gods cannot make, rather than to what they can cre-
ate out of their arbitrary imagination. The ethico-political character of the 
foedera is indeed present in Lucretius’s mind, but it is not necessary, here, to 
oppose their positive and their negative character. The foedera are the actual 
concourse of things, that both negatively prevents and positively allows them 
to happen.133
Something needs to be added to the role played by the foedera naturae 
in the Epicurean polemics against teleology. Droz-Vincent suggests that the 
genitive in foedera naturae can be intended in a subjective and an objective 
sense.134 He rules out the latter, laws that ‘govern’ or ‘control’ nature, though, 
because it is too close to the modern idea of a law of nature. It remains, thus, 
the former, laws ‘belonging to’ nature, in the sense of the rules that Nature 
imposes on and prescribes to its phenomena, in order to guarantee their 
regularity.135 Droz-Vincent claims136 that Lucretius is discreetly reintroducing 
some kind of teleology, precisely through the idea of a rule-giver Nature. Such 
fi nalism would also be confi rmed by the repeated use of fi nis, with its double 
meaning of end and scope. I believe, on the contrary, that Lucretius is not 
reintroducing any kind of fi nalism here. On the contrary, the foedera naturae, 
intended as the concourse of many several things, are precisely the antidote 
to any fi nalism.
Lucretius explicitly obliterates, for example, the subordination of animal 
organs to their function, which would teleologically act as a shaping principle:
Do not suppose that the clear light of the eyes was made in order that 
we might be able to see before us; or that the ends of the calves and 
thighs were jointed and placed upon the foundation of the feet, only to 
enable us to march forward with long forward strides; that the forearms 
again were fi tted upon sturdy upper arms, and ministering hands given on 
either side, only that we might be able to do what should be necessary for 
life. Such explanations, and all other such that men give, put effect for 
133 See Boyancé (1963), passim. See also Morgan (1984), p. 110 and passim.
134 G. Droz-Vincent, ‘Les foedera naturae chez Lucrèce’, in Lévy éd. (1996), pp. 191–211.
135 G. Droz-Vincent, ‘Les foedera naturae chez Lucrèce’, p. 210.
136 Following Mesnard (1947). Contra Casini (1963).
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cause and are based on perverted reasoning [omnia peruersa praepostera 
sunt ratione];137 since nothing is born in us simply in order that we may use 
it, but that which is born creates the use [quod natumst id procreat usum]. 
There was no sight before the eyes with their light were born, no speaking 
of words before the tongue was made; but rather the origin of the tongue 
came long before speech, and the ear was made long before sound was 
heard, in a word all the members, as I think, existed before their use; they 
could not then have grown up for the sake of use [haud igitur potuere utendi 
crescere causa]138
In the same way that order and regularity do not pre-exist the ordered and reg-
ulated development of nature, the functions performed by organs do not pre-
exist the organic life of individuals within a determinate species.139 The case of 
human inventions is different, as they have been created out of experience, and 
thus invented for the sake of their use.140 Sensus and membra, however, does not 
have any teleological origin in the Epicurean system.
Lucretius’s Impact on the Augustan Age
The materialist and atomist theories powerfully reworked by Lucretius have a 
large impact on the literature of the Augustan age as some of the most impor-
tant authors react to his rationalisation and systematisation of philosophical 
thought. Virgil, Horace, Vitruvius and Ovid, none of whom is, strictly speaking, 
137 Ernout and Robin (1925–8), II, p. 261: ‘This is, in fact, the problem with the doctrine 
of fi nal causes according to its opponents: it turns upside down the relationship 
between things, peruersa ratione, it everywhere puts the effect before the cause, omnia 
praepostera; it makes πρότερον-ὕστερον. The critique is perfectly clear: it is not the 
need or the usefulness that create the organ (834 sq., 842, 857); the organ has created 
itself spontaneously, and thus originates the need to use it, in short the usage or the 
function (835, 840 ff.), by giving us its idea, notitiam utilitatis (853 ff.).’ Contra Bailey in 
Lucretius (1947), II, p. 1281, for whom: ‘Lucr.’s argument in this paragraph is simple-
hearted [. . .]. The argument is not in itself convincing [. . .].’
138 Lucr. IV.825–42.
139 Casini (1963) underlines the anti-Aristotelian nature of this argument, as well as its 
faithfulness vis-à-vis the core of the doctrine in Diodorus I,7 and Ep. [2] 73–6. Insofar 
as they agree with Aristotelian teleology, Stoics are also targeted by Lucretius. Contra 
Schrijvers, ‘L’homme et l’animal in the De rerum natura’, in Algra, Koenen, Schrivers eds. 
(1997), pp. 151–61, who thinks that one should see the fi nalist and anti-fi nalist explana-
tions alike in Lucretius, insofar as a certain kind of fi nalism, at least in humans, results 
from their initial formation by chance. On Lucretius and Diodoros see also Woltjer 
(1877) and Spoerri (1959).
140 Lucr. IV.843–57.
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a philosopher, feel compelled to tackle philosophical ideas, infl uenced by, or 
as a response to, Lucretius’s enterprise. Monstrosity, once again, comes to the 
foreground, as if it were the concept that, though marginal, threatens the whole 
system from the exterior, or as if only its internal consideration and absorption 
could make a system of thought strong or appealing enough to establish itself 
and represent the spirit of the age.
In his Eclogue IV, Virgil prophesises a new golden age. To materialist ratio-
nalism, as Hardie has underlined, Virgil responds with real impossibilia whose 
existence would overturn the consistency of Lucretius’s nature.141 Virgil’s 
position, however, is far from being a simple opposition to Lucretian rational-
ism. For Virgil, monsters appear not only in the threatening marginal world 
of Circe, in which nature’s normality has been twisted and subjugated by the 
obscure force of magic, but also in the enlightening explanation of the souls’s 
incarnation pious Anchises gives to Aeneas.142 Virgil does not indulge in cre-
dulity, but neither does he unconditionally adhere to Lucretius’s enterprise 
of completely rationalising nature to obliterate every and any form of marvel-
lous. Indeed, the marvellous is essential to Virgil’s poetry. As Alain Deremetz 
suggests, Virgil instead elaborates an original conception of the marvellous 
that is strongly infl uenced by Lucretius yet open to the rhetorical effect of 
prodigious monstrosities, such as the mirabile monstrum of Aen. III.26, the 
bleeding bush into which Polydorus has been metamorphosised.143 Such a 
blend of materialist infl uence and mythological materials resurfaces power-
fully in Silenus’s cosmogonic and mythological song in Eclogue VI, which 
clearly reveals the infl uence of Virgil’s teacher, the Epicurean Siron. After 
the unambiguously Lucretian cosmogonic account, representations of thorny 
subjects and unhappy passions proliferate.144
In the Aeneid, Virgil places monsters in the underworld’s vestibule, where 
‘many monstrous forms besides of various beasts are stalled at the doors, 
Centaurs and double-shaped Scyllas, and the hundredfold Briareus, and the 
beast of Lerna, hissing horribly, and the Chimaera armed with fl ame, Gorgons 
and Harpies, and the shape of the three-bodied shade’.145 Accompanied by 
the Cumaean Sibyl, Aeneas has the human reaction of fear and repulsion. 
141 Verg. B. IV.37–48. See P. Hardie, ‘Cultural and Historical Narratives in Virgil’s Eclogues 
and Lucretius’, in Fantuzzi, Papanghelis eds. (2006), pp. 275–300.
142 Verg. Aen. VII.21 and VI.724. See also P. Hardie, ‘Virgil: A Paradoxical Poet?’ in Hardie 
(2009), pp. 95–112.
143 A. Deremetz, ‘The Question of the Marvellous in the Georgics of Virgil’, in Hardie 
(2009), pp. 113–25. 
144 Verg. B. VI.31 ff.
145 Verg. Aen. VI.285–9.
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He reaches for his sword, but the Sibyl explains that monsters are not real, but 
only appearances: ‘did not his wise companion warn him that these were but 
faint, bodiless lives, fi tting under a hollow semblance of form, he would rush 
upon them and vainly cleave shadows with steel.’146 As Lucretius explained, 
monsters spring out of the traditional thought as illusory images, simulacra of 
reality whose composite nature is possible only in the imagination, not the 
reality of the physical world. The Cumaean Sibyl offers Aeneas a sketch of 
Lucretian wisdom, without renouncing the rhetorical power evoked by the 
mythical creatures. Monstrosity ultimately makes it possible for the poet to 
present Epicurean arguments favourably. Monsters also allow Virgil to keep 
the fearful strength of ancient tradition intact, while presenting it in the frame 
of his highly original poetry.
The ambivalence toward the monstrous also appears in Horace, one of the 
Augustan poets whose works most explicitly insist that monsters are not real. 
Nonetheless, at the end of Ode II.20, the poet imagines himself transformed 
into a monstrous swan, thus transgressing Lucretius’s opposition to the impos-
sible phenomena of metamorphosis that Horace typically insists on.
The beginning of Horace’s Ars poetica is famous for the denunciation 
of the chimaera as a paradigm of impossible monstrosity that ruins not just 
poetry but all aesthetics:
If a painter chose to join a human head to the neck of a horse, and to 
spread feathers of many a hue over limbs picked up now here now there, so 
that what at the top is a lovely woman ends below in a black and ugly fi sh, 
could you, my friends, if favoured with a private view, refrain from laughing? 
Believe me, dear Pisos, quite like such pictures would be a book, whose idle 
fancies shall be shaped like a sick man’s dreams, so that neither head nor 
foot can be assigned to a single shape. ‘Painters and poets,’ you say, ‘have 
always had an equal right in hazarding anything.’ We know it: this licence 
we poets claim and in our turn we grant the like; but not so far that savage 
should mate with tame, or serpents couple with birds, lambs with tigers.147 
The Ars is one of the most infl uential classical texts on the writing of poetry 
and drama. Its opening moulds a monstrous shape whose impact recalls the 
hybrid compositions of forms in struggle with each other that Plato locates 
within the soul. This chimaera should be killed and replaced by a correct 
esthetic canon that avoids all exaggeration, that does not attempt to seduce 
the reader with images of impossible creatures. The almost Surrealist image of 
146 Verg. Aen. VI.292–4.
147 Hor. Ars poetica 1–13.
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the chimaera, Citroni suggests, is refused more for its inconsistency than for 
its irreality.148 In this sense, Horace’s philosophical approach is inspired both 
by Lucretius’s principle of nihil admirari and by Aristotle’s appeal to the consis-
tency of parts that explicitly connects the physical and the poetical domain.149 
The diversity of subject is acceptable only if it does not push the boundaries 
of the impossible or unreal.
Interestingly, Steidle suggests that the Ars poetica’s debut does not 
de-legitimate the composite fi gures transmitted by tradition such as centaurs 
or the Sphinx.150 Although impossible, these characters are solidly legitimised 
by tradition and transposed into a mythical dimension. The continuity of the 
tradition grants a certain truth value to the mythical fantasy. In this respect, 
because he recognises the value of tradition, Horace grants a certain form of 
existence to the mythical creatures that he explicitly denounces. Its impos-
sibility notwithstanding, the monster becomes true because tradition keeps it 
alive beyond and against the aesthetic and physical logic that demolishes its 
ontological reality. The monster thus survives imaginatively at the expense of 
its ontological possibility.
This radical rejection of the ontological reality of monstrosity echoes the posi-
tion of another prominent Augustan-age personality – Vitruvius. The opening of 
De architectura is often associated with Horace’s denunciation of chimeric mon-
strosity. In Vitruvius’s view, such condemnation extends to all that is grotesque, 
because the grotesque lacks the ethical sense that is necessarily anchored in a 
certain proportion, balance and measure. In Vitruvius’s words:
[the] imitations based upon reality are now disdained by the improper 
taste of the present. On the stucco are monsters rather than defi nite repre-
sentations taken from defi nite things [imagines certae]. Instead of columns 
there rise up stalks; instead of gables, striped panels with curled leaves 
and colutes. Candelabra uphold pictured shrines and above the summits 
of these, clusters of thin stalks rise from their roots in tendrils with little 
fi gures seated upon them at random [sine ratione]. Again, slender stalks 
with heads of men and of animals attached to half the body. Such things 
neither are, nor can be, nor have been. [. . .] pictures cannot be approved 
which do not resemble reality. Even if they have a fi ne and craftsmanlike 
fi nish, they are only to receive commendation if they exhibit their proper 
subject without transgressing the rules of art.151 
148 M. Citroni, ‘Horace’s Ars Poetica and the marvellous’, in Hardie (2009), pp. 19–40.
149 Arist. Po. 1451 a 1–2.
150 Steidle (1939), p. 12.
151 Vitr. VII.V.3–4.
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Vitruvius echoes the same principle we have seen in Palaephatus: because such 
things have never existed, they do not and will not exist. Existing reality stands 
for Vitruvius as an infl exibly normative principle according to which the art-
ist must not create and represent things that do not exist. The boundaries of 
artistic creation exclude everything stained by falseness, making them inconve-
nient and undesirable, even if they are skilfully fashioned: the falseness in fact 
perverts and diverts the skills from their true end, i.e. representation according 
to reality.
The monstrous in Vitruvius relates to an unbreakable connection between 
form and function. Things are condemned because they are sine ratione and 
thus ontologically and aesthetically contradictory.152 Monsters do not and 
cannot perform any function; they have no role to play, and for this reason, 
they must be condemned. When the artist recreates them, he is artifi cially 
keeping monsters alive, against the truth of nature. Artistic representation is 
praised when inspired by the principle of verisimilitude, and condemned when 
it violates the boundaries of ontological possibility.
Differently from Virgil, Horace and Vitruvius appear little concerned 
about the ambivalent relation between normality and monstrosity. Such an 
ambivalence, however, appears again in the last great author of the period: 
Ovid. The Metamorphoses’s impact on literature, arts and the comprehension 
of mythology at large can hardly be overestimated. Largely conceived as a 
response to the rationalising and demythologising project of ancient mate-
rialism, particularly Lucretius, Ovid aims to rediscover the encyclopedia of 
mythology inherited from the Greeks, especially Homer and Hesiod.
Scholars are divided on Ovid’s intention and attitude. His aetiological 
method, Myers claims, does not just oppose the scientifi c approach, but makes 
use of it by mingling science and myth.153 Beagon also points out the unphi-
losophical nature of Ovid’s approach to the philosophical material the poem 
explores.154 Alfonsi, on the contrary, places the development of Ovid’s poetry 
within the framework of the Stoic enterprise. In this sense, the Metamorpho-
ses is not a poem of wonders, but a poetic theology of history philosophically 
grounded in Posidonius’s system.155 More recently, Nelis has insisted on the 
philosophical, and in particular Lucretian and Empedoclean, background of 
152 V. Platt, ‘Where the Wild Things Are: Locating the Marvellous in Augustan Wall Paint-
ing’, in Hardie (2009), pp. 41–74.
153 Myers (1994), pp. 25–6.
154 M. Beagon, ‘Ordering Wonderland: Ovid’s Pythagoras and the Augustan Vision’, in 
Hardie (2009), pp. 288–309.
155 L. Alfonsi, ‘L’inquadramento fi losofi co delle Metamorfosi ovidiane’, in Herescu (1958), 
pp. 265–72.
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Ovid’s discourse.156 A precise reconstruction of the philosophical and literary 
background of such a complex poem is a diffi cult enterprise.157 Ovid’s use of 
natural science and mythology produces an often original interpretation of 
classical myths in which monstrosity, which is at the heart of the metamorphic 
logic that characterises nature as a whole, plays a prominent role.
The cosmogony in book I and Pythagoras’s discourse in book XV are two 
places in which Ovid explicitly touches upon philosophical questions. By no 
means, however, are they his only use of philosophical material; in fact, it is 
by exploring Ovid’s account of each and every myth that the reader discovers 
not only the original reworking of scientifi c theories, but also monstrosity’s 
fundamental role in setting into motion nature’s endlessly metamorphic char-
acter. Metamorphosis is the affi rmation not only of the instability and fl uidity 
of natural laws, but also the imaginative production of what nature was and 
could be vis-à-vis what it currently is.
Ovid’s scientifi c mythology turns the principle of nature’s infl exible 
constancy, clearly expressed by Palaephatus and resurfacing, for example, 
in Vitruvius, upside down. Ovid is not searching for a stabilising principle, 
but rather a destabilising one that challenges the constant predetermination 
of forms. Nature, for him, is wonderful, not rational; ever-changing, not 
self-stabilising. The only stability is fl uctuation, in which the extraordinary 
becomes normal, and the monstrous becomes the norm. In Pythagoras’s 
speech, wonder, as Beagon puts it, fi lls the gap between the reality of what 
nature is and the reality of what it could be.158
Paradoxically, Ovid accomplishes the re-mythologisation of science via 
Lucretius’s materialism and, more generally, the cosmogonic accounts of 
Empedocles and the Epicureans. Ovid often explicitly contradicts Lucretius, 
as in XV.153 ff. in which Pythagoras states that the reason one does not have 
to fear death is not because when we are, death is not and when it is, we are 
not, but rather because our soul is deathless.159 Lucretian language, how-
ever, comes forward in key moments in which a general cosmogonic account 
frames and prepares for the exploration of individual metamorphoses. The 
four Empedoclean elements, as Lucretius calls them, are renamed semina 
rerum, beyond and against Lucretius’s explicit opposition to Empedocles. 
Book I presents the formation of diverse species from the earth:
156 D. Nelis, ‘Metamorphoses 1.416–51: noua monstra and the foedera naturae’, in Hardie 
(2009), pp. 248–67.
157 See e.g. A. Barchiesi’s commentary in Ovidio (2005–15), passim.
158 See again Beagon, ‘Ordering Wonderland’, passim.
159 Ou. Met. XV.153–9.
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[. . .] the earth spontaneously produced [forms of life] of divers kinds; after 
that old moisture remaining from the fl ood had grown warm from the rays 
of the sun, the slime of the wet marshes swelled with heat, and the fertile 
seeds of life, nourished in that life-giving soil, as in a mother’s womb, grew 
and in time took on some special form. So when the seven-mouthed Nile 
has receded from the drenched fi elds and has returned again to its former 
bed, and the fresh slime has been heated by the sun’s rays, farmers as they 
turn over the lumps of earth fi nd many animate things; and among these 
some, but now begun, are upon the very verge of life, some are unfi nished 
and lacking in their proper parts, and oft-times in the same body one part 
is alive and the other still nothing but a raw earth. For when the moisture 
and heat unite, life is conceived, and from these two sources all living 
things spring. And, though fi re and water are naturally at enmity, still 
heat and moisture produce all things, and this inharmonious harmony 
[discors concordia] is fi tted to the growth of life. When, therefore, the 
earth, covered with mud from the recent fl ood, became heated up by the 
hot ethereal rays of the sun, she brought forth innumerable forms of life; 
in part she restored the ancient shapes, and in part she created creatures 
new and strange [noua monstra].160
Without any divine intervention, life mechanically springs from the earth in 
a variety of forms and shapes. The concordia discors of fi re and water takes the 
place of divine providence and leaves the processes to their aleatory meta-
morphical reproduction of ancient forms and creation of new monsters, just as 
they did for Empedocles and Lucretius.161 Ovid’s re-mythologisation of mate-
rialist science leads to a different outcome than that of Lucretius. Whereas 
Lucretius had excluded the existence of mythical forms such as the centaur, 
Ovid presents the formation of all sort of monstrous shapes. According to 
Nelis, this is the proof that Empedocles’ presence in the poem is stronger 
than Lucretius’s. However, as we have seen, it is not so simple to separate the 
two, especially on the role of the spontaneous generation of life in the early 
cosmogony. Moreover, the outcome of Ovid’s account is, after all, the birth of 
a mighty monster:
[The earth], indeed, would have wished not so to do, but thee also she 
then bore, thou huge Python, thou snake unknown before, who wast a ter-
ror to new-created men; so huge a space of mountain-side didst thou fi ll. 
160 Ou. Met. I.416–37.
161 See, for an exhaustive account of this passage, Nelis, ‘Metamorphoses 1.416–51: noua 
monstra and the foedera naturae’.
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This monster the god of the bow destroyed with lethal arms never before 
used except against does and wild she-goats, crushing him with countless 
darts, well-nigh emptying his quiver, till the creature’s poisonous blood 
fl owed from the black wounds.162 
Python is a strong and threatening monster that would certainly have sur-
vived had not the god exterminated it, but both Lucretius and Empedocles 
would have seen it as spontaneously disappearing from the earth.
Physical and mythical causality coexist in the poem, not always in opposi-
tion to each other. As Beagon has underlined, whereas Lucretius (and, to some 
extent, Empedocles) offers tools to overcome astonishment, Ovid’s Pythagoras 
invites the reader to experience it and enjoy its wonderful outcomes. For Ovid, 
monstrosity plays a strategic function of both supporting a scientifi c understand-
ing of nature’s fl uidity and exploring the mythical account of nature without 
prejudice. Following Lucretius, Ovid is not interested in fi nding, through divine 
providence, a comprehensive explanation for every aspect of life. His intent 
instead is to obliterate the role of an intelligent providence in order to leave 
room for the monstrously productive forces of nature. Ovid’s Typhon in book V, 
as Rosati has underlined, is a bold hero who challenges the Olympians and 
reveals a world in which humans are not frightened of the gods. He reveals the 
possibility of another world, possibly a world to come.163
We have seen how Epicurean and Lucretian atomism developed ancient 
materialism in an original and powerful fashion. I have focused on Epicurus’s 
and Lucretius’s treatment of the generation of life, not only its consistency, 
but its mutability: these two ideas constitute the major challenge facing the 
atomists as they respond to the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy of ideas 
and forms. Only by explaining abnormality and monstrosity can atomists make 
sense of their immanent ontology that, based solely on matter in motion, rules 
out every transcendent, divine and providential principle of organisation. 
Order does exist in the universe, and it does include monstrosity. This concept 
must be explained within the limits that nature has to produce its diversity, 
and the foedera naturae that guarantee the stability of this order.
I have attempted in this chapter to develop the thesis that the foedera and 
the limits of nature are neither imposed on nature from above nor established 
by nature in its realm. They are the result of spontaneous atomic motion. 
Within a plane of radical immanency, my suggestion is that not only do the 
foedera discriminate between the possible and impossible monstrosities pro-
duced on earth, as much scholarship suggests, but that successful monstrosities 
162 Ou. Met. I.438–44.
163 G. Rosati, ‘Latrator Anubis: Alien Divinities in Augustan Rome, and how to Tame Monsters 
through Aetiology’, in Hardie (2009), pp. 268–87.
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play a role in determining what those foedera are. I have thus argued that the 
Lucretian expression foedera naturae is best understood less as a natural law and 
more as a conjuction or concourse of favourable events. This means that Epi-
cureans understand monstrosity’s appearance in nature completely differently 
than Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle speaks about monsters’ accidental necessity, 
Lucretius views them as necessarily contributing to the spontaneous shaping of 
nature’s regularity.
Epicurus’s and Lucretius’s philosophy allows us to see the emergence of a 
metaphysics that fl attens the universe on a monistic plane of immanence, one 
whose ontology defi nitely rules out every transcendent principle or superior 
normativity. Exceptions, anomalies and monstrosity are essential elements in 
this system, which is also intended to rule out fear and superstition. Against 
Plato and Aristotle, as shown in the previous pages, Epicurus and Lucretius 
think about monstrosity not as the deviant exception, but rather as part of 
a norm that constantly makes itself, immanently and progressively, out of 
nature’s autonomous effort to reproduce itself.
Atomism thus stands as a viable alternative to Platonic idealism and 
Aristotelian formalism. The magnitude of the struggle between these philo-
sophical systems cannot be understated. It is echoed in the poetry and aes-
thetic theory of the Augustan age, as we saw in the last paragraphs of this 
chapter, in which authors such as Virgil, Horace, Vitruvius and Ovid react 
in different ways to the atomist system and its reinvigoration by Lucretius.
Materialism is the necessary condition for this philosophical reinvigoration. 
However, it is not suffi cient, as Stoicism, the other powerful materialist system 
of antiquity (and the subject of the next chapter) shows: metaphysics can be 
materialist and normative and teleological. The treatment of monstrosity, once 
again, reveals the differences and specifi cities of philosophical systems, pointing 
to the radical alternatives found in the history of Western philosphy.
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Stoicism
A large amount of the writings of Stoic philosophers has been lost. When 
we are able to reconstruct their thought, it is often through fragments and 
the testimonies of their opponents. Yet the Stoics’ physics, cosmogony and 
anthropology have been extremely infl uential since the Hellenistic period, 
fi rst as a powerful response to both Attic philosophy and Epicureanism, then 
through its fusion with Platonism, for example in the Hellenised Judaism of 
Philo of Alexandria, as well as its reception in early Christian theology.
The fragmentary literature by and on Stoics shows little interest in the topic 
and language of monstrosity. Nevertheless, Stoic physics and ontology origi-
nally develop arguments on many, if not all, of the philosophical domains that 
we have been discussing so far and that are relevant for the comprehension of 
the concept of monstrosity: the origin and development of life, the meaning of 
nature and its functioning, the divine and its relationship to the cosmos, neces-
sity and chance, fate and providence. I will show in the following pages how 
Stoicism thinks about monstrosity in its main fi elds of interest, as well as the 
most important heritage that classical Stoicism leaves to the future.
I use the traditional and widely accepted distinction between ancient, 
middle and late Stoicism.1 Compared to Epicureanism, in which two names – 
Epicurus and Lucretius – stand out in importance, Stoicism is much more artic-
ulated in different and sometimes opposed positions, developed across several 
centuries in Greek and Latin culture. The grounding tenets of Stoic physics 
have been developed by the school’s fathers, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, 
in the early stage of Stoicism.2 Stoics postulate a divine force (πῦρ τεχνικόν) 
that, reminiscent of Heraclitus’s fi re, produces, permeates and organises the 
 1 Against the use of the expression ‘middle Stoicism’, see Pohlenz (1948), p. 191, who 
prefers to speak about the hellenisation of Stoicism. 
 2 SVF I.98 (= Eus. PE XV.816 d).
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universe. God and the world are thus the only two existing realities, sharing a 
material nature, although active in the former case and passive in the latter. 
The Stoics derive the idea of a demiurgic force from Plato but, against him, 
they proclaim its immanence to the world. Stoic ontology is thus based on a 
strict monism: everything that exists is not only material,3 but is also somehow 
divine, being a part of God, organised and directed by its intelligence.4
From Empedocles and the early cosmogonies, they draw the idea of an 
endless cycle of birth and destruction.5 The cosmos’s organisation begins with 
the transformation of fi re into water, which contains seeds (σπέρματα or λόγοι 
σπερματικοί) whose nature is rational and whose function is to produce the 
four traditional elements.6 This rational principle is also a causal principle, 
universal and absolute, which has operated forever and will operate forever 
as a normative virtue. Thus, fate (εἱμαρμένη or fatum), truth (ἀλήθεια or 
ueritas) and law (νόμος or lex) are strongly intertwined and make possible the 
ontological comprehension of nature. The three principles act necessarily and 
necessarily produce the best possible outcome, indeed the only possible one.
The active principle that dynamically produces the universe is the πνεῦμα. 
It is a force that keeps together all the universe’s beings with different degrees 
of tension (τόνος) and through the continuity of matter, since Stoics, against 
the Epicureans, deny any existence to the void within the universe and imag-
ine matter as infi nitely divisible. Beings are thus diversifi ed according to the 
principle that grounds their consistency, namely λόγος for humans, ψύχή for 
animals in general, φύσις for all living beings and ἕξις for inanimate objects. 
The πνεῦμα functions as a unifying principle, according to which the common 
nature of all things is ensured in the best possible way.
It is utterly important, for the Stoics, to postulate the rational essence 
of the cosmological unifying force. Working at the same time as a causal 
principle and a normative virtue, the πνεῦμα ensures the order, constancy 
and consistency of the universe. Stoics push this concept to its extreme con-
sequences, postulating a rigid determinism which takes also the form of an 
 3 On the process whereby Stoic philosophy absorbes Plato’s cosmology, see Reydams-Schils 
(1999).
 4 SVF II.1027 (= Athenag. Leg. 6). See R. B. Todd, ‘Monism and Immanence: The 
Foundation of Stoic Physics’, in Rist (1978), pp. 137–60.
 5 A notable exception is Panaetius, who believes instead in the eternity of the cosmos and 
rules out the periodical confl agration marking the end of a cycle and the beginning of 
the following one. See [Panaetius] (1952, 2nd ed.), 69.
 6 Manil. I.149–70, gives an account of the initial process during which fi re cools down 
into water. See also Simon and Simon (1956) and Hahm (1977).
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optimistic providentialism. Their effort to mediate this grounding aspect with 
the actual confi guration of nature and the world – which the Epicureans saw 
as far from perfect – constitutes one of the most powerful explanations of 
imperfections, evil and monstrosity in classical thought. It forms the core of 
Hellenistic Judaist theodicy and part of the later Christian theodicy, rever-
berating throughout future centuries.
Nominalism
The monism and materialism of the Stoics are closely related to their con-
ceptualism or nominalism, namely their critique of ideas. Incorporeals, or 
ἀσώματα, exist for them beyond the actual material bodies. They are void, 
space and time, together with sayables and meanings. They do not exist in 
themselves, but only in our mind, and depend on our capacity of thinking. 
Not only are they the only incorporeals, but they are also the only universals. 
They are universal, one can say, because they are not real and existent in 
themselves, but rather in and through our mental capacity of thinking beyond 
individuality. In other words, because of the grounding function of material-
ity, existence is fi rst and foremost individual: materiality and individuality go 
hand in hand in the Stoic universe.7
Stoics generally employ the concept of εἶδος in the sense of σχῆμα, or 
external appearance. Ideas do not exist for themselves in the technical sense 
established by Plato. Whereas for Plato they possess the highest degree of 
reality, Zeno claims that they merely are soul’s representations, φαντάσματα, 
without an autonomous or full existence.8 Τό λεκτόν, ‘something’, is different 
from the ‘thing’: the name ‘Socrates’, for example, is different from the real 
and corporeal man named Socrates. Whereas Socrates has a full existence, 
Socrates’ name almost exists.9
According to Chrysippus, ideas depend upon and are necessarily embodied 
in individual things.10 Isnardi-Parente argues that Chrysippus’s generalisation 
of Zeno’s initial theory is aimed at obliterating the character of reality attrib-
uted to ideas not only by Plato’s transcendentalism, but also by Aristotle’s 
 7 Reale (1975–80), III, p. 336. See also ‘Nominalisme’, in Lalande and Panaccio eds (2012). 
The ἀσώματα eventually play a strategic function, beyond and sometimes against their 
Stoic meaning, in Christian literature, in which they become the incorporeality, opposed 
to the visible world, the spiritual opposed to the physical. See Lampe, ad. loc.
 8 SVF I.65 (= Stob. I.136.21).
 9 See Pohlenz (1948), p. 65.
10 SVF II.394 (= Alex.Aphr. de An.). In themselves, Chrysippus argues, ideas are not 
determinate: SVF II.278 (= Simp. in Cat.). See also the group of fragments regarding 
Chrysippus’s idea that sola corpora esse, non esse ideas, SVF II.357–68.
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hylemorphism.11 The ἀνατύπωμα, or mental image, does not have any corre-
spondence in material reality, in the same way that the λεκτά do not have any 
autonomous existence. They only connect – in thought – material objects, 
which are fully existent only in the corporeal world. This defi nition is thus 
a polemical nominalism, whose function is to attack transcendentalism and 
universalism.
The Stoics’ account of ideas and mental representations is not intended, 
however, to epitomise only their limitation, or their inferior nature vis-à-vis cor-
poreal things. Imagination and mental activity, qua activity, is also a capacity 
for reasoning; that is, for composing and decomposing concepts that can help 
formulate hypotheses, thoughts and theories if appropriately employed. This is 
when the example of monstrosity becomes useful for understanding how the 
mind works. Diogenes Laertius explains that analogy is, for Chrysippus, one 
of the possible ways of knowledge: ‘Under notions derived from analogy come 
those which we get (1) by way of enlargement, like that of Tityos or the Cyclops, 
or (2) by way of diminution, like that of the Pygmy. [. . .] Of notions obtained 
by transposition creatures with eyes on the chest would be an instance, while 
the centaur exemplifi es those reached by composition [. . .].’12 The λόγος works 
upon the physical representation, enabling the mind to imagine monsters that, 
as the Epicureans claim, do not exist.13
This activity of the mind can be seen as a potentiality because it is subject 
to rational laws that homogeneously characterise all of reality. In other words, 
imagination can be useful because it is to some extent rational, being an activity 
of the λόγος. As Sextus explains,
every thought occurs either owing to sensation or not apart from sensa-
tion, and either owing to experience or not without experience. Hence we 
shall fi nd that not even the so-called false presentations – such as those in 
dreams or madness – are detached from things known to us by experience 
through sense. And in fact when the hero in his madness imagines as his 
Furies ‘Maids shaped like dragons and all blood-besprent’, he is conceiving 
a shape compounded of things that have appeared to his senses.14
Sensation is the ground of intellection. More importantly, and because of this, 
both sensation and intellection always rely upon, and are bound to, the actual 
material reality of things. Nothing is or can be imagined that has not been 
previously experienced in one way or the other: the Centaur, which has never 
11 Isnardi-Parente (1999), pp. 67 ff. Hylemorphism is the claim that Being consists of both 
matter and form.
12 SVF II.87 (= D.L. VII.53).
13 See Pohlenz (1948), pp. 56–7.
14 SVF II.88 (= S.E. M. VIII.56). The quote is from E. Or. 256.
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been seen by anyone, can be imagined because both men and horse belong, on 
the contrary, to everyone’s common experience. Within Stoic ontology and 
psychology, thus, no monstrosity can be conceived which is absolute, in the 
sense of not being somehow anchored to an existing reality. Monstrosity, at 
least in the mental domain, is subject and subordinated to experience and, as 
such, to the material reality of things.15
Stoics, in this way, obliterate the transcendence of ideas and forms by 
substituting for it the immanent principle of λόγος. The explanation and 
conception of Becoming and multiplicity is thus obtained neither by way 
of emanation of superior ideas, nor by way of actualisation of perfect forms. 
Becoming and multiplicity in the world are the unfolding of the λόγος itself 
that immanently operates within and upon matter, like a seed in the earth. 
The idea of semina rerum is precisely what the Stoics have in mind as an active, 
dynamic and vital principle to oppose to ideas and forms.16
This dynamic principle, fi rmly rooted in the physical world and in the 
vital tension of matters, shaped and informed by the πνεῦμα, helps frame the 
relation between normality and monstrosity in an original way, especially in 
the physical and biological domain. Concrete shapes in the physical world do 
not refl ect the superior reality of ideas, nor do they actualise the perfection 
of forms into matter. They are immanently produced by life itself, vibrating 
through matter in accordance with the πνεῦμα’s tension.
The theory of seminal reasons has an important place in early Stoicism, 
and it provides an account of zoogony that is coherently opposed to Attic 
teleology and Epicurean materialism alike. The σπερματικός λόγος is identi-
fi ed with the divine principle that shapes and informs the material world in 
its actual existence.17 The material cosmos being changeable and diverse, the 
seed functions as a principle of stabilisation.18
The seminal reason is produced by the fi re in the ἐκπύρωσις, the confl a-
gration that marks the end of the old and the beginning of the new world. The 
15 See also SVF II.332 (= Sen. Ep. 58.15): ‘Certain of the Stoics regard the primary genus 
[Gummere: ‘i.e. the genus beyond “that which exists”’] as the “something”. I shall add the 
reasons they give for their belief; they say: “in the order of nature some things exist, and 
other things do not exist. And even the things that do not exist are really part of the order 
of nature. What these are will readily occur to the mind, for example centaurs, giants, 
and all other fi gments of unsound reasoning, which have begun to have a defi nite shape, 
although they have no bodily consistency”.’ This strategy will be used by Descartes to 
think about mental images of monsters. See Del Lucchese (2011). On Seneca and early 
modernity see Marzot (1944) and Chevallier, Poignault eds (1991).
16 See Reale (1975–80), III, p. 379.
17 SVF II.580 (= D.L. VII.135–7).
18 SVF II.717 (= Procl. in Prm. V).
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individual λόγοι are fragments of the single λόγος that unfolds itself to give 
life to the whole. They bear within them, thus, the rational character of the 
universe and correspond, within the material monism of the Stoic universe, to 
the Aristotelian views. If the σπερματικοì λόγοι have the same active force of 
ideas, however, they lack their strong teleological character.19
The very material nature of the seed, its relationship with the earth and 
the idea of germination are strongly reminiscent of animals being generated 
in and sprouting from the earth, as in the early zoogonies. Unlike Empedocles 
or Lucretius, though, early Stoics do not think about monstrosities as a spe-
cifi c zoogonic stage, at least in the fragments that survived.20 This is due to 
the subordination of the entire cosmic cycle, including zoogony, to the divine 
principle of fate, with its religious providential connotation.
This is particularly clear in middle Stoicism, and especially in Posidonius, 
who gives a detailed account of early cosmogony, based on the ἐκπύρωσις.21 
Posidonius is interested not only in the physical mechanism of germination of 
seeds, but also, and more importantly, in its providential unfolding, religiously 
accomplishing the rational order of the universe. Stoics, however, have differ-
ent visions on the providential nature of the universal movement. The Latin 
poet Lucan, for example, develops an opposed vision of it. The ἐκπύρωσις is 
not for him the accomplishment of the harmonic cycle of the universe. It is 
rather the movement subverting natural laws and plunging the world into the 
chaotic end of civilisation:
When the framework of the world is dissolved and the fi nal hour, closing so 
many ages, reverts to primeval chaos, then [all the constellations will clash 
in confusion,] the fi ery stars will drop into the sea, and Earth, refusing to 
spread her shores out fl at, will shake off the ocean; the moon will move 
in opposition to her brother, and claim to rule the day, disdaining to drive 
her chariot along her slanting orbit; and the whole distracted fabric of the 
shattered fi rmament will overthrow its laws [totaque discors machina diuulsi 
turbabit foedera mundi].22 
19 As explained by Aetius and Athenagoras, this is also the origin of Stoics’ pantheism. 
See SVF II.1027 (= Placit. I.7.33 and Athenag. Leg. 6). See Pohlenz (1948), pp. 78–9.
20 See for example SVF II.739 (= Origenes Cels. I.37).
21 Pohlenz (1948), pp. 219–20.
22 Lucan. I.72–83. Johnson (1987) stresses the importance of the direct attack against the 
Stoics’ idea of the harmonius and divine craft (p. 17): ‘To call any machine, particularly 
this machine, the universe, discordant is to accuse it of failing itself, of being and not 
being itself simultaneously, of betraying itself, of destroying itself. [. . .] This is not, need-
less to say, a very Stoical attitude.’ On the comparison between civil war and the fi nal 
confl agration see also Lucan. II.289–91.
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Generally, however, Stoics share a positive vision of the cosmic cycle that 
might contain anomalies, but is nonetheless providential and divine in nature. 
Within this framework, the Aristotelian idea of monstrosity as an imperfect 
actualisation of the form becomes untenable. The development of the eternal 
λόγος is by defi nition perfect, both at the global and the individual level.23 
Zeno was already able to explain apparently abnormal and anomalous phe-
nomena with very powerful intuitions. Concerning animal beings, for example, 
he claims the idea of a panspermia, i.e. the origin of the seed from the whole 
body and, beyond it, from the whole genus. Whereas the lack of resemblance 
between the child and the parents is a form of monstrosity for Aristotle, for 
early Stoics, on the contrary, it is perfectly explained by the global origin of the 
σπερματικοì λόγοι in the entire ancestry.24
It is important to stress, once again, the pre-eminence of the religious 
and providentialist argument over the mechanical explanation of matter and 
its motion. If everything is matter in the Stoic universe, including the spirit, 
everything is also divine and rationally determined. If, on the one hand, the 
Stoic conception undermines the Peripatetic explanation of monstrosity as 
a failure of the actual information of matter by the form, on the other hand 
Stoicism always places the rational action of the πνεῦμα before and above the 
mechanical arrangement of matter.
The early Christian reception of Stoicism and its reworking of the con-
cept of semina rerum is crucial here. Tertullian, for example, makes use of 
the Stoic doctrine to clarify the Christian concept of God. God is spirit or 
πνεῦμα, in the Stoic sense. He pervades the whole universe inasmuch as he 
is material and corporeal.25 This element becomes for Tertullian a powerful 
tool against Gnosticism and its condemnation of matter. Matter cannot be 
evil and monstrous precisely because it is divine, just as it was for the Stoics.26
Grant argues that the originality of the doctrine of semina and their strong 
bond with rationality is transformed by Augustine into the active and original 
23 Cic. ND II.86–7: ‘The government of the world contains nothing that could possibly be 
censured; given the existing elements, the best that could be produced from them has 
been produced. Let someone therefore prove that it could have been better. But no one 
will ever prove this, and anyone who essays to improve some detail will either make it 
worse or will be demanding an improvement impossible in the nature of things.’
24 Pohlenz (1948), p. 86.
25 See Moreschini (2004), pp. 485 ff.
26 See Tert. Adu.Marc. and Adu.Val. passim., as well as Cult.fem., in which the female toilette 
is condemned as a vain attempt to improve and embellish nature, which is already perfect 
because divine.
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action of God in nature. All events, normal and miraculous, as well as all 
beings, normal and monstrous, have their origin in the semina rerum that God 
has initially implanted in nature. The immanent nature of Stoic σπερματικοὶ 
λόγοι is thus transformed in the ordinary course of nature, created and 
directed ab aeterno by the transcendent God.27 Although the Judeo-Christian 
idea of creation is alien to Stoicism, Christianity is able to implant it on the 
philosophical ground inherited from the Greeks. For Christians like Minucius 
Felix this is the chance to rebuke all the fantasies and superstitious beliefs of 
the pagans, especially their awful monsters:
Our ancestors were so ready to believe in fi ctions, that they accepted on 
trust all kind of wild and monstrous marvels and miracles: Scylla with ser-
pent coils, a hybrid Chimaera, a Hydra replenishing its life from vivifying 
wounds, Centaurs half-horse half-man, or any other fi ction of folklore fell 
upon willing ears. Why recall old wives’ tales of human beings changed 
into birds and beasts, or into trees and fl owers? Had such things happened 
in the past, they would happen now; as they cannot happen now, they did 
not happen then.28 
Such a strong belief in the divine order of the universe takes the shape of a 
boundary against the fi ctions of ancient poetry, so as to recall the regularity 
of nature’s behaviour in a quasi-Epicurean fashion: whatever is not possible 
now has never been possible before. For Minucius, however, this is due to the 
active action of the omnipotent God.
The dialectic between laws of nature and the will of a personal God also 
characterises the philosophy of Lactantius, a Christian who was strongly infl u-
enced by Stoicism yet harshly critical of its immanentism. Lactantius believes 
fi rmly in the divine nature of the world preached by the Stoics, but this nature 
is not immanently self-generated, but rather created by a God who is and 
remains above and beyond his creation:
since the Stoics are of opinion that all the heavenly bodies are to be con-
sidered as among the number of the gods, since they all have fi xed and 
regular motions, by which they most constantly preserve the vicissitudes of 
the times which succeed them. They do not then possess voluntary motion, 
since they obey prescribed laws, and plainly not by their own sense, but by 
27 See Grant (1952), pp. 218–19.
28 Minucius Felix 20.
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the workmanship of the supreme Creator, who so ordered them that they 
should complete unerring courses and fi xed circuits, by which they might 
vary the alternations of days and nights, of summer and winter. But if men 
admire the effects of these, if they admire their courses, their brightness, 
their regularity, their beauty, they ought to have understood how much 
more beautiful, more illustrious, and more powerful than these is the maker 
and contriver Himself, even God.29 
Lactantius insists on the idea of a normative regularity of natural phenom-
ena, but he sees the danger of worshipping the creature and forgetting the 
creator, especially because the Stoic God did not create the world. Seeds of 
divinity have been sown throughout nature, but God is responsible for how 
they germinate.
The idea that providence extends to the whole of nature, but also exceeds 
its limits and our comprehension of it, is also developed by John Chrysostom. 
Notwithstanding his anti-philosophical stance, John’s Christian thought reveals 
an interesting use of Stoic (and Platonic) elements against Aristotelianism. 
Whereas Aristotle claims that providence does not extend to the sub-lunar 
realm, Chrysostom follows the Stoics and their praise of the beauty, harmony 
and order of nature as a whole. Interestingly, however, monsters reveal better 
than normal phenomena providence’s direct action in the world. Providence 
can act directly to produce phenomena like sea-monsters and reptiles that 
immediately show God’s absolute power over nature.30 When our reason is 
challenged by such phenomena, as well as by the evil and imperfection that we 
struggle to explain, it is better to withhold our judgement, recalling that we are 
merely the created facing the mysteries of creation.31
Pelagius, another theologian strongly infl uenced by Stoicism, insists instead 
on the capacity of reason to recognise the Lord and read, in his creations, the 
magnifi cent work of the creator. The beauty of the world simply demonstrates 
God, says Pelagius with a Stoic accent:
Since what is known about God. What can be known by nature about God, 
that he exists and that he is just. Is plain to them. To their consciences. For 
every creature bears witness that it [is] itself [not] God, [and] shows that it 
29 Lact. Epit. XXI (= XXVI in AA. VV. (1970), vol. VII).
30 John Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis VII.12.
31 See M. A. Schatkin, St. John Chrysostom’s Attitude toward Nature and Science, in AA. VV. 
(2007), pp. 259–69.
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was made by another, with whose will it ought to comply. [. . .] Furthermore, 
[the creatures’] changeability, which cannot belong to eternity, proves that 
they were created.32 
Although already fi ltered by many early Christian thinkers,33 this position 
clearly exploits Stoic arguments. The ordo naturae that allows humans to natu-
rally and spontaneously know God through the creation comes close to the 
concept of natural laws and legality. This has both a normative and a descrip-
tive function: humans should behave in accordance with this order, which 
describes the infi nite wisdom of the creator and the goodness of His work. 
Pelagius often employs the expression reddere rationem, which points to an 
objective reality of order and harmony in a Stoic vein, not just to an individual 
rational faculty.34
Back to pagan Stoicism, from his own horrifi ed perspective, Lucan also con-
fi rms, by opposition, the divine nature of the seminal origin of things. When 
the world is on the edge of the catastrophe, nature, ‘at variance with itself’, 
produces monsters, ‘brought forth from no seed [nullo semine]’.35 Together with 
ghosts and evil omens, physical anomalies are produced spontaneously, as if 
they were at the same time within and outside the world and its normal cycle 
of production and reproduction. Monstrosity plays here the role of a principle 
antithetic to life as it expresses the divine in the world.
Stoic nominalism has another important consequence concerning the 
knowledge of individual things. Aristotle’s metaphysics of forms explains 
monstrosity as a fault and a failing of the form’s action upon matter. The 
intelligible reality, no matter how defective its actualisation is, remains 
intact beyond its individual manifestations. This is also why a proper sci-
ence, i.e. knowledge and explanation, of individual monstrosities cannot be 
obtained and should not be the object of scientifi c research for Aristotelians. 
For Chrysippus, on the contrary, a science of individual things is not only 
32 Pelagius Exp. Rom. 1.19. See also 1.20: ‘For since the creation of the world his invisible prop-
erties, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, having been understood through the 
things that were created, so that they are without excuse. His hidden qualities are deduced 
from things that are manifest. For if he made the things which are visible so splendid that 
some considered them gods and tried to assert that they are eternal, how much the more 
were these people able to understand that the one who made these things is everlasting 
and almighty and boundless.’ See Moreschini (2013), p. 677.
33 As claimed by Matteoli (2011), pp. 29 and passim. See also Spanneut (1957), pp. 162–3.
34 See Valero (1980), pp. 103 ff.
35 Lucan. I.589.
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possible, but necessary. It is indeed the only science that one can have. By 
criticising the Aristotelian forms, Stoicism argues for a science of objects 
that were previously excluded from the domain of scientifi c explanation and 
that could only fall under sensation.36
Stoics, however, do not intend to recognise the absolute authority of sen-
sations. They know that sensations are often fallacious. For this reason, they 
must be submitted to the authority of λόγος, which is indeed held as a superior 
faculty. We have a full comprehension, Zeno claims, only when λόγος assents 
to the αἴσθησις and the representation is thus verifi ed.37 This process produces 
a cataleptic representation, in which the object is directly apprehended, seized 
and grasped by the mind, as if it was fi rmly held by one’s hand, according to the 
famous Stoic metaphor. The κατάληψις thus reintroduces a certain hierarchy 
among principles of knowledge, moving away from the Epicurean theory, which 
had also taken sensation as a starting point. Whereas for Epicurus only the regu-
larity and repetition of observations can verify the sensation, Stoics postulate 
the superiority of a rational criterion that must dominate sensation.
This opposition to the Epicurean theory reintroduces a form of transcen-
dence of rationality over material reality. Monstrosities are by defi nition the 
individual, unique and irregular manifestations of nature. Whereas nature’s 
regularity is, for Epicureans, the only acceptable and fully immanent criteria 
with which to analyse and interpret exceptions, Stoics introduce, through 
the cataleptic representation, a transcendent norm of judgement. The λόγος 
is the mental authority through which the material and actual existence of 
individual phenomena must be judged and interpreted. Properly speaking, 
Stoics recognise the existence of laws in the sense of authoritative princi-
ples that shape natural individual existences, whereas Epicureans recognise 
only generalisations, stemming from the repeated observations of regularities. 
Stoics mistrust these generalisations, because they see in them the claim of 
philosophy to build universal descriptions, while for them only individual 
phenomena have a real existence.
The presence of transcendence in the Stoic criterion is particularly recog-
nisable in later Christian sources, directly infl uenced by Stoicism. The indi-
vidual, unique and irregular phenomena, in this milieu, become God’s direct 
intervention in nature or, in other words, the miracle. The individual, irregu-
lar and monstrous phenomenon was undermined by the Epicurean theory 
of knowledge, with the aim of defusing superstitious beliefs. Stoics, on the 
36 Isnardi-Parente (1999). See also Sedley (1982) on the specifi c problem of individual 
identity.
37 SVF I.60 (= Cic. Acad. I.41).
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contrary, acknowledge the full reality of individual phenomena, no matter 
how irregular they are, since regularity is only the vain philosophical attempt 
to build universals. Christians will appropriate this idea and build on it a 
theological critique of philosophy, according to which natural laws are only 
unjustifi ed generalisations. To these generalisations, Christians respond with 
the faith in God’s power of performing miracles, producing monsters and, 
more in general, establishing or demolishing regularities at his own wish.38
Individual, anomalous and monstrous things must be recognised as God’s 
intervention, outside and against any possible generalisation or universalisa-
tion. Stoic nominalism thus becomes the ground for the religious belief in 
individual and exceptional events, beyond and against the attempt to ration-
alise nature through the recognition of regularities and repetitions.39 The evo-
lution of this reasoning opens up to the problem of beauty and goodness in the 
universe, coupled with the question of evil. Stoicism, once again, has much to 
offer on this ground.
Good and Evil, Beauty and Ugliness
A group of fragments informs us about Chrysippus’s belief that everything 
beautiful (καλός) is also good (ἀγαθός), and everything ugly (αἰσχρός) is also 
bad (κακός).40 The link between καλός and ἀγαθός is already established by 
38 There is a complex discussion in scholarship regarding the relationship between 
Stoicism and Christianity. This is connected to the debate about the Semitic origin of 
Stoicism, already underlined by Nietzsche in ‘Nachgelassene Fragmente. Herbst 1887 
bis März 1888’, in Nietzsche (1970), VIII.2, p. 356 and developed by Pohlenz, whose 
entire reading is grounded on the Semitic character of Stoic philosophy. The thesis of 
the Semitic origin of Stoicism has a specifi c source in the German intellectual milieu of 
the 1930s and is worth mentioning here more for its relevance to understanding intellec-
tual and academic life under the Nazi regime than for its historiographical strength. See 
Canfora (1979 and 1980) as well as Bossina (2012). Pohlenz also insists on the unfi llable 
gap between the Stoics’ interest in nature and its laws on the one hand, and the Chris-
tian doctrine of the creation on the other hand. See Pohlenz (1948), p. 401. Through 
the Hellenisierungsprozeß, Pohlenz argues, the Christian absorption of Stoic philosophy 
becomes possible only by rejecting the core ideas of the system. See Pohlenz (1948), 
p. 418 and p. 423. Reacting to Bonhöffer’s thesis (1911), according to which Stoicism 
prepares the way for Christianity, Duncan (1952) also claims their incompatibility, 
because of the opposition between monism and dualism. More wisely, I believe, Span-
neut (1957 and 1970) underlines the Stoic reminiscences in the Christianised concept 
of natural and divine normativity in the Church’s fathers. See also Campenhausen 
(1955 and 1960) and, more recently, Moreschini (2004 and 2013).
39 Grant (1952), pp. 194–5.
40 SVF III.16 (= Stob. II.77.16) and SVF III.29–37.
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Plato and is a widespread topos in Greek classical culture. Stoicism, however, 
puts a stronger emphasis on the correspondence between beauty and good-
ness, expanding the idea and assigning an ontological and epistemological 
meaning to the aesthetic and ethical concept, through the pervasive action 
of reason (λόγος) that informs the whole universe at every level and in every 
manifestation.
This vision of the universe has a strong religious fl avour. The divine per-
meates the whole world, establishing the uncreated and absolute charac-
ter of its goodness, which is thus fully natural. A life according to nature, 
κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, is human’s end according to the Stoics. Through this idea, 
Stoicism develops several elements already present in Attic philosophy,41 and 
opposed to the Epicureans’ philosophy, which claims on the contrary the 
unkind character of nature.42 God’s nature, and thus nature as a whole, is 
absolutely good. Humans as well as animals are attracted by goodness and 
beauty,43 and by following them, they accomplish their nature according to 
the highest principle of reason and virtue.44 Humans can of course deviate 
from such natural virtue, and opt for vice instead. Yet this leaves untouched 
and uncorrupted, for Stoics, the nature of beauty and goodness, which is 
absolute in itself. As Marcus Aurelius puts it:
Everything in any way lovely is lovely of itself and terminates in itself, 
holding praise to be no part of itself. At all events, in no case does what 
is praised become better or worse. This I say also of what is commonly 
called lovely, for instance materials or works of art; and indeed what is 
there lacking at all to that which is really lovely? no more than to law, 
no more than to truth, no more than to kindness or reverence of self. 
Which of these is lovely because it is praised or corrupted because it is 
blamed? does an emerald become worse than it was, if it be not praised? 
and what of gold, ivory, purple, a lute, a sword-blade, a fl ower-bud, a 
little plant?45 
41 In particular, the notions of οἰκείωσις, close to that of self-conservation, and ζῆν 
ὁμολογουμένως, or adaptation to nature. See Spanneut (1970). See also Chroust (1963), 
p. 285: ‘The Greek term which expresses most closely this “according to nature” is the 
word οἰκείωσις – a term which also denotes “the taking as one’s own”, “appropriation”, 
or “adaptation”. It was liberally used by the Early Stoics, who made it a key term in their 
philosophy.’ See also Wiersma (1937).
42 See for example Lucr. V.222–34 and supra.
43 SVF III.38 (= S.E. M. XI.99).
44 SVF III.76 (= D.L. VII.94).
45 M.Ant. IV.20 (= Farquharson I, pp. 58–9).
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Both from the global and the individual point of view, the perfect good con-
sists in a balanced life according to the harmony requested by nature, namely 
consistent with its order.46
Whereas it is true that life in harmony with nature and, more in general, 
the absolute nature of goodness are not specifi c to Stoicism, Stoic philoso-
phers develop this idea in a highly original manner. Stoics boldly depart from 
the Platonic origin of this idea, following a radical monism. Against any ide-
alisation of goodness, Stoics postulate its material nature. An idea of goodness 
does not exist, because ideas are not superior entities, and thus goodness itself 
unfolds, and can be pursued, within the only existing natural dimension, that 
of materiality.
The good, Seneca claims, produces effects. It produces happiness in the 
mind and in the body alike. But everything that moves things in a similar fash-
ion must be of the same nature, namely corporeal. Bodies only, in the Stoic 
universe, can act, and thus, strikingly, Stoics do not hesitate to postulate the 
material and corporeal nature of goodness: ‘the good is active: for it is benefi -
cial; and what is active is corporeal. The good stimulates the mind and, in a 
way, moulds and embraces that which is essential to the body. The goods of 
the soul. For the soul, too, is corporeal. Ergo, man’s good must be corporeal, 
since man himself is corporeal.’47
The immanence of goodness in materiality is a strong and bold stance for 
Stoics. It is also what opens up several problems and renders them vulnerable 
to criticism. First of all, if everything is matter, including goodness and divin-
ity, then the origin of evil, imperfection, anomalies and monstrosities must 
be explained referring to one and the same causal principle. Both Plato and 
Aristotle, although in different ways, had made use of matter’s inferiority as an 
adjuvant cause of the imperfection of the world. Matter, however, is conceived 
by Stoics both as the divine principle and the world. Where does imperfection 
46 SVF III.83 (= D.L. VII.100) and SVF III.13 (= Cic. Fin. IV.14). Cleanthes speaks about 
the harmonic movement of the universe: SVF I.502–3 (= Clem.Al. Strom. V.8.48 and 
Corn. Theologiae Graecae Compendium ND 32). See also Manil. I.247–54: ‘This fabric 
which forms the body of the boundless universe, together with its members composed 
of nature’s diverse elements, air and fi re, earth and level sea, is ruled by the force of a 
divine spirit; by sacred dispensation the deity brings harmony and governs with hidden 
purpose, arranging mutual bonds [foedera] between all parts, so that each may furnish 
and receive another’s strength and that the whole may stand fast in kinship despite its 
variety of forms.’ On the concept of harmony, see W. Hirschmann, Harmonie, in HRW, 
III, pp. 1297–1304, and Spitzer (1963), who, however, does not address the Stoic con-
cept at length. See also Spanneut (1970), p. 166 and M.-A. Zagdoun, L’harmonie chez les 
stoïciens, in Caye et al. a cura di (2011).
47 SVF III.84 (= Sen. Ep. 106.2).
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come from? Stoics walk on a narrow path when they try to keep together the 
material nature of God and the material origin of imperfections.48
The Stoics’ treatment of this issue shows a strong ambivalence. Pohlenz 
underlines that the debasement of matter constitutes a Platonic and Aristo-
telian element carried forward by Stoicism.49 At the same time, as Pohlenz 
himself recognises, this idea was developed with more and more emphasis 
during the imperial period in the Academic and Peripatetic culture, against 
Stoicism and, more specifi cally, against Poseidonius’s immanentism, for exam-
ple in the theological cosmology of the pseudo-Aristotelian Περὶ κόσμου, 
whose author claims God’s transcendence and the unworthiness of lower and 
imperfect things to be inhabited by the divine principle.50
Early Stoicism makes clear that, although the universe’s nature is exclusively 
material, a distinction can be made between an active and a passive principle. 
As Diogenes Laertius explains, ‘[Stoics] hold that there are two principles in the 
universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a 
substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent 
in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artifi cer of each 
several things throughout the whole extent of matter.’51
The πῦρ τεχνικόν, or creative fi re, is an active principle that shapes passive 
matter. Although it is material itself – the Stoic prerequisite to be a cause52 – fi re 
acts upon something which is indifferently intended as an underlying layer without 
quality and inert (ἅποιος), pure matter (ὕλη) and a substratum (ὑποκείμενον).53 
Although this theory reproduces the Aristotelian distinction between matter 
and form,54 it also develops the Peripatetic principle in a wholly new direction, 
48 As Plutarch, SVF II.1168 (= Plu. Moralia, De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos 34. 
1076 C) argues, ‘[. . .] while they [scil. the Stoics] are cross with Menander for his the-
atrical pronouncement ‘Of human ills the chiefest origin/Is things exceeding good’ – for 
this, they say, is at odds with the common conception – yet they do themselves make 
god, though good, the origin of things evil. For matter has not of itself brought forth 
what is evil, for matter is without quality and all the variations that it takes on it has got 
from that which moves and fashions it. That which moves and fashions it, however, is 
the reason existing in it [i.e. the immanent reason, λόγος ἐνυπάρχων], since its nature 
is not to move or fashion itself.’ On Plutarch and Stoicism see Babut (1969), Hershbell 
(1992). See also SVF II.1136 (= Gal. UP V.4). On Galen’s attitude, strongly infl uenced 
by the Stoics, see infra.
49 Pohlenz (1948), p. 100
50 See Pohlenz II.175, G. Reale, A. P. Bos, Monografi a introduttiva, in Reale, Bos (1995, 2a 
ed.), pp. 23–171, and Festugière (1949–54), II.460–518, who underlines the ambivalent 
relationship of the text with the Stoic doctrines.
51 SVF I.85 (= D.L. VII.134). See also Posidon. 5 and 100.
52 See again Ar. Did. (= Stob. I.13.1) and Duhot (1989).
53 See Isnardi-Parente (1999), p. 21.
54 Pohlenz (1948), p. 67.
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whereby the dialectic between active and passive takes place entirely within the 
material element itself.
The fi rst consequence is that the Stoic body is the conjunction of matter 
and quality: without the latter, the former would only be a dead ὕλη.55 The 
second consequence is that the aggregate of matter and quality should be 
conceived as a dynamic being, always in motion. It is an aggregate moved 
by a particular kind of motion, originally conceived, once again, against the 
Aristotelian idea of a movement of actualisation of the form as well as the 
uncaused random movement of Epicureans.
Stoics place a tensional movement (τονικὴ κίνησις), caused by the πνεῦμα, 
within matter itself. Following Sambursky, Rist underlines that Stoics use the 
verb διήκω, ‘pervade’, implying ‘vibration, such as is produced by the twang-
ing of a taut string’ and specifi cally distinguished, e.g. by Philo, from move-
ment from one place to another.56 As Galen reports, it has to be intended as a 
‘ “simultaneous movement in opposite directions”, or as neither inwards alone 
nor outwards alone, but as a continual variation between the two, or as con-
tinually backwards and forwards’.57
Pohlenz suggests that the tensional motion gives coherence and cohesion to 
the cosmos, and makes it an artwork of perfect beauty.58 Clearly, the κίνεσις that 
the Stoics have in mind is opposed to the uncaused or spontaneous movement 
of Epicureans. Produced by the πνεῦμα, the tensional movement brings with 
it the spirit’s rationality and reveals the design on which every individual thing 
depends. In this sense, the τονικὴ κίνεσις is the antidote to the παρέγκλισις.59
Now, if one thinks about the Aristotelian notion of monstrosity as the 
failure of the informative movement, one can legitimately wonder whether 
the Stoic notion of monstrosity can be seen as a failure of, and within, the ten-
sional movement with which the active πνεῦμα pervades and informs the pas-
sive matter. Several indications suggest this conclusion. In the physical world 
in the fi rst place: without the πνεῦμα, the passive element would disintegrate, 
because it lacks the cohesive force (συνεκτικὴ δύναμις) that keeps things 
together.60 Within human himself: the πνεῦμα’s tone falls (καταπίπτω) when 
one has a passion, thus disintegrating, in some way, the spirit’s consistency.61
55 Pohlenz correctly argues that this position is developed by Neoplatonism. See Pohlenz 
(1948), p. 66, and Reale (1975–80), III, p. 355. This does not imply, however, that mat-
ter does not have a proper existence in itself, as Weil (1970) argues.
56 Rist (1969), p. 86.
57 Rist (1969), p. 86, and SVF II.446 (= Gal. De tremore, palpitatione, convulsione, VI).
58 Pohlenz (1948), p. 76: ‘ein Kunstwerk von vollkommener Schönheit’.
59 Sambursky (1959), p. 57.
60 Sambursky (1959), p. 31.
61 SVF II.877 (= Gal. De locis affectis IV.3).
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Sambursky argues that the tone recalls Empedocles’ forces acting in the 
universe. One could also wonder whether it is reminiscent of the Empedoclean 
confl ictual nature of these forces and, as a consequence, of monstrosity as a 
result of the long and complex process of their stabilisation, slowly taking the 
appearance of what can eventually be observed and recognised as the currently 
normal structure of the universe. Does the Stoic tensional motion imply mon-
strosity as one of the possible outcomes of material vibration?
In Stoic literature, the strongest demotion of matter appears perhaps in 
Epictetus, whose tone is reminiscent of the Platonic hierarchies, and antici-
pates the Neoplatonist and Christian ontological grading. The body is, for 
Epictetus, frail: no more than earth, mud (πηλός) and almost a corpse: ‘This 
body is not thine own, but only clay cunningly compounded.’62 This principle 
is fundamentally important to him, in order to establish a solid ground for the 
freedom of moral choice: whereas the body can be impeded, the moral choice 
is free and in our power.63
No wonder, thus, that late Stoicism tends to emphasise the contrast, rather 
than the cooperation, between the active and the passive principles. Matter 
steadily becomes an element that resists God’s formative action. Seneca is 
confi dent in answering what appears already an inconvenient question:
How powerful is God? Does he form matter for himself or does he merely 
make use of what is already there? Which comes fi rst: Does function deter-
mine matter, or does matter determine function? Does God do whatever 
he wishes? Or in many cases do the things he treats fail him just as many 
things are poorly shaped by a great artist not because his art fails him but 
because the material in which he works often resists his art?64 
The response is explicitly directed against the Epicurean theory of chance. 
Stoics intend not only to explain nature according to a divine principle, but 
also to justify this principle for everything that happens in the universe. The 
core of Christian theodicy lies in the Stoic religious attitude toward evil and 
62 Arr. Epict. I.1.11. See also III.22.41: ‘how can that which is naturally lifeless, earth, or 
clay, be great or precious?’
63 Epict. Ench. 9. Materialism is the main obstacle to a Christian reception of Stoicism. 
Epictetus’s attitude is the most important point that makes possible this reception, over-
coming the ‘scandal’ represented by Stoics’ materialism in the eyes of Christian thinkers. 
See for example Clem.Al. Prot. V.58P: ‘the Stoics [. . .] say that the divine nature perme-
ates all matter, even in its lowest forms; these men simply cover philosophy with shame’. 
See Pohlenz (1948), p. 409.
64 Sen. Nat. I praef. 15. See also Ep. 58.27: matter prevents god from creating everything 
immortal, and to overcome the body’s imperfections.
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good as a result of the dialectic between the active and the passive principles 
in the universe. Marcus Aurelius makes it clear that
the nature of the Whole would not have winked at [ill] things either out 
of ignorance or because (though it knew of them) it had not the power or 
skill, as to permit good and ill to befall indifferently, both good and bad 
men equally. Now death, and life, good report and evil report, pain and 
pleasure, wealth and poverty, these all befall men, good and bad alike, 
equally, and are themselves neither right nor wrong: they are therefore 
neither good nor ill.65 
One the one hand, thus, we have the demotion of passive matter vis-à-vis 
the active divine principle. Evil and imperfection lie in matter’s resistance to 
the πνεῦμα’s action. On the other hand, we have the idea that matter and 
spirit, the passive and the active principles, are harmoniously integrated, and 
fi nd their place, in the same universe, whose nature is accomplished and in 
which good and evil are in fact only names for things and events that refl ect 
the same perfect nature. The inconsistency is only apparent. It is rather an 
ambivalence, depending on the immanence of goodness within materiality 
itself. This is why Christian thinkers, although ruling out the unacceptable 
materiality of the divine principle,66 understand that Stoic philosophy offers 
a powerful tool for theodicy. This tool is a strong explanation of imperfection 
and monstrosities within the universe, whose providentially organised nature 
must be recognised beyond its only apparent imperfection.67
Tertullian is among the fi rst Christian thinkers to recognise the paramount 
importance of the problem of natural evil. The mistake, he claims, is to assign 
a benevolent or malevolent character to nature. In fact, for God, nature is 
only a tool used to reward or punish human actions. Even the intervention 
of Satan has been explicitly allowed by God, and devils only operate through 
God’s permission. Their monstrous nature emerges from their origin, as 
Tertullian explains: ‘certain angels corrupted themselves and [. . .] from them 
was produced a brood of demons yet more corrupt, condemned by God with 
the authors of their race and that prince whom we have named’.68 The devils 
65 M.Ant. II.11. See Farquharson in Marcus Aurelius (1944), II, pp. 520–1.
66 See for example Tatian and Clement Alexandrinus, SVF I.159. A notable exception, as 
we have seen above, is Tertullian.
67 See for example M.Ant. IV.29 and Farquharson in Marcus Aurelius (1944), II, pp. 319, 
as well as M.Ant. VIII.49–50 and Farquharson in Marcus Aurelius (1944), II, pp. 374. 
See also Pohlenz (1948), p. 348.
68 Tert. Apol. XII.
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are a veritable monstrous race: they are the descendants of angels who were 
attracted to women and revolted against God to satisfy their lust.69 The result 
of these unnatural unions is a race whose function is to pervert and corrupt 
humanity.70 They pass on to humans knowledge that makes them fall and 
condemns them to perdition. Satan’s technique is precisely to use the beauty 
and attractiveness of creation to accomplish his purposes: beauty may have a 
monstrous use, just as monstrosity and evil, intended as a divine punishment, 
perform a function within God’s plan.71
Lactantius also stresses the powerful malignant nature of the feminine in 
corrupting angels and transforming them into demons.72 Lactantius develops 
his theodicy – which eventually has a dramatic impact on philosophy – in line 
with the philosophical ground offered by Stoicism, showing how good and 
evil, merit and vice, in the hands of God, always work together:
I ask whether virtue is a good or an evil. It cannot be denied that it is a 
good. If virtue is a good, vice, on the contrary, is an evil. If vice is an evil 
on this account, because it opposes virtue, and virtue is on this account a 
good, because it overthrows vice, it follows that virtue cannot exist with-
out vice; and if you take away vice, the merits of virtue will be taken away. 
For there can be no victory without an enemy. Thus it comes to pass, that 
good cannot exist without an evil. Chrysippus, a man of active mind, saw 
this when discussing the subject of providence, and charges those with 
folly who think that good is caused by God, but say that evil is not thus 
caused. [. . .] good and evil are so connected with one another, that the 
one cannot exist without the other.73 
We know how bitter Lactantius can be against the Stoics. His approval of 
Chrysippus’s ethics is thus even more signifi cant, revealing how crucial Stoic 
inclusive ethics and the Stoic theory of the good use of evil are for early 
69 See e.g. Tert. De virginibus velandi, I.12.
70 For this whole argument, see Zimmerman (1984), pp. 289 ff.
71 See Tert. Apol. XII–XXIV. Evil also performs a plan according to Minucius, yet not as a 
punishment but rather as a test and a training through discipline. See Minucius Felix 36: 
‘For fortitude is braced by weaknesses, and calamity is frequently the school of virtue; 
strength, both of mind and body, grows slack without hard training. [. . .] in adversities 
[God] tries and tests us every one; weighs each man’s disposition in the scales of peril; 
proves man’s will even to the last extreme of death, with the assurance that in his sight 
nothing can perish. As gold is tried by fi re so are we by ordeals.’
72 Lact. Epit. XXII.10–2.
73 Lact. Epit. XXIV.2–10 (= XXIX in AA. VV. (1970), vol. VII).
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Christian thinkers.74 Evil and vice are necessary, both to know good and 
virtue and to allow God’s plan to unfold as He has ordered.
The powerful ambivalence of Stoic philosophy also appears in another 
important domain, namely the origin of human evil and imperfection, when 
humans do not follow their own nature and choose vice instead of virtue. 
Stoicism is adamant in claiming that evil comes upon humans from outside 
and does not belong to their nature. Rational souls have not been made 
evil by nature. They rather become evil because of a wrong education, or 
because they are diverted from virtue, or because they are confused to the 
point that vice becomes for them a second nature.75 There is also a dif-
ferent perspective, though, within the Stoic movement itself, developed in 
particular by Posidonius, one that excludes the original purity and goodness 
of human souls. The ambivalence and ambiguity lie in human nature itself, 
which participates in both good and evil:
Posidonius doesn’t think [. . .] that vice [evil: κακία] comes in afterwards 
to human beings from outside, without a root of its own in our minds, 
starting from which it sprouts and grows big, but the very opposite. Yes, 
there is a seed even of evil in our own selves; and we all need not so much 
to avoid the wicked as to pursue those who will prune away and prevent 
the growth of our evil. For it is not the case, as the Stoics say, that the 
whole source of evil comes into our minds from outside us; no, in wicked 
men the greater part of it is internal, and only a very minor infl uence has 
an external source.76 
Posidonius is consciously countering Chrysippus’s orthodoxy on this point, 
opening up to the idea of a duality of forces, rational and irrational, both 
operating within us.77 This is a crucial point for Stoics’ anthropology and, 
more widely, for their very conception of good and evil. Challenged by this 
contention, Christian anthropology eventually develops in a different and 
opposed direction, either stressing the Platonic transcendence of good vis-
à-vis evil, including the goodness of humans, created in the image of God, 
74 See also Lact. De opifi cio Dei IV.1 on the meaning and reason of fragility and why God 
has given it to humans. See also De ira dei V.8 on the necessary coexistence of love and 
hate, XIII.23–4 on the necessity of evil, XV.3 on the necessary existence of things in the 
opposite, and XX.1 ff. on why evil strikes good people.
75 SVF III.233 (= Origenes Cels. III.69).
76 Posidon. 35 C (= Gal. De Sequela 819–20).
77 Rist (1969), p. 213.
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or underlining the immanence and thus the misery of humans, sinners for-
ever lost without God’s help. Whereas the former attitude tends to isolate 
the perfection of humans vis-à-vis the monstrosity of original sin, the latter 
approach brings the monster within human nature itself.78
No surprise, thus, that the monster-within powerfully and ominously sur-
faces from the dark landscapes of Lucan’s Pharsalia. Nature as a whole, in 
Lucan’s view, shows its horrible face, especially in his Africa, ‘a region so fer-
tile of monsters’.79 A region, though, that is not to blame for what it is, since 
the Romans are the ‘trespassers in a land of serpents’ and somehow deserve 
the misery that they suffer. Africa’s human inhabitants, on the contrary, are 
far from monstrous. Hardened by the harshness of the land and physically 
accustomed to its monstrosity, they even feel pity for the Romans’ misery, and 
promptly provide relief to them.80
Not all the natives are kind and humane, though. In book VI Lucan gives 
one of the most astonishing portraits of monstrosity in classical literature, that 
of the Thessalian witch Erichto. Visited at night by Sextus Pompeius, younger 
son of Gnaeus Pompeius, Erichto performs her sacrilegious rite, waking up the 
corpse of a dead soldier and making him speak the future with hell’s voice. 
Erichto embodies the obscure force that haunts Roman mentality in an age of 
awful and crucial transformation. Erichto’s monstrosity plays a strategic func-
tion in the poem, and reveals aspects of the Stoic mentality – and its crisis – in 
Lucan’s age. The witch is as powerful as she is hideous and frightful. She chal-
lenges the infernal power that hesitates one moment to respond to her call. 
‘Paretis?’ (‘Do ye obey?’) is her war cry, daring to threaten hell’s power itself with 
an even higher and more monstrous force.81 Erichto is not only the expression 
of chaotic disorder. She is the messenger of a monstrous counter-order that rises 
and opposes itself to the benign normality in which men delusionally believe.82
78 Origen’s, Basilius’s and Ambrogius’s anthropological thought are consistent with this 
version of Stoicism. See Pohlenz (1948), pp. 424 ff.
79 Lucan. IX.700 ff.
80 Lucan. IX.893–9. See Aumont (1968). On Africa’s snakes see also Solin. 27.28 ff.
81 Lucan. VI.744–9.
82 Johnson (1987), p. 19. H. Le Bonniec, ‘Lucain et la religion’, in Durry éd. (1970), 
pp. 159–200 and passim, argues that Lucan himself speaks with Erichto’s voice, but that 
the poet is only doubting because of tragic events, and has not lost his faith in the cosmic 
and human order. One can hardly recognise, however, the same order that Panaetius or 
Posidonius praise. Şerban (1973), p. 32 and passim, compares Lucan’s anti-classicism 
to Romanticism, and contrasts it with Virgil’s use of imaginary. The encounter with 
Erichto has traditionally been associated with, and opposed to, Aeneas’s descent into 
Hades. Şerban interestingly remarks, however, that while Virgil’s hero travels to the 
underworld, it is the hell itself that, in Lucan, comes to the surface.
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Because of the absolute and fully natural character of goodness and beauty, 
Stoics postulate that ugliness and imperfection are, as a consequence, rela-
tive and derivative. This means that physical and moral ugliness, as well as 
monstrosity, are conceived as the privation and diminution of the perfection 
of goodness and beauty. It also means that their character is relative within the 
world itself. The consequence is a signifi cant degree of relativism and open-
ness in the judgement and treatment of alterity. In his Discourses III.I.1–9 
Epitectus develops very clearly the idea of relativity:
Tell me if you do not think that some dogs are beautiful, and some horses, 
and so every other creature. [. . .] Is not the same true also of men, some 
of them are handsome, and some ugly? [. . .] Do we, then, on the same 
ground pronounce each of these creatures in its own kind beautiful, or do 
we pronounce each beautiful on special grounds? [. . .] Since we see that a 
dog is born to do one thing, and a horse another, [. . .] in general it would 
not be unreasonable for one to declare that each of them was beautiful 
precisely when it achieved supreme excellence in terms of its own nature; 
and, since each has a different nature, each one of them, I think, is beauti-
ful in a different fashion.83
Beauty and ugliness are relative and make sense only within a specifi c genus, 
that of the dog for dogs, that of the horse for horses. Within it, however, the 
criterion of excellence becomes absolute, and humans themselves must pursue 
their own virtue to the highest degree to be καλός. Every compromise makes 
them αἰσχρός or turpis. III.1 is also the only dissertation in which Epictetus 
makes use of the term τέρας, otherwise very rare in the Stoic vocabulary 
overall. Monstrous is, for Epictetus, the appearance of those whose nature or 
behaviour make them different precisely from the genus to which they belong: 
if a woman has hairs or a man depilates, they become monstrous and, to some 
extent, they make themselves monsters.
Monstrosity’s relativism and imperfection helps the Stoics to build the 
idea of hierarchy within nature and, in particular, human nature. Nature’s 
diversity stems from matter. It is a sign of richness, Manilius explains, and yet 
nature’s different manifestations can be ordered according to degrees of per-
fection. Within human races, for example, ‘nations are fashioned with their 
own particular complexions; and each stamp with a character of its own the 
like nature and anatomy of the human body which all share’. Whereas the 
Romans have ‘the features of Mars, and Venus’, and thus ‘well-proportioned 
83 Arr. Epict. III.1.1–9.
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limbs’, the Ethiopians, Manilius adds, ‘stain the world and depict a race of 
men steeped in darkness’.84
Stoics largely and generally prefer the term διάστροφος, deformis, to the 
monstrous (τεράστιος or τερατόμορφος), but also to the διάστροφος, pravus, 
twisted or distorted.85 The choice of language is utterly important. Monteil 
explains that whereas the αισχρότης (deformitas) only implies the shape’s 
alteration, without any presupposition of an ideal prototype, the διαστροφή 
(pravitas), on the contrary, involves a judgement of blame related to the 
violation of a norm. Whereas the αἰσχρός, preferred by Stoics, is absence 
of a form, the διάστροφος, signifi catively absent in Stoicism, refers to the 
abuse and violation of a pre-existing form.86 Although the meaning varies, 
of course, depending on the cultural milieu and the epoch, this conclusion 
is consistent within the general framework of Stoicism. Lucan’s vision of the 
world, as expected, plays the role of an exception. Lucan does not make a 
large use of informis, deformis and prauus. The monstrosity of the civil war 
and, as a consequence, of men’s condition becomes evident through the fre-
quent use of uultus and foedus, underlining respectively the idea of monstrous 
mutilation, sickness, indecency and dirtiness, as well as that of pestilential 
morality, pathologically altered physicality, exceptionality and sacrilegious 
debauchery.87
As a result, Stoics imagine that every single individual, animate and 
inanimate, has its own place in the universe. The universe can be ordered 
according to a hierarchy, but this necessarily includes, as one of its own 
parts, every single thing, no matter its degree of perfection or rationality. 
For Posidonius, this sensibility becomes intellectual curiosity with regard to 
anomalous, borderline and monstrous phenomena, within which the inves-
tigator of nature must recognise the same universal concept of life.88 Even 
what is αἰσχρός and deformis, thus, has a place and a function to perform 
within nature. The order of nature and the place that things have in it is 
clear. When it is not clear, it will become so in due time. History shows, in 
fact, that utility and necessity have helped humans discover many things 
previously unknown, as Lactantius explains.89
84 Manil. IV.715 ff. On Manilius’s Stoicism see Salemme (1983), Abry (1983), Colish 
(1985) and R. Radice, M. Manilio, L’astronomia, in Radice (1998), pp. 1–687, especially 
the rich introductory essay and commentary. On the Ethiopians see infra.
85 See Radice et al. a cura di (2007).
86 Monteil (1964), p. 258 and passim.
87 See Wacht (1992), ad. loc. and Monteil (1964).
88 See Pohlenz (1948), p. 224.
89 SVF II.1172 (= Lact. De ira dei XIII). 
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The Stoics try to give a solid theological and philosophical foundation 
to the explanation of imperfection, evil and thus monstrosity in the world. 
The theological argument is rooted in Heraclitus’s logic of the necessary 
coexistence of contraries and is strongly defended by Chrysippus in his Περὶ 
προνοίας:
There is absolutely nothing more foolish than those men who think that 
good could exist, if there were at the same time no evil. For since good is 
the opposite of evil, it necessarily follows that both must exist in opposi-
tion to each other, supported as it were by mutual adverse forces: since as a 
matter of fact no opposite is conceivable without something to oppose it.90 
Evil is necessary, not only to the comprehension, but also to the existence of 
good. They exist only together, and almost support each other.91 Pohlenz con-
nects this passage to Pl. Phd. 60 b–c, but Chrysippus also has in mind the Pla-
tonic theory of natural catastrophes.92 The philosophical argument developed 
by Chrysippus is rooted in nature’s unity and universal identity, within which 
change and mutation must necessarily happen:
For even if the nature of the universe is one and the same, the origin of evils is 
not by any means always the same. Although the nature of some particular 
individual man is one and the same, things are not always the same where 
his mind, his reason, and actions are concerned. [. . .] also even more may 
this be said of the universe, that, even if it remains one and the same 
generically, yet the events which happen to the universe are not always 
the same nor of the same kind. For there are not periods of productivity 
or of famine all the time, nor always of heavy rain or drought. In this way 
neither are there determined periods of fertility or famine in the life of 
good souls; and the fl ood of bad souls increases or decreases. In fact, for 
those who want to have the most accurate knowledge of everything that 
they can, it is an unavoidable doctrine that evils do not always remain the 
same in number on account of the providence which either watches over 
earthly affairs or cleanses them by fl oods and confl agrations, and probably 
not only earthly things but also those of the whole universe which is in 
need of purifi cation whenever the evil in it becomes extensive.93 
90 SVF II.1169 (= Gell. VII.1.2–4).
91 Pohlenz (1948), pp. 99–100. 
92 Pl. Criti. 109 d, Ti. 22 b–25 d, Lg. 677 b ff. See supra. This theory was much older. Already 
presented by Xenophanes, Vorsokr. 21 A 33 (= LM [8] XEN. P7, D22, R20 = Hippol. 
Haer. I.14), it was also developed by Aristotle. See also Bollack (1971).
93 SVF II.1174 (= Origenes Cels. IV.64).
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It is the whole, thus, that must be considered, and not only the single parts 
of the universe or the single events of a causal chain, historically develop-
ing according to the world’s destiny and rationality. The pre-eminence of the 
whole over its parts is one of the most important arguments presented by 
Stoics to undermine the critique of nature as imperfect and disordered. It is 
also a pivotal argument for the reading of monstrosities within it. As Balbus 
explains:
As in vines or in cattle we see that, unless obstructed by some force, nature 
progresses on a certain path of her own to her goal of full development, 
and as in painting, architecture and the other arts and crafts there is an 
ideal of perfect workmanship, even so and far more in the world of nature 
as a whole there must be a process towards completeness and perfection. 
The various limited modes of being may encounter many external obsta-
cles to hinder their perfect realisation, but there can be nothing that can 
frustrate nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains within herself 
all modes of being.94 
Different degrees of perfection establish differences among things and events.95 
As the Attic philosophy teaches, the heavenly region is indeed more perfect 
than the earthly one.96 Observing the latter, thus, one might be induced to 
even doubt about the presence of a divine intelligence guiding the whole uni-
verse.97 Yet the whole is precisely what wipes away any doubt, if one learns to 
look at it. On a global scale everything, including monstrosity and evil, has its 
own utility in this ontology:
Vice is peculiarly distinguished from dreadful accidents, for even taken in 
itself it does in a sense come about in accordance with the reason of nature 
94 Cic. ND II.35. On Cicero’s exposition of Stoic physics through Balbus see Festugière 
(1949–54), II, pp. 375–425, Dragona-Monachou (1976), Lévy (1992), and B. Besnier, ‘La 
nature dans le livre II du De natura deorum de Cicéron’, in Lévy éd. (1996), pp. 127–75.
95 Posidon. 21, explains that ‘the universe is governed according to intelligence and 
providence, as Chrysippus says in Bk V of On Providence, and Posidonius in Bk III of 
On Gods, since intelligence pervades every part of it as soul pervades us; but actually 
through some parts it is more, through some less. For through some parts it has come 
in cohesion, as through bones and sinews; through others as intelligence, as through 
governing principle.’
96 Cic. ND II.56: ‘In the heavens therefore there is nothing of chance or hazard, no error, no 
frustration, but absolute order, accuracy, calculation, and regularity. Whatever lacks these 
qualities, whatever is false and spurious and full of error, belongs to the region between the 
earth and the moon (the last of all heavenly bodies), and to the surface of the earth.’
97 SVF II.1185 (= Origenes Princip. III).
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and, if I may put it so, its genesis is not useless in relation to the universe as 
a whole, since otherwise the good would not exist either.98 
Following Chrysippus, but beyond him, middle Stoicism is able to recog-
nise order and beauty not only in the superior universe, as it was for early 
Stoicism,99 but also and consistently in the earthly realm, with its diversity 
and multiplicity of landscapes, plants and animals. When Cicero’s Balbus 
sketches the wonders of nature, the earth comes fi rst, followed by celestial 
bodies:
First let us behold the whole earth, situated in the centre of the world, 
a solid spherical mass gathered into a globe by the natural gravitation of 
all its parts, clothed with fl owers and grass and trees and corn, forms of 
vegetation all of them incredibly numerous and inexhaustibly varied and 
diverse. [. . .] Think of all the various species of animals, both tame and 
wild! think of the fl ights and songs of birds! of the pastures fi lled with 
cattle, and the teeming life of the woodlands! Then why need I speak of 
the race of men? who are as it were the appointed tillers of the soil, and 
who suffer it not to become a savage haunt of monstrous beasts of prey 
nor a barren waste of thickets and brambles, and whose industry diversi-
fi es and adorns the lands and islands and coasts with houses and cities. 
Could we behold these things with our eyes as we can picture them in 
our minds, no one taking in the whole earth at one view could doubt the 
divine reason.100 
Even more important than the beauty of the earthly realm is the perfection 
of the human body. Early Stoicism, once again, does not recognise the physi-
cal perfection of humans as intensely as middle Stoicism does. Panaetius in 
particular is able to create a new aesthetic of the human body, which is very 
far from the ideal perfection of the Greek canon, and much closer to the 
practical idea of an ontological adaptation and perfect adjustment of humans 
to the world. The human body is the most appropriate tool to accomplish the 
λόγος’s action. Rather than naively celebrating anthropocentrism, Panetius 
recognises the human power of adaptation to the world.101
 98 SVF II.1181 (= Plu. Moralia. De Stoicorum repugnantiis] 1050 F. See also SVF II.935 
(=1056 D): ‘[Chrysippus] has written that to particular natural entities and motions 
many obstacles and impediments present themselves but none at all to that of the uni-
verse as a whole;’ See Sambursky (1959), p. 114, and Isnardi-Parente (1999), p. 29.
 99 See again SVF II.1185 (= Origenes Princip. III).
100 Cic. ND II.98–9. See also Pohlenz (1948), p. 196, and Isnardi-Parente (1999), p. 136.
101 Pohlenz (1948), p. 197.
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One of the most powerful ancient celebrations of nature’s diversity is Pliny 
the Elder’s encyclopaedic enterprise. Pliny discusses monstrosity and mirabilia 
in a way that is infl uential for centuries in science, philosophy and the arts.102 
In his Natural History, he gladly accepts Aristotle’s invitation to see the gods 
even in the kitchen, and to treat every aspect of nature’s diversity as deserving 
the scientist’s attention: ‘The nature of [the world’s] animals is as worthy of 
study as almost any other part thereof, if in fact the human mind is capable of 
exploring everything.’103 The accent is on both nature’s richness and the mind’s 
capacity to grasp its meaning. Yet the opening of book VII immediately takes the 
argument in a direction of ambivalence and ignorance, one deriving from the 
paradoxical human position in which they are the greatest but also the weakest 
of all creatures: ‘The fi rst place will rightly be assigned to man, for whose benefi t 
great nature seems to have created everything else. However, for her consider-
able gifts she exacts a cruel fee; so that it is diffi cult to decide whether she is 
more of a kind parent or a harsh stepmother to man.’104 Pliny’s argument reveals 
a well-meditated Stoic sensibility toward nature that nonetheless responds with 
astonishment to nature’s disconcerting power.
One can clearly see the unifying principle of Stoic reasoning in the back-
ground of the prodigious quantity of materials collected, catalogued and 
explained in Pliny’s encyclopaedic enterprise.105 It is Stoicism’s conception of 
the divine that gives consistency and coherency to overabundant nature, with 
its immense variety of beings and phenomena. Beyond the apparent prolifera-
tion of rules and exceptions that characterise different geographical regions and 
different ontological domains, Stoic teleology and providentialism give unity to 
the world as a whole. In fact, nature must be apprehended as a whole, or com-
prehension would be lost in the labyrinth of facts and their puzzling variety,
[. . .] facts which will, I am sure, seem extraordinary and unbelievable to 
many readers. Who, after all, believed in the Ethyopians before actually 
seeing them? And what is not regarded as wondrous when it fi rst gains 
public attention? How many things are judged impossible before they actu-
ally happen? Indeed, the power and might of nature lacks credibility at 
every point unless we comprehend her as a whole rather than piecemeal106
102 See Stahl (1962), pp. 101–19, Beagon (1992), Healy (1999), pp. 63–70, Naas (2002), 
pp. 243–393, Beagon (2007) and Gibson, Morello eds. (2011).
103 Plin. HN VII.1. On Aristotle’s mention of Heraclitus’s gods in the kitchen see supra. See 
also Beagon (1992), p. 129 and passim.
104 Plin. HN VII.1–2.
105 See e.g. E. Paparazzo, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Elder Pliny’s Naturalis Historia’, in 
Gibson, Morello eds. (2011), p. 110, who underlines Pliny’s debt towards Posidonius.
106 Plin. HN VII.6–7.
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Monstrosity is thus framed as a part of nature’s rationality; otherness must be 
seen as variety within unity. The monstrous races, for example, which eventu-
ally have an enormous impact on medieval and early modern literature and 
art, are interesting because they reveal not only the blurred boundaries of 
humanity, but also because such a thing, i.e. humanity, reveals its thousand 
faces as yet another powerful manifestation of nature.107 Although monstrous, 
these races are interesting precisely because they reveal their participation in 
and resemblance to humanity:
India and the territory of the Ethiopians are particularly abundant in mar-
vels. The largest animals are produced in India; [. . .] On a mountain called 
Nulus, according to Megasthenes, there are people with feet turned back-
wards and eight toes on each; while on many mountains there is a race of 
dog-headed men who dress in animal skins, bark rather than talk and live 
on animals and birds which they hunt armed only with their nails. He says 
there were more than 150,000 of them at the time he was writing. Ctesias 
also writes that in a certain Indian tribe the women give birth once in a 
lifetime and the hair of their children starts turning grey from the momenth 
of birth. He also says that there is a race of men called the Monocolo (‘One-
legged men’) by virtue of their single leg which enables them to jump with 
amazing agility. They are also called Sciapodae (‘Shady-feet’) because when 
it gets too hot they lie down on their backs on the ground and protect them-
selves with the shadow of their foot.108 
Located in a remote and mysterious East and South, the monstrous races 
reveal yet another aspect of the world. They illustrate the principle that guides 
107 See Bianchi (1981). See also Garland (1995), pp. 159 ff.
108 Plin. NH VII.21–3. Pliny enumerates many other races, including the satyrs, the 
Choromandae, ‘who do not talk but emit harsh shrieks’, the Struthopodes, the 
Sciratae, ‘who only have holes where their nostrils should be and snake-like strap feet’, 
the Astomi, ‘a people with no mouths’, the Trispithami (‘Three-span men’) and the 
Pygmies, the Cyrni who live for 140 years, and the Indians who ‘copulate with ani-
mals and the offspring are human-animal hybrids’. Herodotus has already mentioned 
India’s fecundity and, in it, the proliferation of species not so much as the violation 
of an ontological order, but rather as nature’s force expressed through its playfulness. 
Revolving around strange and unusual customs, his account is much less focused on 
monstrosity. In this respect, Herodotus’s infl uence on the genealogy of the idea of 
Indian monstrosities appears weaker than Pliny’s. See Hdt. III.97–106 and supra, as 
well as Pohlenz (1937), Immerwahr (1966), Hartog (1991) and Munson (2001). On 
Pliny’s India see Sedlar (1980). Ctesias (FGH 688) and Megasthenes (FGH 715) were 
the major sources for the Indian monstrous races who, through Pliny, also reach Solin. 
51. 27–8. See also the texts in André and Filliozat (1986), as well as Mund-Dopchie 
(1992) and F. Nieto in Solino (2001).
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the Stoic scientifi c attitude and interprets monstrosity as an aspect of normal-
ity, a part of the whole in which – though the full rationality of nature’s design 
is not wholly clear – the unity of divine action is still recognisable. Within the 
material nature of the divine principle, Pliny looks for physical explanations 
for the diversity of shapes as well as the variety of customs and practices that 
work to build the concept of monstrous otherness.
Beagon stresses the attitude that distinguishes Pliny’s astonished approach 
from Aristotle’s colder and more rational explanation.109 Aristotle speaks about 
the teratogenic environment created by the scarcity of water in Africa and the 
way it forces animals to gather in a limited space, thus inducing inter-species 
copulations, and their resulting monstrous offspring. Differently, Pliny focuses 
on India’s and Africa’s climate, its excessive heat and the stronger capacity of 
the mobile element of fi re to mould bodies and carve their outlines.110 Thus a 
natural element creates the monstrous offsprings more autonomously, indeed 
even without the willingness of animals to engage in cross-boundary inter-
course. I believe, however, that Beagon exaggerates the difference between 
the two authors. Both Aristotle and Pliny are interested in the causal and 
physical explanation of monstrous phenomena, and Pliny’s approach is no less 
rational than Aristotle’s. It is more accurate to say that it is based on a differ-
ent kind of rationality, one in which the individual behaviour of animal speci-
mens is less important than nature’s necessary unfolding. Pliny’s worldview is 
the Stoic one, and thus based on the idea of an autonomous and necessary 
actualisation of the intervention of the divine in the world, regardless of the 
behaviour of individuals.
Now, if monstrous races, monsters and mirabilia belong to the order of nature 
and reveal the divine reason and its providential purpose, it is all the more diffi -
cult to grasp and fully explain such a purpose. Pliny attempts an explanation that 
reveals something less than a full commitment to Stoic providentialism:
Nature has cleverly contrived these and similar species of the human race to 
amuse herself and to amaze us. As for the individual creations she produces 
every day, and almost every hour, who could possibly reckon them up? Let 
it be a suffi cient revelation of her power to have placed entire races among 
her miracles.111
Nature does not do anything in vain. So be it. Yet for for the sake of what does 
it do such monstrous things? To amaze us, Pliny states. Here we see anthropo-
centrism resurfacing, with humans taking centre stage and bending the whole 
109 M. Beagon in [Pliny the Elder] (2005), p. 150.
110 Plin. NH VI.187. See Dasen (1993), p. 178.
111 Plin. NH VII.32.
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of nature’s purpose, even its deviations, to what is useful, meaningful or merely 
wonderful for them. Nature, Pliny adds, also produces monstrosity to amuse 
herself.112 Nature’s playfulness, in this context, seems like an aleatory exception 
to the principle of strict necessity that characterises the Stoic understanding 
of providential nature. Not only does it appear to respond more to the ques-
tion ‘why not’ than the question ‘why’, it resembles more the atomist idea of 
potentially infi nite compositions of matter that equally (and unprovidentially) 
exhaust nature’s possibilities, than it does the necessitarianism of the Stoics. 
Let us listen to Pliny on the hereditary transmission of genetic character:
[. . .] sound parents may produce deformed children and deformed par-
ents may produce sound children with the same deformity as themselves. 
Birthmarks, moles, and even scars can reappear in descendants, a tattoo 
sometimes recurring up to the fourth generation among the Dacians. [. . .] 
Other children, again, may resemble their grandfather, and, in the case of 
twins, one may resemble the father, the other the mother.113 
He seems amazed at the inconsistent and yet foreeseable behaviour of nature, 
at the regularity of irregularities for which there seems to be no causal expla-
nation. Yet he does not respond to this seeming absence of explanation with 
the generic call for Stoic providentialism that we might expect.114
If monstrosity reveals the absolute and ultimate power of nature, such 
power remains unexplained. Nature seems to be more playful and less con-
sistently rational and teleological than a Stoic attitude would imply. I believe 
that without renouncing the Stoic framework Pliny struggles to contain the 
wonderful diversity of nature within the monolithic principle of Stoic Prov-
idence. Something similar happens to Lucan. Whereas Lucan’s Stoicism is 
challenged by the appalling misery that characterises humanity in his own 
time, Pliny’s Stoicism is confronted with the astonishing diversity of nature, by 
112 M. Beagon in [Pliny the Elder] (2005), p. 162, points to the frequency of the theme of 
nature at play in NH.
113 Plin. NH VII.50.
114 If Pliny’s explanation of genetic transmission of genetic character must be placed within 
a Stoic framework, it is certainly a heterodox framework, within which Pliny feels com-
pelled to make room for the aleatory as much as for necessity. See Plin. NH VII.52: 
‘Resemblances offer considerable food for thought. They are believed to be infl uenced 
by many chance occurrences, including sight, hearing, memory, and images absorbed at 
the very moment of conception. Even a chance thought which briefl y crosses the mind 
of one or other parent may form or confuse the resemblance. This is the reason why 
there are more variations within the human race than there are among all the other 
animals; the swiftness of man’s thoughts, his mental agility and the versatility of his 
intelligence produce a wide variety of features; whereas the minds of other creatures are 
sluggish and exhibit a uniformity in keeping with their particular species.’
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its incomprehensible and apparently inexplicable tendency to produce mon-
sters and mirabilia. Pliny’s response can be read as a sincere recognition of the 
limits of human understanding facing the immensity of nature and its divine 
character. It can also be read, though, as the recognition of nature’s fl exibil-
ity and inconsistency, an entity whose playfulness sometimes reveals aleatory 
physical behaviour rather than an infl exibly providential intervention.
There is a long tradition of connecting providence to nature’s diversity 
and its marvellous character within Stoicism. It arises from the gap between 
sympathy as a general principle of explanation and the mystery of specifi c 
phenomena that cannot be explained by the science of the time. While every-
thing reveals sympathy, not everything can be explained by it. Differently from 
Pliny’s approach, a number of authors developed an interpretation of the world 
that tried to grasp its divine character through the supernatural and the tera-
tological manifestations of nature rather than through rationalised enquiry. 
The Egyptian thinker Bolus of Mendes, for example, plays a paramount role 
in the second century BCE in connecting Stoic providence with the literary 
genre of paradoxography of which he is a recognised authority.115 Following 
the work of Max Wellmann, Festugière underlines Bolus’s break with Aristo-
tle’s scientifi c approach and early Hellenistic science more broadly.116 Yet one 
should not forget that the modern meaning of scientifi c enquiry recognisable 
in Aristotle or Pliny’s did not pre-exist, but was shaped by works interested in 
the mirabilia, the curious and the monstrous commonly found in nature, and 
that in his day, Bolus was not necessarily read against Aristotle, but with him.
The idea of sympathy is also emphasised in the work of a later author 
strongly interested in nature’s curiosities, Claudius Aelianus. The intertwin-
ing of Stoicism and naturalism resurfaces in the second century and char-
acterises Aelianus’s encyclopaedism, which is very concerned with topics 
typically developed in paradoxographical literature. Like Pliny, Aelianus sees 
nature as a source of marvels. In his work, his scientifi c effort reveals a taste 
for the amazing and astonishing aspects of prolifi c nature. Such a taste, how-
ever, does not mean that he is credulous. When confronted in the dialogue 
between Silenus and King Midas with Teopompus’s account of a monstrously 
giant race, or when describing the way that Ausones’ forefathers are rep-
resented as centaurs, Aelianus makes his disbelief clear.117 After indulging 
in the exploration of literary materials for stylistic purposes, Aelianus’s fi nal 
comment brings the argument back to a more rational explanation, one close 
115 See Giannini (1963), p. 262, and Payón Leyra (2011), pp. 118 ff. 
116 Festugière (1949–54), II, pp. 197–200.
117 Ael. VH III.18 and IX.16.
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to that of the Stoics. The Stoics’ contention is mainly employed against the 
materialist theory of the pre-existence of the organ to the function. Although 
the praise of the human body can be generally referred to Platonic teleology, 
it is Stoicism that specifi cally develops this argument, with a particular atten-
tion to the central role played by the hand. Balbus sings a veritable hymn to 
the perfection of the body,118 which culminates with the apology of the hand, 
whose perfect anatomy is recognised as the material ground of the develop-
ment of the arts and, more in general, of civilisation.119
This argument eventually plays a central role in early Christian philoso-
phy. Christian thinkers follow the Stoics’ praise for the perfection of God’s 
creatures, their beauty and clever engineering that lets the body achieve all 
its functions. Minucius Felix, for example, claims that the erect posture tes-
tifi es to human nobility.120 More generally, the creature’s perfection reveals 
that of the creator. Against the Epicurean argument of chance, nothing could 
be more evident to those with intellect to understand and eyes to see than 
the gifts of the divine Artifi cer. Without His continual action, the whole uni-
verse would be in danger: ‘How easily would confusion overtake the order, 
were it not held together by sovereign reason! [. . .] Above all, beauty of form 
declares the handiwork of God: our poise erect, our look upward, our eyes 
stationed in the watch-tower of the head, and the other senses all posted in 
the citadel.’121
The apology of the hand in particular, already discussed by Aristotle 
against Anaxagoras, becomes the apology of humanity as such.122 It plays 
118 Cic. ND II.134 ff.
119 Cic. ND II.150–2: ‘What clever servants for a great variety of arts are the hands which 
nature has bestowed on man! The fl exibility of the joints enables the fi ngers to close 
and open with equal ease, and to perform every motion without diffi culty. Thus by the 
manipulation of the fi ngers the hand is enabled to paint, to model, to carve, and to draw 
forth the notes of the lyre and of the fl ute. And beside these arts of recreation there are 
those of utility, I mean agriculture and building, the weaving and stitching of garments, 
and the various modes of working bronze and iron; hence we realize that it was by apply-
ing the hand of the artifi cer to the discoveries of thought and observations of the senses 
that all our conveniences were attained, and we were enabled to have shelter, clothing, 
and protection, and possessed cities, fortifi cations, houses, and temples. [. . .] by means 
of our hands we essay to create as it were a second world within the world of nature.’
120 Minucius Felix 17: ‘[. . .] our distinction from the beasts is this, that their downward 
earth-bound gaze is fi xed only on their food: we, with countenance erect and heav-
enward gaze, endowed with speech and reason, enabling us to recognize, perceive and 
imitate God, neither may nor can ignore the heavenly sheen which thrusts itself upon 
our eyes and senses [. . .].’
121 Ivi. Cf. Moreschini (2004), p. 543.
122 Renehan (1992).
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an important role in Galen and it soon becomes a classic topos in Christian 
apology.123 Lactantius profusely illustrates the hand’s virtues and how it epito-
mises God’s wisdom and care for His beloved human creature:
What shall I say of the hands, those ministers of reason and wisdom? The 
Master Artifi cer fashioned these with a plain and moderately concave surface 
so that whatever must be grasped can fi tly occupy this surface. He terminated 
them in the fi ngers in which it is diffi cult to settle whether appearance or 
utility is the greater. For their number is perfect and complete; their order and 
gradation most appropriate; the curvature of matching joints is fl exible; the 
form of the nails, rounded and tightly grasping the ends of the fi ngers with 
curved protection lest the softness of the fl esh falter in the function of hold-
ing, furnishes great ornament.124 
The Stoic teleological principle fi nds a perfect accomplishment in Lactantius’s 
Christian apology of God’s wisdom. The adaptation of the organs, and of the 
hand in particular, is perfect because the project of the divine artifi cer is perfect. 
Animals, and humans in particular, could not be more perfect than they are, 
because they have been engineered by the Almighty Himself. The idea of imper-
fection, along with that of spontaneous adaptation, disappears from the picture. 
Better: imperfection and the monstrous, or turpis, are assigned to anything that 
our imagination might forge that would be different from the existing reality 
which testifi es to God’s perfect plan:
How marvellously the very things which are given to brutes and denied to 
man are ordered unto the beauty of man defi es expression. For if He had 
added to man the teeth of wild beasts, or horns, or claws, or hoofs, or a 
tail, or hair of varied hues, who does not realise how unsightly [turpe] an 
animal he would be? [. . .] But since God made man an eternal and immor-
tal animal, He armed him not exteriorly as He did the other animals, but 
interiorly; and He placed his defense not in his body but in his soul. For 
it would have been superfl uous, since He had bestowed what was greatest 
on him, to have covered him with bodily defenses, especially since these 
would mar the beauty of the human body.125 
123 See Arist. PA IV.10, 687 a 3–b 25. See infra for Galen, and Grant (1952), pp. 12–13: 
‘Galen rejects the opinion of Anaxagoras that man’s wisdom is due to the fact of his 
having hands, and defends the view of Aristotle that because he was wise he was given 
hands.’ See also Hankinson (1989) and Hankinson (1998).
124 Lact. De opifi cio Dei X.22–4.
125 Lact. De opifi cio Dei II.7–9. See also De ira Dei VII.3 and X.22, in which the beauty of 
creation works as an antidote to the atomist’s hypothesis.
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Even from an ethical point of view, were humans not what they are, crushed 
by their fears, they would become monsters, and society itself would collapse:
What mutual respect would there be? What order? What plan? What 
humanity? Or what would be more disgraceful [tetrius] than man? What 
more savage [efferatius]? What more cruel [immanius]? But since he is 
weak, and is not able by himself to live apart from man, he seeks society, 
so that life in common may be both more attractive and more secure.126 
Lactantius is aware of the danger involved in claiming that, because every-
thing is perfect, then God could have not done anything different from what 
he did. After all, is not God almighty? Could he not have produced more 
monsters, had He wanted to? Lactantius tries to preserve both God’s omnip-
otent freedom and the necessity of His plan’s perfection, but his answer 
poses inconvenient questions, and creates rather than solves problems: ‘For 
considering the condition of things, I understand that nothing ought to be 
done otherwise. I do not say that nothing could be done otherwise, for God 
is all powerful, but it is of necessity that that Most Provident Majesty did 
what was better and more right.’127
Only the Christian, according to Lactantius, can grasp nature’s perfection – 
pagans, including Stoics, blinded by their own ignorance, wander vainly trying 
to understand nature. Such blindness reveals the monstrosity of pagan phi-
losophy itself, which is like a twisted and dislocated body whose members ‘are 
at variance with one another, and are not united together by any connecting 
link, but as it were, dispersed and scattered, appear to palpitate rather than 
to live’.128
Stoicism also reworks the Aristotelian idea of the gods in the kitchen and 
the beauty of the universe as a whole, in each and every one of its parts. Marcus 
Aurelius perfectly summarises this idea, making a large use of Chrysippus’s con-
cept of attendant circumstances (ἐπακολούθησις):
We must also observe [. . .] that even the secondary effects of Nature’s 
processes possess a sort of grace and attraction. [Many] characteristics 
that are far from beautiful if we look at them in isolation, do nevertheless 
because they follow from Nature’s processes lend those a further orna-
ment and a fascination. And so, if a man has a feeling for, and a deeper 
insight into the processes of the Universe, there is hardly one but will 
126 Lact. De opifi cio Dei IV.20–1.
127 Lact. De opifi cio Dei III.4.
128 Lact. Inst. III.2.2. See also Pichon (1901), p. 93.
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somehow appear to present itself pleasantly to him, even among mere 
attendant circumstances [κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν]. Such a man also will feel 
no less pleasure in looking at the actual jaws of wild beasts than at the 
imitations which painters and sculptors exhibit, and he will be enabled to 
see in an old woman or an old man a kind of freshness and bloom, and to 
look upon the charms of his own boy slaves with sober eyes. And many 
such experiences there will be, not convincing to every one but occurring 
to him and to him alone who has become genuinely familiar with Nature 
and her works.129
Pohlenz suggests that Christian theodicy, so important for the early modern 
concept and interpretation of monstrosity, is rooted in this Stoic argument. 
He also claims that Marcus Aurelius’s mediation is epitomised by the author 
who will be more easily Christianised, namely Epictetus, for whom Stoic fate 
easily becomes God’s will.
Monstrosity explicitly appears in Epictetus’s powerful example: ‘What do 
you think Heracles would have amounted to, if there had not been a lion like 
the one which he encountered, and a hydra, and a stag, and a boar, and wicked 
and brutal men, whom he made it his business to drive out and clear away?’130
This argument also leads to a redefi nition of the concept of παρὰ φύσιν, 
employed by Zeno and other Stoics. I believe that it should be read as preter-
natural rather than against nature. In Epictetus’s words:
How, then, can it be said that some externals are natural, and others 
unnatural [παρὰ φύσιν]? it is just as if we were detached from them. For I 
will assert of the foot as such that it is natural for it to be clear, but if you 
take it as a foot, and not as a thing detached, it will be appropriate for it to 
step into mud and trample on thorns and sometimes to be cut off for the 
sake of the whole body; otherwise it will no longer be a foot. We ought to 
hold some such view also about ourselves. What are you? A man. Now if 
you regard yourself as a thing detached, it is natural for you to live to old 
age, to be rich, to enjoy health. But if you regard yourself as a man and as 
a part of some whole, on account of that whole it is fi tting for you now to 
129 M.Ant. III.2. See also IX.28 and the several passages quoted by Pohlenz (1948), p. 348 
and n.
130 Arr. Epict. I.6.32. See also Epict. Ench. 27: ‘Just as a mark is not set up in order to be 
missed, so neither does the nature of evil arise in the universe.’ Although the text is 
plain and straightforward, G. Boter in Epictetus (1999) ad loc. feels compelled to clarify: 
‘That is, it is inconceivable that the universe should exist in order that some things may 
go wrong; hence, nothing natural is evil, and nothing that is by nature evil can arise.’ 
See also Pohlenz (1948), p. 339, and, on Epictetus and Christianity, Bonhöffer (1911) 
and Jagu (1989).
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be sick, and now to make a voyage and run risks, and now to be in want, 
and on occasion to die before your time. Why, then, are you vexed? do 
you not know that as the foot, if detached, will no longer be a foot, so you 
too, if detached, will no longer be a man? for what is a man? A part of a 
state; fi rst of that state which is made up of gods and men, and then of that 
which is said to be very close to the other, the state that is a small copy of 
the universal state.131 
A genuine opposition is thus established between the general and the par-
ticular. Although men might perceive things only at their individual level, it 
is the whole that makes sense. Reason acts through general and not through 
particular ways. Whereas Epicureans maintain that gods’ perfection consists 
in a complete indifference to the human world, Stoics deem that gods are 
indifferent only to minora, and when insignifi cant things are damaged, it is 
certainly not their fault, since they are superior to them, and indifferent to 
minor details, such as a king in his own kingdom.132 ‘De minimis non curat 
praetor,’ says the Latin expression. This concept eventually has a major role 
in the Judeo-Hellenistic reception of Stoicism, such as in Philo’s theodicy.133 
Fully material and yet spiritual, immanent and yet normative, impersonal and 
yet creator: this philosophical system requires a new and original defi nition of 
God, the divine and its providential intervention in the world.
Providence, God and Teleology
The Stoic conception of a providential divine intervention in the world, and 
thus nature’s teleological character, is the strongest theoretical tool left by 
classic Stoicism to natural philosophy. The image of God in Stoicism, however, 
has a long and complex history, that goes from the early opposition to the Attic 
principle of transcendence of the divine, to its progressive anthropomorphisa-
tion and separation from the world, coherent with Christian theology. In this 
sense, the concept of providence also has various meanings within Stoicism. 
Initially relying upon a materialist ontology, providence steadily transforms 
itself into God’s personal intervention in the world. Stoicism thus provides a 
versatile conceptual tool for understanding natural monstrosities by fi nding a 
place for evil and imperfection within a universe framed theologically.
The impersonal and immanent idea of God is typical of early Stoicism. 
Nonetheless, the tendency is toward a personal and transcendental concep-
tion of the divine, accentuated in later Stoicism, when the school comes in 
131 Arr. Epict. II.5. 24–6.
132 SVF II.1179 (= Cic. ND III.86). See also SVF II.1180 (= Cic. ND III.90).
133 See infra.
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touch with Judaism and early Christianity.134 These, I believe, should be seen 
as two different attitudes rather than two different stages. Both attitudes, in 
fact, appear across the centuries and characterise the different periods of the 
school’s development. The early Stoics’ conception of God is fi rmly rooted in 
the school’s postulate of material monism. God’s corporeality is its most impor-
tant feature. God is the cause of all things because it is fi rst and foremost the 
purest nature and cause:135 purest and yet corporeal.136 Causality and mate-
riality cannot be disjointed; thus God is merely the highest peak of material 
reality, which is the only existing ontological reality within the Stoic universe, 
elaborated against Attic idealism.137
Nature thus has a divine character that immanently produces all its effects. 
The accent is put, in this perspective, on the unity of God and nature, on their 
correspondence and common existence. Pantheism is the short name for this 
indissoluble unity between the heaven and the earth, which share one and the 
same substance. Diogenes Laertius explains that
Cosmos is the individually qualifi ed being of the substance of the whole, or, 
as Posidonius says in the Meteorology (the elementary treatise), a systematic 
compound composed from heaven and earth and the natural constitutions 
in them, or a systematic compound composed from gods and men and what 
has come into being for their sake.138 
Τό σύστημα is the orderly whole. Edelstein-Kidd translates it as ‘systematic 
compound’. The term is consciously employed by Posidonius to underline the 
idea of a whole formed by several parts. The term has a long philosophical tra-
dition. It is used by Plato to stress the strong unity of vital phenomena and its 
134 See Dragona-Monachou (1976) and Ewing (2008).
135 Such is the πνεῦμα’s nature. See Sambursky (1959), pp. 36–7.
136 SVF I.153 (= Hippol. Haer. XXI.1). Seen Duncan (1952), pp. 128–9.
137 SVF I.153 (= Gal. Phil. Hist. XVI) registers the Stoics’ sharp opposition to Platonic ideal-
ism, and Plotinus, SVF II.315 (= Plot. VI.1.26), protests against it. See also the beautiful 
theological incipit of Sen. Nat. I praef. 13–4: ‘What is god? The mind of the universe. 
What is god? All that you see, all that you do not see. In short, only if he alone is all 
things, if he maintains his own work both from within and without, is he given due credit 
for his magnitude that that can be contemplated. What, then, is the difference between 
our nature and the nature of god? In ourselves the better part is the mind, in god there 
is no part other than the mind. He is entirely reason.’ Seneca is keen on underlying both 
the immanence and superiority of god: et intra et extra opus suum tenet. See contra Pohlenz 
(1948), p. 320, who perceives a strong sense of transcendency in Nat. A different atmo-
sphere reigns in Seneca’s tragedies in which, on the contrary, a powerful tension between 
divine goodness and human evil monstrosity emerges. See Dupont (1995).
138 Posidon. 14. See also Posidon. 15: ‘Zeno says that the substance of god is the whole 
universe and in particular, heaven [SVF I.163]; a similar version is given by Chrysippus, 
On Gods Bk I, and by Posidonius, On Gods, Bk I.’
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comprehension as the highest form of wisdom,139 by Aristotle as a synonym of 
animal organism,140 and by Epicurus to describe the material aggregate of body 
and soul.141 God and the world form an immanently organised system and a 
compound, whose laws express the highest form of rationality.
The laws of this immanent compound, divine and natural at the same 
time, should be conceived through the idea of rationality and perfection 
rather than that of normativity.142 God and nature represent the laws that 
guide and inform the whole universe because the universe itself is rational 
and perfect.143 The law and the right reason (the ὀρθός λόγος) are God itself, 
according to Chrysippus.144 The difference between divine and human reason, 
Cicero’s Balbus explains, is solely one of degree and not of nature.145
The idea of a community of reason between men and gods contrasts, of 
course, with the indifferent Epicurean gods as well as with the Attic tran-
scendence of the divine, both in the form of the Platonic demiurge and the 
Aristotelian νοῦς. As Pohlenz suggests, the Stoic λόγος replaces the νοῦς, 
whose thinking activity is independent and separate from the physical and vis-
ible sphere.146 Moreover, because God is φύσις and λόγος at the same time,147 
one possible consequence of this materialist pantheism is polytheism: another 
aspect of Stoicism that early Christianity rules out and fi ghts against.148
In Stoic philosophy, however, there is a strong ambiguity that makes possible 
both a signifi cant degree of transcendence in the concept of God as well as an 
139 Pl. Epin. 991 e.
140 Arist. GA II.4, 740 a 20.
141 Epicur. Ep. [2] 66. One could expand the analysis to the theological and political mean-
ing of the term.
142 Signifi cantly, for men, normativity takes the form of the concrete necessity to follow a 
rational life, exempt from passions, namely a life according to the divine that is in us. 
See for example Posidon. 187.
143 SVF II.1009 (Placit. I.6).
144 SVF I.162 (= D.L. VII.88).
145 SVF II.1127 (Cic. ND II.78): ‘From the fact of the gods’ existence (assuming that they 
exist, as they certainly do) it necessarily follows that they are animate beings, and not 
only animate but possessed of reason and united together in a sort of social community or 
fellowship, ruling the one world as a united commonwealth or state. It follows that they 
possess the same faculty of reason as the human race, and that both have the same appre-
hension of truth and the same law enjoining what is right and rejecting what is wrong.’
146 Pohlenz (1948), pp. 34–5.
147 Koester (1968), pp. 521–8, underlines the interchangeability of god and nature in Stoicism.
148 See Reale (1975–80), III, p. 365 and, contra, Isnardi-Parente (1999), pp. 22–3. See also 
Solmsen (1963), p. 463. With regard to providence, Tertullian has one of the most inter-
esting positions. He denounces the Stoic divinisation of providence because he feels 
that it challenges God himself: God, not providence, rules the universe. See Moreschini 
(2004), pp. 483 ff.
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anthropomorphic view of the divine. Let’s begin from the end, namely the uni-
verse’s fi nal confl agration. Although everything dies and is reborn in the same 
way, immanently transformed by and through a new beginning, Chrysippus 
suggests that the divine somehow survives outside nature and above the con-
fl agration itself, alone and imperturbable. As Seneca puts it: ‘[The wise man’s] 
life will be like that of Jupiter, who, amid the dissolution of the world, when the 
gods are confounded together and Nature rests for a space from her work, can 
retire into himself and give himself over to his own thoughts.’149 When nature 
cessat, thus, God still cogitat in a separate state.
The most important testimony of a personal and transcendental conception 
of God in early Stoicism is, however, Cleanthes’ hymn to Zeus.150 In contrast 
with early Stoics’ general lack of interest for the transcentental world,151 a deep 
religiosity arises from Cleanthes’ prayer. The confl agration becomes for him a 
sacred and cosmic ceremony that inaugurates the order beyond chaos. God is 
the lawgiver who rules the λόγος and the supreme king, the ὕπατος βασιλεύς. 
This expression is an unmistakable homage to the tradition of the Homeric 
Zeus.152
The hymn also addresses the problem of evil as a resistance of the earthly 
realm to the ordering principle of God’s wisdom. Cleanthes offers a synthetic 
and yet elaborate picture of God’s relationship to the creation that anticipates 
the core of subsequent theodicies. The πνεῦμα permeates nature, but in dif-
ferent ways and to different degrees. Not only, thus, does the world become 
anthropocentric, but every imperfection and monstrosity fi nds its place in it, 
within an ordered hierarchy of beings.153
No matter how strongly the early Stoic postulate of material monism 
resists the religious development toward a personal god, Cleanthes’ posi-
tion is extremely infl uential and constitutes the ground for the Hellenistic 
Judaist and Christian reworking of Stoicism into a theodicy.154 With few 
149 SVF II.1065 (= Sen. Ep. 9.16).
150 SVF I.537 (= Stob. I.1.12). On Cleanthes’ hymn see Festugière (1949–54), II, pp. 
310–32, James (1972), and K. Sier, Zum Zeushymnos des Kleanthes, in Steinmetz hrsg. 
(1990), pp. 93–108.
151 Pohlenz (1948), p. 93.
152 See Hom. Od. I.45: ὕπατε κρειόντων and Il. XIX.258: θεῶν ὕπατος.
153 Pohlenz (1948), p. 82. This religious anthropocentrism, Pohlenz suggests, is the major 
obstacle to the understanding and acceptance of Aristarchus’s heliocentrism. See also 
Aujac (1989). Anthopocentrism is also the major difference with Platonic providence, 
whereby Stoics think that god makes humans a creature of primary importance. See also 
Renehan (1992).
154 See Clem.Al. Prot. VI.61P–62P: ‘Cleanthes of Pedasis, the Stoic philosopher, sets forth 
no genealogy of the gods, after the manner of poets, but a true theology. [. . .] he teaches 
clearly, I think, what is the nature of God [. . .].’
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exceptions,155 Stoic philosophers tend to accept this personalisation of God. 
Cleanthes’ idea that God is the father (πατήρ) of humanity is shared by 
Epictetus156 and by Manilius.157 Epictetus transforms the universal rational-
ity of the divine principle into an individual relation between humans and 
God.158 Aratus’s Stoic moment is deeply rooted in Zeus’s anthropomorphic 
character:
Let us begin with Zeus, whom we men never leave unspoken. Filled with 
Zeus are all highways and all meeting-places of people, fi lled are the sea 
and harbours; in all circumstances we are all dependent on Zeus. For we 
are also his children, and he benignly gives helpful signs to men, and rouses 
people to work, reminding them of their livelihood, tells when the soil is 
best for oxen and mattocks, and tells when the seasons are right both for 
planting trees and for sowing every kind of seed. For it was Zeus himself 
who fi xed the signs in the sky, making them into distinct constellations, 
and organised stars for the year to give the most clearly defi ned signs of 
the seasonal round to men, so that everything may grow without fail. That 
is why men always pay homage to him fi rst and last. Hail, Father, great 
wonder, great boon to men, yourself and the earlier race! And hail, Muses, 
all most gracious! In answer to my prayer to tell of the stars insofar as I may, 
guide all my singing.159 
The tendency to make God a personal entity, by the time Cicero composes his 
De natura deorum, is well established within Stoicism. Developing the older 
155 The most notable and important one being Lucan who, vis-à-vis the monstrosity of 
the human world, prefers to exclude the gods from his poem, or to include them only 
to criticise them because they have supported Caesar’s victory and the loss of Roman 
freedom. See Tremoli (1968).
156 Arr. Epict. I.6.40, I.9.6. See Radice (1982), K. Algra, Epictetus and Stoic Theology, in 
Scaltsas, Mason eds. (2007), pp. 32–3. Algra (p. 55) underlines, however, the wide 
limitations to Epictetus’s theism, which set it apart from the Christian anthropomorphic 
conception of divinity.
157 Manil. IV.883–93: ‘We perceive our creator, of whom we are part, and rise to the stars, 
whose children we are. Can one doubt that a divinity dwells within our breasts and 
that our souls return to the heaven whence they came? Can one doubt that, just as the 
world, composed of the elements of air and fi re on high and earth and water, houses an 
intelligence which, spread throughout it, directs the whole, so too with us the bodies 
of our earthly condition and our life-blood house a mind which directs every part and 
animates the man?’
158 Pohlenz (1948), p. 339. Even more special is the relationship with the philosopher, who 
becomes god’s ἄγγελος. See K. Ierodiakonou, The Philosopher as God’s Messenger, in 
Scaltsas, Mason eds. (2007), pp. 56–70.
159 Arat. I.1–18. See Kidd in Aratus (1997), p. 12 and p. 162. See also James (1972).
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idea of God as an administrator of his household,160 Cicero contributes to 
develop an infl uential metaphor, namely the image of God consciously acting 
upon nature in a fashion similar to that of the artisan crafting his own work. 
Cicero already reads this tendency in Zeno’s concept of nature which is, he 
explains,
‘a craftsmanlike fi re [ignis artifi ciosus], proceeding methodically to the work 
of generation’. For he holds that the special function of an art or craft is to 
create and generate, and that what in the processes of our arts is done by 
the hand is done with far more skilful craftsmanship by nature, that is, as I 
said, by that ‘craftsmanlike’ fi re which is the teacher of the other arts. And 
on this theory, while each department of nature is ‘craftsmanlike’, in the 
sense of having a method or path [uia and secta] marked out for it to follow, 
the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its 
embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely ‘craftsmanlike’ but actually ‘a crafts-
man [natura non artifi ciosa solum sed plane artifex dicitur]’, whose foresight 
plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail.161 
In later Stoicism, Marcus Aurelius accomplishes the task of building an 
anthropomorphic image of God by revisiting the early idea of the divine λόγος 
and its opposition with the Aristotelian νοῦς. The philosopher-emperor thor-
oughly reverts to the concept of νοῦς in order to better isolate God above the 
corporeal sphere in which evil is concentrated in the form of a passional psy-
chic life that hinders an ethical life.162 Although Marcus Aurelius consciously 
avoids fi lling the gap between Stoicism and Christianity, the convergence is 
achieved.
The same pattern had been followed by Stoic philosophers in developing the 
idea of providence and fi nalism, another instrument in the theoretical toolbox 
necessary to understand and make sense of the concept of monstrosity. Schol-
ars have suggested that because of its universal and general character, as well 
as the impersonal nature of God, the providence of the Stoics tends towards 
immanence rather than transcendence.163 Yet Stoic providence is characterised 
by the same ambivalence that one may discern in the development of the idea 
160 SVF II.1127–31: Mundum esse urbem (uel domum) bene administratam. 
161 Cic. ND II.57–8.
162 Pohlenz (1948), pp. 342 and 344.
163 See Pohlenz (1948), p. 98 and Reale (1975–80), pp. 370–1. On Seneca and Christianity 
see Momigliano (1950), Colish (1985), Martina a cura di (2001). On Stoics’ fi nalism, 
see Rieth (1934) and Dragona-Monachou (1976), specifi cally on Epictetus, pp. 227–9, 
and on Marcus Aurelius, pp. 252–3.
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of divinity. Chrysippus, for example, speaks about providence as both God and 
the universe itself. Providence appears as the very same rational organisation of 
the material universe according to divine laws, namely to right reason itself.164
Cleanthes, however, realises that the mere correspondence between the 
universe and the divine principle is not enough to express the beauty and good-
ness of the universe. Thus, although God does not create matter but merely 
organises it, like Plato’s demiurge, it acts teleologically and providentially.165 
The teleological character of the divine intervention is linked to the superiority 
and transcendence of God, signposted once again by the reference to the νοῦς: 
providence, Cicero explains by interpreting Zeno, enters the universe in the 
form of mens mundi, or the world’s intellect.166
The whole of book II of De natura deorum is concerned with the provi-
dential and teleological character of nature, powerfully developed against the 
mechanical and antifi nalist conception of Epicureans. Against the ‘extraordi-
nary democracy’ of atoms,167 self-organising without any external direction, 
Stoics claim the necessity of a guiding principle, reworking and developing 
Attic fi nalism. Cicero’s Balbus clarifi es the connection with the Socratic 
matrix: ‘Man’s intelligence must lead us to infer the existence of a mind 
[in the universe], and that a mind of surpassing ability, and in fact divine. 
Otherwise, whence did man “pick up” (as Socrates says in Xenophon)168 the 
intelligence he possesses?’ It is the regularity, beauty and order of nature that 
wipes away any doubt and reinforces the certitude that it has been created by 
a superior intelligence.
The main exception to this attitude within Stoicism is, once again, Lucan, 
who sees only an evil fate acting in human history and, specifi cally, in the 
wicked fate that brings Rome’s freedom to an end.169 In Lucan, fate does not 
express the world’s rationality anymore, but it rather becomes the name of 
reason’s death.170 Gods do not exist or, if they do, they do not care about 
human miseries.171 It is not the Epicurean divine imperturbability that Lucan 
164 SVF II.528 (= Ar. Did. apud Eusebium praep. Evang. XV.15). See also SVF II.1106–26: 
De providentia et natura artefi ce. See Simon and Simon (1956), p. 111.
165 SVF I.509 (= Ph. Prou. II.48).
166 Cic. ND II.58. See contra Goldschmidt (1953), pp. 91–2.
167 This is the powerful concept used – and criticised – by the third-century Christian writer 
Dionysius of Alexandria in his On Nature. See Dion.Alex. and Grant (1952), p. 16.
168 See X. Mem. I.4.8 and supra. 
169 See Pohlenz (1948), p. 284, and Narducci (1979).
170 O. Steen Due, ‘Lucain et la philosophie’, in Durry éd. (1970), pp. 201–32.
171 Lucan. VII.444–55: ‘In very truth there are no gods who govern mankind: though we 
say falsely that Jupiter reigns, blind chance sweeps the world along. [. . .] Man’s destiny 
has never been watched over by any god.’
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suggests, but rather a malignant indifference, enriched by its ironical powerless 
presence in the human mind: what do gods do instead of directing the world 
or helping men in their pain? They send prodigies, so that even any remote 
hope for the future is pitilessly wiped away.172 The Stoic spectacle of the uni-
verse’s harmony has given way to the horrendous portrait of human solitude. 
Whereas the atheist or even the Epicurean feels reassured by this solitude, and 
grounds her materialism on it, Lucan becomes incapable of defending even 
the core of his Stoicism:
Either this universe strays for ever governed by no law, and the stars move 
to and fro with course unfi xed; or else, if they are guided by destiny, speedy 
destruction is preparing for Rome and for mankind. Will the earth gape 
and cities be swallowed up? Or will burning heat destroy our temperate 
clime? Will the soil break faith and deny its produce? Or will water every-
where be tainted with streams of poison? What kind of disaster are the 
gods preparing? What form of ruin will their anger assume?173 
Not even the alternative between Epicurean chance and Stoic fate survives in 
this infernal landscape. Narducci has analysed Lucan’s attitude toward provi-
dence, and the debate surrounding the poet’s feelings on this pillar of the Stoic 
system. He correctly suggests that Lucan’s invective goes much beyond pure 
rhetoric, and thus that the poem represents both a strong reaction against 
poetical classicism, soon triumphant in Virgil’s masterpiece, and a serious blow 
to the Stoic claim to best interpret the tensions of this period.174 In Narducci’s 
view, however, Lucan remains to some extent faithful to Stoicism, making 
his tensions and ambiguities just more evident. Lucan’s pessimism and anti-
providentialism, Narducci argues, are not put forward against Stoicism, but 
rather derive from it.175
I believe that the crisis of Stoicism, in Lucan’s poem, is more serious than 
Narducci claims. An orthodox Stoic vision of humanity’s historical misery, 
facing the monstrosity of civil war, would not allow any pessimism at all, if 
this was the necessary course that the universe had to follow. No alternative, 
and no regret: this would be the orthodox conclusion, or else Stoicism would 
172 Lucan. I.522–25: ‘[. . .] that no hope even for the future might relieve anxiety, clear proof 
was given of worse to come, and the menacing gods fi lled earth, sky, and sea with portents.’
173 Lucan. I.639–50. See also Steen Due, ‘Lucain et la philosophie’, pp. 211–12.
174 Narducci (1979), p. 37. See also S. Casali, ‘The Bellum Civile as an Anti-Aeneid’, in 
Asso (2011), pp. 81–109.
175 Narducci (1979), pp. 68–71: Lucan’s would only be a particularly pessimistic view 
of the world’s natural movement after the ἀκμή, tending relentlessly toward the 
fi nal confl agration. In line with Stoicism, Lucan’s pessimism abandons history, and 
becomes cosmic. On Lucan’s physics see Schotes (1969).
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renounce any ethical function and any aspiration to reach ἀπάθεια, or the 
absence of passions and suffering, which is anything but what Lucan asks the 
reader to experience through the painful lines of his poem.
Despite Lucan’s exception, though, the faith in the regularity and beauty 
of the universe prevails within Stoicism, and it establishes itself as a dogma 
beyond and against human and natural weakness, imperfection and monstros-
ity. More importantly, teleology is employed as an argument to make sense of 
monstrosities and assign them a place in the universe. Clarifying the religious 
nature of early Stoicism, Balbus explains that
lightning, storms, rain, snow, hail, fl oods, pestilences, earthquakes and occa-
sionally subterranean rumblings, showers of stones and raindrops the colour 
of blood, also landslides and chasms suddenly opening in the ground, also 
unnatural monstrosities [portenta] human and animal, [. . .] [are] alarming 
portents [that] have suggested to mankind the idea of the existence of some 
celestial and divine power.176 
Later Stoicism develops this vision and connects it with the anthropomorphic 
character of God. Nature, Epictetus explains, drags humans to follow its own 
will.177 Learning nature’s will is part of human morality.178 Τὸ βούλημα τῆς 
φύσεως: it is not an end or τέλος that Epictetus has in mind anymore, but a 
genuine will or βούλησις.179 With the verb βούλομαι, Epictetus stresses the 
personal will or wish of gods beyond the simple τέλος, following an ancient tra-
dition already established by Homer and continuing up to the early Christian 
thinkers.180 Before showing how this doctrine is connected with the belief in a 
universe hierarchically characterised by different degrees of perfection, let us 
fi rst see Lactantius’s position, one of the most important Christian thinkers, 
and deeply marked by pagan philosophy.
Lactantius has a strategic importance in the early Christian reworking of 
the Stoic providential divinity. Before his more direct condemnation of Stoic 
optimism in De ira dei, Lactantius’s providentialism is built upon Stoic elements 
176 Cic. ND II.14.
177 Arr. Epict. II.20. 15. See also I.6.1 ff., III.15.14 and III.17.1 ff.
178 Epict. Ench. 26.
179 This βούλησις eventually becomes the will of god and, in particular, his positive will for 
good which is not incompatible with his permission of evil. See DGE and Lampe sub 
voce and, in particular, Clem.Al. Prot. IV and Strom. IV.12.
180 LSJ sub voce: ‘Hom. uses βούλομαι for ἐθέλω in the case of the gods, for with them 
wish is will.’ See also M.Ant. II.3: ‘The work of the gods is full of Providence: the work 
of Fortune is not divorced from Nature or the spinning and winding of the threads 
ordained by Providence.’ See also Farquharson in Marcus Aurelius (1944), II, pp. 284–5. 
See also TGL sub voce and Hijmans (1959).
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and constitutes one of the most infl uential early visions of Christian providence. 
As we have seen, Lactantius’s polemical argument is directed fi rst and foremost 
against the ‘folly’ of Epicureans, who deny providence and ‘assign the origin of 
things to inseparable and solid bodies from the chance combinations of which all 
things come to be and have arisen’. As with the Stoics, his condemnation is sharp 
and unambiguous: ‘they are mad, even to the point of ridicule’.181 Providence is 
in fact evidence that cannot be missed by the wise observer of nature:
[. . .] who can doubt respecting a providence, when he sees that the heav-
ens and the earth have been so arranged, and that all things have been so 
regulated, that they might be most befi ttingly adapted, not only to wonder-
ful beauty and adornment, but also to the use of men, and the convenience 
of the other living creatures? That, therefore, which exists in accordance 
with a plan, cannot have had its beginning without a plan: thus it is certain 
that there is a providence.182 
Lactantius uses providence as a weapon against the Epicurean theory of 
chance. In this part of the Opifi cio, which eventually proves very infl uential in 
building rising resistance against materialism, he directly tackles the argument 
of monstrosity:
When Lucretius was showing that animals were produced, not by some 
fashioning of a divine mind, but as he put it, ‘fortuitously’, he said that, in 
the beginning of the world, there had been in existence innumerable other 
living creatures of wondrous form and size [miranda specie ac magnitudine], 
but that they could not continue because either the power of getting food 
or the means of coming together and reproducing had failed them. Of 
course, to make place for those atoms of his, fl itting in the infi nite and the 
emptiness, he had to rule out Divine Providence. But when he saw that 
there is a marvellous system of providence existing within all things that 
breathe, what emptiness for that scoundrel to say that there had existed 
monsters [animalia prodigiosa] in which this system ceased!183 
Aware that the concept of monstrosity, ontologically speaking, could destabi-
lise the idea of an Almighty God just as it destroyed that of a caring demiurge, 
Lactantius addresses the core of the Epicurean theory of monstrosity. He conve-
niently leaves aside Lucretius’s Empedoclean argument about the stabilisation 
181 Lact. De opifi cio Dei II.10–1.
182 Lact. Epit. I.1 (= I in AA. VV. (1970), vol. VII, p. 224).
183 Lact. De opifi cio Dei VI.1–14.
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and regularisation of shapes out of nature’s innumerable attempts, saying that if 
monsters existed once, which is absurd, then they would still exist today:
if all things come to be, not by Providence, but by the chance of comings 
together of atoms, why does it never happen by chance that those prin-
ciples come together in such a way as to effect an animal of such a kind 
that would hear with its nostrils, smell with its eyes, and see with its ears? 
If those ‘fi rst bodies’ [primordia] leave no kind of position untried, mon-
sters ought to have been produced daily of a sort in which a preposterous 
arrangement of members and widely different uses would prevail. But since 
all the kinds and all the parts in each observe their own laws and arrange-
ment and guard the uses attributed to them [leges, ordines et usus], it is 
evident that nothing was made by chance, since the perpetual disposition 
of the divine plan is preserved.184 
Let’s leave aside the absurd Epicurean hypothesis, Lactantius suggests, and 
embrace instead the self-evident truth of the Christian God. His plan comes 
fi rst, before everything else, so all things are therefore accomplished according 
to a perfect project. Lactantius uses the metaphor of the architect who, before 
constructing a building, considers carefully his problems, takes measurements, 
fi nds the best position for columns and conduits, light and heavy weights, etc. 
And if this is true for a modest but skilful builder, why should it not be so for the 
most sublime of the architects, God Almighty? Since everything has been done 
cum ratione, ‘why should anyone think that God, in making the animals, did not 
provide all that would be necessary for living before He gave the life itself? The 
life surely could not exist unless there were fi rst the means by which it exists.’185
Now that we have explored Lactantius’s thought, let us return to pagan 
Stoicism. Its point of view is consistent with both the Platonic and the Aristote-
lian idea of different degrees of perfection in the universe. Stoics rework in their 
own guise the concept of accidental necessity, or necessity κατὰ συμβεβηκός, 
that Aristotle introduces to explain monstrosity. Chrysippus claims that perfect 
and imperfect beings are both necessary, and yet not equally so:
[Chrysippus] does not think that it was nature’s original intention to make 
men subject to disease; for that would never have been consistent with 
nature as the source and mother of all things good. ‘But,’ said he, ‘when 
184 Lact. De opifi cio Dei VI.1–14. See M. Perrin in Lactance (1974), pp. 290–1.
185 Lact. De opifi cio Dei VI.1–14. On the metaphor of the architect, see M. Perrin in Lac-
tance (1974), pp. 290–1. See also De ira Dei IX.1 ff. and XIII.1 on the argument of 
teleology strongly infl uenced by Stoicism.
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she was creating and bringing forth many great things which were highly 
suitable and useful, there were also produced at the same time troubles 
closely connected with those good things that she was creating’; and he 
declared that these were not due to nature, but to certain inevitable con-
sequences, a process that he himself calls κατὰ παρακολούθησις. ‘[. . .] In 
the same way diseases too and illness were created at the same time with 
health. Exactly, by Heaven!’ said he, ‘as vices, through their relationship to 
the opposite quality, are produced at the same time that virtue is created 
for mankind by nature’s design.’186
Per sequellas, Gellius says, hesitating on what looks like a subaltern necessity, 
‘quod ipse [sc. Chrysippus] appellat “κατὰ παρακολούθησις”’. Imperfection 
presents itself as a consequence of perfection. In Aristotle, παρακολουθέω – 
the Latin consequi – has the meaning of a necessary consequence, of an effect 
that goes hand in hand with its cause, always and logically following it.187 
Beyond this logical necessity, coordinating cause and effect, Chrysippus con-
sciously subordinates the accidental result to its cause, and make it a mere 
by-product. Following, but somehow reworking, the Aristotelian explanation 
of monstrosity as necessary by accident, Chrysippus thinks of imperfection as 
the subaltern circumstance of perfection.
Evil and good necessarily coexist within providence’s plan. Nonethe-
less, monstrosity and imperfection are not there intentionally and origi-
nally (προηγουμένως), but rather concomitantly (κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν).188 
Ἐπακολουθέω is also close to the Latin subsequor. This concept has a strong 
relevance for the interpretation of the role and function of monstrosity within 
the creation, especially in and through the Hellenistic Judaist and Christian 
theodicy, for example in both Philo’s189 and Origen’s theodicies.190
Moving away from Cleanthes’ reduction of evil to humanity’s deviation from 
its ethical end, Chrysippus expands the place and role that evil and imperfec-
tion play in the universe. A much stronger theodicy, thus, is needed to save 
the image of a benevolent divinity. Imperfection and monstrosity need to be 
justifi ed, and Chrysippus makes use of the τύχη, interpreting it as the result of 
concomitant, related and ‘confatal’ causes, whose complex outcome cannot be 
precisely foreseen but can still be conceived within God’s providential action.191
186 SVF II.1170 (= Gel. VII.1.7–13).
187 Arist. Top. 131 b 9, 125 b 28, Cat. 8 a 33, Metaph. 1054 a 14.
188 Pohlenz (1948), p. 100.
189 See Ph. Prou. II.100 and infra. See also Barth (1906), p. 26.
190 Pohlenz (1948), p. 426 n.
191 On the confatalia or ἀργός λόγος see SVF II.956–64.
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Monsters and monstrosities, thus, do not break with universal necessity. 
They fi nd their place within nature and, as much as normal and normally 
beautiful events, they confi rm the existence of the divine.192 If it is true that 
individual beings are hierarchically ordered according to different degrees of 
perfection, it is also true that lower beings, including the most abnormal and 
exceptional ones, can sometimes reveal the divine, and even more conspicu-
ously than the higher and more perfect beings. The relation between per-
fection and imperfection is here developed in a different direction, toward 
the concept of portent and prodigy.193 It is through portents, prodigies and 
monstrosities that Stoics are able to assign a large weight to the concept of 
εἱμαρμένη or fatum.194 It is also portents that illustrate the importance of divi-
nation – the tool that, once again, God grants to men so that they may fi nd 
their way in the world.195
Firmly grounded on the physical dogma of continuity and the negation 
of the void, the Stoic concept of fate embraces the universe as a single unity, 
within which all events are necessarily connected to each other, no matter 
their degree of perfection or rationality. Stoics call this concept συμπάθεια, 
expressing the rigidity and inalterability of all cosmic events.196 Because of 
universal sympathy, individual beings must be conceived as parts of a bigger 
individual, such as organs of the same organism.197
This organicism explains the inclusive nature of Stoic philosophy, whose 
outcome is a cosmopolitan conception of humanity, extended to barbarians and, 
in some cases and exceptionally, to animals as well.198 Monstrosities cannot be 
condemned in this framework, and fi nd their place within nature as an outcome 
192 This is the sense of the Stoics’ interest in early paradoxography. See Giannini (1963).
193 Prodigies are, in this sense, the real ancestors of the Christian miracle. Cic. ND II.7: 
‘Prophecies and premonitions of future events cannot but be taken as proofs that the 
future may appear or be foretold as a warning or portended or predicted to mankind – 
hence the very words “apparition”, “warning”, “portent”, “prodigy.” Even if we think 
that the stories of Mopsus, Tiresias, Amphiaraus, Calchas, and Helenus are mere base-
less fi ctions of romance (though their powers of divination would not even have been 
incorporated in the legends had they been entirely repugnant to fact), shall not even the 
instances from our own native history teach us to acknowledge the divine power?’ See 
Martinazzoli (1951) and, more recently, Cotter (1999).
194 See Chase Green (1944), M. E. Reesor, Necessity and Fate in Stoic Philosophy, in Rist 
(1978), pp. 187–202, and Magris (1984).
195 See Bouche-Leclercq (1879–82) and M. Schofi eld, ‘Théologie et divination’, in 
Brunschwig, Lloyd eds (1996), pp. 527–40.
196 See Sambursky (1959), p. 41, for whom, at least initially, sympathy is an evolution of the 
Aristotelian idea of cosmic order. 
197 Pohlenz (1948), p. 216.
198 See for example Chroust (1963).
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of nature’s power to produce diversity. As Seneca explains, summarising the 
inspiring principle of his Natural Questions:
Nature does not present her work in only one form but prides herself 
on her variety. She has made some things larger, some swifter than oth-
ers, some stronger, some more moderate; she has separated some from 
the crowd, so that they might move as unique and conspicuous things 
[singula et conspicua]; some she has consigned to the herd. Anyone who 
thinks that nature is not occasionally able to do something she has not 
done frequently, simply does not understand the power of nature [naturae 
potentia].199
On this ground, the philosopher must have the same attitude toward each 
and every natural phenomenon, including anomalies and monstrosities. 
Anything deserves the attention of the scientist, who knows that every-
thing is connected in nature, and necessarily so. Sorabji has argued that this 
attitude is the original attempt made by Stoics to redefi ne the concept of 
normativity, in order to include all phenomena within natural laws.200 This 
exceptionless regularity manifests itself in the idea of a repetition of the 
same circumstances over the endless cosmic cycle. It also manifests itself in 
the importance that prodigies and monstrosities have in revealing the key 
to understanding apparently unrelated events and offering a guide to those 
who are able to read them through divination. Monsters, in this sense, might 
not make sense in themselves, and yet they necessarily do within the global 
comprehension of nature. This is why, Seneca explains, divination becomes 
possible:
You make God too unoccupied and the administrator of trivia if he arranges 
dreams for some people, entrails for others. Nevertheless, such things are 
carried out by divine agency, even if the wings of birds are not actually 
guided by God nor the viscera of cattle shaped under the very axe. The roll 
of fate is unfolded on a different principle, sending ahead everywhere indi-
cations of what is to come, some familiar to us, others unknown. Whatever 
happens, it is a sign of something that will happen. Chance and random 
occurrences, and without a principle, do not permit divination. Whatever 
has a series of occurrences is also predictable.201 
199 Sen. Nat. VII.27.3.
200 R. Sorabji, ‘Causation, Laws, and Necessity’, in Schofi eld, Burnyeat, Barnes eds. (1980), 
pp. 250–82.
201 Sen. Nat. II.32.3–4. In this sense, on Seneca’s Dialogues, see A. Wilcox, ‘Nature’s Monster: 
Caligula as Exemplum in Seneca’s Dialogues’, in Sluiter, Rosen eds. (2008), pp. 451–75.
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In this sense everything also deserves our astonishment, both the common 
and the unusual, both the normal and the abnormal. Against superstition, the 
scientifi c attitude educates men to the wonders of nature: a conclusion that 
resonates throughout the centuries and, in particular, in Augustine.202
A notable exception to the belief in divination is Panaetius’s scepticism 
toward this practice.203 Even more signifi cant, however, is Diogenianus’s criti-
cism of this practice. Diogenianus’s argument reveals what is at stake in the 
attempt to use monstrosities as an epistemological tool. Diogenianus contrasts 
science and chance, adopting the Aristotelian point of view that there is no 
science of the accidental. By defi nition, he claims, monsters are accidental, 
and thus cannot offer any real comprehension of nature’s laws. Aristotelian 
teleology allows the understanding of monstrosity, but rules out its epistemo-
logical use.204 Stoic determinism, on the contrary, makes everything necessary 
in the same way, including monsters, whose precise origin we might not know, 
but whose teleological harmony with nature can be granted as a postulate.205
Once again, Lucan also represents a notable exception to the orthodox 
Stoic stance on divination, and one that is much more radical than that of 
Panaetius. Given the radically negative view of the course of history, he asks, 
would it not be better to ignore future events? This remark confi rms the 
Stoic belief in the possibility of divination. It turns upside down, though, the 
positive use that Stoics claim for divination itself. And no matter, for Lucan, 
the ontological ground that makes divination possible. Whether Stoic or 
Epicurean, nature can reveal only evil and misdeeds:
And now heaven’s wrath was revealed; the universe gave clear signs of 
battle; and Nature, conscious of the future, reversed the laws and ordi-
nances of life, and, while the hurly-burly bred monsters, proclaimed civil 
war. Why didst thou, Ruler of Olympus, see fi t to lay on suffering mortals 
this additional burden, that they should learn the approach of calamity by 
awful portents? Whether the author of the universe, when the fi re gave 
way and he fi rst took in hand the shapeless realm of raw matter, established 
the chain of causes for all eternity, and bound himself as well by universal 
law, and portioned out the universe, which endures the ages prescribed for 
it, by a fi xed line of destiny; or whether nothing is ordained and Fortune, 
moving at random, brings round the cycle of events, and chance is master 
202 Sen. Nat. VII.1.1–2.
203 See [Panaetius] (1952, 2nd ed.), 68 and 71. See also Grant (1952), p. 51, and Sambursky 
(1959), pp. 68 ff. Panaetius’s attitude might be the Stoic source of Philo’s denial of 
divination.
204 Sambursky (1959), pp. 70–1. See also Ioppolo (1986).
205 On Stoic determinism see Bobzien (1998).
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of mankind – in either case, let thy purpose, whatever it be, be sudden; let 
the mind of man be blind to coming doom; he fears, but leave him hope.206 
The argumentative force of Stoicism lies in its capacity to successfully join 
together religious faith in the teleological and providential character of divine 
intervention with scientifi c approach to the study of nature. Juvenal elegantly 
warns against the danger of making a vulgar use of divination.207 Cicero’s De 
divinatione is largely devoted to this problem, and presents, in a balanced man-
ner, a direct response to the scepticism based on Peripatetic arguments.208 Sen-
eca explains that the knowledge of nature is the highest value. It is a value in 
itself, but also because it chases away fear and superstition:
Since the cause of fear is ignorance, is it not worth a great deal to have 
knowledge in order not to fear? It is much better to investigate the causes 
and, in fact, to be intent on this study with the entire mind. [. . .] An earth-
quake produces a thousand strange things [mille miracula] and changes the 
appearances of places and carries away mountains, elevates plains, pushes 
valleys up, raises new islands in the sea. What causes these things to hap-
pen is a subject worth investigating.209 
Anomalous and portentous phenomena, once again, help the philosopher con-
tinue such a diffi cult task. The more scientifi cally oriented authors agree on 
this. Balancing the religious and mystical attitude with a genuine belief in the 
epistemological value of divination, they frame monstrosities within the whole 
to which they belong. Gods cannot be directly responsible for every single 
206 Lucan. II.1–15. See Johnson (1987), p. 9.
207 Iuu. XIII.
208 Cic. Div. I.54: ‘[. . .] it is enough for me to fi nd, not many, but even a few instances of 
divinely inspired prevision and prophecy. Nay, if even one such instance is found and 
the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude 
every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, 
that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.’
209 Sen. Nat. VI.3.4–VI.4.1. See also Grant (1952), p. 167. Epictetus beautifully advises 
welcoming both the auspicious and the ominous response, and warns against the use of 
divination to avoid what must be done in any case. Epict. Ench. 32: ‘Do not [. . .] bring 
to the diviner desire or aversion, and do not approach him with trembling, but having 
fi rst made up your mind that every issue is indifferent and nothing to you, but that, 
whatever it may be, it will be possible for you to turn it to good use, and that no one will 
prevent this. [. . .] when it is your duty to share the danger of a friend or of your country, 
do not ask of the diviner whether you ought to share that danger. [. . .] reason requires 
that even at this risk [sc. Death] you are to stand by your friend, and share the danger 
with your country.’
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detail, as the universe is too complex. Yet in the beginning, Cicero explains, 
the universe was made so that effects necessarily follow their causes, and can 
be foreseen by recognising their anticipatory symptoms.210 The monsters that 
appear right before Caesar’s death belong to such a category of symptoms:
While [Caesar] was offering sacrifi ces on the day when he sat for the fi rst 
time on a golden throne and fi rst appeared in public in a purple robe, no 
heart was found in the vitals of the votive ox. Now do you think it possible 
for any animal that has blood to exist without a heart? [. . .] On the fol-
lowing day there was no head to the liver of the sacrifi ce. These portents 
were sent by the immortal gods to Caesar that he might foresee his death, 
not that he might prevent it.211 
Signs, wonders and monstrosity are sent by the gods to instruct men: this idea 
is eventually developed in early Christianity and has a strong infl uence during 
the medieval and early modern periods. More generally, the ideas of both God 
and providence elaborated within Stoicism as a development and a reworking 
of Attic philosophy and as a polemical response against Epicureanism contrib-
ute to the philosophical framework left as a heritage to future centuries.
In this chapter we looked at the Stoic approach to monstrosity, paying 
attention to both the system’s internal articulation and the way the school’s 
ideas unfolded from the early Hellenistic period through the Imperial age. 
Stoics contribute to the debate on monstrosity by forging original intellectual 
tools to explain imperfection and evil in the framework of a rational cosmos 
providentially built and guided by a divine principle. I have argued that the 
original position developed by the Stoics rests on a nominalism that treats 
all generalisation and universalisation as the illusory abstractions of a weak 
human imagination. Through nominalism, Stoics obliterate the idea of tran-
scendency and understand the material world’s multiplicity, with all its imper-
fections, via the development of a divine rational principle. Comparing the 
two previous chapters lets us see that such immanency is different from the 
atomists’ version. Stoics order the universe according to degrees of perfec-
tion, and instead of ruling out qualitative differences (e.g. between good and 
evil, normal and abnormal, beauty and ugliness), as the Epicureans do, they 
reintroduce them in a divinely providential, teleologically oriented structure.
210 Cic. Div. I.52.
211 Cic. Div. I.52. The argument also includes an attempt at explanation: ‘Therefore, when 
those organs, without which the victim could not have lived, are found wanting in the 
vitals, we should understand that the absent organs disappeared at the very moment of 
immolation.’
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Monstrosities are thus explained with original and powerful ideas such as 
the panspermia (i.e. the origin of the seed from the whole body and the whole 
genus), the vital forces informing matter, the semina rerum and, more generally, 
the uniqueness of every being, which Christian thought eventually transforms 
into God’s omnipotent creation of wonders. I have highlighted in this chap-
ter the ambivalent contrast between the immanency of the divine material 
principle throughout matter itself and the transcendent order that allows the 
distribution of beings of varying degrees of perfection. This can be seen, for 
example, in Manilius’s thought, in which there exists a tension between the 
idea of relativity of beauty and ugliness on the one hand, for which nothing 
is absolutely superior to anything else, and the superiority of Western races to 
Ethiopians on the other, which undermines relativism. Stoics, I have argued, 
deem evil and monstrosity necessary to conceive and comprehend nature’s 
diversity and its providential order. Imperfection and monstrosity become the 
subaltern circumstances of perfection. Moreover, these attitudes allow them 
to elaborate foundational arguments for teleological and providential philoso-
phies such as the perfection of the human body. Scepticism, the third great 
system – in fact, the anti-system – of the Hellenistic age, will take an entirely 
different approach, as we willsee in the next chapter.
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Scepticism
In 155 BCE, three philosophers travel to Rome from Greece with the task of 
obtaining the cancellation of the 500 talents fi ne imposed on the Athenians 
for the destruction of the city of Oropus. The mission is successful for the three 
ambassadors, Diogenes the Stoic, Critolaus the Peripatetic and Carneades the 
Academic. The political success, though, is accompanied by a cultural disaster. 
Waiting to be received by the Senate, they entertain the curious and inquisitive 
Romans with a series of philosophical lectures. Carneades opts for a very sensi-
tive topic, namely the nature of justice.1 Against a substantialist conception 
of justice, he argues for its problematic character, its being grounded on force, 
and ultimately he maintains relativism and the inexistence of natural right. 
More than a realistic and pessimistic position, Carneades intends to illustrate 
the powerful rhetorical and theoretical dimension of his philosophy, namely 
Scepticism.
Greek culture shows its monstrous face to Rome, the rising political power 
in the Mediterranean, after the battle of Pydna and the extinction of the 
Antigonid dynasty. Roman culture, at this time, is still relatively untouched 
by philosophical ideas. Cato the Elder is among the most shocked of his 
fellow citizens, and successfully pleads for the rapid expulsion of the three 
philosophers from Rome. The vain hope is to keep philosophy outside of the 
city, and to protect youth from its corruptive character. This ban is unsuc-
cessful. What do Romans fi nd abhorrent in Carneades’ thought? What is so 
unbearable in his rhetoric and philosophy?
Romans certainly did not need to meet and greet the Greek ambassadors 
to be aware, in practice if not in theory, of the harsh character of justice. What 
was outrageous was rather the Sceptic belief that not only the idea of justice, 
but every philosophical and – as a consequence – scientifi c, theological and 
 1 Cic. Resp. III.8–11.
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moral idea does not and cannot have a solid and unquestionable ground. Men 
ordinarily claim truths, anchoring them, through a process of reasoning, on 
what they believe is a solid ground. The counter-truth argued by Carneades is 
that this very process is ungrounded, and thus all the past and, arguably, future 
philosophical theories must be doubted.
The defi nition, conception and treatment of monstrosity has been devel-
oped within the ontological, physical and metaphysical framework of previous 
schools of thought, notably atomism, Platonism, Peripateticism, Stoicism. The 
Sceptics call all of these schools dogmatic.2 If Sceptics claim the ability to 
undo the latter’s grounding frameworks, what remains of monstrosity? And 
also what remains, more worryngly, of the related concept of normality? If 
every theory and even every defi nition is ungrounded, how can anyone or 
anything be defi ned as normal or monstrous? Ancient Scepticism provides 
powerful tools to respond to these questions, tools that enjoy a long life being 
received and reworked in the following centuries.
In this chapter, I will focus mainly on the aspects of Scepticism that pertain 
to the interpretation of the concepts of normality and monstrosity. Although 
it is necessary to distinguish clearly between Pyrrhonism, Neo-Pyrrhonism and 
the new Academy,3 these aspects reveal a certain consistency of treatment 
across the main stages of the development of Scepticism. I will reconstruct 
these aspects through authors whose doctrines are sometimes very diverse, 
although they contribute to developing a consistent set of tools against a 
strong concept of normality, tools that offer an original perspective on the 
idea of monstrosity.
The ground of Sceptic philosophy is the necessity of the suspension of 
every positive discourse (the ἀφασία) on the determinate nature of things, 
thus on good or evil, right or wrong, beauty or ugliness. Similarly to Stoicism 
and Epicureanism, the immediate τέλος of this philosophical attitude is an 
ethical concern, the ἀταραξία or imperturbability of the mind. The Neos-
ceptic Sextus Empiricus, going back to Pyrrho and the ancient sources of his 
movement in search of the root of Scepticism, puts it plainly in his Πυρρώνειοι 
ὑποτυπώσεις by way of defi nition:
Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to 
judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equi-
pollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought fi rstly to 
 2 See D.L. IX.74.
 3 On the New Academy see C. Lévy, ‘Cicero and the New Academy’, in Gerson (2010), 
pp. 39–62.
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a state of mental suspense [ἐποχή] and next to a state of ‘unperturbedness’ 
or quietude [ἀταραξία].4 
According to the Suda, Pyrrho was the fi rst to introduce the ἐποχή, the 
suspension of judgement that generates the unperturbedness.5 The con-
fl icting appearances of things are the object of undecided or undetermined 
(ἀνεπίκριτος) disputes. It is interesting to note that while for Peripatetics 
such as Simplicius the undecidability comes from the fact that arguments 
are ‘unexamined’,6 Sceptics rather insist on their undecidable character. 
Disputes cannot be decided, because knowledge lacks a solid ground for 
any decision whatsoever, even after careful examination of the problem. 
Whereas this might be seen as generating inquietude and painful uncertainty, 
Sceptics counterintuitively argue that undecidability helps men to recog-
nise that nothing is good or evil, right or wrong, beautiful or ugly, normal or 
monstrous in itself. It helps them to be worried only for inevitable things and, 
even in this case, to be worried less than anyone else.7
Objections to this system, however, begin to be raised precisely on moral 
and ethical grounds, that is to say on the core of the doctrine itself. The 
Sceptic is portrayed as an antisocial individual. Diogenes Laertius tells that 
 4 S.E. P. I.8. See also P. I.27–8: ‘For the man who opines that anything is by nature good 
or bad is for ever being disquieted [. . .]. On the other hand, the man who determines 
nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; 
and, in consequence, he is unperturbed [ἀτᾶρακτος].’ Robin (1944), p. 9, suggests that 
ethics and practical life are always the major concern in Scepticism, vis-à-vis ontological 
speculations and scientifi c knowledge.
 5 S.E. P. I.25–30. 
 6 Simp. In Ph. 1148.29.
 7 S.E. P. I.30 and Aenesidemus of Cnossus (2014), B1 (=Phot. Bibl. 212 169 b 18–31). 
Pyrrho himself was indeed unworried, if one believes Antigonus of Carystus’s testimony 
in D.L. IX.62: ‘He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for noth-
ing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, 
dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but 
he was kept out of harm’s way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, 
used to follow close after him. But Aenesidemus says that it was only his philosophy 
that was based upon suspension of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his 
everyday acts. He lived to be nearly ninety.’ Besides the irony of this passage (but also 
the effectiveness of his friends’ care, if he managed to live up to ninety years old!), this 
statement explains Pyrrho’s dismissal of phenomena, which has a strategic importance 
in Sceptic philosophy (see infra). Reale interprets this image of Pyrrho as a direct attack 
on Aristotelian ontology based on the Law of Non-Contradiction. See G. Reale, ‘Ipotesi 
per una rilettura della fi losofi a di Pirrone di Elide’, in Giannantoni a cura di (1980), 
pp. 243–336, esp. p. 318. See contra, Bett (2000), pp. 123–31.
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Pyrrho is reproached for ignoring his friend Anaxarchus fallen into a slough.8 
It is certainly madness, and it leads to contradiction, to deem all things equal, 
claims Eusebius of Caesarea, who bitterly asks: ‘What sort of citizen, or judge, 
or counsellor, or friend, or, in a word, what sort of man would such an one be? 
Or what evil deeds would not he dare, who held that nothing is really evil, or 
disgraceful, or just or unjust? For one could not say even this, that such men 
are afraid of the laws and their penalties; for how should they, seeing that, as 
they themselves say, they are incapable of feeling or of trouble?’9
Both ethical and ontological objections were quite frequent in the Hel-
lenistic philosophical school. Despite these objections, though, ancient 
Scepticism has solid philosophical roots and its exponents have sharp tools 
to counter any dogmatic claim, including the categorisation of normality, 
abnormality and indeed monstrosity. It is particularly relevant for the present 
enquiry that the main philosophical source of Scepticism, according to an 
established tradition, is Democritean atomism. Eusebius claims that Sceptics 
and Cyrenaics should be joined in the study of atomists.10 As Dal Pra suggests, 
the major infl uence of atomism on Scepticism can be seen in the disjunction 
and opposition between reality and perception, or between how things are 
and how they are necessarily perceived by men.11 This is how Galen describes 
Democritus’s philosophy:
‘For by convention colour, by convention sweet, by convention bitter, but 
in reality atoms and the voids’ says Democritus, who thinks that all the 
perceptible qualities are brought into being, relative to us who perceive 
them, by the combination of atoms, but by nature nothing is white or black 
or yellow or red or bitter or sweet. By the expression ‘by convention’ he 
means ‘conventionally’ and ‘relative to us’, not according to the nature of 
things themselves, which he calls by contrast ‘reality’, forming the term 
from ‘real’ which means ‘true’. The whole substance of this theory is as fol-
lows. People think of things as being white and black and sweet and bitter 
and all other qualities of that kind, but in truth ‘thing’ and ‘nothing’ is all 
there is. That too is something he himself said, ‘thing’ being his name for 
the atoms and ‘nothing’ for the void.12 
 8 D.L. IX.63. Ironically, on this unfortunate occasion, only Anaxarcus himself ‘praised 
[Pyrrho’s] indifference and sang-froid’.
 9 Eus. PE XIV.18 (= Pirrone (1981), pp. 106–7).
10 Eus. PE XIV.19 (= Pirrone (1981), p. 91).
11 Dal Pra (1975, 2a ed.), p. 47. On Democritus and Scepticism see also F. Decleva Caizzi, 
‘Democrito in Sesto Empirico’, in Romano a cura di (1980), pp. 393–410, and Gigante 
(1981).
12 Gal. De clementis secundum Hippocratem I.2, Vorsokr. 68 A 49 (= LM [27] ATOM. D23b, 
D43, D63 = Taylor (1999) 179 d).
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Galen clearly realises that atomic theory raises the question of essential or 
intrinsic properties: are secondary qualities intrinsic to things, or are they rela-
tive to the observer, engaged in the observation in a specifi c time and place?13 
Atomists propose two important principles in response to this question: 1) the 
knowledge of secondary qualities is necessarily relative to the encounter with 
the observer’s organs of perception, and 2) it is precisely this theoretical and 
non-experimental conclusion that allows us to grasp the reality of nature’s 
material structure.
Democritus’s position, as regards the sensorial appearance of reality, 
leads to the conclusion that even when men agree on the appearance of 
things, it does not mean that the latter’s inherent nature is in fact as it 
appears. Things’ properties are rather νόμοι, by convention. In this onto-
logical hypothesis, knowledge is threatened by the loss of any fi xed and 
stable ground, and is exposed to the relativity and uncertainty of sensual 
perceptions. Pyrrho appears to be the fi rst to draw such a conclusion from 
Democritus’s attitude. Although Pyrrho is not mainly or directly interested 
in a deep immersion into physics or the study of nature’s physical details, it 
is clear why he might have been attracted by an ontology that exposes the 
feebleness of every epistemological enterprise because of, and not despite, the 
nature of physical reality itself.
The Sceptic and relativist tendency of atomist physics is already devel-
oped by Democritus’s pupil Metrodorus of Chios. Metrodorus insists on the 
clear distinction between knowledge through reason and knowledge through 
sensation. We do not know much, if anything, with the senses, and this 
makes knowledge impossible. The only legitimate knowledge is the ratio-
nal kind, and the criticism of knowledge through sensation, upon which 
Scepticism is grounded, has thus a Democritean origin.14 The convergence 
of Scepticism and atomism is, however, limited to perception. Whereas the 
two schools are very close on the ethical goals of the εὐθυμία (cheerfulness 
or contentment) and ἀταραξία (calmness or impassiveness), they diverge 
on the possibility of gaining rational knowledge beyond sense perception.15 
The atomic hypothesis, for Democritus and his followers, is indeed able to 
offer an explanation and provide knowledge of nature. It also provides an 
interpretation of the weakness of perception itself and of the reasons for 
which the senses deceive us.16 Atomism, in this sense, is dogmatic because 
it claims positive knowledge and certainly does not pursue the suspension 
of judgement.
13 See Taylor’s commentary, pp. 176–7.
14 Robin (1944), pp. 5, 16 and passim. 
15 Stough (1969), p. 32.
16 See Bett (2000), p. 153 and Appendix C, p. 187.
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The Tropes and the Critique of Essentialism
The richness of Scepticism, for the present enquiry, lies in turning doubt and 
ἐποχή into the ends and not only the means of philosophy. The boundary 
between normality and monstrosity can thus be challenged through Sceptic 
arguments. Let us follow this kind of contention in what is perhaps the most 
systematic development of Sceptic philosophy, namely the tropes. Ascribed 
to Aenesidemus in the number of ten, the tropes are the fundamental modes 
through which Sceptics defend undecidability and the suspension of judge-
ment concerning how things are in their real nature.17 The tropes, a real 
anti-dogmatic war machine,18 contain strong conceptual tools for challeng-
ing and rethinking monstrosity. Three of them are particularly relevant in 
this sense: the fi rst and second ones, on the diversity of phenomenological 
reality, sub-human and human alike, and the ninth one, on rare events.
The fi rst trope concerns the relativity of affections that generate disharmony, 
unbalance and confl ict in the animal world. Natural differences cause the same 
thing to produce different impressions and affections.19 Sense-affection strongly 
implies a ‘divergent, discordant, and confl icting character’.20 Humans are thus 
confronted with a multiplicity of changing phenomena and dragged into the 
unstable and confl ictual experience of reality. Stability and unshakeable certi-
tude are illusions, because of the nature of reality, characterised by diversity and 
contradiction. Humans are able to tell how things appear, but certainly not how 
they are, or how they should be judged, or what their nature is: ‘Although I shall 
be able to say what the nature of the underlying objects appears to me to be, I 
shall be compelled, for the reasons stated above, to suspend judgement as to its 
real nature.’21
Knowledge is thus exposed to the confusing nature of phenomenal reality. 
The phenomenon confronts the perceiver by taking centre stage and imposing 
on him a confusing experience. The phenomenon is from φαίνεσθαι, come to 
light, appear to be in a certain way, in sense experience or in mental reality, 
and also bring to light and cause to appear.22 Both Plato and Aristotle use the 
17 On the tropes, see G. Striker, ‘The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus’, in Burnyeat (1983), 
pp. 95–115, Flückiger (1990), pp. 78–89, Gaukroger (1995). See also Brochard (1923), 
Polito (2004) and Polito’s commentary to the testimonia in Aenesidemus of Cnossus 
(2014).
18 Conche (1973), esp. ch. XI.
19 S.E. P. I.40.
20 S.E. P. I.43.
21 S.E. P. I.78.
22 Cassin (2014), p. 777: ‘We fi nd the same Indo-European root *bh(e)ə2– (illumine, 
shine) in phôs [φῶς] (light), in phantasia [φαντασία] (imagination, representation), and 
also in phêmi [φημί] (to say).’
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term phenomenon for what is, and appears to be, evident in itself. The epis-
temological fi ght concerning this concept becomes apparent early on, with 
the Sceptics using the term, especially against Stoics, for what appears to the 
senses and forbids rational evidence. Pyrrho evokes this idea with a powerful 
statement, preserved by Diogenes Laertius, Sextus and Galen: ‘The phenom-
enon prevails on every side, wherever it may go’ [ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντῃ 
σθένει, οὗπερ ἂν ἔσθῃ].23
Scholars have underlined the different and plausible interpretations of 
Pyrrho’s ambivalent statement: What does ‘prevail’ mean in this context? 
The ambivalence of this passage also depends on the meaning of the phenom-
enon itself, in a threatening and monstrous manner. The phenomenon reveals 
something about Being that, at the same time, makes its knowledge diffi cult 
and even impossible.24 Being and phenomenon appear as mutually threaten-
ing and mutually dependent on each other, as Aristotle explains, suggesting 
that, without corresponding to Being but only to its appearance, the phenom-
enon nonetheless guides thought in its movement toward truth. By defi ning 
this relationship, Attic philosophy attempts a double move: establishing the 
agreement of thought and Being through a phenomenality, and perhaps a phe-
nomenology, of truth (i.e. the essence manifesting itself in its visible form), 
while at the same time laying the ground for the distinction between visible 
and intelligible, as well as the subordination of the former to the latter. The 
phenomenon brings the philosopher to the heart of the ontological problem, 
i.e. the problem of Being and its truth.
Sceptic philosophers choose their target well. They understand that dog-
matism can be undermined by attacking the legitimacy of the agreement 
between the phenomenon and the essence and the subordination of the one 
to the other. Sceptics ground their criticism, I believe, on another ambigu-
ity implied in the concept of phenomenon. Modern languages still carry 
the memory of such an ambiguity in the double sense of the phenomenal, 
namely what appears to the senses, but also what is exceptional, extraordinary, 
remarkable or marvellous and ultimately amazing. Latins already have the res 
23 I follow Stough’s translation of this passage, see infra. See Pirrone (1981), 63 A–C (Decleva 
in Pirrone (1981): ‘L’apparenza totalmente domina, là dove giunga’); D.L. IX.105; Hicks 
in Diogenes Laertius (1950), p. 517: ‘But the apparent is omnipotent wherever it goes’; 
Polito in Aenesidemus (2014), p. 138: ‘But that which appears is all-powerful wherever it 
goes’; S.E. M. VII.30 (Bury in Sextus Empiricus (1953–61) II, p. 17: ‘Yea, the Appearance 
is ev’rywhere strong, where’er it approacheth’), and Gal. De dign. puls, in Galeni, Claudii 
(1821–33), VIII.776. 
24 See Polito’s elaborate comment of the articulation between different conceptions of the 
φαινόμενον within Scepticism in Aenesidemus (2014), pp. 139–52. See also Auroux 
éd. (1990) II, 1928–30.
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mirabilis for the φαινόμενον: the Sceptics imperceptibly bring us to the heart 
of the discourse on monstrosity. The confl ictuality comes forward: Being and 
essence claim stability; the phenomenon is supposed to reveal this stability, 
to make it apparent and bring it to light. Contrarywise, it disturbs the picture 
and confuses that claim. It has the phenomenal power of shaking the nature of 
beings25 and making everything appear loose.
In the same way that the simulacrum claims its own autonomy vis-à-vis 
the symbiotic balance between original and copy,26 the phenomenon claims its 
own reality vis-à-vis the intelligible reality itself. By doing so, the phenomenon 
exposes philosophy to the threat of the monstrous and phenomenal character 
of appearances.27 Its strength, against the subtleties of dogmatism, lies in the 
plain and evident nature of everyone’s experience. Common sense, as Sextus 
explains, cries out against the dogmatist’s claim.28
‘The phenomenon prevails on every side, wherever it may go’: three inter-
pretations of this statement, and of the status of the phenomenon in Scepticism, 
become possible. Sceptic philosophy has been criticised for leading to inaction, 
passivity and indolence, for the lack of criteria for judging life’s conduct. What 
if, however, the phenomenon itself becomes a candidate for the role of criterion 
to be followed? This is the fi rst sense that one can give to Pyrrho’s statement, 
namely a normative meaning whereby the phenomenon is able to prevail only 
because nothing else can. The phenomenon becomes the mover, whose outcome 
is not inaction, as common sense seems to suggest, but rather phenomenal action. 
The criterion of such an action bars intellect and thought (διάνοια and λόγος), 
denying them any right whatsoever to draw any conclusion as to the nature of 
things, on the ground of the exclusive validity of the phenomenon.29 Without 
25 Stough (1969), p. 23, underlines that ‘Timon’s use of φύειν (n. 3) suggests that φαινόμενον 
was contrasted with φύσις by the early Pyrrhonists.’
26 See Deleuze (1969).
27 Cassin éd. (2004), p. 777: ‘Phainomenon retains a certain ambiguity. Sometimes the term 
designates that which “appears” or seems to appear as this or that, without really or truly 
being so (thus a phainomenos sullogismos [φαινόμενος συλλογισμός] is one that “merely 
seems to reason” [Aristotle, Top. I, 100 b 25]); other times, it designates what we call, 
properly, “phenomena,” that is, obvious and constraining events, such as natural phe-
nomena, that are sometimes remarkable and for which we have to account (apodounai ta 
phainomena [ἀποδοῦναι τὰ φαινόμενα] [Aristotle, Metaph. Λ, 1073 a 36–7]).’
28 S.E. P. I.210: ‘[. . .] the view about the same thing having opposite appearances is not a 
dogma of the Sceptics but a fact which is experienced not by the Sceptics alone but also 
by the rest of philosophers and by all mankind.’ See Flückiger (1990), p. 52.
29 See Dumont (1972), p. 8 and passim. Dumont calls this attitude phenomenism and, 
reaching beyond its atomist origin, he gives the highest degree of consistency to the 
φαινόμενον: ‘Le phénomène est une réalité matérielle ou, si l’on préfère, un corps.’
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ruling out the ambiguity, Stough attributes this fi rst possible interpretation to 
Timon, who ‘may also mean, however, that the phenomenon prevails by com-
manding acceptance. That is, though we do not claim that honey really is sweet, 
we do (cannot help but) grant that it appears (tastes) sweet.’30
A second interpretation, more widely shared among scholars, suggests that 
the phenomenon negatively imposes its presence and exclusive reality, ruin-
ing the possibility of knowledge. By barring intellect and thought, it puts the 
perceiver in a passive position and subjugates her to the mere phenomenal-
ity of things. In this sense, the phenomenon produces a real psychological 
constriction, evoked by Sextus in P. I.19 and 22. In this interpretation, such 
constriction merely has a negative value and cannot be intended in any nor-
mative sense. Pyrrho’s statement, following this argument, leads to the mere 
acknowledgement of human’s misery and his intellectual weakness. Human 
life is dominated by what manifests itself, becoming his lord and master.31
Expanding on the phenomenal and monstrous character of the φαινόμενον, 
however, a third reading becomes possible for what, in Pyrrho’s view, ‘prevails 
on every side’: ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντῃ σθένει. Σθένω means, after all, to 
have strength or might, to have power and be able to do something, close to 
the Latin valeo. Sceptics are well aware of the relationship of force that exists 
between concepts. The mind is a real Kampfplatz upon which arguments con-
front each other, destroy each other, acquire hegemony and obtain the fi nal 
victory. The overall Sceptic strategy is precisely to reveal that no victory is 
ever fi nal. They obliterate the conditions of this fi ght by claiming that the 
belief in the superiority of one argument over the other is an illusion and that, 
in fact, arguments have always the same force, an ἰσοσθένεια that inevitably 
compels the suspension of judgement.32
The phenomenon autonomously appears, strong and mighty, in front of 
us. Like a simulacrum, it brings its polemical presence to the foreground. 
The appearance claims autonomy more than omnipotence, thus destroying 
every and any claim of the essences’ power.33 Sceptic phenomenalism recon-
nects with the confl ictual incipit of Greek philosophy, in the Parmenidean 
clash between λόγος and experience (ἐμπειρία). In their phenomenal and 
confl ictual diversity, things that appear (τὰ δοκοῦντα) claim their specifi c 
truth and being.34
30 Stough (1969), p. 24. See also Brochard (1923), pp. 77–91, and Long (1978).
31 See Decleva Caizzi in Pirrone (1981) who suggests the translation of φαινόμενον with 
appearance, esp. pp. 262–5.
32 See S.E. M. IX.59.
33 See Conche (1973), p. 56. 
34 Vorsokr. 28 B 1 (= LM [19] PARM. D4, R8, R16, R39, R52 = S.E. M. VII.111 ff.)
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Plato, for example, is well aware of the danger represented by the δοκοῦντα,35 
and his strategy is to reduce the phenomena to mere φαντάσματα.36 Yet the 
phenomenon resists this appropriation and reduction. Beyond the alternative 
between a criterion to be followed in the absence of any better ground, and 
the psychological constriction that imposes itself, the fi rst trope’s phenomenon 
embodies the monstrous nature of the anti-dogmatic principle par excellence. 
Autonomous and independent, the phenomenon grounds the diversity of the 
natural world on an open and fl at ontology that questions the meaning of 
boundaries, the strength of defi nitions and the lines of distinction, and, ulti-
mately, ruins hierarchies and divisions.
Aenesidemus’s second trope is also relevant for the present enquiry. 
Connected to the fi rst one by the idea of diversity and relativity, it explains 
that human customs and beliefs are necessarily different and a universal cri-
terion of judgement is once again ruled out. The argument is directed against 
not only dogmatists in general, but also all partisans of the superiority and 
excellence of human reason over the irrational, thus Stoics in particular. Not 
only animal diversity, but also human differences lead inevitably to the suspen-
sion of judgement. Humans build standards of judgement, but illegitimately 
so. Standards cannot be generalised and they prove to be false and wrong in 
many cases. Affections and impressions vary as much as possible on earth, and 
thus the only logical and coherent position to avoid contradiction and illusion 
is, once again, the ἐποχή.
Sextus’s argumentation is constructed quite effectively. First comes the 
mere acknowledgement of the universal diversity among humans, who differ in 
their shape (μορφή) and temperament, or body’s habit (ἰδιοσυγκρασία): ‘[. . .] 
in respect of choice and avoidance of external objects men exhibit great dif-
ferences [. . .] and the enjoyment of different things is an indication that we 
receive varying impressions from the underlying objects’.37 Meat, wine or fi sh 
affect individuals in different ways and no universal norm can be established for 
subjects who are supposedly similar (e.g. humans), but in fact very different in 
all respects.
Although Sextus refers to a common knowledge that can be experi-
enced by everyone, he brings into the picture extreme cases and exceptional 
examples to reinforce his argument and strike the reader. Human diversity 
not only abolishes normative and universal claims, but also makes room for 
what is close to the monstrous, namely the exceptional, the wonderful and 
35 See R. 505 d 5–9.
36 R. 516 b 3–4.
37 S.E. P. I.80.
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the astonishing φαινόμενα: an old woman swallows thirty drams of hemlock; 
someone suffers no harm from scorpions’ or poisonous spiders’ stings; some-
one else is able to cross a desert without drinking a drop of water.38 More 
importantly, Sextus fully addresses the question of otherness, generalising the 
peculiarities of those exceptions by bringing entire populations into the pic-
ture. The world is big: Sceptics know it, and denounce the dogmatist claims, 
throwing light on their ignorant provincialism: ‘The body of an Indian differs 
in shape from that of a Scythian [. . .] thus Indians enjoy some things, our 
people other things [. . .]’. Sextus is unsystematic, but also very specifi c, nam-
ing the Psyllaeans of North Africa, the Tentyritae of Egypt, the Ethiopians of 
Lake Meroë.39
Humans are as multiple and diverse as animals and material things. Bodily 
diversity, moreover, impacts, or at least refl ects, mental diversity. Thus, taste 
depends on judgement and refl ects the lack of universality. There is nothing 
wrong or blamable in how the human body and mind work. What is wrong, 
however, is the dogmatist’s claim to draw norms from their functioning, 
for example pointing to the superior knowledge and nature of the wise (the 
Stoics, once again, are particularly targeted by Sextus). The wise human will 
necessarily be Plato for the Platonist or Epicurus for the Epicurean. The para-
dox here is that in order to build a universal norm, dogmatists lean on their 
particular beliefs.
The fi nal part of Sextus’s argumentation concerning the second trope rules 
out even a possible compromise, based on a light form of dogmatism: what 
if one took the average as a rule, and the currently established norm for a 
guide, without attempting to dogmatise further? This argument recalls the 
traditional image of Scepticism following accepted customs and beliefs. Yet, if 
this resulted in anything different from ἐποχή, it would still be a mistake. The 
average exists, but it does not explain or justify precisely what it is supposed 
to explain, namely the unknowable diversity and richness of nature and men:
He who maintains that we ought to assent to the majority is making a 
childish proposal, since no one is able to visit the whole of mankind and 
determine what pleases the majority of them; for there may possibly be 
races of whom we know nothing amongst whom conditions rare with 
38 S.E. P. I.81–4. For an opposite attitude towards the Ethiopians, e.g. in Manil., see supra, 
but also, a few years later, Solin. 30.1 ff. who recognises the Ethiopians’ perverted cus-
toms but doubts their physical monstrosity. Further East, though, the monstruosa facies 
gentium makes its appearance (Solin. 30.12).
39 S.E. P. I.81–4.
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us are common, and conditions common with us rare [. . .] Necessarily, 
therefore, the differences in men afford a further reason for bringing in 
suspension of judgement.40 
Sextus reaffi rms the exigency of widening one’s experience and bringing other-
ness into the picture, beyond and against any supposedly universal and dog-
matic rule. Others can be wonderful and astonishing, but they are not marginal, 
or peripheral, or even rarer with us more than we are rare with them. In this 
respect, Scepticism connects once again with its Democritean source. Together 
with early atomists, Democritus had been attracted by the vastness of the world 
and the relativist and anti-dogmatic consequences that one can draw from it.41
Let us see now the ninth trope, which deals with the specifi c cause of 
humans’ weakness and misuse of judgements, namely the rarity of events. This 
argument has a strong infl uence on discourses concerning abnormality and 
monstrosity in every domain. The trope, Sextus explains, is based on the fre-
quency and rarity of events. Humans draw conclusions on the essence and 
nature of things, once again illegitimately grounding judgements on how things 
affect them. What is rare and uncommon (σπανός), however, says something 
only about the perceiver’s relation with the event or thing, and nothing about 
its nature. Sextus employs the example of the comet, whose superstitious use 
was certainly familiar to the reader. The sun, he says, is certainly ‘more amaz-
ing’ than the comet, more beautiful and more useful. Humans are, nonetheless, 
accustomed to it, and thus judge it with no astonishment. The comet, on the 
contrary, that only rarely appears in the sky, is regarded with amazement, awe, 
and like a portent or a sign of Zeus (a διοσημία): ‘rare things [. . .] we count as 
precious, but not what is familiar to us and easily got’.42
The ninth trope is clearly directed against the Stoic, whose rationalism does 
not imply abandoning the superstitious practice of divination. The comet, real 
monster of the sky, is a well-chosen example in this respect. Sextus knows that 
dogmatic knowledge has not only ontological but also practical consequences 
and, in a fashion similar to that of Epicureans, intends to dismantle their ground 
based on astonishment and ignorance. Notwithstanding the differences between 
the new Academy and Sextus’s Neo-Pyrrhonism, Cicero develops a similar 
argument against divination and superstition.43 In Div., he recognises that won-
ders come from the unusual and portentous, explaining that this refers only to 
40 S.E. P. I.88–9.
41 Robin (1944), p. 26, stresses the importance of Hecataeus of Abdera in this respect 
(p. 26).
42 S.E. P. I.141–3.
43 On Cicero’s Scepticism, see Gigon (1973), Goerler (1974), pp. 185–97, and Lévy (1992).
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our ignorance and certainly not to the nature or essence of the portent itself.44 
In ND, Cicero adds that, on this ground, the idea of ordering things according 
to their perfection, i.e. one of the core ideas of Stoicism, is fl awed, because ‘no 
defi nition is given of the meaning of “superior” and “more excellent”’.45
Once again, relativity overcomes every dogmatic claim. The conclusion 
fl ows in the same way and leads, following a logical and inevitable conse-
quence, toward the ἐποχή. In Sextus’s words:
Since then, owing to the frequency or rarity of their occurrence, the same 
things seem at one time to be amazing or precious and at another time noth-
ing of the sort, we infer that though we shall be able perhaps to say what 
nature appears to belong to each of these things in virtue of its frequent or 
rare occurrence, we are not able to state what nature absolutely belongs to 
each of the external objects. So because of this Mode [i.e. trope] also we 
suspend judgement regarding them.46 
The tropes thus summarise the Sceptics’ reasons for the suspension of judge-
ment. Yet they should not be considered as a counter-dogmatics, presented as 
a consistent theory, but rather as the tool for the obliteration and demolition 
of every possible dogmatism. The consequences are great for the traditional 
ontological systems and, in particular, for every discourse concerning taxono-
mies, normativity and monstrosity.
Another strong argument, in this sense, is in Timon’s early liquidation 
of determination, related to the explanation of Pyrrho’s argument about the 
οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. In his Πυθών, Timon declares that
the Sceptics even refute the statement ‘Not more (one thing than another).’ 
For, as forethought is no more existent than non-existent, so ‘Not more 
44 Cic. Div. II.22: ‘You spoke of a mule bearing a colt. Such an event excites wonder because 
it seldom occurs; but if it had been impossible it would not have occurred. And it may be 
urged with effect against all portents that the impossible never has happened and that 
the possible need not excite any wonder. Now, in case of some new occurrence, igno-
rance of its cause is what excites our wonder; whereas, the same ignorance as to things of 
frequent occurrence does not. For the man who marvels that a mule has foaled does not 
understand how a mare foals and is ignorant of animal parturition in general. What he 
sees frequently causes him no astonishment even though he does not know how it hap-
pened. If something happens which he never saw before he considers it a portent. Then, 
which is the portent – the mule’s conception or its parturition? The conception, it may 
be, is contrary to the usual course of nature, but the parturition follows as a necessary 
sequel of conception.’ See also Div. II.28.
45 ND III.26. See Dal Pra (1975, 2a ed.), p. 193.
46 S.E. P. I.144.
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(one thing than another)’ is no more existent than not. Thus, as Timon 
says in the Pytho, the statement means just absence of all determination and 
withholding of assent [τὸ μηδὲν ὁρίζειν, ἀλλὰ ἀπροσθετεῖν].47 
Timon prohibits every determination, in view of the suspension of judgement, 
not only on the inner nature of things, but also for what concerns their essence 
in relation to, and as distinguished from, that of other things. The verb ὁρίζειν 
means defi ne, determine, ordain, lay down, but also delimit or limit, part or 
divide, and separate from, with a border or a boundary. Decleva correctly 
underlines the difference between ‘determine’ and ‘defi ne’, suggesting the for-
mer reading in Timon’s work.48 The semantic distinction, though, does not 
obliterate the similarity of ontological effects produced by determination and 
defi nition alike. This similarity consists in the operation of partage that not only 
produces dogmatic conclusions, but also constructs essential differences on 
the mutually exclusive relation between sameness and otherness, identity and 
alterity and, from here, between normality and abnormality. Following Pyrrho, 
Timon appears to intend determination not only in the sense of ascertaining 
something, but also of setting boundaries, fi xing positions, limiting and distin-
guishing something from something else. And this is precisely what Scepticism 
proscribes. Carneades means the same thing when he denies the possibility of 
knowing inherent and intrinsic features of things. At stake is the very concept 
of essence, whose consistency depends on a defi nition, which in turn depends 
on the construction and perception of ‘essence’.49
Sceptics also forbid a different approach to the partage between normality 
and abnormality, an approach that is not defi nitional (i.e. based on the defi ni-
tion of their essence), but rather derivative, i.e. that obtains abnormality and 
monstrosity from normality by way of quantitative or qualitative transforma-
tion. A human can be said monstrously tall, or a cow monstrously fat. However: 
how tall, or how fat, is monstrously such? When is tall or fat too much, so much 
so that quantity becomes quality, and normality is transformed into monstros-
ity? Surely one can add a small quantity to a normal height or weight, and still 
be within normality. Supposedly, this operation cannot be repeated without, at 
47 D.L. IX.76 (= Pirrone (1981), fr. 54.).
48 Decleva, in Pirrone (1981), p. 234: ‘ὁρίζειν means «determine» and not, as it is often 
said of this text, “defi ne” (cfr. LSJ. III 1; Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s. v. ὁρίζειν, p. 524: 
“forma activa ὁρίζειν logica defi niendi signifi catione non videtur usurpari”). Von Fritz, 
Pyrrhon [in RE XXIV (1963), coll. 89–106], 100 is correct (“wir setzen nichts fest . . . wir 
grenzen nichts als wahr gegen etwas Falsches ab, wir sagen nichts bestimmtes aus”) [my 
translation].’ See also TGL sub voce and Dal Pra (1975, 2a ed.), p. 94.
49 See Sextus, M. VII.411–15. See also Dal Pra (1975, 2a ed.) and Gigante (1980), p. 138 n.
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some point, normality slowly fading, or abruptly transforming, into something 
abnormal and monstrous. Yet, Sceptics intend to deny this transformation and 
forbid precisely this passage. For them, abnormality or monstrosity cannot be 
derived or obtained from normality: it is the famous argument of the sorites.
‘Sorites’ comes from σωρός, the heap, a collection of objects piled up on 
each other. The metaphor is used to deny the possibility of attributing a predi-
cate to a subject. Consider a heap of wheat grains: surely I can remove one 
grain, without the heap being transformed in something else or, more specifi -
cally, into a non-heap. What happens if I keep repeating the operation? Will 
the second-last grain, or the very last one, still be the same heap? And if not, 
when did it become a non-heap? Which grain was the one that changed the 
quantity into quality? The argument underlines the paradox of a threshold 
that supposedly transforms the nature and essence of the object – the heap or 
the tall human or the fat cow – into something else, i.e. a non-heap, or a mon-
strously tall being or a monstrously fat animal. Sceptics employ the sorites to 
argue against the consistency of determinations. Cicero describes the sorites 
fallacy as irrefutable:
No faculty of knowing absolute limits has been bestowed upon us by the 
nature of things to enable us to fi x exactly how far to go in any matter; 
and this is so not only in the case of a heap of wheat from which the 
name is derived, but in no matter whatsoever – if we are asked by gradual 
stages, is such and such a person a rich man or a poor man, famous or 
undistinguished, are yonder objects many or few, great or small, long or 
short, broad or narrow, we do not know at what point in the addition 
or subtraction to give a defi nite answer. [. . .] you admit my point, that you 
cannot specify in your answers either the place where ‘a few’ stops or that 
where ‘many’ begins; and this class of error spreads so widely that I don’t 
see where it may not get to [. . .]. Consequently that science of yours gives 
you no assistance against a sorites, as it does not teach you either the fi rst 
point or the last in the process of increasing or diminishing.50 
Sceptics also use the argument to underline the changing and fl uid nature of 
reality, which prevents universal conclusions and rigid defi nitions that would 
establish boundaries and fi x identities in a certain and stable manner. Carneades’ 
argument highlights the problem of the psychological threshold that makes us 
50 Cic. Acad. II.92–5, also for Carneades’ response to Chrysippus’s attempt to solve the 
sorites’s paradox by remaining silent on the critical threshold. On the sorites see Auroux, 
p. 2427, Lalande, pp. 1011–13, Ritter, Gründer hrsg. (1971–2007), IX, cc. 1090–9. See 
also S.E. M. VII.416 ff., Dal Pra (1975, 2a ed.), p. 104 and passim, and Wiggins (1980).
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able to grant or deny a certain status to something in virtue of the quantity of 
its components or its features. Such a status is always problematic, since the 
threshold depends on the infi nite divisibility of that quantity and the infi nitesi-
mal quantity that, supposedly, makes or unmakes the thing’s identity: whereas a 
continuity exists, the mind illegitimately perceives a discontinuity.51
Sorites-like arguments were not the exclusive monopoly of Sceptics. On 
the contrary, Stoics had made powerful use of them exploring the effi cacy of 
ascending from the less to the most perfect, which in turn is based on the 
conception of degrees of perfection that, although in different ways, they 
share with Plato and Aristotle. Cleanthes’ attempt to prove God’s existence 
in this way is faithfully reported by Sextus.52 Cleanthes’ argumentation, nev-
ertheless, is not entirely convincing, as it does not appear to fully exploit the 
potentiality of transitivity from one element to the other of the ascending 
chain. With Carneades, Cicero clearly understands the dogmatist’s weakness. 
He declares that Stoic arguments are nothing less than monstra and plays the 
sorites argument against them:
[. . .] if Zeus is a God, Poseidon also, being his brother, will be a God. And 
if Poseidon is a God, Achelous, too, will be a God; and if Achelous, Neilos; 
and if Neilos, every river as well; and if every river, the streams also will 
be Gods; and if the streams, the torrents; but the streams are not Gods; 
neither, then, is Zeus a God. But if there had been Gods, Zeus would have 
been a God. Therefore there are no Gods.53 
If ontological dogmas do not resist the fl uidity of thought, if everything is rela-
tive and becomes instead of being, if boundaries and essential distinctions are 
only fi ctional or delusional, not much room is left for the defi nition of normality 
51 Robin (1944), p. 83. See also Dumont (1972), p. 236, who connects this argument to 
the Sceptic’s conception of sense knowledge.
52 S.E. M. IX.88–91. 
53 S.E. M. IX.182–3. See also Cic. ND III.43: ‘If I adopt your doctrines, tell me what answer 
I am to make to one who questions me thus: “If gods exist, are the nymphs also god-
desses? if the nymphs are, the Pans and Satyrs also are gods; but they are not gods; 
therefore the nymphs also are not. Yet they possess temples vowed and dedicated to 
them by the nation; are the other gods also therefore who have had temples dedicated 
to them not gods either? Come tell me further: you reckon Jupiter and Neptune gods, 
therefore their brother Orcus is also a god; and the fabled streams of the lower world, 
Acheron, Cocytus and Pyriphlegethon, and also Charon and also Cerberus are to be 
deemed gods. No, you say, we must draw the line at that; well then, Orcus is not a god 
either; what are you to say about his brothers then?” These arguments were advanced 
by Carneades, not with the object of establishing atheism (for what could less befi t 
a philosopher?) but in order to prove the Stoic theology worthless [. . .].’ See also Cic. 
ND III.44.
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and its opposition to abnormality and monstrosity. No space is left, moreover, for 
the traditional and orthodox conception regarding the entity that supposedly 
provides the stability and the meaning of the universe, namely God.
To What Purpose?
In a passage of the Icaromenippus, Lucian tells that, seated on a golden throne, 
Zeus listens to men’s prayers. Grave diffi culties loom when two men make con-
trary prayers and promise equal sacrifi ces: ‘He was really in a dilemma [. . .] he 
didn’t know which one of them to give assent to; so that he was in the same plight 
as the Academicians and could not make any affi rmation at all, but suspended 
judgement for a while and thought it over, like Pyrrho.’54 The Lucianic irony in 
this passage is not directed against Pyrrhonism, but rather against the orthodox 
believers in the divine’s intervention in the world and, as a consequence, the 
possibility for humans to either infl uence or foresee it through divination.
In M. IX, Sextus develops a long and verbose analysis of several beliefs 
on the nature of gods, claimed by different philosophers and schools. The 
aim is not to praise atheism, but rather to juxtapose and contrast different 
opinions, producing the diaphony of many philosophical voices that inevitably 
leads to the suspension of judgement.55 Because atheism can be as dogmatic 
as theism, Sextus’s and the other Sceptics’ intention is certainly to expose the 
inconsistency of a single belief, when several contrasting theories have been 
advanced by so many wise philosophers. I believe, however, that rather than 
a diaphony, it would be more appropriate to talk about the cacophony of the 
philosophers’ opinions, i.e. a plurality that is so confusingly contradictory that 
it ruins entirely the belief in a rational and providential divinity. The coher-
ent outcome of the strongest Sceptic argument leads inevitably to atheism, at 
least as a consequence, if not as a systematic theoretical position.56
The Sceptic critique of religion is directed fi rst and foremost against Stoics, 
and only secondarily against Epicureans and other dogmatists.57 Although Scep-
tics do not necessarily prefer Epicurean arguments to Stoic ones,58 an effective 
Scepticism destroys the foundation of Stoicism on the nature of God as a lord and 
54 Luc. Icar. 25. 
55 Hankinson (1995), p. 240. See also Ley (1966–89), I, pp. 493–505, and G. Reale, 
‘Ipotesi per una rilettura della fi losofi a di Pirrone di Elide’, in Giannantoni a cura di 
(1982), p. 309 ff., who follows Brehier (1967) and focuses on Pyrrho’s religiosity, speak-
ing about his concept of wisdom as an ‘experience of the absolute’ (p. 334). See also Dal 
Pra (1975, 2a ed.), pp. 210–13 and passim.
56 See Conche (1973), esp. p. 182 and p. 197.
57 Hankinson (1995), p. 238.
58 Not infrequently, it is the opposite, as Cic. ND clearly demonstrates.
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rational ruler of the universe. Scepticism unmakes, in other words, the ontological 
framework within which the concepts of monstrosities and anomalies have been 
systematised by Stoic dogmatism. When Sceptics claim their devotion, because 
of a prudent adoption of shared customs and beliefs, the irony implicit in this 
position should not be overestimated.59 The intent of avoiding the accusation 
of impiety seems a reasonable justifi cation for this prudent attitude, and a con-
vergence between Scepticism and Stoicism on this point could be recognised.60 
However, although Stoics and Epicureans might have a common concern regard-
ing the accusation of impiety, I rather believe that Sceptics directly target the 
pillars of the Stoics’ conception of rational divinity and its providential role in 
nature, something they could not fi nd in Epicureans.61
Moreover, when Sextus discusses the nature of God, he acquiesces in, and 
makes use of, the Epicurean argument on the presence of evil in the world 
and against providence. Sextus converges with the Epicureans on this point, 
and his argument eventually becomes classic, informing subsequent criticism 
of providentialism based on the presence of evil, imperfections and monstrosi-
ties in nature. Had God forethought (προνοέω) everything in the world, there 
would not be any badness (κακία) in it. If he forethinks only something and 
not everything, why this rather than that, especially since he surely has the 
will (βούλευμα, a term cherished by Stoics) and the power (δυναστεία) to 
take care of everything?62 Sextus goes as far as to imagine the concept of an 
evil genius: ‘And if, again, he has the power but not the will to have fore-
thought for all, he will be held to be malignant; while if he has neither the will 
nor the power, he is both malignant and weak – an impious thing to say about 
God.’ The conclusion is strikingly clear and has the force of a demonstration: 
‘God has no forethought for the things in the universe.’63
59 See S.E. P. III.2: ‘Since [. . .] the majority have declared that God is a most effi cient 
Cause, let us begin by inquiring about God, fi rst promising that although, following 
the ordinary view, we affi rm undogmatically that Gods exist and reverence Gods and 
ascribe to them foreknowledge, yet as against the rashness of the Dogmatists we argue as 
follow [. . .].’ Sounding like an excusatio non petita, Sextus’s statement puts forward the 
two necessary elements that any dogmatist would expect to be there: the existence and 
the providence of god. See contra Chiesara (2003), p. 186 and passim, who argues that 
Sextus does not oppose the divine as the main effi cient causality of everything, although 
more from the point of view of sentiment than like a proof or a demonstration.
60 Dumont (1972), p. 39.
61 See Flückiger (1990), p. 118.
62 S.E. P. III.9–10.
63 S.E. P. III.9–10. Sextus also makes use of this argument to introduce and explain the 
meaning of the tropes in P. I.32: ‘We oppose [. . .] thoughts to thoughts, when in answer 
to him who argues the existence of Providence from the order of the heavenly bodies we 
oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and draw from this the 
inference that Providence does not exist.’
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To revere God and to accept at the same time that the world is as we see it, 
full of evils and imperfections, is contradictory and shamefully impious. With 
the due differences, Cicero puts a similar argument into Velleius’s mouth:
I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless fi gments 
of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato’s 
Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may ren-
der ‘Providence’) of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and 
senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fi re; these are the mar-
vels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. [. . .] 
Those [. . .] who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wis-
dom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living 
being could conceivably possess. [. . .] We see that vast portions of the earth’s 
surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun’s proxim-
ity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. 
But if the world is God, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as 
limbs of God, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively.64 
The believers – this is the Sceptic conclusion – are in fact the more blasphe-
mous.65 Stoics, in particular, praise the rational nature of the world, and reason 
as the most divine principle, spread throughout nature. Yet, Sceptics contend, 
reason is also capable of the worst misdeeds, as the infamous case of Medea 
proves, as well as the infi nite number of monstrosities that one fi nds in the 
human and the natural realm alike.66
Teleology, both Stoic and Aristotelian, is also targeted and in this, again, 
Sceptics converge with Epicureans. Cicero’s Chrysippus considers teleology as 
a direct consequence of the unshakeable belief in God’s existence.67 The very 
64 Cic. ND I.18–24. See also Div. II.120: ‘I ask for what reason did the deity, when making 
the universe for our sakes (for that is the view of your school), create so vast a supply of 
water-snakes and vipers, and why did he scatter so many death-bringing and destructive 
creatures over land and sea?’ Also important is the striking absence of a theodicy in Bal-
bus’s exposition of the Stoic argument on divinity in the world, one that the reader would 
have expected, knowing that it was part of the classic Stoic argumentation. See B. Besnier, 
‘La nature dans le livre II du De natura deorum de Cicéron’, in Lévy éd. (1996), p. 138.
65 Robin (1944), p. 211.
66 Cic. ND III.68: ‘This gift of reason forsooth, which according to your school divine 
benefi cence has bestowed on man alone, the beasts do not possess; do you see then how 
great a boon the gods have vouchsafed to us? [. . .] Medea was criminal, but also she was 
perfectly rational. Again, does not the hero plotting the direful banquet for his brother 
turn the design this way and that in his thoughts?’ See Robin (1944), p. 110.
67 Cic. ND III.26: ‘If we saw a handsome mansion, we should infer that it was built for its 
masters and not for mice; so therefore we must deem the world to be the mansion of the 
gods. Assuredly I should so deem it if I thought it had been built like a house, and not 
constructed by nature, as I shall show that it was.’
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ground of this evidence, however, has already been destroyed by Scepticism. 
Thus, one only has to draw the consequences of it, vis-à-vis the supposedly 
teleological character of nature:
But then you tell me that Socrates in Xenophon asks the question, if the 
world contains no rational soul, where did we pick up ours? And I too ask 
the question, where did we get the faculty of speech, the knowledge of num-
bers, the art of music? unless indeed we suppose that the sun holds conver-
sation with the moon when their courses approximate, or that the world 
makes a harmonious music, as Pythagoras believes. These faculties, Balbus, 
are the gifts of nature – not nature ‘walking in craftsmanlike manner’ as 
Zeno says [. . .], but nature by its own motions and mutations imparting 
motion and activity to all things [omnia cientis et agitantis motibus et muta-
tionibus suis]. And so I fully agreed with the part of your discourse that 
dealt with nature’s punctual regularity, and what you termed its concordant 
interconnexion and correlation; but I could not accept your assertion that 
this could not have come about were it not held together by a single divine 
breath. On the contrary, the system’s coherence and persistence is due to 
nature’s forces and not to divine power; she does possess that ‘concord’ 
(the Greek term sympatheia) of which you spoke, but the greater this is as a 
spontaneous [sua sponte] growth, the less possible is it to suppose that it was 
created by divine reason.68 
The reference to Socrates in the opening lines, as well as to the world’s har-
monious music, highlights that the critique is not directed exclusively against 
Stoic teleology, but against fi nalism in general. The Sceptic strategy is twofold. 
First, like the Epicureans, they criticise the consistency of the concepts of, and 
the distinction between, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, perfection 
and imperfection. Then, they attack the Stoics’ concept of order from a dif-
ferent angle: even if one could say that order exists in nature, one could not 
conclude that it is the benevolent effect of a caring divinity, whose artifi cial 
intervention has teleologically moulded nature for men’s sake. The order of 
nature is not an order at all if, by it, one intends the idea of a divinity acting as 
a craftsman with a τέλος in mind.
An Epicurean tone of a sort clearly resonates in this argument. Interest-
ingly, this synergy between Scepticism and Epicureanism eventually fi nds 
an echo in one of the most interesting and less canonic Christian thinkers, 
Arnobius of Sicca. Between the third and fourth centuries, Arnobius makes 
68 Cic. ND III.27–8.
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use of this eclectic approach to defend Christianity against the pagans who 
unjustly accused it of having brought all sort of evils and perturbations.69 
According to Arnobius, philosophers – and this shows how weak pagan 
knowledge is – do not know the laws that govern nature. For example, they 
cannot explain the causes of monstrosities, which nonetheless belong to 
natural phenomena: ‘For what purpose have such limitless and countless 
kinds of monsters and snakes been fashioned or brought forth?’70 In the same 
way, humans cannot understand why their nature is so limited and why so 
many evils plague their life and appear in nature.
Such ignorance suggests a Sceptic attitude (quite uncommon in Christian 
apologists), infused with Stoic elements of a passive acceptance of reality as it 
is given to us:
Would you venture to say that this and that thing in the world, the origin 
and fi nal cause of which you cannot explain or analyse, is bad, and because 
winter possibly hinders you from enjoying delights and pleasures, would 
you say that it is a pernicious, austere thing? [. . .] Hellebore is a poison to 
men: ought it for this reason not grow? The wolf lies in wait at sheepfolds: 
is nature at all to blame because it has created a beast most dangerous to 
the woolbearer? By its bite the serpent takes away life: would you really 
condemn the foundation of things because it added to living creatures 
monsters so fi erce ?71 
Nature behaves spontaneously, independent of any anthropocentrism or 
teleology. Evils happen for reasons unrelated to the effects they might have 
on men. That in no way means, however, that they happen for no reason. 
Nature’s behaviour is autonomous and unknown and unknowable by humans:
If anything occurs which fosters us and our affairs with but little happy suc-
cess, it is not therefore an evil and to be regarded as pernicious. The world 
either rains or does not rain; it is for itself that it rains or does not rain, and 
though perhaps you do not know it, it either evaporates excessive moisture 
with drying heat or it moderates a long spell of dryness by shower of rain. 
It produces pestilences, diseases, famines, and other deadly forms of evil. 
69 On Arnobius’s eclecticism, see Moreschini (2004), pp. 278 ff. On his Scepticism, see 
Pichon (1901), pp. 49 ff.
70 Arnob. Nat. II.59.
71 Arnob. Nat. I.11. See also I.8: ‘What if – and this is nearest the truth – what seems 
adverse to us is not really evil to the world itself, and that judging all things in term of 
our own advantage, we blame the results of nature because of unproved opinions?’
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How can you tell whether it does not remove what exists in excess, to this 
end that by forcing things to take losses, it may set moderation upon their 
tendency to develop riotously?72 
The causes of so much evil remain unknown. What is certain, however, is that 
God cannot be their author. This reveals how useless pagan knowledge and 
science is, and why only God, not nature, deserves our attention, because only 
He can be known through faith. Philosophers have failed utterly; Christ is the 
only master of truth.73
Again, such eclecticism, marked by a Sceptic tone, is uncommon in early 
Christian thinkers. This makes Arnobius’s strategy even more interesting for 
us. He discusses the presence of evil and monstrosity in nature not to justify 
or explain God’s actions, but to separate God from nature and its miseries. 
He also uses monstrosity to denounce humans’ claim to every and any sort of 
primacy in the universe, both ontologically and – even more surprising for a 
Christian – morally. Arnobius plays with ontological boundaries to undermine 
humanity’s claim to any special status. Precisely when other Christian think-
ers praise the beauty and order of the universe and elevate humans above 
other creatures in the name of God’s providence, Arnobius, using Sceptic 
irony, denies any order and providence. In his famous monologue on the ox, 
he gives animals the power of speech to denounce human monstrosity:
O Jupiter, or whatever other god thou art, is this [scil. the sacrifi ce], then, 
humane or right, or is it to be regarded as fair at all, that when someone 
else has sinned, I should be killed and from my blood thou shouldst allow 
satisfaction to be given thee – [. . .] Ask Piety whether it is more just that I 
be slain, done away with, or that man should be pardoned and be free from 
punishment for what he has done. [. . .] Is not this [scil. human actions] 
bestial, monstrous, savage, does it not seem to thee, O Jupiter, unjust and 
barbarous for me to be killed, for me to be slain, that thou mightest be 
appeased and that acquittal rest on the guilty?74 
Arnobius’s attitude is rooted in the early history of pagan Scepticism, which 
converges with the Epicureans in their critique of teleology. The conceptual 
weapons they use, however, cannot be the same. The spontaneous character 
of order that Cicero recognises in nature is worthy to note. Sua sponte, Cicero 
says, obliterating the idea of a design from the Stoic συμπάθεια and thus 
72 Arnob. Nat. I.10.
73 See B. Amata, La polemica anticreazionista e antiscientifi ca di Arnobio di Sicca, in AA. VV. 
(2007), pp. 317–29.
74 Arnob. Nat. VII.9.
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bereaving it of any teleological consistency. Even the Epicurean atoms work 
spontaneously, and chance has no other meaning for atomists. In interpreting 
Scepticism, nevertheless, Cicero carefully suggests avoiding the confusion. 
Although αὐτόματος is precisely sua sponte, Cicero makes an effort to dis-
tinguish the Sceptics’ hypothetical character of nature’s spontaneity from 
atomists’ chance. He fi nds a suitable source for this in Strato of Lampsacus. 
We have seen supra Strato’s approach to the problem of teleology. Cicero 
plays Strato against Democritus, rescuing the idea of spontaneity from the 
monopoly of atomism. Strato’s point, as it is read and endorsed by Scepti-
cism, is that there can be a spontaneous order that is neither the result of 
blind chance, nor the end of a providential divinity. Both dogmatisms are 
thus ruled out.75 Ruled out together with this, moreover, is the ground for 
superstition and for the use of dogmatic authority for devotional purposes, 
namely the belief in divination.
Whatever knowledge can be gained from the observation of the order 
of nature, it comes from natural science, and certainly not from divination. 
Partisans of divination, such as the Stoics, respond to criticism by saying that 
everything is connected in nature, and thus phenomena that we can observe 
can be interpreted as signs of things that we do not know yet, but are still 
knowable with the use of the proper divinatory art. This argument eventually 
resonates through the centuries, to some extent resembling the specifi cally 
modern concept of symptom: is the fever not a clinical sign of a pathological 
process, or the wind a meteorological sign of a movement of air between areas 
of different atmospheric pressures? And is it not legitimate to use such signs 
and symptoms to foresee events, as in the case of meteorological conditions, 
and sometimes to infl uence them, as when we choose the appropriate treat-
ment for a specifi c sickness?
This is quite a strong argument, and Sceptics need to provide an equally 
strong response. It is true that there are signs in nature, they grant. Yet even 
if these signs were knowable, Sceptics argue, this would be science’s domain, 
and not a matter of divination:
I am impressed with the force of the questions with which Carneades 
used to begin his discussions: ‘What are the things within the scope of 
divination? Are they things that are perceived by the senses? But those 
are things that we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Is there, then, in 
such objects some quality that we can better perceive with the aid of 
prophecy and inspiration than we can with the aid of the senses alone? 
75 See Credaro (1889), pp. 224 ff., Dal Pra (1975, 2a ed.), pp. 191–2, Robin (1944), p. 104, 
Chiesara (2003), p. 82.
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And is there any diviner, anywhere, who, if blind, like Tiresias, could tell 
the difference between white and black? Or, who, if deaf, could distin-
guish between different voices and different tones? Now you must admit 
that divination is not applicable in any case where knowledge is gained 
through the senses.’76
In other words, divination and science both foresee, and yet the former does 
it illegitimately. No matter that Scepticism does not intend to dogmatise, 
but only to demolish dogmatic arguments. In this case, converging with the 
Epicurean critique of divination, Scepticism leads to a profound attack on 
superstition in the form of divination. This argument is extremely relevant 
to the discourse of monstrosity, since it relies upon the nature of the thing or 
the event to be scrutinised, for example a monster or a portent. Does such a 
thing depend on chance and fortune, or is it the necessary outcome of mate-
rial and mechanical conditions? If the latter, then it is science’s business, and 
divination does not have any place or role to play in it. If the former, than 
both science and divinatory art have no power to grasp the portent’s mean-
ing. Because it is completely random – this is Carneades’ conclusion – not 
only humans, but even a god would be unable to know it. If God were able 
to know it, and thus to produce it for the sake of men’s knowledge, then it 
would be something necessary, and thus again an object of science and not 
of divination.77
Denunciation of knowledge’s illusion, relativisation of judgement, oblit-
eration of every determination in thought and in action, cast a sombre shadow 
on the idea of divinity and providence, and ridicule divination and, as a conse-
quence, religious devotion: a rich haul for a movement of philosophers whose 
major claim is that they know only that they know not! The discourse on 
monstrosity comes out of the Sceptic experience enriched by arguments that 
challenge the traditional attitude vis-à-vis normality and abnormality.
Stoicism in particular comes under attack. Stoics recognise the danger and 
are scared by this movement, as much as they are by Epicurean materialism. 
Like the Romans in front of Carneades, they see the outrageous nature of their 
enemy, and the effectiveness of its attack. Zeno’s orthodox disciple Aristo 
of Chio forges a powerful metaphor for his Sceptic adversary Arcesilaus, a 
metaphor of hybridity and monstrosity: ‘Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, 
76 Cic. Div. II.9. See Dal Pra (1975, 2a ed.), pp. 256–61. See also ND II.12–14 and passim. 
For Sextus, see M. V passim.
77 Dal Pra (1975, 2a ed.), p. 217 and Robin (1944), p. 114 . On the Sceptic critique of 
divination see also Credaro (1889), pp. 243 ff., Barnes (1990), pp. 74–5, and Hankinson 
(1995), pp. 256–61.
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in the midst Diodorus.’78 Sceptics themselves are aware of the monstrosity 
of their philosophy, or rather of the monstrous force that is needed to eradi-
cate the opposite monstrosity of dogmatism. In Cicero’s words: ‘I agree with 
Clitomachus when he writes that Carneades really did accomplish an almost 
Herculean labour in ridding our minds of that fi erce wild beast [fera et immanis 
belua], the act of assent, that is of mere opinion and hasty thinking [ . .].’79
78 S.E. P. I.234. Sextus refers to Diodorus Cronos the Megaric philosopher. See R. G. Bury 
in Sextus Empiricus (1953–61), I, p. 145: ‘The verse is a parody of Homer, Il. VI.181 (cf. 
Hesiod, Th. 323), who thus describes the Chimaera: πρόσθε λέων, ὄπιθεν δὲ δράκων, 
μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα (“Lion the head of her, Dragon the tail of her, trunk of a She-goat”).’
79 Cic. Ac. II.108.
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Middle and Neoplatonism
We have arrived at the last chapter of this enquiry, Middle and Neoplatonism. 
It is not that they should be considered the conclusion of antiquity or, some-
how, the most mature, accomplished and harmonic evolution of ancient 
philosophy. On the contrary, as we will see, Platonism is possibly the most 
troubled philosophical movement of this period. It will be challenged to adapt 
in dramatic, sometimes ambiguous, always innovative ways. It changes tre-
mendously to respond to the Hellenistic crisis. Rather than a peaceful and 
harmonic evolution, we will see a dazzling struggle to survive the tensions 
that characterise the end of the ancient world. I conclude this enquiry with 
Middle and Neoplatonism because, along with Stoicism, it is the philosophi-
cal movement that most naturally converges with Christianity, thus opening 
up original perspectives for the coming ages. This is why I have included here 
several early Christian thinkers – Augustine among them – whose philosophi-
cal background and inspiration are largely Platonic.
After the sceptical turn of the second century BCE, the Platonic Academy 
searched for a way to revitalise its prestige by turning back to its ancient dogmas. 
Some of the most fundamental points of Platonism, which had been successfully 
challenged by the Hellenistic schools, found new strength in the cultural envi-
ronment and climate that steadily emerged in the early Imperial age. Platonism 
not only looked back at its own history and tradition; it also found strength in the 
encounter with ideas and doctrines originated beyond the boundaries of Greek 
and Latin culture, chiefl y Judaism, Hermetism and Christianism. Platonism con-
vergences with these cultures and reinvigorates its lost status. This effort, how-
ever, came at a price. The impact of Hellenistic philosophy on the mentality of 
the late Republican age had been too strong to simply revert back to Attic dog-
matism. Platonism was thus forced to evolve and integrate concepts and ideas 
derived in particular from Stoicism, Peripateticism and Neo-Pythagoreanism, 
with all of which it fi nds common ground. This is the most substantial heritage 
that Middle and Neoplatonism, beyond occasional confl icts and incomprehen-
sions, leave to the following centuries.
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The convergence of these philosophical traditions under the common 
name of Platonism should not hide the fact that Middle and Neoplatonism, as 
well as Christian Platonism, are very diverse and eclectic phenomena.1 Plato’s 
heritage is constantly renegotiated with different philosophical infl uences, 
following the impulse of original individual philosophers who have very dif-
ferent attitudes toward the tradition. They offer diverging interpretations of 
both Plato’s thought and of the whole history of Greek philosophy, back to the 
pre-Platonic thinkers. Many of the philosophers whose importance for Middle 
and Neoplatonism is unquestioned are indebted to different traditions. Philo 
of Alexandria to Judaism, for example, Alcinous to Peripateticism, Numenius 
of Apamea to Pythagoreanism, Antiochus of Ascalon, Maximus of Tyrus and 
Galen to Stoicism, which also infl uences Christian Platonists such as Justin 
Martyr, Origen and Augustine, without forgetting, of course, the great impor-
tance of the Chaldean Oracles and Hermetism.2
All these schools, in fact, had developed strong arguments rearding the main 
philosophical and theological problems at the heart of Platonism – problems, 
moreover, that Plato himself had left at least partially unanswered or not con-
sistently developed, such as the role and status of demons and intermediate 
creatures or the creation of matter. Alongside Platonism, those schools have 
also fought their battle against the common enemy, namely materialism and 
Epicureanism. Thus, the movements that fall under the name of Middle and 
Neoplatonism develop original solutions for many points of philosophical and 
theological interest that are relevant to the interpretation of monstrosity. These 
are the conception of God, and in particular God’s degree of immanence in or 
transcendence of the world; the question of the universe’s order, creation and 
maintenance; the notion of ideal and material reality and their mutual relation-
ship; the concept of providence and theodicy. Monstrosity plays a function in 
all these metaphysical, physical and theological areas, and it consistently sur-
faces in the thought and writings of this age, threatening the effectiveness and 
strength of their solutions.
The Material World and the Rediscovery of Transcendence
Middle and Neoplatonism rediscover God’s transcendence. Whereas in the 
dualistic form openly maintained by several Middle Platonists and directly 
inspired by Plato’s Timaeus, or in a monistic form more typical of Neoplatonism, 
the philosophy of this period reworks the ancient problem of the principle by 
 1 Vimercati in Medioplatonici (2015), p. 52, speaks about the ‘ecumenical’ character of 
Platonism in this age.
 2 Infl uences that should recall for us all the limits of philosophical labels, when they are 
taken out of context and without confronting the primary sources.
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stressing its transcendence toward the material universe.3 This is undoubtedly 
the main point of confl ict with both Stoicism and, sometimes, Peripateticism. 
When it is interpreted by Platonists as a form of materialism, Peripateticism 
is as shocking and horrifying as atheism or Epicureanism.4 On this ground, 
the Eastern infl uence plays a major role and it is not a coincidence that one 
of the main pillars of the Platonist renaissance – Philo – lived and wrote in 
Alexandria of Egypt, one of the most lively cities of the Mediterranean and 
one of the most infl uenced by the cultural exchange with the East.5 Judaism, 
Hermetism, but also a genuine Platonic core of doctrines converge against the 
philosophical monstrosity represented by Stoic and atomist materialism, and 
in particular by Epicurus himself.
Maximus of Tyrus defi antly speaks about the monstrosity of material-
ism, naming the atomists Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus alongside the 
atheist Diagoras of Melos and the Peripatetic Strato.6 The reference to Strato 
shows that even Peripateticism is seen as an enemy for the true transcen-
dental and theologically oriented vision of the universe. Although Middle 
and Neoplatonist philosophers like Ammonius, Alcinous and Plotinus are 
strongly infl uenced by Aristotle, others like Philo and Atticus oppose the 
reconciliation with Peripateticism, openly rejecting its immanentist view of 
the fi rst principle.
In different degrees, Middle and Neoplatonists’ God is transcendent and 
ineffable. Source of all perfection, God is king and father of all people.7 He 
also creates nature – clearly an anti-Stoic opinion – as well as the law that 
governs it.8 In the Opifi cio mundi, Philo of Alexandria underlines the different 
ontological statuses of God and its creation. Only God is, in the full sense of 
the term, and its Being is opposed to the lesser non-Being of the world. The 
world is created, but its existence is a kind of non-Being vis-à-vis the absolute 
and true Being, which is untouched and unaffected by the process of genera-
tion and corruption. Philo, however, feels with astonishing clarity the problem 
that Middle and Neoplatonic philosophers experience, especially when they 
 3 See H. Dörrie, ‘Die Frage nach dem Transzendenten im Mittelplatonismus’, in AA. VV. 
(1957), pp. 191–241.
 4 On Platonism and Stoicism, see W. Theiler, ‘Plotin zwischen Plato un Stoa’, in AA. VV. 
(1957), pp. 63–103. On Peripateticism see Atticus (1977). 3.49–65.
 5 On Alexandria in the Imperial and Ptolemaic age see RE I.1, cc. 1376–88, Andresen et 
al. (1965), I, cc. 112–13, RAC I, cc. 271–83, BNP I, cc. 496–99, Jaeger (1961), and Fraser 
(1972).
 6 Max.Tyr. XVII.5.
 7 Ph. Prou. II.15. For the abbreviation of Philo’s works, I follow Philon d’Alexandrie 
(1961–), pp. 15–16.
 8 See Martens (2003), pp. 75 ff. and passim.
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later have to face Gnosticism. The problem is to balance God’s transcendence 
with its role in creating and maintaining the universe, as well as with the 
necessity of praising God’s providence for the beauty and perfection of its cre-
ation. Philo thus invites the reader to join him in the glorifi cation of the world, 
yet not above the creator itself. This would be impious. The world is indeed 
created, and thus its beauty and perfection are below those of its creator, as 
much as the world’s Being is inferior to the creator’s fullest Being.9
Philo makes use of the concept of monstrosity to stress the subordination of 
the creation to its creator. He denounces the materialist and Epicurean system as 
a monstrosity. This was already a widespread topos in his time and culture, but 
Philo originally contributes to establishing the equation of Epicurus’s name with 
the horrifying position of atheism.10 Philo focuses on the allegory of the snake, 
‘an animal without feet sunk prone upon his belly; [. . .] he takes clods of earth as 
food; [. . .] he carries in his teeth the venom with which it is his nature to destroy 
those whom he has bitten’.11 The man subject to passions is similar to the snake, 
and falls into temptation because of the female’s wicked infl uence. Through 
this allegory, Philo denounces in the Opifi cio mundi not only Epicurus’s ethics 
based on pleasure, but also his physics and cosmology, based on the immanent 
pluralism of atoms generating the universe without any unifying and transcen-
dent principle.12 The allegory of the fall epitomises the transcendent unity of the 
divine principle, developed all along the Opifi cio. Philo’s monotheist sensibility 
rises against the plurality and multiplicity of Epicurus’s materialism, the worst of 
all ontological monstrosities.13
Philo’s attack against philosophical materialism is conducted through 
theological conceptions inspired by Judaic monotheism as well as with philo-
sophical weapons borrowed from different sources, but mainly from Platonism. 
Suffi ce to say that Philo fi nds the concept of the incorporeal, so deeply stra-
tegic for his theological philosophy, in Alexandrian Platonism and not in the 
Bible, from which it is absent.14 Thus God’s nature is ambiguously twofold: 
on the one hand, a pure transcendence and incorporeality, which makes him 
 9 Ph. Opif. 8–9.
10 M. Hadas-Lebel, ‘Introduction’, in Philon d’Alexandrie (1961–), XXXV, pp. 58–63.
11 Ph. Opif. 157. On Clement’s use of the same allegory see infra.
12 A. Le Boulluec, ‘La réfl exion de Philon sur le plaisir’, in Lévy, Besnier éds (1998), 
pp. 129–52, esp. pp. 140–3.
13 See C. Lévy, ‘Philon d’Alexandrie et l’épicurisme’, in Erler, Bees hrsg. (2000), pp. 122–36.
14 See ThWNT sub πνοή which, in the LXX, is used for the Hebrew ֫נָפֶׁש or נְׁשָמָה. Philo con-
tests its use instead of the more canonic πνεῦμα, the soul (Leg. I.33). He argues for the 
material consistency of the light breathing (πνεῦμα), while the πνοή is the spirit created in 
the divine image. More generally, on the hellenisation of Judaism see Jaeger (1961).
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not only utterly perfect, but also absolutely absolved of whatever imperfection 
one might fi nd in the world. On the other hand, God is the king, father and 
architect of the world, thus intimately connected with its creation.15
It does not come as a surprise, thus, that Philo develops a negative theology, 
testifying to an early use of attributes like unnamable (ἀκατονόμαστος) and 
unutterable (ἄρρητος), and whose roots are in early and Middle Platonism. 
This negative theology does not contribute to clarifying God’s relation with 
its work, and remains ambiguous on points such as the actual meaning of cre-
ation.16 These points are open to interpretation in Plato himself, and do not 
fi nd a precise philosophical solution in Philo either, who tries to clarify the 
issue by accepting the concept of creation,17 yet as an event that happens out-
side of time. The relation between the creature and the creator is thus one of 
complete dependence and ontological subordination, with the spirit and the 
intelligible element having sway over the sensible and material one.18
Philo reworks the Platonic theory of ideas to describe the creative act of 
God as a realisation of a work of art inspired by a model and a paradigm.19 
Whereas ideas were uncreated in Plato, in Philo’s view God creates the para-
digms fi rst, from which he eventually builds the sensible reality.20 The para-
digms are an expression of God’s total perfection.21 Yet they are different and 
absolutely other from him, since God is absolute simplicity, no composite, and 
absolute Being, while ideas already possess parts, are composite and become 
something else.22 God’s perfection, for this reason, does not entirely survive in 
the copy, not even in the fi rst one of Adam and Eve. Because the copy lives in 
the domain of Becoming, it is negatively affected because of feminine nature 
and sinful desire.23 Becoming, thus, assaults Being and undermines its paradig-
matic perfection. The connection with monstrosity is made clear by Philo, for 
example when he interprets the giants as an image of the sons of the earth, in 
other words the carnal men, defeated by passion.24
15 Ph. Opif. 17–18. See also M. Hadas-Label, ‘Introduction’, p. 98, and Runia (2003a) on 
the philosophical image of God as king and architect.
16 See Dillon (1977), pp. 145 ff.
17 Ph. Opif. 7–9.
18 Ph. Aet. 1.
19 The theory of ideas is the ground of Philo’s philosophy and makes him the founder of Middle 
Platonism, according to Wolfson (1948) I, p. 200. See also Dillon (1977), p. 159 and passim, 
Belletti (1987). For Plato’s idea as a model, see Grg. 503 d–e; Cra. 389 a–c; and above.
20 Ph. Opif. 19.
21 Ph. Opif. 134 ff.
22 Ph. Leg. II.1–3.
23 Ph. Opif. 139–40.
24 Ph. Gig. 62 ff., with reference to Gen. 6.4. See Winston, Dillon (1983).
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Pleasures and desire are also at the heart of a suggestive passage of De agri-
cultura in which Philo discusses humans’ status vis-à-vis his passions through 
the allegorical interpretation of Moses’s prayer in Gen. 49.17 ff. and, more 
generally, of the ‘prodigies and marvels’ of the biblical fi gure of the snake.25 
Moses compares the judging faculty of the soul to the snake, ‘a creature tor-
tuous in its movements, of great intelligence, ready to shew fi ght, and most 
capable of defending itself against wrongful aggression’. When passions take 
over the human, though, the snake becomes ‘a crawling thing with many a 
twist, powerless to raise itself upright, always prone, creeping after the good 
things of earth alone, making for the hiding-places afforded to it by the body, 
making its lair in each of the senses as in cavities or dug-outs, giving advice to 
a human being, athirst for the blood of anything better than itself, delighting 
to cause death by poisonous and painless bites’.26 Opposed to Moses’s, this is 
Eve’s serpent, representing feminine pleasure and subjection to the earthly 
passions of fl esh, those of an ‘evil kind’.27
Other texts of Philo suggest that the sensible and material dimension is not 
good or evil in itself, but rather absolutely passive, and a receptacle that can 
become everything. This probably depends on the fact that the material used 
for the cosmos is not created by God. As absolute unformed matter, it is avail-
able to him. The creative power of God thus fi nds a substrate which is unable 
to fully and completely refl ect the creator’s goodness.28 When left alone, for 
its part, matter tends to chaos, and would fall to ruin, were not for the great 
architect’s organisation.29 Thus the world reveals at once its beauty and the 
sublime skills of its maker, since all things are, in their beauty and regularity, 
precisely what they ought to be.30
To describe the dependency of the world from the creator, Philo makes 
use of the Platonic concept of the Monad and the Dyad. Monad and Dyad 
belong to the ancient conceptual tools of Greek philosophy, and have been 
employed to explain the multiplicity and changeability of things as a function 
25 Ph. Agric. 95 ff.
26 Ph. Agric. 95 ff. On this passage, see Calabi (2003).
27 Philo insists on the origin of evil in the body and the lower animal part of the human 
being. Leaving the physical body with death is thus a relief and a liberation, since one 
abandons the corpse to which the true self is bound (νεκρὸς σύνδετος). This image, as 
Courcelle (1966), p. 104 and passim, has underlined, is close to that of the Etruscan 
torment in which the victim is attached to a corpse and left to die. The body becomes 
a veritable fi gure of monstrosity which threatens the real life. For the body as a tomb in 
Plato see Grg. 493 a, 525 a; Cra. 400 b–c; and supra. See also Buffi ère (1956), pp. 460–6.
28 See Runia (2003b), p. 590.
29 Ph. Opif. 22. See M. Hadas-Lebel, ‘Introduction’, p. 70.
30 Ph. Prov. I.70.
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of an individual and unique principle (μονάς). Plato had maintained the 
existence of a Dyad as an intelligible matter upon which the One acts and 
to which it establishes limits.31 The doctrine of the Dyad is further devel-
oped by Neo-Pythagoreanism and is connected with Middle and Neoplatonic 
thought. The main problem, in the Imperial age, becomes the mutual rela-
tion of Monad and Dyad, and the origin of the latter vis-à-vis the former. The 
Neo-Pythagorean concept of Dyad stresses its passive character, opposed to 
the activity of the Monad. Immanent and transcendent solutions are con-
fronted in the attempt to explain how God and creation can be connected, 
by both saving God’s transcendence and claiming its more or less direct inter-
vention in creating and maintaining order.
According to Aetius, Xenocrates borrows Plato’s concept of Monad and 
Dyad.32 He envisages the One as father of the universe, and the Dyad as 
mother of the gods. This testimony stresses the collaborative and harmoni-
ous character of the two divine beings, underlining the fact that godly forces 
inhabit the corporeal world. Although connected to the material world, how-
ever, the divine cause’s transcendence is discussed and differently interpreted. 
For example, Antiochus of Ascalon, possibly with a Stoic accent, insists on 
the immanence of the primal cause to the universe, and its necessarily mate-
rial character.33 On the contrary, strongly infl uenced by Neo-Pythagoreanism, 
Eudorus of Alexandria claims the existence of two main and opposed prin-
ciples, one ordered, defi nite, knowable, male, numerically odd, right and light, 
the other disordered, undetermined, unknowable, female, numerically even, 
left and dark.34 The relation between Monad and Dyad is thus dialectically 
interpreted by different authors. The strongest philosophical interpretation of 
the two principles yet is in Plutarch’s Moralia, in which one can see monstros-
ity emerging at the heart of Middle Platonist metaphysics.
Plutarch’s work has a strong religious connotation. Some of his major texts 
from the Moralia describe the nature of the divine as highly transcendent vis-
à-vis the world. Far from being marked by a harmonious development, though, 
31 See Pl. Phlb. 26 e–30 e. See also Dillon (1977), 126 ff., on the Platonic origin of the 
doctrine of the Monad and Dyad in Middle and Neoplatonism.
32 Xenocrates 213, in Senocrate e Ermodoro (2012), p. 237 (= Placit. I.7.30)
33 Similarly to the Stoics, the concept of an immaterial cause is for him unintelligible. 
This aspect is crucial for Antiochus’s metaphysics, and in my view it prevents him being 
considered a Middle Platonist. See also Dillon (1977), 81 ff. For Antiochus’s physics see 
Cic. Acad. I.27 ff. and Fin. IV.36.
34 Eudor.Acad. (= Mazzarelli [1985], 5, pp. 201–2 = Medioplatonici [2015], p. 81 ff.). 
Even Eudorus, though, can barely be considered a Platonist, as suggested by Dillon in 
Goulet, éd. (1989–) ad loc.
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the relation between the worldly and the divine is ambiguously and threaten-
ingly confl ictual, revealing a tension in which monstrosity plays a great part. 
Cosmogony is, in Plutarch’s view, a passage from chaos to order rather than 
a proper act of creation, as it was for Philo. The demiurge, in this sense, has 
initially confronted a recalcitrant matter that pre-existed its formative action. 
The resistance of matter is never defi nitely overcome and becomes the ground 
for the perennial clash between good and evil.35
In De E apud Delphos, a theological treatise on the nature of the divine, 
Plutarch describes the ambiguous status of the divine: when it is Apollo it is 
incorruptible and immutable by nature, and yet when it is Dionysus it endures 
a diversifi cation that transforms it into the world’s Being. Apollo is the purest 
divinity and Dionysus is divinity’s other face. God’s unity is thus torn apart 
and dismembered, not only in an ontological duality, but also in a physical 
multiplicity that manifests itself in the world.36 Plutarch clearly contrasts 
God’s unity with the world’s multiplicity by underlining the atemporal nature 
of the former, as well the purity of its being vis-à-vis the heteroclite nature of 
becoming, a real otherness (ἑτερότης).37 Now, in the De defectu oracolorum, 
alterity is also said to be a principle of dissolution (διαιρετικόν), and thus 
opens up to a dangerous and ambiguous dialectic of generation and corruption 
that inhabits the very movement of the divine toward the world.38
This movement of generation and dissolution is far from harmonic and 
peaceful in Plutarch’s view. Thus, it immediately becomes important, to him, 
to clarify that not only is God not responsible for it, but also that God himself 
prevents the total destruction into which the non-Being, by its nature, would 
irreparably collapse:
[. . .] as for [God’s] vagaries and transformations when he sends forth fi re 
that sweeps his own self along with it, as they say, and again when he forces 
it down here and directs it upon the earth and sea and winds and living 
creatures, and, besides, the terrible things done both to living creatures 
and to growing vegetation – to such tales it is irreverent even to listen; 
[. . .] For, on the contrary, so far as he is in some way present in the world, 
by this his presence does he bind together its substance and prevail over its 
corporeal weakness, which tends toward dissolution.39 
35 On the confl ictual nature of Plutarch’s cosmogony see Babut (1969), p. 286 and passim.
36 Plu. Moralia. De E apud Delphos 388 E–F. For the titles of Plutarch’s Moralia I follow the 
list given in Plutarch (1927–2004), I, pp. xxxiv–xxxvii.
37 Plu. Moralia. De E apud Delphos 393 A–C.
38 Plu. Moralia. De defectu oracolorum 429 B–D.
39 Plu. Moralia. De E apud Delphos 393 E.
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The opposition between Being and non-Being is thus clearly claimed, as well 
as the innocent character of God, to transcend the lower life of the world. The 
solution that Plutarch and several other Platonists fi nd to maintain both the 
active character of God and its lack of responsibility for the changeable mun-
dane reality is to imagine intermediate creatures that operate on its behalf 
and directly intervene in nature. I will explore later how the theory of inter-
mediate entities is affected by the idea of monstrosity. Suffi ce to say, here, 
that Plutarch’s intermediate entities entertain a twofold activity with nature 
itself. Whereas God is never responsible for destruction, its agents defi nitely 
are, since their ‘offi ce is concerned with Nature in dissolution and generation 
[περὶ τὴν ἐν φθορᾷ καὶ γενέσει φύσιν]’.40 Because the ‘other’ gods or demigods 
necessarily belong to the realm of multiplicity, one must assume that such a 
realm, even if only at its highest point, is indeed capable of generating and 
producing some reality, and not only of destroying it. At conceptual level, 
thus, the realm of multiplicity reveals the existence of a poietic faculty which 
is threateningly autonomous from God himself.
Such a poietic faculty of multiplicity surfaces in the De defectu oracolo-
rum, when Plutarch openly makes use of the older theory of the Monad and 
the Dyad. The former gives ontological consistency to the latter. This is clear 
through the theory of numbers, for which the multiple exists, i.e. acquires an 
ontological consistency, only through the One and when it is grasped through 
unity; otherwise it collapses into chaos, indetermination and ultimately non-
Being.41 Multiplicity defi nitely shows a riotous nature, tending to subtract 
itself from the normative nature and ordering faculty of the One. Its resis-
tance to being delimited by Unity ‘throws all into confusion, and makes it to 
be without rhythm, bounds, or measure’.42 Yet it makes it something, and not 
nothing. Plutarch’s struggle is against the autonomous power of multiplicity, 
whose ontological consistency he intends to reduce to nothing, but which 
resists its own annihilation by showing the autonomous power to produce a 
world, however monstrously confused and chaotic.
Matter is moved by the evil cosmic soul.43 The demiurge, according to 
Plato, pervades the world with justice. It is however a geometrical and not an 
arithmetical justice (i.e. not proportional to the thing’s position in the scale of 
beings), which alludes not only to the diversity within the universe but also to 
the role and function that forms exert over matter.44 Geometrical forms become, 
in Plutarch’s reading of Plato’s myth, the limit imposed upon unformed and 
unharmonious matter. From it, ordered forms were able to emerge, guided by a 
40 Plu. Moralia. De E apud Delphos 394 A.
41 Plu. Moralia. De defectu oraculorum 429 A–B.
42 Plu. Moralia. De defectu oraculorum 429 A–B.
43 Plu. Moralia. De animae procreatione in Timaeus 1014 D–E, 1015 E.
44 The argument of a geometrical justice appears also in Plot. III.3.5. See infra.
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superior principle of reason. Matter, however, spontaneously fi ghts to resist this 
process and to return to the initial indistinction, the primordial ἄπειρον, with 
monstrosity as a weapon against its geometrical shaping and regularisation.45
Plutarch is aware of the monstrous nature of matter’s autonomous poietic 
power, and he explicitly deals with this idea in a topical passage of De Iside et 
Osiride in which the threat is embodied by the allegory of Typhoeus:
[. . .] they have a legend that the soul of Osiris is everlasting and imperish-
able, but that his body Typhon oftentimes dismembers and causes to disap-
pear, and that Isis wanders hither and yon in her search for it, and fi ts it 
together again; for that which really is and is perceptible and good is superior 
to destruction and change. The images from it with which the sensible and 
corporeal is impressed, and the relations, forms, and likeness which this takes 
upon itself, like impressions of seals in wax, are not permanently lasting, but 
disorder and disturbance overtakes them, being driven hither from the upper 
reaches, and fi ghting against Horus, whom Isis brings forth, beholden of all, 
as the image of the perceptible world. Therefore it is said that he is brought 
to trial by Typhon on the charge of illegitimacy, as not being pure nor uncon-
taminated like his father, reason unalloyed and unaffected of itself, but con-
taminated in his substance because of the corporeal element. He prevails, 
however, and wins the case when Hermes, that is to say Reason, testifi es and 
points out that Nature, by undergoing changes of form with reference to the 
perceptible, duly brings about the creation of the world.46 
Of extraordinary force and size, Typhoeus shows strength and determination 
in contending with the Olympians, and succeeds in temporarily subjugat-
ing Zeus himself. Such a strength, hyperbolically underlined by the literary 
sources, does not fi nd an equivalent in the surviving visual documents, to the 
point that the iconography sometimes suggests a creature whose monstrosity 
is defi nitely not impressive, and which dangerously refl ects the divinity that is 
about to strike him. Typhoeus is not absolute chaos, but rather a viable coun-
terpart to Zeus himself.47
45 Plu. Moralia. Quaestiones convivales VIII.2.
46 Plu. Moralia. De Iside et Osiride 373 A–C.
47 See O. Touchefeu-Meynier in LIMC, VIII.1, sub voce: ‘En fait, notre T. n’est pas très 
impressionnant. Sans doute a-t-il des traits, somme tout habituels, de la monstruosité: 
l’hybridité, avec partois la présence de quelques serpents annexes [. . .], la duplication 
[. . .], et parfois la grand taille suggérée par la position verticale dressée [. . .] ou par la 
présence d’un Zeus plus petit [. . .]. Certes, les images ne pouvaient prétendre rivaliser 
avec les portraits hyperboliques de la litérature. On s’étonne cependant de ne pas retrou-
ver pour notre anguipède des procédés dont le langage iconographique est, d’habitude, 
habile à tirer parti pour suggérer la sauvagerie, la force, l’agressivité: T. est le plus souvent 
soigneusement coiffé et vêtu [. . .] bien loin d’être agressif [. . .].’
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This attitude seems refl ected in Plutarch’s use of the myth, in which the 
monster brings Horus to trial ‘on the charge of illegitimacy’. The material and 
inferior principle defi es the higher god on the ground of an illegitimate claim 
to perfection, and is defeated only by the intervention of Hermes, who claims 
the reasonable character of creation. Plutarch’s compelling argument succeeds 
in bringing the myth to the level of a theologico-philosophical cosmogony, 
borrowed from, and rooted in, Platonism. This also emerges when Plutarch 
subsequently merges the myth of Typhoeus with that of Apollo’s birth:
The birth of Apollo from Isis and Osiris, while these gods were still in 
the womb of Rhea, has the allegorical meaning that before this world was 
made visible and its rough material was completely formed by Reason, it 
was put to the test by Nature and brought forth of itself the fi rst creation 
imperfect. This is the reason why they say that this god was born in the 
darkness a cripple [ἀνάπηρος], and they call him the elder Horus; for there 
was then no world, but only an image and outline of a world to be. But this 
Horus is himself perfected and complete; but he has not done away com-
pletely with Typhon, but has taken away his activity and strength. Hence 
they say that at Kopto the statue of Horos holds in one hand the privy 
members of Typhon, and they relate a legend that Hermes cut out the 
sinews of Typhon, and used them as strings for his lyre, thereby instructing 
us that Reason adjusts the Universe and creates concord out of discordant 
elements, and that it does not destroy but only cripples the destructive 
force. Hence this is weak and inactive here, and combines with the sus-
ceptible and changeable elements and attaches itself to them, becoming 
the artifi cer of quakes and tremblings in the earth, and of droughts and 
tempestuous winds in the air, and of lightining-fl ashes and thunderbolts.48 
Following the tradition, Horus itself is presented as twofold. The older one, as 
being spontaneously generated without waiting for the informing principle of 
Reason to properly act upon matter, and the newer one, as the accomplished 
and perfect creature, fi nally responding to the rational character transmitted 
to it from above. A strongly dualist interpretation of Platonism appears to 
inform this text, with the sharp opposition between the rational soul taming 
and informing the material substratum.49 The world self-generated depends 
only on matter’s activity. It is a misshapen attempt, a crippled being and a 
monstrous abortion. The echo of ancient cosmogonies, and of Empedocles’ in 
particular, clearly resonates.
48 Plu. Moralia. De Iside et Osiride 373 A–C.
49 See Dillon (1977), pp. 26 and 207.
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The destructive activity of Typhoeus and the reconstructive activity 
of Isis does not resemble a dialectic, but rather a proper and open confl ict 
between two opposing gods. Compared to the dissolution brought about by 
multiplicity in De E apud Delphos, the material monster of De Iside et Osiride 
shows a more threatening capacity of building an alternative order, or at least 
a confi guration of Being: crippled and chaotic, but an order nonetheless. Its 
ontological illegitimacy is decided only through force and deception in the 
myth, and its philosophical meaning is the sharp confl ict between the prin-
ciple of transcendence, embodied by reason, and that of immanence, embod-
ied by monstrosity.50
Plutarch aims at a philosophical victory of transcendence and of the 
Platonic demiurgic principle over immanence and the exclusively material 
nature of the cause, shared by atomists and Stoics: Zeus comes out victorious 
over Typhoeus after all.51 Yet, as in the myth, monstrosity is far from being 
defeated once and for all. Typhoeus is weak and emasculated, and yet the poi-
etic faculty of reason comes into being only through ordering, from above, the 
monstrous creation, and not through its destruction. The reasonable world, 
in its perfection, is described as harmony created out of discordant elements, 
and Typhoeus’s destructive force is not annihilated, but only crippled. This 
is the reason why tumultuous and tempestuous phenomena still happen on 
earth. Normality is full of residual monstrosity and, even worse in Plutarch’s 
perspective, normality is nothing but the crippling of the destructive force, 
and indeed the monstrifi cation of monstrosity itself.
Plutarch’s dualist conception has a great infl uence on several Middle 
Platonists, such as Maximus of Tyrus. The material realm is, for Maximus, 
sharply opposed to the intelligible one. The latter, however, is also the origin 
and cause of everything beautiful and good one can fi nd in the former.52 Mat-
ter is however what binds humans to passionality, ruining the soul’s freedom. 
50 See contra C. Froidefond in Plutarque (1972–93), V.2, p. 303, and Froidefond (1972), 
p. 66. In my view the powerful use of the myth testifi es less to an Aristotelian attitude 
toward the rehabilitation of matter, as Froidefond claims, and more to a specifi cally 
Middle Platonic anxiety toward matter’s claimed activity, at the same time autonomous 
and monstrous. Appropriately, Donini (1992b), p. 105 and passim, underlines that the 
‘rebel necessity’ of matter surfaces more vividly in the texts of Plutarch in which, like in 
the Quaestionum convivialium, the physical explanation of phenomena becomes predom-
inant and the rhetorical appeal to theocentrism does not offer any protective ground 
against the spontaneous manifestation of the material reality.
51 On Plutarch’s hostility to Stoic’s immanentism see Babut (1969), pp. 462–3 and passim. 
See also Hershbell (1992a). On the importance of Plutarch’s attitude for Neoplatonism 
see Zambon (2002).
52 See Goulet, éd. (1989–) IV, pp. 324–48 and Soury (1942a).
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Maximus makes use of monstrosity to explain this idea, and in particular of 
the old monstrous races, which he interprets allegorically:
Poets tell us that there was once a Thessalian race that lived on Pelion 
and had strange bodies, with the rear quarters of horses, from the navel 
down. In such an uncouth conjunction as this it is surely entirely inevi-
table that human and bestial nature should pasture together: that such 
creatures should speak like men but feed like beasts, see like men but mate 
like beasts. Well done, poets and sons of poets, progenitors of an ancient 
and noble poetry; what a clear allegory you have given us of the bond that 
binds us to the pleasures! When bestial desires overwhelm the soul, they 
do not alter the external human appearance, but in the actions he performs 
they reveal their victim as a beast not a man. This is what is meant by the 
Centaurs, the Gorgons, the Chimaeras, Geryon, and Cecrops. Remove the 
desires of the belly, and you have removed the beast from man; remove 
the desires of the privy parts, and you have cut the beast in two! But as 
long as these desires live in a man and are nourished in him, and he defers 
to them and tends them, it is inevitable that it should be their impulses 
that dominate, and that his soul should speak with their accents.53 
Maximus is undoubtedly echoing the infl uential image of the tripartite soul of 
R. IX, 588 c ff.54 Even more interesting, I believe, is the radical form of mon-
strosity that Maximus conjures up. Whereas Plato’s image has the function of 
explaining how the beast can and must be tamed, Maximus more drastically 
suggests that the only cure is to cut it in two pieces. No mediation is envisage-
able and no taming is possible for humans when passions take over the soul.
On this ground, Middle Platonism appears to converge with Pythagore-
anism, and in particular with Numenius, who also claims the primacy of the 
incorporeal over the material and the causal dependency of the latter from the 
former. Like Plutarch and Philo, Numenius insists on the opposition between 
divine Being on the one hand and terrestrial Becoming, or non-Being, on the 
other. Together with Plutarch and Philo, Numenius embodies the highly reli-
gious approach to the Platonic discourse on divinity, and his thought comes 
close to Philo’s Hellenic Judaism, explicitly claiming that Plato is Moses 
speaking Greek.55
Numenius, however, originally reworks the Pythagorean position about 
the negativity of matter and adapts it to the Platonic dialectic between 
53 Max.Tyr. XXXIII.8.
54 See Puiggali (1978), pp. 429 ff, and supra.
55 Numen. 8 (= Eus. PE XI.10.12–14).
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the demiurge and its work. Along with its negative character, according to 
Chalcidius, Numenius insists on its necessary presence and on the benefi c 
intervention of divinity:
[. . .] God adorned matter with a magnifi cent strength and corrected her 
defects in every way, while not destroying them lest material nature per-
ish entirely, nor permitting her to spread and expand in every direction. 
But, while nature stood fast and could thus be called away from a trouble-
some state to a favorable one and be transformed, by conjoining order 
to disordered confusion, limit to immoderation, and cultivation to fi lth, 
he converted her total state, illuminating and embellishing it. In short, 
Numenius denies and denies correctly that any condition of generated 
objects can be found anywhere exempt from defect: not in the arts of 
man, not in nature, not in the bodies of animals, nor indeed in trees and 
plants; not in fruits, not in the fl ow of air or in an expanse of water, nor 
even in the heaven itself. For everywhere it mingles itself with providence 
as if it were some stain of an inferior nature.56 
God tames matter. He is also careful not to destroy it entirely, but keeps it 
in check, so to speak, by infusing order, measure and beauty where they are 
lacking.
The exigency of establishing a comfortable separation between God and 
the world returns, like a footprint, in all the major Middle and Neoplatonist 
philosophers. An interesting interpretation is offered, for example by Galen’s 
teacher Alcinous (or Albinus).57 Strongly infl uenced by Stoicism, and con-
trary to Atticus’s attitude, Alcinous is open to the reconciliation of Aristotle’s 
and Plato’s thought. Although conceived as a handbook of Platonism, Alci-
nous’s Didaskalikos is far from being a mere repetition of Plato’s doctrine. It is 
probably the most coherent text of Middle Platonism on the nature of God. It 
nonetheless reveals the exigency of negotiating between transcendence and 
the presence of the divine in the world.
In book X, Alcinous develops a coherent treatise on the nature of God. 
He eminently ascribes goodness, beauty and perfection to God, thus claiming 
its separateness from the world which it inhabits and providentially rules.58 
The ambiguity that we have seen in Plutarch’s writings, though, also emerges 
56 Numen. 52 (= Chalcid. In Timaeum 299). See also Dragona-Monachou (1994), pp. 44–76.
57 On the diffi cult identifi cation of this Middle Platonic author see in particular Goulet, 
éd. (1989–), ad loc., Moraux (1973–84), II, pp. 441 ff., Dillon (1977), pp. 267–304, and 
Dillon, Introduction, in Alcinous (1993).
58 Alcinous (1993), X.
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in Alcinous. Notwithstanding his horror toward materialism, and thus his 
opposition to every physical interpretation of the divine inspired by Stoicism, 
Alcinous is in fact brought to recognise that matter is indeed necessary to the 
cosmos. Although it is the principle of everything that is chaotic, matter is still 
a principle, together with God and ideas.59
In Latin Middle Platonism, the principle of transcendence is more clearly 
argued, such as in Apuleius of Madauros.60 In his De deo Socratis, Apuleius 
strongly claims the separation of the gods from the world61 as well as their 
ineffable character.62 Like Plutarch, but with an even stronger accent, he also 
claims, in the De Platone, the opposition between two essences, one eternal 
and truly existent, and the other created and mortal. The latter is entangled 
in Becoming, and thus like a shadow of the former.63 Beaujeu has pointed out 
that the separation between God’s substance and power is the truly original 
character of Apuleius’s De mundo, the translation of the Pseudo-Aristotle’s 
Περὶ κόσμου, in which God is father and saviour of the universe, and yet is 
not engaged in its production.64 The transcendence of the divine is argued 
with an even stronger emphasis than in the original Greek text.65
Apuleius reworks the concept of archetypal ideas, from among which God 
selects his models to shape individual and concrete things.66 Everything origi-
nates in matter, and yet initially in a chaotic form, which is eventually ordered 
by the demiurge.67 The ambiguities that one can read in Plutarch surface again 
in Apuleius. Everything is composed from different elements, well balanced 
and harmonised to best imitate the model.68 This resemblance, however, some-
how threatens the model itself, questioning the purity and transcendence of the 
idea. The ability of the lower being to imitate the higher one indirectly implies 
the necessity for the higher one to somehow be assimilated. The original purity 
and transcendence of the paradigm is lost, vis-à-vis every concrete realisation. 
Apuleius gives an initial defi nition of ideas in Plat. 190, where one reads that 
59 See G. Invernizzi, ‘Introduzione’, in Invernizzi (1976).
60 On Apuleius’s philosophy see in particular Dillon (1977), pp. 312–27, and Gersh (1986), 
pp. 215–325.
61 Apul. Soc. 123 and 128.
62 Apul. Soc. 124.
63 Apul. Plat. 193.
64 Apul. Mund. 343. On the Περὶ κόσμου see infra.
65 Published in Aristotle (1955). See also Moreschini (1978), p. 69, and Gersh (1986), pp. 
273–9. This strong contrast, as Dragona-Monachou has underlined, intends to recover 
the original Platonic inspiration, following in particular Lg. X.
66 Apul. Plat. 192–3.
67 Apul. Plat. 194.
68 Apul. Mund. 334.
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they are nulla specie nex qualitatis signifi catione distinctae (‘distinguished by no 
mark of species or quality’). As Beaujeu and many others have suggested, this 
is probably only a mistake of the copyist, since Apuleius cannot have assigned 
matter’s characteristics to ideas.69 Yet Apuleius does not think about ideas as 
God’s thought, like Alcinous. Even if he cannot be such a poor Platonic phi-
losopher, something emerges in his thought that reveals the ambivalence of the 
threatening relation between material things and their models.
Notwithstanding the strong claim for transcendence, and thus for God’s 
purity, the ambiguity of the divine nature surfaces in one of the most philo-
sophically inspired texts of Apuleius, namely the tale of Cupid and Psyche in 
the Metamorphoses.70 The tale is inspired by Plato’s theory of Love in Phaedrus 
248 c–252 c. Although the allegorical reading of the tale is not philosophi-
cally straightforward, Eros fully maintains the traditional ambiguity of his 
character in Apuleius, according to a genealogy that can be traced back to 
archaic theogonies. Here, Eros is often born together with the Earth, and 
straight out of Chaos.71 His paternity is uncertain, and he can be cunning, 
unmanageable and even cruel,72 sublimely epitomised by Sappho’s image of 
the bittersweet creature (γλυκύπικρον ὄρπετον).73 Euripides’ Phaedra con-
siders Eros her master in the fi rst Hippolytus.74 The divine principle, in this 
philosophically complex text of the Metamorphoses, is far from pure. It is on 
the contrary exposed to the ambiguity that derives from its erotic contact 
with the earthly world of passion and desire.75
Middle Platonism develops an increasingly negative view of matter. This 
will appear as a problem to which Neoplatonism tries to fi nd a solution. It is 
worthy to mention, here, that also the Chaldean Oracles and the Corpus Herme-
ticum contribute to this negative conception. The former explicilty talks about 
evil matter (κακῆς ὕλης), seen as an aggressive and demonic force, from which 
only the higher sphere of the Ethereal World is spared,76 and opposed to ‘[. . .] 
69 Beaujeu in Apulée (1973), commentaire, ad loc. See also Moreschini (1978) who is more 
prudent.
70 See O’Brien (2002) and Fletcher (2014).
71 Hes. Th. 120 ff. and Hyg. Fab. prologue. See also F. I. Zeitlin, Eros, in Settis a cura di 
(1996–2002), I, pp. 369–430, and Brisson (2008, 2e ed.), p. 76. Plato, Smp. 178 b, believes 
the opposite. 
72 See Hornblower and Spaworth (2012, 4th ed), Roscher (1884–90), Grimal (1951), Grimal 
(1965), Gantz (1993) and LIMC, sub voce.
73 Sapph. (= PLF fr. 130).
74 Euripide (1927–2003), VIII.2, pp. 221–48.
75 See Janoušek (2006), p. 33. For the tragic roots of the ambivalence within the divine, see 
Untersteiner (1955, 2a ed.), passim.
76 Orac.Chald. 88.
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the light-hating world, boisterous of matter, where there is murder, discord, 
foul odours, squalid illnesses, corruptions, and fl uctuating works’.77 The Ascle-
pius simply states the inferiority of the concrete individuals to their model and 
form,78 since only the latter is stable and pure, while the former are necessarily 
different from each other and constantly changing. The Corpus Hermeticum 
makes a direct connection with the idea of monstrosity: ‘The vice of soul is 
ignorance. For the soul, when it is blind and discerns none of the things that 
are nor their nature nor the good, is shaken by the bodily passions, and the 
wretched thing becomes – in ignorance of itself – a slave to vile and monstrous 
bodies [ἀλλόκοτος and μοχθηρός], bearing the body like a burden, not ruling 
but being ruled. This is the vice of soul.’79
These ideas are also explored in the early Christian thought infl uenced by 
Platonism, often in contrast to Stoic Christianity, but sometimes with a sin-
cretic and eclectic approach. Clement of Alexandria is a good representative 
of Christian Platonism. Although we do not possess his cosmogony, Clement 
closely follows Philo and considers the sensible world to be only a copy of the 
intellectual world, which serves as a model.80
Humans, Clement claims, are composed of a rational and irrational ele-
ment. The soul and the body, whose distinction becomes so important for early 
Christian thinkers, are rooted in the basic elements of the Platonic analysis. 
The body is linked to the earth, while the soul stretches out toward God:
[Man] is like, it appears to me, the Centaur, a Thessalian fi gment, com-
pounded of a rational and irrational part, of soul and body. Well, the body 
tills the ground, and hastes to it; but the soul is raised to God: trained in 
the true philosophy, it speeds to its kindred above, turning away from the 
lusts of the body, and besides these, from toil and fear [. . .]81 
Along with the centaur, Clement also follows Philo’s allegorical argument 
about the snake, which represents the blameful turn toward matter, i.e. plea-
sure and sin. However, the corporeal must not be condemned, Clement adds, 
drawing his material straight from the Timaeus, and explicitly writing against 
77 Orac.Chald. 134.
78 Ps.Apul. Ascl. 35.
79 Corp.Herm. X.8. Scott, in [Corpus Hermeticum] (1924–36), I, p. 193, has it as ‘uncouth 
and noxious bodies’. Ἀλλόκοτος means of unusual nature, or form, strange, portentous 
(Pl. Euthd. 306 e), but also horrible and monstrous. Μοχθηρός is closer to wretched (Pl. 
Phdr. 268 e Grg. 504 e, R. 343 e), in a moral sense, knavish, rascally.
80 Clem.Al. Strom. V.93.4 (= AA. VV. (1970), II, p. 467). Cf. Lilla (1971). See also the 
collection of excerpts known as the eighth Stromateus in Havrda (2016).
81 Clem.Al. Strom. IV.3.9 (= AA. VV. (1970), II, p. 410).
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the Gnostics. Instead, if we want to grasp the double constitution of humans, 
best understood through the metaphor of the centaur, one of the more complex 
ancient mythological monsters, we must understand the corporeal terms of 
human nature and its features.82
One of the most interesting questions raised by Christians vis-à-vis pagan 
Platonism is the problem of the negative in considering the development from 
the merely organising role of the demiurge to the creative role of God. We have 
seen how pagan middle Platonism interprets evil and monstrosity in relation to 
the inferior world and matter’s behaviour in the hands of the powerful demi-
urge. What happens, however, when Christian Platonism abandons the idea of 
demiurgic activity in favour of the creation ex-nihilo? In the fi rst half of the sec-
ond century, Origen plays a fundamental role in clarifying the new dogma, thus 
opening up a new and problematic domain for the role and status of monstros-
ity. If God creates the universe, rather than merely organising its pre-existing 
matter, he becomes even more directly responsible for the presence of evil and, 
in particular, of monstrosity. What role does monstrosity have in a world cre-
ated out of nothing according to the project and plan of an almighty crafter?
In his On First Principles, Origen explains that everything was always con-
tained and comprised, forever, in the Wisdom of the Almighty:
Since within [the] very subsistence of Wisdom was every capacity and 
form of the creation that would come to be – both of those things which 
exist primarily and of those which occur in consequence, having been 
formed beforehand and arranged by the power of foreknowledge regard-
ing these very created things, which had been as it were outlined and 
prefi gured in Wisdom herself – Wisdom herself says through Solomon 
that she was created the beginning of the ways of God, that is, containing 
within herself the beginning and the reasons and the species of the entire 
creation.83 
Everything has already been formed, forever, in God’s pre-science, and this 
includes monstrosity. In this case, every argument that explained monstrosity 
through a resistance of the lower reality to the higher informative principle or 
through a necessary corruption due to the dynamic involved in the process 
of actualisation of forms loses its validity. Monstrosity, like normality, has a 
role written since ever and forever in the original plan of creation. This argu-
ment, through several mediations and transformations, eventually constitutes 
82 See Henne (2016), pp. 205–7. On the fi ght against Gnosticism see Monfrinotti (2014), 
pp. 162 ff.
83 Origenes Princ. I.2.2. See also I.4.4, II.3.6.
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the foundation of preformationist explanation, whose theoretical core is thus 
Platonic and based on the new Christian vision of creation.
Let’s go back to pagan Platonism and the question of love and desire, which is 
at the heart of the relation between the divine and the world.84 When one moves 
from Middle to Neoplatonism, one sees a similar analysis, but also an interesting 
evolution. Love is an essential part of Plato’s theory of the soul, and its function 
is to grasp Truth. Plotinus grants a much wider role to Love, making the erotic 
movement the ground of the procession of the One toward the intelligible world. 
Love is life’s power, and yet it does not lose, for Plotinus, the ambiguous status 
that derives from its origin. The erotic desire is originally corporeal and a demon 
that lacks something and desires what it has not. Although its lack is only partial, 
since there would be no desire of goodness in the complete absence of goodness, 
it refers to matter and thus to the absolute evil and privation.85
Matter can be thus contrasted to the One (Ἕν), in which no duality can 
be found since it precedes the Dyad,86 and about which one can hardly speak, 
given its ineffable nature beyond Being and essence. The One is the prin-
ciple of everything, and yet it is nothing in particular, because of its absolute 
transcendence and anteriority.87 However, through the ἕνωσις or oneness, 
Plotinus also intends the One as present, in a certain manner, in things.88 
With Philonic accent, Plotinus calls the world God’s son, and a supremely 
beautiful one.89 This relationship is even stronger than in Philo. The One 
is absolute Goodness and it functions as a model for every individual being. 
Beings derive their own consistency and unity from their conversion toward 
the One, following their own erotic desire for it.
No confl ict or duality, thus, attains the ineffable and transcendent One 
from which everything else derives. Beyond the One, on the contrary, every-
thing seems threatened by such a dependency of its ontological consistency 
from its desire. The desire reveals things’ lack of and thirst for Being rather 
than the peaceful plenitude of a harmonic cosmos. It is a monstrous desire 
that things have for what they are not, and for their otherness.90 This is the 
source of Plotinus’s theory of evil:
Is matter, then, also evil because it participates in good? Rather, because 
it lacks it; for this means that it does not have it. Anything which lacks 
84 On Plotinus see Wolters (1985). More broadly, on Eros in Plato and Neoplatonism, see 
Cornford (1952), pp. 80 ff., and Rist (1967b).
85 Plot. III.5.9. See Laurent (1999), p. 93 and infra.
86 Plot. V.1.5.
87 Both positively, e.g. in V.6.3 and VI.9.3, and negatively, e.g. in III.8.10 and VI.8.8. 
88 Plot. VI.9 and V.4.1. On the One, see Meijer (1992).
89 Plot. V.8.12. See Brehier (1928) and Guyot (1906).
90 Laurent (1992), p. 92.
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something, but has something else, might perhaps hold a middle position 
between good and evil, if there is more or less of a balance between its lack 
and its having; but that which has nothing because it is in want, or rather is 
want, must necessarily be evil. For this thing is not want of wealth but want 
of thought, want of virtue, of beauty, strength, shape, form, quality. Must it 
not then be ugly? Must it not be utterly vile, utterly evil?91
Evil does not have a proper autonomy and ontological consistency. It is a by-
product of the good and a necessary outcome of its relative distance from the 
principle. It is privation (στέρεσις), whose function is to establish a monist 
metaphysics against the dualist tendency.92
As Plotinus makes clear, evil must be conceived in connection with the 
material element. Plotinus builds a new philosophical meaning for the term 
ἀπόστασις, previously used to talk about the distance between the earth and 
the stars93 or about death as the abandonment of life.94 Yet the ἀπόστασις is 
also the rebellion and the defection. Monstrosity thus has, for Plotinus, the 
diminishing character of a degradation, that of matter because of its distance 
from the One. It is also a threatening and rebellious abandonment that estab-
lishes the gap with being as an opposition based on absolute otherness.
Plotinus, however, makes an interesting attempt not to present the rela-
tion between matter and form in terms of an open confl ict. This is the ground 
of one of the most original and diffi cult passages of the Enneads, strongly 
infl uenced by Stoicism. It is treatise 18, Ennnead V.7.7, in which Plotinus 
denies Plato’s conclusion that ideas of individual things do not exist. They 
do exist, Plotinus argues, or else concrete individuals would be completely 
cut off from the intelligible world, with evidently deleterious ethical conse-
quences. The treatise is the occasion, for Plotinus, to accept the Stoic theory 
of ἰδίως ποιόν, for which individual differences are essential and not acci-
dental, and they depend on the form and not on matter or, in other words, 
on the individual’s essence and not on its actual embodiment in the material 
and sensible world.95
91 Plot. II.4.16, translation modifi ed.
92 See Kalligas (2014), pp. 223 ff. On Plotin’s theory of evil see also Schröder (1916) and 
D. O’Meara’s commentaire, in Plotin (1999).
93 Archim. Aren. I.5, Xenoph., Vorsokr. 21 A 41a (= LM [8] XEN. D31, D35), Anaxi-
men., Vorsokr. 13 A 7(6) (= LM [7] ANAXIMEN. P2, D3), X. Mem. IV.7.5, Arist. Cael. 
291 b 8.
94 E. Hipp 277.
95 Although Brehier in Plotin (1991) underlines Plotinus’s tendency toward Stoicism on 
this point, one should not forget that the quality is, for Stoics, strictly immanent to mat-
ter, while Neoplatonism intends it in an idealistic manner, with matter as subordinate 
and derived from form. See Reale (1975–80), IV, p. 571.
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The distinction is important, and Plotinus makes use of the concept of 
monstrosity to denounce as absurd the hypothesis that he condemns, as well 
as to avoid the direct confrontation between form and matter:
[. . .] how does it come about that children conceived in different seasons 
are different? Is it then the matter which makes the difference since it is 
not dominated in the same way [in the different seasons?] If that were so, 
then all the children but one would be contrary to nature. But if the differ-
ence is a great diversity of beauty, the form is not one. Only ugliness is to 
be attributed to the infl uence of matter, and even there the perfect forming 
principles are present, hidden but given as wholes.96 
Plotinus faces an alternative: either matter alone is responsible for the actual 
individual characteristics, or they rather depend on forms and essences, 
which are specifi c in themselves to individual beings. According to the for-
mer hypothesis, all individuals but one would be monstrous. By denying this 
absurd hypothesis, Plotinus must admit that matter and forms are unequally 
responsible for those differences, and they are, so to speak, heterogeneous in 
their effects: matter alone is responsible for ugliness, while forms alone are 
responsible for beauty, in all its degrees and individual differences. Plotinus 
thus adapts the Stoic theory of individual qualities to his own theory of the 
powerless character of forms. The consequence is that, to avoid the absurd 
consequence of calling only one child normal and all other children παρὰ 
φύσιν, one would have to suspend judgement on individual features, which 
would paradoxically have to be considered beautiful vis-à-vis the form, but 
also ugly vis-à-vis matter.
Elsewhere, however, Plotinus presents forms and matter as directly con-
fronting each other, within the homogeneous domain of the concrete and 
informed material reality.97 Matter now has the character of an active and 
threatening resistance against the form:
[. . .] evil is not in any sort of defi ciency but in absolute defi ciency; a 
thing which is only slightly defi cient in good is not evil, for it can even be 
perfect on the level of its own nature. But when something is absolutely 
defi cient – and this is matter – this is essential evil without any share in 
good [. . .]. But if one considers that things external to the soul are evils, 
illness or poverty for instance, how will one trace them back to the nature 
96 Plot. V.7.2. On the interpretation of this treatise and its diffi cult character see É. Brehier 
in Plotin (1999), V. pp. 119–22, L. Brisson et al. in Plotin (2003), pp. 405–7.
97 On Plotinus’s ambivalence regarding the active malignant character of matter see also 
Brehier (1928), p. 205.
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of matter? Illness is defect and excess of material bodies which do not 
keep order and measure; ugliness is matter not mastered by form; poverty 
is lack and deprivation of things which we need because of the matter 
with which we are coupled, whose very nature is to be need.98 
Plotinus’s attempt is to relegate evil and monstrosity to the absolute non-
Being. The language of participation is employed to explain the relative 
degrees of imperfection of actual things. Negativity, thus, is always relative 
insofar as it is embodied, and it is absolute only when taken in itself. In itself, 
however, it does not have ontological consistency. Indeed, evil is something 
precisely and only because of its embodiment and of the form’s incapacity to 
dominate matter.99 One is able to partially represent ugliness as a defect and 
an imperfect actualisation of the form. How does one, however, represent 
what is completely formless? Such a complete lack of form, I would call abso-
lute monstrosity, which can only be thought through a complete negation, a 
void of forms that leaves space for matter’s unchained power:
[. . .] when for instance we see an ugly face in matter, because the forma-
tive principle in it has not got the better of the matter so as to hide its 
ugliness, we picture it to ourselves as ugly because it falls short of the form. 
But how do we know what has absolutely no part in form? By absolutely 
taking away all form, we call that in which there is no form matter; in the 
process of taking away all form we apprehend formlessness in ourselves, if 
we propose to look at matter.100 
As we have seen above, Plato himself suggests that matter, uncreated by the 
demiurge, resists its information. I think, however, that Plotinus’s attempt to 
frame this concept within a strict monism reveals the deep infl uence of the 
Aristotelian concept of matter’s resistance to its formal and fi nal cause, which 
is precisely the ground of his theory of monstrosity as something’s failure to 
realise its own teleology.101
 98 Plot. I.8.5. See Kalligas (2014), ad loc.
 99 See also Plot. VI.1.9 and Laurent (1992), pp. 94 ff.
100 Plot. I.8.9. See also Rist (1967a), pp. 127–8 and Plot. II.4.16: ‘Is matter, then, the same 
thing as otherness? No, rather it is the same thing as the part of otherness which is 
opposed to the things which in the full and proper sense exist, that is to say rational and 
formative principles. [. . .] that which is has nothing because it is in want, or rather is 
want, must necessarily be evil. For this thing is not want of wealth but want of thought, 
want of virtue, of beauty, strength, shape, form, quality. Must it not be ugly? Must it not 
be utterly vile, utterly evil?’
101 See above. On Plotinus’s theory of matter’s resistance see also IV.4.38.
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The active threat represented by matter in Plotinus’s universe surfaces 
in the treatise on evil. Matter undoubtedly has some power. It is not only a 
negative power of resistance, though. It is now a destructive power, or rather 
a contaminating and polluting one, namely the capacity to affect the forms 
from which it receives its ontological consistency. Forms are thus justifi ed or 
absolved, that is to say they are not responsible for misshapes and monstrosi-
ties. Yet they are also incapable, in Aristotelian terms, of fully accomplishing 
their informative task. Forms necessarily and consistently lose in their struggle 
with matter:
The forms in matter are not the same as they would be if they were by 
themselves; they are formative forces immanent in matter, corrupted 
in matter and infected with its nature. [. . .] For matter masters what is 
imaged in it and corrupts and destroys it by applying its own nature which 
is contrary to form, not bringing cold to hot but putting its own formless-
ness to the form of heat and its shapelessness to the shape and its excess 
and defect to that which is measured, till it has made the form belong to 
matter and no longer to itself [. . .].102 
This is the price that Plotinus has to pay for his strict monism. If it is true that 
evil is always touched by goodness in a certain manner, and thus made relative 
and subordinate, the contrary is also true: goodness is necessarily touched and 
contaminated by evil. In defi ning evil as lacking measure (ἄμετρος), unlimited 
(ἄπειρος) and formless (ἀνείδεος), the measure, the limit and the form them-
selves are touched and polluted by such a power of negativity. By limiting evil, 
form and goodness are also reciprocally limited.103
Evil, as Whittaker has argued, comes from matter when it has reached its 
ultimate term, ἔσχατος, and it cannot produce anything good or beautiful any 
more. Matter thus drags the form far from its origin and its purity. And yet this 
is the ambiguous and ambivalent conclusion that affects Plotinus’s Neopla-
tonism: matter is also necessary, because without it, there would not be any 
goodness in general, nor anything good in particular.104 Evil and monstrosity, 
as in Aristotle, become threateningly necessary to goodness and normality. 
102 Plot. I.8.8. Kalligas (2014), p. 235, also reads this passage as the confi rmation that mat-
ter could not be completely passive, without being at the same time the origin of evil. 
See also Plot. I.8.14, and Laurent (1992), pp. 89–90, who correctly speaks about the 
‘danger que la radicale impuissance représente’.
103 See the clear explanation of De Capitani (1985), with specifi c reference to Plot. I.8.7.
104 Whittaker (1928, 2nd ed.), p. 81. See also Kalligas (2014), with specifi c reference to the 
ἔσχατον and to Plot. I.7.7.
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This is the source of chaos, but also of life, and without this source, there 
would be only the solitude and silence of the One.105
Although ambivalent and sometimes ambiguous, Plotinus’s monism is 
the attempt to overcome the ambiguities implicitly conveyed by a dualism of 
Neo-Pythagorean inspiration, which eventually develops in Gnosticism, one 
of the strongest adversaries of Platonism.106 Plotinus’s monism is of paramount 
importance both in the development of Platonism in the Imperial age, and 
its relationship with Christianity. Two fundamental dogmas of Christianity, 
namely creationism and the resurrection of the fl esh, are unacceptable for 
those who, like several Middle Platonist philosophers, assign autonomy to the 
principle of Evil. This is one of the main causes of the confl ict between Middle 
Platonists like Porphyry and Celsus, and Christians like Origen. Overcoming 
dualism, Plotinus makes monism the ground for a possible reconciliation of 
Platonism and Christianity, which is eventually accomplished by Eusebius and 
Augustine.107
Plotinus’s pupil, Porphyry, also reveals in his thought the tension between 
monism and dualism, and makes monstrosity play an interesting role in the 
analysis of the divine. Porphyry refers to the Hebrew God as αὐτογένετος, self-
generated.108 Only an apophatic description of it can be given, since human 
words cannot explain its complete autonomy and oneness, at the origin of 
everything.109 For Porphyry, however, ineffable is far from also meaning almighty, 
as in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In his criticism, Porphyry makes use of the 
concept of monstrosity to denounce Christian lies, and in particular the concept 
of a god that would be able to make anything, for example that the past did not 
happen or that two plus two could make anything different from four.110
105 See J. M. Rist, ‘The Problem of Otherness in the Enneads’, in AA. VV. (1971), p. 81: 
‘The metaphysical explanation which Plotinus offers of the otherness present in the 
intelligible world, and at all subsequent levels of the cosmos, is in terms of motion. 
Motion is defi ned by Aristotle as an incomplete activity, and it is incomplete in so far 
as it has not attained its end. Thus it is natural for Plotinus to associate motion closely 
with some kind of desire or striving; and it is of course a mark of all levels of reality 
below the One that they are striving to return to their source. If there was no otherness 
present in things, Plotinus argues, we should have the stillness and silence of the One 
[V.1.4.38–9]. Without otherness there is no motion. And motion involves lacking.’
106 See Rist (1965), Barra (1972), De Capitani (1985). Contra Dillon (1977), p. 45 and passim.
107 Like Origen, Plotinus was a disciple of Ammonius Saccas in Alexandria. See Gilson 
(1969, 2e ed.).
108 Porph. De philosophia ex oraculis haurienda 324 F (= Eus. PE IX.10.3–5; XIV.10.5).
109 Porph. De philosophia ex oraculis haurienda 325 F (= Theos. 173.17–174.22).
110 Porph. Chr. 89 and 90 a (= Mac.Magn. IV.6–7) on the monstrous falsity of the idea 
that the heavens will be subject to the fi nal judgement. See also Chr. 94 (= Mac.Magn. 
IV.24), against god’s omnipotence.
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From Plotinus’s henology, Porphyry draws the idea of a duality that pro-
ceeds from, and is absorbed by, the unity. This idea is common to Indian phi-
losophy, and reveals an explicit syncretism in Porphyry’s interest in Eastern 
thought. In a fragment on his work on the River Styx preserved by Stobaeus, 
Porphyry introduces the image of a statue that represents Shiva as lord of 
the universe.111 Quoting the Syriac Gnostic Bardaisan, Porphyry describes the 
statue as an androgyne being, on which a complete cosmology would be writ-
ten. Through the intermingling of the opposites, one can grasp the complex 
relation between unity and duality.112 The opposites coincide in the divine 
totality, one and undifferentiated. It is the monstrous androgyne that sub-
limely conveys this idea. The hermaphrodite becomes in Porphyry the para-
digm of an undifferentiated state that precedes the individual classifi cations of 
beings that we experience in the visible world. The divine represented by the 
statue is total and monstrous, possibly total because monstrous. If this is the 
case, not only does monstrosity precede normality; it becomes in some sense 
its origin and its destiny, in an indistinction that does not frighten anymore, 
but rather seduces for its potentiality.113
Porphyry also joins the Neoplatonic denunciation of matter as evil. In the 
Sentences, he poetically tries to provide the full range of ambiguous characteri-
sation of matter vis-à-vis forms:
According to the ancient sages such are the properties of matter. Matter is 
incorporeal because it differs from bodies. Matter is not lifeless, because it is 
neither intelligence, nor soul, nor anything that lives by itself. It is formless, 
variable, infi nite, impotent; consequently, matter cannot be existence, but 
111 Porph. De Styge 376 F (= Stob. I.3.56 = Porfi rio (2006), fr. 7.25–77).
112 See C. Castelletti, ‘Introduzione’, in Porfi rio (2006), pp. 69 ff., and Brisson (1997). For 
the Platonic origin of the theme of androgyny see Smp. 189 d–193 d, and supra. See also 
O’Flaherty (1980).
113 The ambivalence of the androgyne in Middle Platonism is already present in Philo, for 
whom sexuality represents both the moment of creation and the origin of sin. See Baer 
(1970). Paradoxographers are also interested in the androgyne and its ambivalent nature. 
The androgyne, along with the ghost, is the subject of one of the most famous tales of 
Phlegon of Tralles, a paradoxographer with an acutely neoplatonist sensibility. At the 
beginning of his Book of Marvels, Phlegon reports a child born in strange circumstances 
among the Aitolians. The child exhibits male and female genitals ‘that differed amaz-
ingly in their nature’. The amazingly discordant nature of the creature refl ects itself in 
the ambivalent role she plays in this intricate story: fi rst she is claimed by the ghost of 
Polykritos, her deceased father, whose apparent intent is to save her from being burned 
by the community. The ghost, however, devours the child, sparing only her head, which 
prophesies a bloody war between the Aitolians and the Akarnanians. A monstrous 
androgyne and a ghost violently break socially accepted rules and impose an obscure 
outcome, which is ultimately benefi cial for the community, as the prophecy allows it to 
prepare for the coming war. See Phleg. Book of Marvels II (= FGH 257 F 36.II).
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nonentity. Of course it is not nonentity in the same way that movement 
is nonentity; matter is nonentity really. It is an image and a phantom of 
extension, because it is the primary substrate of extension. It is impotence, 
and the desire for existence. The only reason that it persists is not rest [but 
change]; it always seems to contain contraries, the great and small, the less 
and more, lack and excess. It is always ‘becoming’, without ever persisting 
in its condition, or being able to come out of it. Matter is the lack of all 
existence and, consequently, what matter seems to be is a deception. If, for 
instance, matter seems to be large, it really is small; like a mere phantom, it 
escapes and dissipates into nonentity, not by any change of place, but by its 
lack of reality. Consequently, the substrate of the images in matter consists 
of a lower image. That in which objects present appearances that differ 
according to their positions is a mirror, a mirror that seems crowded, though 
it possesses nothing, and which yet seems to be everything.114 
Porphyry closely follows his teacher here, underlining however the dualist 
conception of the universe, whose beings exist between the One, above, and 
matter, below.
In Augustine, we fi nd a similar degree of complexity regarding the con-
cept and role of matter and the causal relation between God and the created 
universe. In the Confessions, Augustine explains how, initially, he thought of 
matter and its imperfection vis-à-vis the perfection of other forms. Matter, for 
Augustine, embodied the horrible status of an absolute monstrosity:
I used to think of [matter] as having countless and varied shapes, and 
therefore I was not thinking about matter at all. My mind envisaged foul 
and horrible forms nevertheless. I used to use the word formless not for 
that which lacked form but for that which had a form such that, if it had 
appeared, my mind would have experienced revulsion from its extraor-
dinary and bizarre shape, and my human weakness would have been 
plunged into confusion. But the picture I had in my mind was not the 
privation of all form, but that which is relatively formless by comparison 
with more beautiful shapes. True reasoning convinced me that I should 
wholly subtract all remnants of every kind of form if I wished to conceive 
the absolutely formless. I could not achieve this. I found it easier to sup-
pose something deprived of all form and nothingness, neither endowed 
with form nor nothing, but formless and so almost nothing.115 
114 Porh. Sent. 20 (= 10. (7) in [Porphyry] (1988), pp. 36–7).
115 Aug. Confessiones XII.6.6. Chadwick mentions, in the footnote, a reference to Simp. 
in Epict. 34 for which Mani’s prince of darkness has fi ve shapes: lion’s head, eagle’s 
shoulder, serpent’s stomach, fi sh’s tail, demon’s feet.
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In the retrospective struggle to conceptualise matter and overcome the illu-
sions of Gnosticism, Augustine conveys a complex idea of a threatening 
monstrosity. Such an idea, however, is soon encompassed by an inclusive 
approach that extends God’s power and generosity to the whole creation, 
including its lowest and most monstrous beings. Formed and unformed 
beings, in Augustine’s language, reveal God’s work across the spectrum, 
from high to low, according to an idea of Platonic gradation, process, and 
emanation.116 Forms are located above us, as explained in On the Trinity, 
because they are immutable, and offered to us so we can judge the sensible 
reality.117 The ideal forms are the ground of our knowledge and, in particular, 
the form of goodness is what lets us us judge whether an individual thing is 
also good.118 God, in this theological framework, is goodness itself, and all 
other creatures are good only by participation.119
God is also the only and unique creator. Any and every other creature, even 
when it produces something, can do so only by the will of the Almighty. Inferior 
creatures thus produce other individuals, more or less good, more or less normal 
or monstrous, by developing seeds that already exist, visible or hidden, in nature 
itself.120 Demons also make use of seeds to produce and act. These seminal rea-
sons have been implanted by God in nature. The origin of everything is in them, 
and production occurs when all the necessary conditions are present. There is 
an interesting resemblance, in this passage, to creatures that are born from hid-
den seeds and are unable to develop completely. Augustine is keen to avoid any 
Aristotelian tone that might suggest a spontaneous failure of the production 
process: God is and remains the creator. Even when Jacob artifi cially produces 
his sheep, it is God who is responsible for the outcome.121
Nature is not the cause, Augustine repeats, no matter what Pliny and 
Cicero claim.122 God is the supreme cause, and this idea is so important that 
it makes the whole Aristotelian theory of causality an oddity to be forgot-
ten: ‘every cause is effi cient, everything effi cient is greater than that which is 
produced, and nothing is greater than God’s will. Therefore [God’s will] has 
no cause to be sought after.’ Omnis causa effi ciens est is thus the only divine 
causality a Christian need contemplate.123
116 See e.g. Aug. Confessiones XIII.2.2.
117 Aug. De trinitate XII.2.2.
118 Aug. De trinitate VIII.3.4.
119 Aug. De trinitate VIII.3.4–5.
120 Cf. Aug. De trinitate III.8.13 and III.9.18.
121 Aug. De trinitate III.8.15.
122 Aug. De trinitate III.2 as well as Ciu. XXI.
123 Aug. Diuersis quaestionibus 28.
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Seminal reasons are in nature, as they were for the Stoics, but they are also 
directly in God. As we have seen, Stoicism already bends toward a certain 
transcendence of the divine principle, but Augustine exploits the conceptual 
tools offered by Neoplatonism to push divine transcendence much further. As 
for the Stoics, Augustine’s seminal reasons function as legal boundaries and 
as normative principles of individual phenomena.124 In De Genesis ad litteram, 
Augustine explains:
All the normal course of nature is subject to its own natural laws. 
According to these all living creatures have their particular, determinate 
inclinations . . . and also the elements of non-living material things have 
their determinate qualities and forces, in virtue of which they function as 
they do and develop as they do, and not in some other way. From these 
primordial principles everything that comes about emerges in its own 
time in the due course of events, and having come to its end passes away, 
each according to its nature.125 
Against the Stoics, however, one must recognise that effi cient causes are not 
just material. God, Augustine explains, does not act as a material cause, but 
as a will.126 Transcendence is thus preserved, allowing the explanation not 
only of ordinary and normal phenomena, but also of rare and unique events, 
including miracles and the birth of monstrosities. Because of their direct origin 
in God, seminal reasons ambiguously explain both normality and exceptions, 
encompassing everything under nature, all of which is the direct creation of 
the almighty God. God’s power is absolute, and revealed not by inconstancy, 
but by the wisdom that characterises his work: Neque enim potentia temeraria, 
sed sapientiae uirtute omnipotens est.127
Transcendence is also at the heart of Proclus’s consideration of the divine, 
together with several other attributes such as immutability, self-suffi ciency, 
imperturbability, simplicity, truth, wisdom, and beauty, that makes gods’ nature 
of the utmost perfection.128 Time and Being are posterior to, and dependent 
on, the divine. Proclus’s philosophy also revolves around the One and the 
concept of henology, with the main preoccupation of absolving the divine 
from evil and denying evil’s existence, certainly in the higher spheres, but in 
124 Not, however, as Lucretian foedera naturae. See, contra, Bouton-Toubolic (2004), 
pp. 192 ff.
125 Aug. Gen.ad Litt IX.17.32.
126 See Causa, in Mayer (1986–), I.
127 Aug. Gen.ad Litt IX.17.32. See also Creatio, creator, creatura, in Mayer (1986–), I, and, 
again, Bouton-Toubolic (2004), pp. 192 ff. See also Morgan (1984), pp. 295 ff.
128 Procl. Theol.Plat. I.19–24; II.2 and passim.
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a certain manner in the sensible world as well.129 Proclus’s major concern is in 
fact to avoid dualism. He thus connects with the Plotinian effort to establish 
a solid monism, going however much beyond Plotinus, whom he criticises 
precisely for having granted a too broad space to negativity as a principle. In 
De malorum subsistentia, Proclus’s attempt is to deny any consistency to the 
dualist hypothesis, and yet he also rejects the idea that evil comes, in any 
conceivable form, from the divine.130 The divine and the mundane thus enter-
tain a hierarchical relation, in which evil is not only subordinated to, but also 
functional to, and tamed by, the higher goodness:
[. . .] blessed and truly happy are those who say that evil things, too, are 
adorned by the gods, and that the unlimitedness of evil things is measured 
and their darkness bounded by them, insofar as evils, too, receive a por-
tion of the good and are allotted the power to exist. These people have 
called this cause by which evils, too, are adorned and ordered the fount 
of evils, not in that it were the mother that gives birth to them – for it is 
inconceivable that the fi rst causes of beings would be the principle[s] of 
the generation of evils – but as providing them with the limit and end, and 
as illuminating their darkness by its own light. Indeed, for evils, too, the 
unlimited is due to partial causes, and limit to universal causes.131
Good is not the mother of evil, but its keeper, insofar as evil is tamed and 
bounded by the divine, which provides it with a limit and a reason for exis-
tence in the whole economy of the universe. The whole treatise De malorum 
subsistentia is a critique of Plotinus Ennead I.8. Against it, Proclus argues that 
no absolute evil exists, symmetrical to the absolute good, as Plotinus claims. 
Not one Evil, but only evils exist, as the title’s plural already indicates. Evils do 
not collectively form anything consistent or positive in themselves. They are 
scattered throughout the existence as a plural heterogeneity, whose explana-
tion can only be given for each individual case. The concept of monstrosity 
itself could not have any consistency in Proclus’s system, since every monster 
would be a singular and individual case with no link to other monsters and no 
connection with anything but itself:
By no means should we posit one cause that is a unique, per se cause of 
evils. For if there is one cause of good things, there are many causes of 
evils, and not one single cause. If all good things are commensurate with, 
129 See Procl. De malorum subsistentia 11.
130 Procl. De malorum subsistentia 31.8–20.
131 Procl. De malorum subsistentia 41.17–24.
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similar to, and friendly with one another, with evils it is the complete 
opposite: neither among themselves nor in relation to good beings do they 
have a common measure. [. . .] we have to posit not one cause of evils, 
but a multitude of causes, some for souls, others for bodies, and examine 
evil from these causes and in these causes. [. . .] For what monad or what 
boundary or what eternal principle could there be for evils, the very being 
of which, down to the level of individual beings, is naturally defi ned by dis-
similitude and indefi niteness? The whole, on the contrary, is everywhere 
without badness.132 
Proclus’s powerful strategy is to demote evil and deprive it of any ontological 
consistency. Evil and monstrous individuals have only an individual consis-
tency and a singular explanation that prevents them from representing any 
threat to the only Monad from which all goodness comes.133
On this basis, Proclus is also able to move beyond Plotinus and, somehow, 
beyond Plato and much of the Middle and Neoplatonic views, on the nega-
tive status assigned to matter. In De malorum subsistentia 27.7–14 a dualist and 
confl ictual vision of matter seems to arise, whereby it is good when the ratio-
nal principle is in control of matter, and it is contrariwise bad when the latter 
gains control and autonomy: darkness, deformity, powerlessness and lack of 
order are the outcomes of such a situation.134 This confrontation, though, is 
undermined in the rest of the treatise, and especially in 36, in which matter 
remains a dysteleological principle, and yet its necessity acquires the status of 
a third principle, next to good and evil. Whereas for Plotinus matter is nega-
tive and yet necessary, Proclus argues against him that matter is necessary and 
thus not negative:
[. . .] there is another, a third nature, that is neither simply good nor evil, but 
necessary. Indeed, evil leads away from the good and fl ees from its nature; 
but the necessary is everything it is for the sake of the good, and it has a 
relation to the good. And any generation that befalls the necessary, happens 
because of the good. If then matter exists for the sake of generation, and if 
132 Procl. De malorum subsistentia 47.1–18. See also 37.7–25: ‘And in general, it is not true 
that evil exists on its own anywhere, for there is no unmixed evil, no primary evil. For if 
evil were contrary to the good in all respects, then, given the fact that the good that is 
on its own and primary precedes the good in other things, evil, too, has to be twofold: 
evil itself, and evil in something else. [. . .] nothing is contrary to the primary good, and 
neither to all things that participate in it, but there is only contrariety to things whose 
participation is not immutable.’
133 See also O’Meara, Introduction, in Plotin (1999), p. 32.
134 Procl. De malorum subsistentia 27.
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no other nature exists for the sake of matter in such a way that we could call 
it the goal or the good, then we must say that matter is necessary to genera-
tion, that it is not evil and that it is produced by divinity as necessary, and 
that it is necessary for the forms that are incapable of being established in 
themselves.135 
Matter’s neutrality is thus the solution to overcome dualism, but also the con-
sequence of a too rigid monism, that is to say to hold the Monad responsible 
for, and name it as the source of, evil and monstrosities. Proclus’s thought is 
the attempt, within Platonism, to tame abnormalities and monstrosities by 
individualising them and, as such, reintroducing them within a harmonious 
vision of the emanative being as well as of providence.
The world, however, is objectively full of evils and monstrosities. Their 
origin and function become a major preoccupation in the development of 
Middle and Neoplatonism. The questions of the nature of the divine and the 
ontology of evil are thus coupled with the search for an explanation of how 
the divine actually communicates with and ultimately takes care of the mate-
rial world. Early Platonism had offered an explanation based on the theory 
of demons as intermediate agents. This solution is thoroughly explored, and 
originally reworked, by Middle and Neoplatonist philosophers as well as early 
Christian thinkers.
Demons
The rediscovery of divine transcendence poses the question of God’s nature 
and its relation with the world. The Stoics offer the solution of a divinity 
intended as an acting logos, material and wholly immanent to the world. God 
permeates the world in the Stoic system, without any mediation. Moving 
away from, and radically condemning, Stoic immanentism, Middle and Neo-
platonism have thus a major problem to solve. They have to explain how a 
transcendent God communicates with the world. The more God is conceived 
as transcendental, the more it needs an intermediate reality that allows com-
munication between the divine and the earthly domain. A further question 
emerges from this problematic. Middle and Neoplatonism intends to maintain 
God’s direct and benevolent intervention in the world, and yet discharge it of 
any responsibility for creating evil and even for being in contact, in whatever 
manner, with the lower nature.
135 Procl. De malorum subsistentia 36.15–23. See also 33 and 37.1–7, as well as Whittaker 
(1928, 2nd ed.), p. 234.
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The ancient idea of demons as intermediate creatures between the divine 
and the earthly domain responds to this twofold problematic.136 The discourse 
on demons testifi es to a dynamic circulation of ideas between philosophy and 
popular culture that is far from being unidirectional. Greek philosophy is cer-
tainly infl uenced, especially during the Imperial age, by Eastern philosophical 
and religious doctrines. It also receives, however, ideas rooted in popular reli-
gion and superstition, concerning the existence of immaterial creatures above 
humans. The Orphic origin of the theme of demons attests to the eternal con-
fl ict between good and evil. The monstrous nature of demons emerges from 
one of the oldest feminine mythological characters, the Κῆρες.137 Sometimes 
a goddess, sometimes the immanent power of an individual, the Κήρ has an 
ambiguous status. Daughter of the Night in Hesiod’s Theogony,138 the lurid 
creature fl ies over the Homeric battlefi eld, with its black wings, sharp teeth 
and long nails, tearing apart corpses, drinking their blood and transporting the 
dead to Hades.139 Plato has it as a literary reminiscence, close to the Harpies, 
plaguing and deadly spirits of corruption.140
Homer speaks of δαίμονες for the divine characters, while in Hesiod 
‘demon’ already has the specifi c meaning of ‘divine spirit’.141 The idea of a pro-
tecting soul develops into the more specifi c personal demon, like the one that 
inspires Socrates according to Plato’s account. The εὐδαίμον and κακοδαίμων 
introduce the idea of being guided by a benign creature or, conversely, tor-
mented by an evil genius.
Plato distinguishes three kind of demons: the guardian (Phd. 107 d–8 c), 
the demon-soul (Ti. 40 d–41) and the semi-god (Smp. 202 ff.). This last text is 
possibly the most infl uential, and the starting point of every following version 
on the role of demons.142 Stoics too grant the existence of demons, as beings 
linked to humans by συμπάθεια and superior to them. Stoics, however, are less 
interested in the intermediate role that demons can play between humans and 
the higher divine sphere. This explains the limited space devoted to demonology 
136 On the δαίμων see above and Hild (1881), Buffi ère (1956), pp. 521–31, Untersteiner 
(1972, 2a ed.), pp. 110 ff., Winkler-Horaček (2015).
137 See Daremberg, Saglio éds. (1877–1919), sub voce, Roscher (1884–90), Rohde (1894), 
Grimal (1951), Grimal (1965), Chantraine (1968–80) and LIMC, sub voce, Gantz 
(1993) and Shapiro (1993), passim.
138 Hes. Th. 211, and Sc. 156–60, 248–57.
139 Il. I.228 and passim, Od. XVII.547. See Pârvulescu (1968).
140 Pl. Lg. XI, 937 d. See also Beaujeu, Commentaire, in Apulée (1973).
141 Hes. Th. 991.
142 See also Cra. 397 e–398 c for the etymology of the name. On demons in Plato, see also 
F. Solmsen, Hesiodic Motifs in Plato, in AA. VV. (1962), pp. 173–211. A wider analysis in 
Béchec (2013).
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in Latin culture dominated by Stoicism, until the Middle and Neoplatonic 
renaissance of the Imperial age. Furthermore, Stoics conceive demons mainly 
as entities charged by gods to punish wicked and unjust humans.143
What is relevant about demons for our research on monstrosity is not only 
their function of a bond (σύνδεσμος) between the divine and the human, i.e. 
what keeps God’s transcendence intact, but also the explanation of their inter-
vention in the world. It is more specifi cally their nature and action, the role 
they perform and the impact that they have, especially on humans, in terms 
of good and evil. Very early on, in fact, their status has been questioned, and 
philosophers have asked whether demons are always and necessarily good, or 
whether they can also be wicked and evil. Euripides already hesitates on the 
ambiguous nature of divine intervention, about which doubts legitimately arise 
when justice fails to establish itself. ‘If gods do anything shameful, they are 
not gods,’ says Bellerophon.144 What then are demons?145 Plato’s demons seem 
to be unambiguously positive and yet, when Plutarch speaks about malignant 
demons, he quotes Lg. X, 896–8, an infl uential text for those who believe in 
their evil nature: ‘Must we [. . .] necessarily agree,’ asks the Athenian stranger, 
‘that soul is the cause of good and bad, beautiful and ugly [αἰσχρός], just and 
unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?’ 
And this, the Athenian continues, is due to several souls, ‘no less than two – 
the benefi cent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the oppo-
site kind’.146 Middle and Neoplatonism are caught in this tension, between a 
benevolent origin – at least philosophically speaking – of demons, and their 
evolution in the sense of wicked geniuses that torment men and are responsible 
for evil in the world.
The demon becomes sometimes a real fi gure of monstrosity, whose function 
is nonetheless strategic in explaining the metaphysical structure of the world 
and its dependence on the divine. Philo of Alexandria recognises the exigency 
of a mediating reality between God and the world.147 He attributes this func-
tion to the mediating logos. Without it, in Philo’s view, God would immediately 
be responsible for everything happening in the earthly region, as it is for the 
Stoics. The logos’s mediating function, thus, is to be the cause of natural real-
ity, less perfect than God itself, and thus at the origin of evil. Evil exists because 
everything depends on God, and yet not without the logos’s mediation.148 The 
143 SVF II.1101–5.
144 E. Bellerophon (= Euripides (1995) Fr. 282).
145 See also Hec. 489–91, and Magris (1986), p. 624.
146 Lg. X.896 e. On this passage see Cherniss (1954).
147 Ph. Opif. 25.
148 See Brehier (1950), p. 130.
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term logos is explicitly borrowed from Stoicism, but the meaning is different 
because Philo intends to claim divine transcendence, while at the same time 
granting God’s benevolent intervention in its creation. Philo’s logos, thus, 
operates in a Platonic way like a τομεύς, a divider or a carver, but also in an 
Aristotelian way, as a δύναμις which needs to be actualised.149 This is precisely 
the notion that Aristotle employs to speak about monstrosity and imperfection 
in nature. Philo makes use of this genealogy to explain the presence of evil in 
nature, at the same time preserving God’s absolute perfection and separate-
ness. It would be unworthy, for God, to wander around in the world, but it 
is perfectly understandable for its δύναμις to accomplish the necessary and 
benevolent task of exercising sovereignity (ἐξουσία) and spreading goodness 
(ἀγαθότης).150
Philo presents the genesis of evil in a twofold way. On the one hand, origi-
nating in the logos’s intermediate nature, evil is the implicit and consequent 
outcome of the creative act. On the other hand, and more interestingly for 
the present enquiry, evil is also the sudden irruption of an essential deformity 
in human creation.151 It is thus a rupture, a break of the homogeneity of the 
divine emanation into the world. It is thus understandable that demons also 
respond to a twofold categorisation. They are positive and benevolent helpers 
of God, not subject to any evil,152 but they are also malignant creatures that 
execute God’s punishment.153
Without neglecting Chrysippus’s infl uence, the genealogy of Philo’s dual-
ism can be traced back to Lg. X and the hypothetically dual structure of 
the soul in Plato. Middle Platonism develops in precisely this direction. A 
strategic role, in this sense, is played by Xenocrates, whose originality con-
sists in the introduction of the twofold characterisation of demons in Middle 
Platonism, according to Plutarch’s testimony.154 Plutarch himself, however, 
is the author who more strongly insists on the evil and monstrous charac-
ter of demons, giving prominence to their malefi c function and the religious 
aspects connected with it.
149 Dillon (1977), pp. 160–1.
150 A term employed also by Plot. IV.8.6.
151 Mazzanti (1988).
152 Ph. Gig. 7.
153 Ph. Quaest. Ex. I.23: ‘Into every soul at its very birth their enter two powers, the salutary 
and the destructive. If the salutary one is victorious and prevails, the opposite one is 
too weak to see. And if the latter prevails, no profi t at all or little is obtained from the 
salutary one. Through these powers the world too was created. People call them by 
other names: the salutary (power) they call powerful and benefi cent, and the opposite 
one (they call) unbounded and destructive.’ See Dillon (1977), p. 173.
154 Xenocrates 222, in Senocrate e Ermodoro (2012), pp. 239–40.
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Plutarch’s early refl ection develops a balanced view on the opposite 
positions of materialist atheism and fanatical superstition. The comparison 
between atheists and the superstitious is already found in Lg. X, but Plutarch 
emphasises how much worse the outcome of a monstrous religion is. While 
the atheist, although wrong, at least lives a quiet life, the superstitious per-
son is constantly tormented and assailed by monstrous apparitions (τεράστια 
φάσματα).155 The rites and sacrifi ces of the superstitious are worthy of a mon-
strous world in which Typhoeus or the giants would have won against the 
gods.156 De genio Socratis also puts forward a rational argument, through Gal-
axidorus’s excursus on the political connotation of religion as a tool to check 
the multitude. Socrates’ genius, Galaxidorus argues, did not partake of any-
thing supernatural. In fact, it was the divinatory spirit common to everybody, 
only a stronger one, and perhaps nothing more than a sneeze.157
Plutarch’s later work develops a much more detailed theory of demonol-
ogy, which occupies a prominent place in Middle Platonism. In De Iside et 
Osiride and Defectu oracolorum, Plutarch traces the theory of evil demons 
back to a Stoic origin.158 Although some similarity emerges, Plutarch departs 
from the Stoic doctrine, both because demons are essential to a Platonically 
inspired transcendent notion of the divine, and because he disagrees with 
the Stoics’ claim of the material nature of all beings. Demons, for Plutarch, 
are wicked precisely because they are closer to the material nature and they 
possess the bodily characteristic that brings them toward evil. Were they not 
evil, judiciously asks Plutarch, what would be the difference between them 
and the gods?159
Demons can be affected by passions, precisely because God, in its purity 
and transcendence, cannot. In thus being affected, they act between the 
human and the divine sphere on behalf of God and as its ministers.160 Typhoeus 
and giants can also be seen as demons rather than gods, and in particular as 
fallen souls, punished and imprisoned in bodies.161 Typhoeus and giants thus 
enjoy this ambiguous status of semi-divine beings, casting shade on the role 
of divinity, whose nature is by defi nition pure, and yet to some extent con-
nected to the evil that its ministers bestow on the world. This tension, once 
155 Plu. Moralia. De superstitione 165 E.
156 Plu. Moralia. De superstitione 171 D.
157 Plu. Moralia. De genio Socratis 579 F ff. See also Soury (1942b) and J. Hani, Introduction, 
in Plutarque (1980).
158 See Babut (1969), especially pp. 388 ff. See also Buffi ère (1956), pp. 521 ff.
159 Plu. Moralia. De defectu oracolorum 418 F – 419 A.
160 Plu. Moralia. De defectu oracolorum 416 E – 417 B. See also Dillon (1977), p. 216.
161 Plu. Moralia. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 945.
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again, derives from Plutarch’s interpretation of Plato’s theory of the malefi cent 
soul in Lg. X. Although the quotation of Plato’s authority could suggest a dis-
tance from the strict dualism typical of further Gnosticism,162 the opposite can 
legitimately be argued: Plutarch’s Platonism gives consistency to a sharp split 
between good and benevolent creatures on the one hand, and monstrously 
malevolent demons on the other. This interpretation of Plato’s theory of the 
evil soul also underlines the active and conscious character of the malefi cent 
force ominously threatening humanity from above, rather than a simple prin-
ciple of chaos that unconsciously escapes the demiurgical ordering action.163
Plutarch’s attitude makes a different articulation within Middle Platonism 
emerge. Middle Platonist philosophers treat God’s relation with the world both 
from a more rationalist standpoint and, conversely, with a deeper religious pre-
occupation. Alcinous is a typical upholder of the former approach. Demons are 
only briefl y mentioned in chapter XV of his Handbook of Platonism, as ‘created 
gods’, with no mention of their nature as evil.164 On the contrary, a religiously 
inspired approach, full of preoccupation with the supernatural, characterises 
Apuleius’s work, whose De deo Socratis is the longest explanation of demonol-
ogy in classical antiquity.165
Apuleius seems to admit evil creatures acting above men, especially in 
the allegorical dimension of his literary masterpiece, the Metamorphoses.166 His 
more philosophical works, however, grant less space to the morally evil nature 
of demons and focus on their ontological status. In De genio Socratis, Apuleius 
is more interested in explaining their character of ‘intermediate’ beings, whose 
nature is to be μεταξύ, ‘in between’ God and nature, and neither good nor bad 
in terms of qualities. They are thus medioximi (intermediate spirits), the spirits 
of humans whose disharmony with themselves condemns them to restlessly 
wander after death, with the effect of scaring the living.167
Apuleius’s ambiguous defi nition refers to a doctrine that lacks consis-
tency within Platonism. Demons can represent otherness, sometimes divinely 
162 See e.g. Dillon (1977), pp. 202–4.
163 Plu. Moralia. De Iside et Osiride 361 B: ‘[Xenocrates] believes that there exists in the 
space about us certain great and powerful natures, obdurate, however, and morose, 
which take pleasure in such things as these [sc. festivals with beatings, lamentations, 
fastings, or scurrilous language or ribald jests], and, if they succeed in obtaining them, 
resort to nothing worse.’
164 Alcin. XV.
165 See J. Beaujeu, Introduction, in Apulée (1973). Apuleius also devotes much space to 
demonology in his Mund. See Goulet, éd. (1989–) ad loc.
166 See e.g. Met. 9.29.
167 See Hijmans (1987), esp. p. 468 ff.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   283 29/08/19   1:55 PM
284 M O N S T R O S I T Y  A N D P H I L O S O P H Y
inspired, sometimes wickedly threatening. They can also be reduced to human 
souls, that is to say, to our inner self wandering around (and above) after 
death, depending once again on the moral quality of humans themselves. The 
monstrous threat, thus, has also a fl uid status, referring to causes that can be 
interior or exterior to ourselves, dependent on or independent of our behav-
iour, testifying to the evil outside or inside us.
The confl ict between souls and demons is at the heart of Numenius’s 
interpretation, as reported by Proclus and referred to in Plato’s myth of 
Atlantis. Wicked demons struggle against the souls during their descent into 
bodies. They are of ‘corrupt kind’ and ‘soul polluters’. Echoing Plutarch, 
Numenius evokes the monstrous background, arguing that ‘the ancient theo-
logians ascribed such confl icts to Osiris and Typhon, or Dionysius and the 
titans, while Plato refers these matters back to the Athenians and Atlanteans 
through piety’.168
Maximus of Tyrus’s demonology also refl ects the ambiguity of the demons’ 
status. ‘Alongside gods, men, and beasts,’ Maximus writes, a ‘race of δαιμόνια’ 
exists.169 Closer to Plutarch’s demons than Alcinous’s or Apuleius’s, such 
beings are nevertheless immortal, unlike Plutarch’s. Unlike many Middle 
Platonist philosophers, moreover, Maximus does not make use of them to 
solve the problem of evil vis-à-vis God.170 He rather employs them to explain 
that, as in the human realm in which different kinds of humans exist, so 
in heaven different kinds of demons fi nd their place, ‘some terrifying, some 
benevolent’.171 More important to him is that without such an intermediate 
realm, in which benevolent and malevolent beings fi nd their place, the rela-
tion between God and the world could not be explained.172
The monstrous dimension of demonology prominently surfaces in the Chal-
dean Oracles, whose authority is as great as that of Plato himself for Middle 
and especially Neoplatonists.173 Demons are here described as a ‘race of evil 
demons [that] draws down souls, (a race) which is also called “. . . bestial and 
shameless” since it is turned towards Nature’.174 The Oracles clearly evokes 
the confl ictual dimension that characterises inferior nature. Chaos and con-
fusion irreparably invade the world, from which God seems to have retired.
168 Numen. 37 (= Procl. in Ti. I.76.30–77).
169 Max.Tyr. VIII.4.
170 See Puiggali (1978), esp. pp. 191–240.
171 Max.Tyr. VIII.8.
172 Max.Tyr. XV.2. See also Goulet, éd. (1989–) ad loc.
173 See Dillon (1977), p. 384.
174 Orac.Chald. 89.
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The Latin Asclepius reproduces this gloomy conception, through the infl u-
ential image of the nocentes angeli:
How mournful when the gods withdraw from mankind! Only the bale-
ful angels remain to mingle with humans, seizing the wretches and driv-
ing them to every outrageous crime – war, looting, trickery, and all that is 
contrary to the nature of souls. Then neither will the earth stand fi rm nor 
the sea be sailable; stars will not cross heaven nor will the course of the 
stars stand fi rm in heaven. Every divine voice will grow mute in enforced 
silence. The fruits of the earth will rot; the soil will no more be fertile; and 
the very air will droop in gloomy lethargy.175
Like the Oracles, the Asclepius also stresses that God has retired from the 
world, an idea whose genealogy can be traced to Plato’s age of Kronos in the 
Statesman.176
Although demonology already has religious connotations in pagan phi-
losophy, it is in Christianity, particularly when infl uenced by Neoplatonism, 
that demons catalyse theologians’ attention. Clement of Alexandria offers 
a vivid representation of Satan’s role, function and operation. Rebel and 
slanderer, Satan is able to corrupt humans’ behaviour and drag men and 
women into sin.177 Following the terminology used by the LXX to trans-
late names of biblical monsters like Leviathan or crocodile, the devil is a 
dragon or snake.178 Infl uenced by Philo, Clement explores Satan’s work, for 
example, in corrupting women via their efforts to embellish their bodies 
through jewels and makeup. Embellishment, Clement suggests, is a perver-
sion of the creation of God that prolongs the perversion of Eve’s original 
sin. Women thus become similar to beasts, and the image of God they once 
bore disappears.
For Origen, the devil’s function is tied to lifting the responsibility for the 
existence of sin and evil from God. Creatures are all endowed with free will, 
including the demons – rational beings who chose to abandon God. They 
cannot, in Origen’s view, be evil by nature, as that would make God directly 
responsible for their wickedness and, in some sense, for evil itself. Devils medi-
ate between God’s goodness and sin via the free will that makes them capable 
of choosing, just as humans can either resist or surrender to sin and evil.179 
175 Ps.Apul. Ascl. XXV. See also Scott in [Corpus Hermeticum] (1924–36), III, 175–6.
176 See supra.
177 See e.g. Clem.Al. Paed. III.5.4. See also Monfrinotti (2014), pp. 259 ff.
178 On the dragon, see Ciccarese (2002), pp. 379–92 and Ciccarese (2007), 253–83.
179 Origenes Princ. I.5.3.
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Their freedom does not imply God’s powerlessness to stop them from com-
mitting evil. On the contrary, these mediators work in accordance with God’s 
plan: they are here to test humans and their resistance to sin.180
It follows that their nature, as well as their appearance, is monstrous, as 
vividly explained by Methodius of Olympus:
Do not lose heart at the deceits and the slanders of the Beast, but equip 
yourselves sturdily for the battle, arming yourselves with the helmet of 
salvation, your breastplate and your greaves. For if you attack with great 
advantage and with stout heart you will cause him consternation; and 
when he sees you arrayed in battle against him by Him who is his superior, 
he will certainly not stand his ground. Straightaway will the hydra-headed, 
many-faced Beast retreat and let you carry off the prize for the seven con-
tests. Lion in front, serpent behind, in the midst chimaera,/Belching forth dread 
might of fl aming fi re./And He slew it, relying on His Father’s omens,/Christ the 
King. Many indeed had it destroyed, not could any endure/The deadly foam that 
spilled from its jaws, had not Christ weakened and crushed it, making it 
completely impotent and contemptible in our eyes.181
The demons, with a striking resonance with classical ideas, become here a 
veritable chimera, powerfully testifying to the transformation of pagan ideas 
into Christian rhetoric.182 Demons have an inherently double status. They 
represent a challenge to and rebellion against God’s rule, but at the same time, 
they act in accordance with his will, and perform a function under his absolute 
rule. To successfully combat Manichaeism, in fact, every idea of the autonomy 
of evil and its actors must be ruled out. This preoccupation, of course, charac-
terises pagan Platonism as well.
Although Plato’s mythical tale refers more to the complementarity of 
Kronos’s and Zeus’s ages than to their opposition and confl ictuality, the 
presence or absence of God in the cosmos takes a threatening form in the 
gloomier version of Middle Platonism. It is for this reason that Neopla-
tonism, like Christianity, seeks to rule out such a threat by establishing 
a strong monism and, with regard to demons, subsume them under the 
unique benevolent principle of the universe.
180 Augustine eventually takes a completely different track. Devils are not mediators 
because God does not need any mediator to act and intervene directly in the world. 
Contrary to many other Fathers of the Church, Augustine sees the doctrine of devil-
mediators developed by Middle Platonists like Apuleius as more of an obstacle than a 
solution for the Christian. 
181 Meth. Symp. VIII.12.
182 See e.g. Moreschini (2013), p. 464.
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Plotinus explores the topic of demons in III.4. Demons are not evil for 
him, they are souls, and like every soul they travel and transmigrate from one 
body to another. Although it is true that the divine Being is opposed to the 
demonic Becoming of the inferior world, souls regularly refl ect the behaviour 
of past lives, and they thus enjoy different degrees of nobility. Plotinus explic-
itly criticises the gloomy conception of Plutarch, and makes the demon refl ect 
the highest part of the soul.183 This is also due to Plotinus’s scepticism toward 
the monopoly of a religious and mythical interpretation of psychology. He thus 
tends to consider demons as an allegory for the soul’s most rational part.184
Such a scepticism is not shared by Porphyry, who grants a broad space to 
magic and, in particular, γοητεία, witchcraft and the magic of nature, which, 
according to Abst. II.41.5, is made through evil demons. Demons are also 
connected with rationality and the soul and yet, contrary to Plotinus’s enlight-
ened reading, also with the soul’s dark side.185 Rationality at least partially 
controls demons, thus making them good. There are also evil demons, though, 
κακουργοὶ or φαυλοὶ, which are overcome by irrationality.186
Demons are thus a constant in Middle and Neoplatonism. Their peace-
ful or wicked nature plays the strategic function of determining the kind of 
relationship that the divine entertains with the mundane. Monstrosity is thus, 
once again, at centre stage, and works as the characterising factor of either 
optimistic and positive views or pessimistic and gloomy conceptions of nature. 
The effort, however, is always to give an explanation of the world’s order and 
disorder, framed within a more or less explicit vision of divine providence. 
Middle and Neoplatonism, in this sense, are in dialogue with earlier schools, 
and contribute to the last pagan systematisation of theology before the radi-
cal innovation brought into the Mediterranean culture fi rst by Judaism, and 
eventually by Christianity.
The World Order
Like the Stoics, Middle and Neoplatonist philosophers do not develop a 
coherent theory of monstrosity. Yet they are widely concerned by the problem 
of order in nature and by the correlative domain within which monstrosity 
183 See Cilento (1973).
184 See Kalligas (2014), p. 486, and Rist (1963).
185 Whereas demons can be interpreted as a mere allegory in Plotinus, they are a dark 
reality in Porphyry. This shift is due, according to Cilento (1973), mainly to the change 
in the cultural climate and the new harsh struggle against Christianity. On allegory in 
Middle and Neoplatonism see Pépin (1958), pp. 176–214.
186 Porph. Abst. II.36–45. See Whittaker (1928, 2nd ed.), p. 116.
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ordinarily takes place, i.e. that of disorder and evil. The question becomes to 
know how the transcendent God creates, organises and maintains order in 
nature, and what kind of normativity it imposes on the earthly domain. The 
problem of norms and normativity concerns at once the physical question 
about God’s creation and organisation of matter, and the ethical question of 
how humans should behave if they aim at their salvation. Facing and expe-
riencing physical and moral evil, Middle and Neoplatonists look for a way to 
defi ne and clarify their concept of nature’s perfection.
Middle and Neoplatonism pursue the discussion on the world’s order and 
perfection that is at the core of all major philosophical schools, since at least 
Diogenes of Apollonia. Philosophy and theology go hand in hand in search 
of a solution to the apparent and threatening chaos of the world. Even when 
it exists, chaos must be apparent and subsumed under a divine plan for the 
whole. Because of its transcendence, the divine might be unseen (ἀφανής) 
and its causality not immediately apparent (ἄδηλος), and yet an effort will 
reveal it to the acute observer, for example in the harmony of the body and its 
organs, with which humans are able to satisfy all their needs.187
The idea of caring divine intervention is transmitted by Diogenes of Apol-
lonia to Plato and becomes a pillar of the demiurgical theory. Plato’s starting 
point is the opposition between the intelligible and the sensible which pre-
cedes the appearance of life. Life is in fact the merging of the two domains 
through the active work of the demiurgic craftsman, who forces and binds 
them together. Intelligence, thus, moulds matter and its necessity. This pro-
cess, however, remains marked by the latent presence of chaos, evil and mon-
strosity as a threatening possibility. As we have seen supra, the major Platonic 
texts on evil, i.e. Tht. 176 ff., Ti. 48 a, Plt. 273 a ff., and Lg. 904 a 6–e 3, do not 
offer a sharply defi ned or exhaustive solution. Lg. X even explicitly suggests 
that the soul can choose evil, which exists as such and must be conceived as 
a polemic adversary (ὑπεναντίος) against goodness. The dark side of Middle 
and Neoplatonism thus has its origin in Plato himself and, through Platonism, 
it eventually reaches Gnosticism.188
Middle and Neoplatonism put an enormous effort into averting this possibil-
ity, by integrating and developing the Stoic idea of fi nalism in the universe, in 
more or less anthropocentric versions. Middle and Neoplatonists largely agree 
with Chrysippus, who argues that apparent evil has a function in the world, and 
is a παρακολούθημα, something which follows, an attendant circumstance. It is, 
187 X. Mem. I.4.5–6 and IV.3.3. See also infra and Magris (1985), p. 626 and passim.
188 See supra. See also Magris (1985), pp. 673–4 and passim, De Capitani (1985), and 
Festugière (1949–54), II, on the ambivalence inherent to Plato himself (pp. 110 ff.) and 
to Platonism (p. 93).
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however, not suffi cient to claim the existence of order. Like Stoics, Platonic phi-
losophers try to explain why the current order is also the best one. As Magris has 
nicely put it, moral and physical order converge within anthropocentric fi nalism, 
as a result of what Plato had already developed with his view of providence.189 
Plato projects human values onto his concept of nature, in order to eventually 
justify those same values from nature itself: the authoritarian state of the Republic 
and the providential cosmos of the Timaeus are intimately connected.190 These 
are the hypotheses or, better, the unshakeable dogmas within which the same 
question keeps being asked in different forms: If God exists, where do evil and 
monstrosity come from?
Philo of Alexandria follows Plato, as well as Aristotle’s theory of natu-
ral place, on the idea of forced composition of different elements within the 
compound. He calls it a state against nature (παρὰ φύσιν), violently brought 
into being by God’s laws. Philo has a paramount importance in the Middle 
Platonist discourse about the world’s order and its dependence on God. Philo 
is probably the fi rst author to coherently develop the idea of laws of nature in 
Greek thought.191 His use of the concept is surely wider than any philosopher 
before him, and contributes to the justifi cation of an idea that was perceived 
as a paradoxical contradiction for many authors before him. As might be 
expected, Philo connects this concept with the Jewish idea of God as legisla-
tor, and draws the conclusion of an order that refl ects the sovereign’s will. He 
thus argues against the materialist and Epicurean idea of a spontaneous origin 
and confi guration of the cosmos, whether ordered or not. Philo regards the 
materialist hypothesis as monstrous, since it is grounded on chaos and ruinous 
confusion (σύγχυσις), prompting the absurd hypothesis not only of an origin 
from chaos, but also of a total dissolution of the cosmos back into its originat-
ing parallel rain of atoms.192 Epicureans thus preach the opposite of order, and 
are themselves compared to the monstrous eunuch that has lost his substance 
and has become unshapen matter.193
The Epicurean monstrosity is also refl ected, as a threat, by the human 
tendency to indulge in abnormal behaviours, at once physically and morally 
blameable, such as illicit sexuality. In De specialibus legibus, Philo discusses the 
sixth commandment. Adultery destroys families and the legitimate descent.194 
189 See Pl. Phd. 46–7 and supra. 
190 Magris (1985), p. 642.
191 Koester (1968), passim.
192 Ph. Aet. 5–6: nothing comes from nothing and nothing falls back into nothing, accord-
ing to Philo’s interpretation of Empedocles.
193 Ph. Spec. I.328–9.
194 Ph. Spec. III.45.
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Several forms of violation are identifi ed, from the less serious, such as marry-
ing a stranger, to the more serious, like the union between brother and sister, 
that Philo has defi ned as a monstrous or disharmonic agreement (ἁρμονίαν 
ἀνάρμοστον).195 Homosexuality is also a particularly serious violation in Philo’s 
view, and the transgressors should be ruthlessly eliminated, since the pleasure 
they are after is παρὰ φύσιν.196
The monstrosity of unruled sexuality is not a tangential thought. It comes 
to the forefront of Philo’s argumentation through the character of Pasiphae, 
king Minos’s wife, and her sin of zoophilia. Interestingly, Philo makes use of 
this example not only to condemn the ultimate degree of infamy that human-
ity has reached, but also to alert the reader about a major threat to the entire 
order of nature, if passions are left unbridled. Abominable monsters (τέρατα 
παλίμφημα) will be born, beings that do not appear to be from this world, 
non-existent (ἀνύπαρκτος) and unreal, like hippocentaurs, chimeras and 
other creatures of the same stock.197 It is worth underlying the originality of 
Philo’s use of the argument of mythical and monstrous animals.198 Whereas 
in Empedocles’ cosmogony they are at the beginning of the creative process, 
and in Lucretius’s they are denied any possibility of existence, mythical mon-
sters are now projected in an apocalyptic and catastrophic future by Philo, 
as a real threat to an undisciplined humanity lusting after beasts. Monstros-
ity is not the archaic premise of normality, but rather its potential threat, 
when sexual desire takes over the regular regime of physical unions.199 The 
total dissolution of elements, seen as the impossible and absurd hypothesis 
claimed by Epicureans, now becomes real and concrete, as the baleful des-
tiny of humanity that challenges God’s laws and throws itself into the arms 
of monstrosity: ‘His ornament has been removed, everything appears as a 
gloomy deformity, matter hurries to leave its form (ablatum decus est: tristi 
deformitate universa affecta sunt: materia formam exuere properat).’200
Such a confusion, though, has a double meaning in Philo, since God himself 
can make use of it against human evil, as in the punishment of humanity in De 
confusione linguarum.201 Confusion and disorder thus become God’s tools and 
the necessary means to the fi nal triumph of goodness. God makes use of evil as 
well as of monstrous prodigies to communicate with humans and, beyond that, 
195 Ph. Spec. III.23.
196 On pursuing pleasure against nature see also Pl. Phdr. 251 a.
197 Ph. Spec. III.45.
198 See A. Moses, in Philo (1961–), XXV, p. 86.
199 On human violations of natural laws, see also Martens (2013), p. 77.
200 Ph. Prou. I.90.
201 Ph. Confus. 187–9. See also Scarpat (1991).
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to actively intervene in his creation. Supernatural and prodigious facts are at the 
heart of God’s relation with his people, sometimes directly, sometimes through 
the mediation of Moses.202 The world itself is, for Philo, a prodigious creation.203
However, Philo is keen in taming the prodigious manifestations of nature 
and keeping them strictly under God’s pattern and providence. In a sense, 
the abnormal and the prodigious are tools that God normally employs. Philo 
does underline that the only reasonable conception of nature is the one that 
springs out of the biblical message, while alternative visions must only be con-
sidered mythical and ultimately impossible. This is the case, for example, of 
the ancient cosmogonies that speak about beings born from the earth. To this 
monstrous conception, Philo opposes the amazing regularity of nature, aston-
ishing and divine (τεράστιον καὶ θεῖον), whose action is grounded on the laws 
of God.204
Admiration can also be a tool for humans to reach God, when they realise 
that the harmony and beauty of creation has been established for his pur-
pose. Humans thus make themselves into the fi nal cause of God, through 
the admiration of his work, which must however remain subordinate to the 
admiration for the creator itself. The opposite would mean to misunderstand 
the divine order of nature and turn the world upside down. This is why revela-
tion becomes the favoured way towards God, while knowledge of God through 
knowledge of nature remains subordinate in Philo’s view.205
The laws of nature, i.e. divine laws, must thus be deemed good and fair 
not in themselves, but precisely because they are created by God and remain 
subordinate to his will. God can in fact change them whenever and how-
ever he desires. The door is thus open to the rational explanation of miracles, 
anomalies and the formation of natural monstrosities. Wolfson has claimed 
that Philo’s God is indeed very close to Plato’s demiurge. A fundamental dif-
ference, however, remains, at least on this ground: whereas Plato’s demiurge is 
immutable and his laws unbreakable, Philo’s God remains absolute master of 
the universe and the omnipotent source of its normativity.206 Natural things, 
Philo stresses, ‘through the power of God, admit of change and transition, so 
202 See e.g. Aet. 2, Mos. I.80, 90–1, 95, 165, II.71, 257, 266, Spec. II.218, IV.129, Prob. 5, 
Abr. 118, Congr. 173.
203 Ph. Plant. 4.
204 Ph. Aet. 55 ff.
205 See M. G. Crepaldi, ‘Admiration philosophique et admiration théologique: la valeur 
du θαυμάζειν dans la pensée de Philon d’Alexandrie’, in Lévy, Besnier éds (1998), pp. 
77–86.
206 God’s power, as Wolfson underlines, is autocratic (αὐτοκράτωρ). See Wolfson (1948), 
pp. 355 and passim.
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as often to produce effects quite the reverse of the ordinary’.207 The paradox 
is only apparent: the law of nature as well as its breaking are not contrasted to 
each other. On the contrary, they both reveal God’s superiority in establishing 
laws and derogating from them whenever he wishes.208
This is how Philo reinterprets Plato’s demiurgic cosmogony through Jew-
ish creationism. The Timaeus is thus mediated with, and read through, the 
Bible. God brings things from non-Being into Being through a veritable poi-
etic activity, within which any anomaly and any monstrosity fi nds its place.209 
Monstrosity, like evil, also loses its abnormal character and becomes part of 
God’s plan since the beginning. The divine informs matter, and thus descends 
into the lower realm, in which intelligence comes in contact with sensibility. 
Like the Platonic demiurge, God produces models of perfection, which even-
tually are plunged into the realm of matter and generate the imperfect reality 
that we all experience. Act and perfection, in this sense, precede power and 
imperfection, and yet they are necessarily bound to each other.
Philo claims the absolute perfection of creation.210 In that case, however, 
imperfect and sometimes monstrous Becoming must not only have its origin 
in the perfect and normal Being, but also be its inevitable outcome. In De 
opifi cio mundi, for example, Philo describes the actual creation of all species, 
by God, at once. All plants and trees are generated at the same time, fully 
grown and mature, for eventually breeding themselves through the normal 
process of reproduction by seeds.211 The perfect act, like a model, precedes 
the necessarily imperfect power. Philo reads the biblical account along these 
lines, claiming that God creates animals from the earth, all perfect but 
according to ontological degrees of relative perfection, since they occupy 
different levels in the scale of beings. The act of God is thus present both 
in the creation of ideal forms and in their subsequent movement of natural 
reproduction through seeds and sperm.212 By making God the source and 
origin of both moments, Philo indirectly subordinates physical monstrosity, 
as well as any kind of evil, to the initial plan of the omnipotent maker of the 
universe.213
207 Ph. Deus 87–8. See also Bockmuehl (1995), pp. 39–42 and passim.
208 On Philo’s concept of law, see also Myre (1976), Decharneaux (1991) and Martens 
(2003). Thus, Philo does not distinguish between natural law and eternal law. Augus-
tine’s distinction is a development of Philo’s position. See Girardet (1995), pp. 292–8. 
209 On the confl ict and the mediation between Platonism and Judaism see Weiss (1966). 
On Philo’s creationism see Tobin (1992) and Nikiprowetzky (1996).
210 See e.g. Prov. II.46.
211 Ph. Opif. 40 ff.
212 Ph. Opif. 62–8.
213 Brehier (1950), p. 171 and passim, has underlined the Stoic tone of such a conception of 
order and harmony within the divine design. See also Spitzer (1963), n. 14, pp. 146–7.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   292 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 M I D D L E  A N D N E O P L AT O N I S M 293
The world’s order implies divine providence, which comes very close, in 
Philo’s thought, to the regularity of Stoic destiny (εἱμαρμένη).214 Providence, 
however, does not contrast with free will.215 In this sense, it has fi rst and 
foremost a demonstrative function, whereby men are alerted by things they 
cannot explain, e.g. natural monstrosities or terrible phenomena such as lights 
and thunders.216 When such events strike and harm us individually, one has 
to think that suffering also has a pedagogic function, in order to remove what 
is shameful, as physical monstrosities need to be healed or removed, as if they 
were ossa superfl ua, bony excrescences.217 Moreover, what harms someone in 
particular can be of general utility, according again to the Stoic idea of second-
ary effects of necessary and providential causes.218 Providence deploys itself 
on the allegorical battlefi eld between normality and monstrosity. While pious 
humans struggle to survive, for example, the impious and monstrous race of 
Kyklopes enjoys the plenitude of natural resources: what would appear more 
unfair and unjust? Yet, Philo remarks, this must be a necessary consequence 
of God’s providential plan.219 Providence can be thus qualifi ed as something 
good which successfully imitates something evil for the sake of a greater 
good.220 This becomes possible, in Philo’s theology, because he contrasts it 
with monstrosity, i.e. an evil that unsuccessfully imitates the good, without 
being able to harm it in the least.
The excellence of the cosmos is thus at the heart of Philo’s infl uential 
attempt to merge Platonism and Judaism. This excellence is also the core of 
other Middle Platonic works, such as the anonymous Περὶ κόσμου.221 Strongly 
infl uenced by Aristotelianism and Stoicism, this text faithfully represents the 
transformation that Platonism has been subjected to in the Imperial age with-
out losing its character, and thus maintaining the recognisable traits that make 
it a fundamental source for Middle Platonism.222 Similar to what Philo stresses 
214 Ph. Prou. I.33. On the centrality of providence for Philo’s theology, see Frick (1999), 
chs 4 and 5 in particular. The older Wendland (1892) is still interesting.
215 See Dragona-Monachou (1975–6) and M. Hadas-Lebel, Introduction, in Philo (1961–), 
XXXV, p. 53, Ewing (2008). See contra Dillon (1977), p. 166, for whom Philo’s provi-
dence inclines toward a kind of determinism inspired by Stoicism.
216 Ph. Prou. I.37–9.
217 Ph. Prou. I.46.
218 Ph. Prou. II.99–100. See also Runia (2003b), p. 587.
219 Ph. Prou. II.94–5.
220 See Hadas-Lebel, Introduction, p. 107.
221 On this text and its history see in particular Festugière (1949–54), II, pp. 460–520, 
Moraux (1973–84), II, pp. 5–82, and G. Reale and A. P. Bos, ‘Monografi a introduttiva’, 
in Reale, Bos (1995, 2a ed.), pp. 23–171.
222 Festugière (1949–54), passim, and Moreschini (1978), p. 130, rather stress the hermetic 
character of the Περὶ κόσμου.
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about the necessity of keeping a clear distinction between the creator and 
the creature, the text has a strong theological dimension. In chapters V-VII, 
the author praises the cosmos’s excellency because of its harmony. Quoting 
Heraclitus, the text intends harmony as the outcome of diversity and even 
irregularity.223 Harmony, however, is more in the creative force than in the cre-
ation itself. Diversity and irregularity are indeed present in the world, and yet 
subordinated by the creator to a perfection teleologically built in view of the 
whole.224 Everything has its function and utility, even phenomena that appear 
absurd or monstrous. Like Plato and Philo after him, the Περὶ κόσμου under-
lines the forced constraint that elements have endured, under the action of 
the creative force, for order to be created in the universe.
This position is also shared by Plutarch, who interprets in this sense the 
meaning of παρὰ φύσιν. Somehow unnaturally, elements have been moved 
and forced together to produce the cosmos. The character of this movement, 
however, does not cause the universe to be against nature, nor does it cause 
anything within the universe to be abnormal or unnatural. Plutarch thus 
contrasts the position of those who claim that some movements or positions 
of celestial bodies are against nature.225 Being natural is related not to the 
essence of a thing, but rather to its function, role and position in the universe 
vis-à-vis the whole of which it is a part:
[. . .] no part of a whole all by itself seems to have any order, position, or 
motion of its own which could be called unconditionally ‘natural’. On the 
contrary, each and every such part, whenever its motion is usefully and 
properly accommodated to that for the sake of which the part has come to 
be and which is the purpose of its growth or production, and whenever it 
acts or is affected or disposed so that it contributes to the preservation or 
beauty or function of that thing, then, I believe, it has its ‘natural’ position 
and motion and disposition.226 
223 Ps.Arist. (= Reale, Bos (1995, 2a ed.), 396 b 20). Apuleius echoes such praise for the 
cosmos’s excellency in his translation, see esp. Mund. 337. See also Apul. Mund. 333.
224 Meteorological events, for example, can be locally disastrous, regionaliter pestifera, for 
Apuleius, and yet healthy for the general state of the world: Apul. Mund. 340. God’s 
help and support is general and not individual or particular, precisely as the the king’s 
action is in his own realm: Apul. Mund. 344 ff. It is worth asking whether Apuleius is 
conscious of the tension between this idea and the several mechanical metaphors he 
uses to describe the top–bottom action of god on the world, such as the stringed puppet 
(Mund. 351–2) or the army as a war machine (Mund. 357).
225 Plu. Moralia. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 926 C ff. 
226 Plu. Moralia. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 927 D.
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Individual natures are subordinated to their constituent role as parts of a 
whole. Everything becomes perfect when it is viewed in its proper context, 
namely the context of the whole perfection.
One can observe, in Plutarch, the development of a principle of paramount 
importance for the explanation of nature in general and the understanding of 
the role and function of monstrosity in particular. According to this principle, 
monstrosity, like evil and imperfection, has to be framed within the general 
and the whole of which it necessarily is a part. I believe that although already 
present in other philosophical schools, and especially in Stoicism, as well as 
in Philo, this principle receives a strongly coherent systematisation in Middle 
Platonism and, eventually, in Neoplatonism. In fact, contrary to Stoics, Middle 
Platonists are particularly concerned by the necessity of claiming God’s direct 
action in the world, maintaining at the same time its transcendence of and 
purity from the world’s evil and imperfection. It does offer a strong account of 
the necessity and perfection of God’s laws together with the explanation and 
justifi cation of every phenomenon in the world.
In De fato, for example, Plutarch claims the inviolable, unalterable, infallible, 
permanent and perpetual (ἀπαράβατος) character of divine rules, intended as 
fate. These rules, in fact, emanate from a cause that, by defi nition, cannot be 
hindered (ἀνεμπόδιστος).227 Although everything happens within fate, however, 
not everything happens according to it. Plutarch explains this difference, appar-
ently minor and yet of paramount importance, through the analogy with the 
civil law, which generally covers all aspects of the citizens’ life, and yet does not 
determine each particular and individual behaviour.228 Room is thus made for 
the contingent, and Plutarch grounds his argument on an Aristotelian idea that 
had been cardinal to explaining how monstrosities and imperfections happen in 
nature, namely the distinction between act and power.
Plutarch quite openly recognises Aristotle’s infl uence, twisting however 
his argument through the distinction between potency, the potent and the 
possible: the potent pre-exists power, which in its turn pre-exists the possible. 
The latter, thus, comes into existence only when nothing hinders its existence 
from the outside.229 Monsters, Aristotle wrote, come into existence precisely 
when something hinders their normal formation from the outside. Plutarch 
reworks the Aristotelian concept of chance, thinking about abnormal and 
227 Plu. Moralia. De fato 568 C–D.
228 Plu. Moralia. De fato 569 A–E. See also J. Hani, Notice, in Plutarch (1972–93), VIII.
229 Plu. Moralia. De fato 571 A. See Arist. GC 317 b 16 and Alex.Aphr. Fat. 176. See also 
Moralia. De fato 570 B on the defi nition of the necessary as the possible whose contrary 
is impossible, and the contingent as the possible whose contrary is also possible.
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anomalous events, namely events that should have happened in one way (i.e. 
normally), but happened in another way (e.g. monstrously) and somehow 
inconsistently with their context and isolated from it.230
Plutarch’s De fato is directed against the Stoics with the aim of liberating 
both human action and divine providence from a rigid conception of destiny. 
By announcing the existence of contingency, possibility, fortune and chance, 
Plutarch intends to maintain the existence of a sphere of events that is not 
determined in advance. He also intends to maintain God’s transcendence 
vis-à-vis this sphere, and God’s control of it. Plutarch thus makes use of mon-
strosity through the same conceptual tools that Aristotle had used to explain 
it, but gives them a transcendent turn. Plutarch’s position has two outcomes. 
First, he claims that miracles and prodigies are indeed possible, if God wants 
them to happen. Natural causes do not explain the whole reality, and although 
prodigies and monstrosities rarely happen, they are indeed possible, without 
being against nature.231 Second, slightly moving away from Plato himself, 
Plutarch argues that the divine acts in the world only at a general level, and not 
on base details, which are thus open to the possibility of monstrous and chance 
deviations from what ordinarily happens.232
The consequences of this attitude toward the ordinary and the exceptional 
create an interesting sense of relativism in Plutarch’s thought. The concepts of 
beauty and ugliness acquire a relative status, for example, when one carefully 
considers aesthetic judgement. Seen from the earth, Lucius argues in De facie 
in orbe lunae, the moon is beautiful, ‘but as a star or luminary or a divine and 
heavenly body she is, I am afraid, misshapen, ugly (ἄμορφος and ἀπρεπὴς), and a 
disgrace to the noble title [. . .]’.233 Maybe it is true that the moon is not inhabited, 
Plutarch writes, by monstrous races, similar to those discussed by Megasthenes 
in his Indika.234 Other races, Plutarch unironically declares, might however exist, 
whose practices and habits humans cannot understand. What would happen if 
one saw only the sea surface? Would anyone be able to imagine the richness of 
the sea creatures? Would not a selenite, in the same manner, think about the 
earth as a miserable place, and deem her moon as the only ‘earth?’235
These arguments also offer Plutarch the occasion to undermine the mech-
anist explanation of both individual things and the universe as a whole, in 
favour of an explanation that ultimately relies on the transcendent rational 
230 Plu. Moralia. De fato 572 D.
231 See Babut (1969), pp. 478 ff.
232 Moraux (1973–84), II, pp. 495–505.
233 Plu. Moralia. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 929 A.
234 Megasth. XXIX (= Str. 15.1.57 = FGH n. 715). See supra on Magasthenes as a source 
for Pliny.
235 Plu. Moralia. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 940 D.
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and divine principle, a principle that has the primacy over its parts and com-
ponents. Different causalities exist in the universe, and different events and 
beings can be related to natural causes as well as to intelligible ones. Philoso-
phers of nature have the tendency to grasp only the former, while poets and 
theologians to consider exclusively the latter. Both causes, however, exist in 
the universe and must be considered at once, as Plato has sublimely done.236
Although everything can be attributed to God, Plutarch does not deny 
the necessary action of matter. Monstrosity shows clearly that a double expla-
nation is necessary, through the monstrous example of Pericles’ one-horned 
ram.237 Anaxagoras the philosopher explains the physical causes, also called 
necessary ones, by an anatomical dissection and a mechanical explanation of 
the anomaly. Lampon the seer, though, explains the meaning of this extraor-
dinary event, which is that the mastery of the city will fi nally be devolved to 
one man. He reveals the link between the superior causality and the divine. 
No doubt, in fact, that the monstrous is due to God’s causal intervention, as 
Plutarch clarifi es.
In my view, however, Plutarch not only establishes a double level of cau-
sality. He also puts the higher level in control of the lower, to maintain the 
order and consistency of the universe. Without divine intervention, Lamprias 
explains in De facie orbis, natural laws would not suffi ce to preserve order, and 
the universe would be doomed to chaos and anarchy.238 This is why ‘[. . .] in 
everything the better has the control of the necessary’,239 with a thesis that 
runs against Stoic materialism. Plutarch reduces the physical explanation to 
Stoic necessitarianism, in order to claim the primacy of a divine providence 
that acts above and beyond the material causes, otherwise ‘I cannot make 
out what use there is of providence or of what Zeus, “the master-craftsman”, 
is maker and father-creator.’240 In his polemic, Plutarch fails to admit that his 
conclusion about God bringing everything toward the best is indeed of Stoic 
origin.241 However, whereas natural and divine order coincide in Stoicism, 
they are different and even opposed for Plutarch, and this makes possible 
miracles and monstrosities in nature.242
236 Plu. Moralia. De defectu oracolorum 435 E–436 A.
237 Plu. Per. 6.
238 Plu. Moralia. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 926 F, which refers to Pl. Ti. 53 b. See 
P. L. Donini, I fondamenti della fi sica e la teoria delle cause in Plutarco, in Gallo a cura di 
(1992), pp. 99–120.
239 Plu. Moralia. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 928 C.
240 Plu. Moralia. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 927 A–B.
241 See P. Donini, ‘Introduzione’, in Plutarco (2011). See also Plu. Moralia. De fato 572 F 
and 573 C.
242 See Babut (1969), pp. 331, 473 and passim.
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Philosophers must also learn to recognise intelligible and fi nal causes even 
when they do not immediately or evidently appear. Once again, every phe-
nomenon and being has its role in the global economy of the creation, as the 
example of the moon once again confi rms. Lamprias and Theon discuss its 
function: similarly to what is asked for monsters, if the moon is not inhabited, 
Theon demands, than why does it even exist? What would its fi nal cause be? 
Lamprias’s answer is clear: even if the moon is a desert, it does not mean that 
it came to be ‘in vain and to no purpose’. The moon can indeed have an end 
and a function, like the parts of our heart that are equally a desert.243
The ontological priority of teleology is thus confi rmed, by Plutarch, in view 
of claiming the perfection of God’s creation and the universe. With Aristote-
lian accents, Plutarch maintains the ontological priority of act over power. This 
equates to the priority of perfection over imperfection or, rather, of Being over 
Becoming, whereby the former serves as a model for the latter. Plutarch dis-
cusses this aspect through the apparently simple and classic question of which 
comes fi rst, the chicken or the egg. In the Table-Talk, Firmus offers a wholly 
mechanist explanation, for which the egg must precede, since what is less per-
fect produces what is more perfect, contributing to the evolution of life as well 
as its diversity. Senecio responds that, on the contrary, perfection must indeed 
precede imperfection, as the entire comes before the mutilated, and the whole 
before the parts. On this ground, Senecio’s argument re-establishes the priority 
of the normal over the abnormal and the monstrous, which are exceptions and 
perfect only insofar as they contribute to the perfection of the whole.244
Plutarch also makes use of the ancient cosmogonic argument of generation 
from the earth. Because what is perfect and complete must precede what is 
imperfect and incomplete, living beings have initially been generated from the 
earth in their accomplished form, as one can still observe today with the mice 
of Egypt, snakes, frogs and cicadas. It is not the earth that imitates the woman, 
but the woman that imitates the earth, as Plato also claims.245 Interestingly, 
Plutarch forgets that the Empedoclean and materialist generation from the 
earth implies the earth’s attempt to reach viable forms by producing innumer-
able monsters, a few of which survive only because they are able to repro-
duce themselves.246 Plutarch might have in mind the spontaneous generation 
discussed by Diodorus Siculus. As for Empedocles, though, Plutarch seems 
to forget that these creatures were only half normal, and in fact monstrous 
in their lower part, which remained unshaped and muddy, like the matter 
243 Plu. Moralia. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 938 ff.
244 Plu. Moralia. Quaestiones convivales 637 B.
245 Plu. Moralia. Quaestiones convivales 637 B.
246 See supra.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   298 24/08/19   12:33 PM
 M I D D L E  A N D N E O P L AT O N I S M 299
from which they were made.247 Monstrosity is now left behind, in Plutarch’s 
attempt to fi rmly establish the priority of perfection over imperfection, and of 
the divine, stable and rational cause over the natural, unstable and mechanis-
tic explanation of the universe.
A similar position is carried forward by Galen of Pergamon, one of the most 
important fi gures of classical medicine and science. Although his thought 
reveals a strong autonomy and independence, and a distinct capacity of bor-
rowing from different philosophical schools and sources, I believe that for what 
concerns monstrosity and the conceptual area surrounding it, Galen deliber-
ately develops a Platonic approach. The result of his enterprise remains one of 
the most infl uential attempts in classical culture to claim, in a scientifi c way, 
the caring presence of the divine in the world and frame anomalies and mon-
strosities within this providential conception. The scientifi c approach is not 
claimed against the theological one, as is the case with materialist philosophers. 
Rather, Galen aims at reconciling science and theology, by fi rst criticising the 
materialists for their ignorance. Their conclusions on the structure of bodies, 
for example, are vitiated by a poor knowledge of anatomy,248 and this criticism 
also includes Aristotle.249 Thus Galen argues for a scientifi c approach whose 
backbone is supported by the recognition of the divine in the world.250
Galen sings a veritable ‘hymn of praise’ to nature and its creator in De usu 
partium III.10. This text, which inspires several ancient and modern authors, 
develops the equation between reality and perfection. Galen interprets this 
perfection fi rst and foremost in terms of ‘usefulness of the actions’ that the 
parts and organs of a body, for example, are expected to perform. The con-
fi guration of bodies is admirable and it is absurd to ask why things are not 
different or better, as several philosophers (like Epicurus, Anaxagoras and the 
atheist Diagoras) have asked, unjustly and absurdly condemning nature.251 By 
simply asking this question, in fact, materialist philosophers make the divine 
itself monstrous, ‘crippling and blinding the godlike faculty by which alone 
247 D.S. I.10.2: ‘As proof that animal life appeared fi rst of all in their land [Egyptians] would 
offer the fact that even at the present day the soil of the Thebaid at certain times gen-
erates mice in such numbers and of such sizes to astonish all who have witnessed the 
phenomenon; for some of them are fully formed as far as the breast and front feet and 
are able to move, while the rest of the body is unformed (ἀδιατύπωτος), the clod of earth 
still retaining its natural character.’ See also F. Fuhrmann, ‘Notes complémentaires’, in 
Plutarch (1972–93), IX.1, p. 182, and Guthrie (1957), p. 39.
248 Gal. UP VI.20.
249 Gal. UP VII.14.
250 Galen’s teleological theology, as Donini (1992) explains, is however polemically opposed 
to the Mosaic and mystery religions. See also Temkin (1973) and J. Boulogne, L’«Épode» 
de Galien. Une célébration du merveilleux, in Bianchi, Thévenez eds (2004), pp. 307–20.
251 Gal. UP XII.6.
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Nature enables a man to behold the truth [. . .]’.252 Nothing could be better 
or be improved in animal bodies, whose perfection refl ects that of the heavens 
and of the whole universe. Thus Galen moves away from the idea of degrees 
of perfection, and recognises the same mark of the divine in the arrangement 
of animal and celestial bodies,253 according to nature’s behaviour, which is, as 
also Hippocrates claims, more just than justice itself.254
Should anything in nature be different from what it currently is, it would 
inevitably transform reality into something monstrous. Monstrosity is thus 
used by Galen as the hypothetical otherness to respond to Epicurus’s and 
Asclepiades’s followers, who claim that individuals evolve depending on their 
activities and the exercise of certain parts of their bodies, and further that 
this could not only be considered as an improvement, but could also under-
mine the idea of a general nature or essence of a class of beings. What would 
a human or a horse be, if humans and horses changed and developed their 
bodies depending on their activity? Galen’s response is that such an alleged 
improvement would only be monstrous:
[. . .] perhaps you think that in individuals who take exercise, parts somehow 
become double, and that in those who are lazy, parts are diminished by half. 
If this is so, then hard workers will doubtless have four feet and four hands, 
and those who take their ease will have only one leg and one hand!255 
Galen also attempts a mechanical explanation of such an impossibility, thinking 
about similar arguments put forward by Aristotle on the contradiction repre-
sented by centaurs. No such powerful monster as a centaur can exist. A monster 
is a monster, and thus outside of nature, in the sense of being contradictory and 
logically impossible:
But why, then was [man] not given four legs and hands as well, like the cen-
taur? The reason is that, in the fi rst place, a commingling of such widely 
different bodies was impossible for Nature. For it was not merely their shapes 
and colours that she would have had to combine, as sculptors and painters 
do; she would also have been obliged to blend their very substances, which 
are absolute and will not mingle. Indeed, if man and horse should ever mate, 
the uterus would not bring the seed to perfection. If Pindar as a poet accepts 
the myth of the centaurs, we should be indulgent, but if he speaks as an intel-
ligent man, pretending to understand what is beyond the grasp of ordinary 
252 Gal. UP III.10.
253 Gal. UP III.10. Galen’s rejection of Epicureanism and materialism is mainly inspired by 
the biological ideas of Plato’s Timeus. See Moraux (1973–84), II. pp. 685–808, Goulet, 
éd. (1989–) sub voce. Dillon (1977) does not include Galen in his analytical survey.
254 Gal. UP V.9.
255 Gal. UP I.21.
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mortals, we must censure his claims to wisdom [. . .] And even if we should 
grant that this animal, so strange and monstrous, could be conceived and 
perfected, nothing could be found to nourish the creature. Would the lower, 
horselike parts be nourished with grass and raw barley, and the upper parts 
on cooked barley and food fi t for men?256 In that case the animal should be 
given two mouths, one human and the other that of a horse, and if we must 
judge from the presence of two breasts, it seems likely that it would also have 
two hearts. [. . .] a man is better able than that monstrosity, the centaur, to 
leap over an obstacle [. . .] perhaps it would be better for us to have four 
legs if they were human legs and not those of a horse. Such an arrangement, 
however, would be of no help to us in any action, and we should lose our 
natural swiftness as well.257 
Nothing can be more perfect that what it is. Galen’s position is interesting 
because it faces two very different enemies: Epicureans and materialists, as we 
have seen, but also theologians who claim that God could have indeed made 
things more perfect if only he had wanted to. We have seen this argument run-
ning through several versions of Platonism, following Philo’s argument in favour 
of God’s omnipotence or Plutarch’s anti-Stoic critique. For Galen, on the con-
trary, if nature and God do not do anything different, it is because it is impossible 
to indiscriminately gather all the advantages of different animal species, such as 
human and horse, together. Nature must choose and give to different species the 
advantages that make them perfect not absolutely, but in themselves.258 Galen 
thus embraces the critique of the almighty God, arguing for a limit and a bound-
ary to what nature can achieve. Nature’s plenitude, in this sense, looks closer 
to Stoics’ necessity than to Plutarch’s and Philo’s higher and unbound power.259
256 See Arist. HA VIII.28, 607 a 1–8 and GA II.7, 746 a 29–35.
257 Gal. UP III.1. Daremberg, in Galien (1854–6), I, ad loc. suggests the reference to Lucr. 
V.878. See supra for both Aristotle and Lucretius on centaurs and chimaeras.
258 Gal. UP III.4.
259 Gal. UP XI.14: ‘Is this the way in which Moses reasons about Nature (and it is a better 
way that Epicurus’)? Yet it is best for us to adopt neither, but, continuing to derive the 
principle of generation from the Creator in all things generable, as Moses does, to add 
to this the material principle. For our Creator has made these hairs feel the necessity of 
preserving always an even length for the reason that this was the better thing. [. . .] Now 
it was not enough merely to will that they should be so; for even if he wished to make a 
rock into a man all of a sudden, it would be impossible. And this is the point at which my 
teaching and that of Plato and the other Greeks who have treated correctly of natural 
principles differs from that of Moses. For him it suffi ces for God to have willed material 
to be arranged and straightaway it was arranged, because Moses believed everything to 
be possible to God, even if he should wish to make a horse or a beef out of ashes. We, 
however, do not feel this to be true, saying rather that some things are naturally impos-
sible and that God does not attempt these at all but chooses from among the possible 
what is best to be done.’ See also Pichot, ‘Introduction’, in Galien (1994).
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This boundary, according to a Platonic reading of the demiurgic action, 
but also to the Aristotelian idea of resistance to the form, is due to matter. 
Galen’s God is not almighty, because he does not create from nothing, and 
encounters a pre-existing matter that is and remains an obstacle.260 Degrees 
of perfection, however, exist within mundane nature, and different beings can 
be deemed less valuable and inferior. An example that Galen repeatedly brings 
forth is that of the ape: ‘[. . .] because the ape has a ridiculous soul and is a 
poor mimic, the body Nature has bestowed on it is correspondingly ridiculous 
[and] uses its legs in the same way as a man who is playing the clown and mak-
ing fun of the way a cripple stands, and limps as he walks and runs’. Galen does 
not deny that the ape’s body makes this animal more apt to perform its proper 
functions than, let’s say, a human. Apes, for example, are perfectly fi t to climb 
on trees. This relativism, however, is subordinated to a scale of degrees of 
perfection that has humans at its top. The ape’s amusing and ludicrous nature 
depends on its comparison with human functions.261
Galen’s argument on apes is intended to fi rmly establish the distinction 
between human and animal. The recognition of the former’s priority is estab-
lished by making the latter monstrous. It is however a curious monstrosity, 
since the ape’s character, although laughable, is to be monstrously perfect. In 
fact, by giving to this being, whose soul is inferior, an inferior body, nature has 
acted according to justice and perfection:
Tell me, O noble sophists and clever accuser of Nature, have you ever seen 
in the ape this fi nger that is commonly called the antihand [. . .]? And if you 
have not seen the ape’s thumb, will you have the effrontery to say that it is 
just like the human thumb? If you have indeed seen one, I suppose you saw 
that it is short, slender, distorted and altogether ridiculous, just as the ape’s 
whole body is. [. . .] Nature would say to you that an animal with a ridiculous 
soul should be given a body with a ridiculous structure. Accordingly, as my 
discourse proceeds, it will show how the ape’s whole body is a caricature of 
the human body. You will see how true this is of the hands when you refl ect 
with me that if an artist or sculptor intended to produce a caricature of the 
human hand, the result would be exactly like what we see in the ape. For we 
are most inclined to laugh at those imitations which carefully preserve the 
likeness in most of their parts but go entirely astray in the most important 
ones. Then what advantage is there in having four fi ngers well formed if the 
thumb is so poorly arranged that it cannot even be called the great fi nger?262 
260 See Gal. UP III.1. See also Moraux (1973–84), II, p. 766, and Hankinson (1989), p. 218.
261 See e.g. Gal. UP III.8. See contra Hankinson (1989), p. 217.
262 Gal. UP I.22.
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It is remarkable that Galen claims ape’s monstrosity vis-à-vis human perfec-
tion and through the recognition of a certain proximity between the good 
model and an inferior imitation. The ape is not ludicrous because it represents 
the human’s otherness, but rather because it resembles and imitates humanity, 
without reaching its degree of beauty. One can think about Plato’s theory of 
the simulacrum. The ape becomes the human’s simulacrum and threatens the 
boundary between human and animal, since it reclaims, with its resemblance, 
the gap that Galen intends to preserve.263
Despite the claim for the equation between reality and perfection, the ape’s 
argument reveals a priority and superiority of essence over existence in Galen’s 
thought. What one thing should be becomes prominent over what it actually 
is. Galen develops this point, once again contrasting the mechanistic expla-
nation of anatomy, in this case by quoting Anaxagoras on the human hand, 
veritable ‘instrument for instruments’. Galen, however, turns upside down 
Anaxagoras’s mechanist explanation. Human intelligence, Galen argues, is 
not the outcome of development due to humans’ use of hands. Rather, intel-
ligence derives from the essence of the intelligent being himself:
It is not because he has hands that he is the most intelligent, as Anaxagoras 
says, but because he is the most intelligent that he has hands, as Aristotle 
says,264 judging correctly. Indeed, not by his hands, but by his reason has 
man been instructed in the arts.265 
The human is thus not the result of a mechanical development, but rather 
the actualisation of a perfect model or essence, to which having hands is 
appropriate and suitable, and whose organs have the best possible disposi-
tion. Galen of course follows Aristotle on this argument and explains that 
the disposition is determined by the end and the scope of such a being, and 
its perfection means a structure that ensures its accomplishment.266 The act 
has thus, once again, the priority over the power, since it is what guides and 
263 On the simulacrum, see below. Galen is probably recalling here Socrates’s search for the 
beautiful in itself and absolutely. See Pl. Hp.Ma. 289 a–c, and esp b 2 ff.: ‘[. . .] does not 
Heraclitus, whom you cite, mean just this, that the wisest of men, if compared with a 
god, will appear a monkey, both in wisdom and in beauty and in everything else?’ See 
also Daremberg, in Galien (1854–6), I, p. 162, n. 3.
264 See Arist. PA IV.10, 687 a 7–18.
265 Gal. UP I.3.
266 Gal. UP I.9. For Aristotle on the hand see PA IV.10, 687 a 3–b 25 and above, as well as 
Temkin (1973), p. 179 and passim, and Hankinson (1989), who stresses the difference 
between the genuine teleology defended by Galen and the immanent teleology of the form 
argued by Aristotle. Galen’s Platonism would thus be syncretistic. See also Hankinson 
(1998). Contra De Lacy (1972) who argues for Galen’s genuine Platonism.
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controls the individual’s movement toward its τέλος: the function should 
be the point of departure of every enquiry, as well as the criterion for each 
discovery.267
Teleology occupies a central position in Galen’s philosophy. In De usu par-
tium VI.12 he elaborates a theory of causality that slightly modifi es Aristotle’s 
taxonomy, building on fi ve different kinds of causes. The primacy of the cause 
for the sake of which, the ‘fi rst and most important’, is argued through the 
reference to Plato’s criticism of Anaxagoras’s limited use of fi nalism in Phaedo 
97 d–99 b.268 Galen extends the critique to materialists, and in particular to 
Asclepiades, expanding once again on the notion of monstrosity:
Asclepiades passes by two causes, that derived from the providence of the 
Creator, which I have called the fi rst cause, and the second, called the 
material cause, so to speak, and arrives at a sort of cause which is the most 
insignifi cant of all [. . .]. It would be a fi ne thing if we had more fi ngers on 
our hands in good health and fewer when we are ill! So too, it would be a 
sight worthy of the wisdom of Asclepiades to see Thersites with perhaps 
three fi ngers, Ajax with seven, Achilles with still more, and Orion and 
Talos with more fi ngers, I suppose, than an iulus has feet! Oh, most noble 
Asclepiades, a man using unsound bases for his teachings cannot escape 
making himself ridiculous at every turn. There is an Intelligence ordering 
and arranging all these things, not merely corpuscles combining with one 
another spontaneously.269 
Galen is probably intending to use a good scientifi c approach against the bad 
materialism of Epicureans. For example, he sees in the order that universally 
characterises nature the mark of a design. If order were only in one species, he 
argues again in De usu partium XI.8, we might even believe that chance exists, 
as Epicurus and Asclepiades claim. But because order is in every and any spe-
cies, than prudence and reason are defi nitely required, and one cannot believe 
in the monstrous and ridiculous270 hypothesis of material chance. The Platonic 
activity of a wise God is thus claimed as the source of nature’s perfection and 
regularity.271
267 Gal. UP I.10.
268 Daremberg (in Galien [1854–6], I, pp. 420–2) clarifi es what is at stake in Galen’s 
reworking of Aristotle’s theory of causality.
269 Gal. UP VI.13. On Galen’s theory of causality see also Hankinson (1994).
270 Gal. UP XI.9 and passim.
271 See contra P. Moraux, ‘Galien comme philosophe: la philosophie de la nature’, in Nutton 
(1982), pp. 87–116, who argues for an immanent principle of regularity, deriving from 
Aristotle rather than from Plato.
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Providence, in this sense, is openly admitted, as an inner faculty that regu-
lates and maintains the otherwise too complex structure of animal bodies:
For, if there was not an inborn faculty given by Nature to each one of the 
organs at the very beginning, then animals could not continue to live even 
for a few days, far less for the number of years which they actually do. For 
let us suppose they were under no guardianship, lacking in creative inge-
nuity and forethought; let us suppose they were steered only by material 
forces, and not by any special faculties (the one attracting what is proper 
to it, another rejecting what is foreign, and yet another causing alteration 
and adhesion of the matter destined to nourish it); if we suppose this, I am 
sure it would be ridiculous for us to discuss natural, or, still more, physi-
cal, activities – or, in fact, life as a whole. For there is not a single animal 
which could live or endure for the shortest time if, possessing within itself 
so many different parts, it did not employ faculties which were attractive 
of what is appropriate, eliminative of what is foreign, and alterative of what 
is destined for nutrition.272 
What are then, in this framework, anomalies? Besides the relative differentia-
tion of degrees of perfection that Galen the philosopher, for example, claims 
between human and ape, Galen the anatomist must be well aware of the exis-
tence not only of differences, but also of abnormalities within a single species. 
Even in this case, Galen thinks that nature cannot be accused of anything. The 
similitude with art helps build the argument. The great sculptor Polycletus may 
make a mistake. He remains Polycletus and nobody will dare to accuse him of 
being unskilled if, among so many perfect works, one or a few of them contain 
a small error.273 The relatively small frequency of monstrosities in nature pre-
vents the possibility of accusing such a skilled craftsman. When imperfection 
becomes more frequent, Galen suggests, then one has to look for its meaning 
within the whole. The female, for example, is indeed less perfect than the male, 
as also Aristotle had claimed. As Aristotle recognises, though, she is necessary 
to procreation and the reproduction of the whole species.274
The Corpus Hermeticum can be considered a text of transition between 
Middle and Neoplatonism. The Corpus describes the fi xed and immutable 
order of the cosmos, which depends on stable laws of nature.275 The divine 
272 Gal. Nat. Fac. II.3.
273 Gal. UP XVII.1. 
274 Gal. UP XIV.6. See above for Aristotle on the imperfection of females. On the difference 
between Galen’s and Aristotle’s teleology see Pichot, ‘Introduction’, in Galien (1994) 
and Hankinson (1989).
275 Corp.Herm. XIX and XX.
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manifests itself through the beauty and order (τάξις) of the world, which con-
trasts with its disorder (ἀταξία):276
Everything that is an order <has been made; only> something placeless 
(ἄτακτος) and measureless (ἄμετρος)277 can be not made. But even this 
does not lack a master, my child. Even if the unordered is defi cient {– defi -
cient, that is, in that it does not retain the character of order –} it is still 
subject to a master who has not yet imposed order on it.278 
The interesting point of this contrast is that the text considers disorder and 
lack of measure provisional, only a residue of the ancient chaos which has not 
yet been subjugated and ordered by the master of the universe. It is the mate-
rial element of it that survives and reveals the original confl ict from which 
everything comes. Order is thus not an essence but a promise, to be reached 
through a confl ictual process which is still in the making.279
Corruption is at the heart of this conception, and must be constantly 
tamed by God, bringing back things to their principle:
There is nothing evil or shameful about the maker himself; such condi-
tions [sc. evil and disorder] are immediate consequences of generation, 
like corrosion on bronze or dirt on the body. The bronzesmith did not make 
the corrosion; the parents did not make the dirt; nor did God make evil. 
But the persistence of generation makes evil bloom like a sore, which is 
why God has made change, to repurify generation.280 
There is a tendency of each thing to decline and move toward imperfection, 
as if the lapse of time would resolve itself only in an inevitable becoming-
monstrous of reality. Only divine intervention can stop this process of corrup-
tion, defeating the otherwise unavoidable negativity of terrestrial things, and 
re-establish order.281
276 Corp.Herm. V.3 and VIII.3–4. W. Scott in [Corpus Hermeticum] (1924–36), II.156 ff., 
suggests the Stoic origin of the argument of contemplation of the world order.
277 See also Nock and Festugière in [Corpus Hermeticum] (1991, 7e ed.) ad loc.: ‘l’absence 
de lieu et d’ordre’, followed by Ramelli in [Corpus Hermeticum] (2005): ‘l’assenza di 
luogo e di misura’, and Scarpi in [Corpus Hermeticum] (2009–11): ‘mancanza di luogo 
e di misura’.
278 Corp.Herm. V.4.
279 All the terminology employed especially refers to military order and organisation in the 
army. See W. Scott in [Corpus Hermeticum] (1924–36), II, p. 162.
280 Corp.Herm. XIV.7.
281 See also W. Scott, in [Corpus Hermeticum] (1924–36), II, pp. 426–7.
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A completely different approach to the problem of order is taken by early 
Christian Platonists, who face a wide range of theological and philosophical 
problems in their attempt to explain the order God creates and maintains in 
the universe, and what role evil, the exception, the abnormality and monstros-
ity play in it. Christian Platonists often stress God’s will and the fact that the 
order God builds has a teleological and anthropocentric meaning. The concept 
of a good order is at the heart of the ideas of Justin Martyr, possibly the fi rst 
Christian apologist to make explicit use of Platonism, in particular the Timaeus, 
mediated by Philo. At the heart of his writings lies the idea of God’s plan of cre-
ation and salvation, or the οἰκονομία. Clement of Alexandria also makes the 
εὐταξία, the good order, which is fully dependent on God’s will (βούλευμα), 
one of the central elements of his theology. While humans are at the centre 
of creation and everything is created for them, Clement is keen to recognise 
the supreme author and underscore the praise He deserves. There must be no 
confusion: it is the creator, not the creation, that must be worshipped.282
Origen also develops the concept of οἰκονομία, which points to God’s 
activity for the sake of humans: ‘[. . .] the providence of God justly governs all 
things and rules immortal souls with the most equitable economy according 
to the merits and motives of each’.283 A good administrator, God manages and 
arranges things in favour of humans – this is the real meaning of providence or 
πρόνοια. Origen follows Platonism in order to deny the Stoic concept of provi-
dence. Providence does not pervade the world as a material πνεῦμα, but as an 
immaterial soul and informative power that acts from above and gives unity, 
coherency and consistency to a world that would otherwise be left in chaos.
Origen’s position opens up the problem of the interpretation of things 
and events that seem at odds with the harmony of the world. Monstrosity is 
among them:
[. . .] with respect to the works of that providence which embraces the 
whole world, some appear most clearly to be works of providence, while 
others are concealed in such a way as to seem to furnish ground for disbe-
lief in that God who orders all things with unspeakable skills and power.284
This is especially true for realities on the earth, in contrast with what happens 
in the sky, where providence’s action is more regular and gives less occasion 
for doubt. The supposed unity and harmony, at least in the earthly world, is 
282 See e.g. Clem.Al. Paed. I.6.5–6. See also Monfrinotti (2014), pp. 196 ff.
283 Origenes, Princ. III.1.17. See also III.1.13–4, IV.2.2.
284 Origenes, Princ. IV.1.7. See also Provvidenza, in Monaci Castagno (2000).
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stained by a capricious diversity that might confuse the believer. It is thus of 
paramount importance for Origen to explain its origin and status. One reads 
in On the First Principles:
When, in the beginning, [God] created those beings that he desired to cre-
ate, that is, rational beings, he had no other reason for creating them other 
than himself, that is, his own goodness. As, then, he himself, in whom was 
neither variation nor change nor inability, was the cause of all those things 
which were to be created, he created all whom he created equal and alike, 
since there was in himself no ground for variety and diversity. But since 
these rational creatures [. . .] were endowed with the faculty of free will, 
this freedom of will either incited each one to progress by the imitation of 
God or drew him to defection through negligence. And this [. . .] is the 
cause of the diversity among rational creatures, drawings its origin not from 
the will or judgement of the Creator, but from the freedom of the individual 
will. [. . .] these are the causes, in my opinion, why this world has assumed 
its diversity, while divine providence arranges each individual according to 
the variety of their movements or of their intellects and purposes. 
God is not interested in, and does not aim at, diversity. The unity and regularity 
of the world initially refl ect God’s perfection and depend on His absolute and 
perfect power. The free will of His creatures, however, makes them diverse, and 
over time this gives the world the irregular face one can now observe. God’s 
providence keeps directing everything, but not as Stoic fate does. Providence 
leaves room for imperfection, sin and monstrosity, as much as it allows perfec-
tion and purity, which are not ontological features, but are acquired by creatures 
in the dynamic activity that follows creation. Evil, for this reason, lacks onto-
logical consistency. In the Commentary on the Gospel according to John, Origen 
explains in detail the nature of evil:
[. . .] evil or wickedness is opposite to the good, and ‘not being’ is opposite 
to ‘being’. It follows that wickedness and evil are ‘not being’. Perhaps it is 
this that deceived those who said the devil is not a creation of God. For 
insofar as he is the devil, he is not a creation of God, but to the extent that 
it falls to the devil ‘to be’, being made, since there is no creator except our 
God; he is a creation of God. It is as if we should say also that a murderer 
is not a creation of God, while we do not annul the fact that qua man, he 
has been made by God. [. . .] we said before that ‘not being’ and ‘nothing’ 
are synonyms, and for this reason those ‘who are not’ are ‘nothing’, and all 
evil is ‘nothing’, since it too is ‘not being’.285 
285 Origenes, Io. II.96–9.
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Origen’s solution is extremely important and infl uential for how Christian 
thinkers eventually use the Platonic theory of evil. The idea comes from Pla-
tonism, yet Origen modifi es it substantially by denying any concrete existence 
to evil, which is not, as it is in Platonism, the form of the non-being. Evil 
or imperfection or monstrosity are nothing in themselves, although they are 
something, insofar that evil, imperfect or monstrous things exist qua things. 
And existing, they can only have been created by God.286
Going back to Pagan philosophy, Neoplatonists expand on the main 
explanations offered by Middle Platonist authors for the sense and meaning 
of order. What becomes particularly relevant is the question of the autonomy 
of evil vis-à-vis the divine, and the alternative between dualist and monist 
readings of their relationship. Plotinus, for example, carries on the critique 
of materialism and Epicureanism, denouncing the ridiculous hypothesis of 
an immanent and self-producing order in nature. The atomist cosmogony, 
based on the παρέγκλισις, means nothing more than absence of causality.287 
Creation, on the contrary, has its own causality, and it is clearly vertical; that 
is to say, it descends from the higher and divine sphere to the lower realm, 
making disorder ontologically subordinate and inferior to, and ultimately 
dependent on, order:
[. . .] order does not exist because of disorder or law because of lawlessness, 
as someone [sc. Epicurus] thinks, that these good things may exist and be 
manifested because of the worse ones; but disorder and lawlessness exist 
because of order, which is imposed from outside. It is because there is order 
that disorder exists, and on account of the law and formative reason, just 
because it is reason, that there is transgression of the law and folly; not that 
the better things produce the worse, but the things which ought to receive 
the better are unable to do so because of their own nature or because of 
some chance circumstance or hindrance from others. For when something 
has its order from outside it may fail to correspond to it either of its own 
accord and from itself or because of and impelled by something else; and 
many things are affected by others when those which act on them do not 
intend to do so and are aiming at something else.288 
Plotinus thus establishes a hierarchical relationship that includes particular 
evil and imperfections under the general presupposition of divine goodness. 
The world speaks for itself and puts beauty and perfection in front of the acute 
286 See Male, in Monaci Castagno (2000), as well as Moreschini (2013), pp. 415 ff.
287 Plot. III.1.1.
288 Plot. III.2.4. See Boot (1984).
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observer’s eyes, regardless of the few imperfections and monstrosities that 
come into existence. Similarly to Galen’s argument on Polycletus’s hypotheti-
cally imperfect statue, Plotinus names the crippled and monstrous Thersites, 
who certainly does not represent the entirety of the human race. Blaming the 
whole on account of a rare imperfection is thus simply unreasonable.289
Evil assumes interesting features in Plotinus’s reading, whose argument on 
this point will eventually be extremely infl uential in the following centuries. 
Plotinus develops the idea that evil is both necessary to goodness and sub-
ordinate to it, insofar as it is nothing more than privation or lack (ἔλλειψις) 
of goodness itself.290 Using an argument reminiscent of Aristotle’s recogni-
tion of the necessity of the unaccomplished for the existence of successful 
accomplishments, Plotinus asks what the divine would be different from, if 
everything simply were divine and perfect,291 and what providence would be 
providential for, if there were nothing to be taken care of.292 The divine, thus, 
is placed at centre stage, and its contrary is defi ned as absence of goodness, 
the necessary absence that makes its presence possible elsewhere, namely in 
the highest sphere.293
This brings forth a certain relativism in Plotinus’s argument, since one 
ought not to ask whether something is more or less than something else, ‘but 
whether it is, as itself, suffi cient; for all things ought not to have been equal. 
[. . .] it was according to nature for things to come about so’.294 Plotinus means 
here the spontaneous order that emanates from above and descends below, 
even with its diverse degree of accomplishment. This order is spontaneous 
and necessary rather than depending on a personal deity, such as for Philo 
and the Christians.295 Magris interprets this spontaneous character of the 
emanation of goodness as a Stoic argument.296 However, I believe that Stoic 
immanentism implies the necessary presence of goodness across the creation 
in equal measure and in every corner of the reality. Plotinus cannot commit 
to this principle of indistinction and to this materialisation of goodness at every 
level. For him, matter is the imperfect principle that has an inferior degree of 
goodness’s presence.
289 Plot. III.2.3.
290 See Whittaker (1928, 2nd ed.), p. 78.
291 Plot. III.2.9. Dragona-Monachou (1994), pp. 4479–80, reads here an echo of the 
Aristotelian critique of the excessive unity of the universe of Socrates and Plato.
292 Plot. III.3.7.
293 Plot. III.2.5 and I.8.6.
294 Plot. III.3.3 and III.3.5 on the relativity of the aesthetic judgement.
295 Plot. III.2.14. See Brehier (1928), p. 192, who argues that Plotinus also goes beyond the 
Platonic image of the anthropomorphic demiurge, too close to the personal god of the 
Christians.
296 Magris (1985), pp. 662 ff.
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This dynamic relation between perfection and imperfection is framed 
within a theory of providence. Providence’s plan is not to overcome but 
rather to refl ect the diversity that characterises the whole vertical emana-
tion. Its justice, as in Plutarch, is geometrical and not arithmetical: every 
individual thing has everything it is owed, by having nothing more that it 
receives:
Providence, then, which in its descent from above reaches from the 
beginning to the end, is not equal as in a numerical distribution but dif-
fers in different places according to a law of correspondence, just as in 
a single living creature, which is dependent on its principle down to its 
last and lowest part, each part having its own, the better part having the 
better part of the activity, and that which is at the lower limit still active 
in its own way and undergoing the experiences which are proper to it as 
regards its own nature and its co-ordination with anything else. [. . .] 
one thing results from all, and there is one providence; [. . .]297 
Plotinus’s providence, however, is far from being the absolute and uncondi-
tional guarantee that, as a dogma, it represents for Judeo-Christian thinkers. 
The treatise on evil reveals, maybe unexpectedly and as an ultimate hesita-
tion, the unstable and conditional character of beauty and harmony in the 
universe:
[. . .] because of the power and nature of good, evil is not only evil; since 
it must necessarily appear, it is bound by a sort of beautiful fetters, as some 
prisoners are in chains of gold, and hidden by them, so that it may not 
appear to the gods, although being present, and men may be able not 
always to look at evil, but even when they do look at it, may be in company 
with images of beauty to remind them.298 
Evil must be chained and hidden. It is defeated and thus rendered less ugly, 
covered up by golden chains, but its makeup is also the ambivalent mark of its 
rebel character, which always threatens to surface, as a rebel slave, against the 
order imposed upon him.299
Similarly to Plotinus, Porphyry insists on the necessity of a recognisable 
order in nature. His argument takes the form of the anti-Christian polemic 
against the almighty God that, as we have seen, also fi nds its place within 
Middle Platonism. Porphyry, on the contrary, believes that such a conception 
297 Plot. III.3.5. See also Spitzer (1963), pp. 168–9.
298 Plot. I.8.15. On the text’s emendation see Kalligas (2014), p. 241.
299 Laurent (1992), p. 99.
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of God is purely monstrous. Were God to break the good order of the universe, 
the world would be disfi gured and made unnatural:
Even if such a thing were possible, it is monstrous [τερατώδης] and 
removed from all that is sensible. For Nature, which created all things from 
the beginning, appointed places befi tting things brought into being, and 
said each should have its proper sphere [. . .]. The divine and active Logos 
[. . .] does not do and will what he is able to do according to his own abil-
ity. Rather according to its suitability he preserves things, watching over 
things according to the law of order [τὸν τῆς εὐταξίας φυλάττει νόμον]. 
[. . .] Nor does he change a man into a winged creature. Nor does he place 
the stars below and the earth above.300 
It is within this cultural and intellectual environment that Augustine elab-
orates one of the most powerful philosophical systems of late Antiquity. It 
stands at the crossroads of Platonism and Christianism, and is also infl uenced 
by Stoicism and Peripateticism. We have already seen the Bishop of Hippo’s 
eclectic reception of Platonism in the question of God’s relation to His cre-
ation. It is, however, around the question of natural order and the role and 
status of monstrosity within it that Augustine offers the most interesting and 
original ideas. Monstrosity becomes for him an explicit domain of enquiry 
and a theoretical object that deserves philosophical attention. His refl ections 
are spread across his body of work, but it is in On Order, the Confessions and 
On Trinity that we fi nd the most interesting analyses of the problem.
In his youth, Augustine was haunted by the problem of evil and disorder, 
especially because of the powerful presence Gnosticism had in his cultural and 
intellectual formation. When, through Neoplatonism and Plotinus in particular, 
Augustine embraces Christianity, the problem of evil fi nds a clear and unam-
biguous solution, succinctly illustrated through his mother Monica’s words in 
De ordine: ‘I reject the notion that nothing at all can happen outside God’s order. 
The very evil that began did not do so from within God’s order, but God’s justice 
did not allow it to stay out of that order, but reduced and compelled it to become 
part of it.’301 The problem of evil is thus the question of its origin, whether it 
starts inside or outside order. Moving away from the anthropocentrism of sev-
eral earlier Church Fathers, Augustine insists that the best vantage point from 
which to frame the problem is the global order, not the limited perspective of 
an individual. Only from that point of view, as both the Stoics and Plotinus had 
explained, although differently, can one understand how the universal order 
encompasses everything, including evil and monstrosity:
300 Cels. 35 (= Mac.Magn. IV.2).
301 Aug. De ordine II.7.23.
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A. [. . .] what do you think might be contrary to order? L. Nothing. How 
can anything be contrary to a whole encompassing everything? Anything 
contrary to order, strictly speaking, ought to be outside it. But I see nothing 
outside order, therefore there must be nothing contrary to it. T. Ah, but isn’t 
error contrary to order? L. Not at all. I cannot see anyone making a mistake 
without a cause. Any series of causes must be included in order. Even error 
as such is not only due to a cause, but itself becomes the cause of something 
else as well. then what is not outside order cannot be contrary to it.302 
Thus everything is within order, bona et mala in ordine sunt. This has impor-
tant consequences for the attitude the good Christian should assume toward 
all things that happen both in nature and to her. Wonder, for example, which 
had such an important role in pagan philosophy, is here denounced by Augus-
tine as a vice generated by something that appears to be outside the order. As 
he explains, this is only the ‘obvious’ order, the expected order, not the whole 
encompassing order that contains every and any event. There is nothing in 
that order that should cause wonder in the mind of those who recognise God’s 
authority and the way He operates upon nature.303 Foolishness, for example, 
might disgust those who approach it from the wrong perspective:
[. . .] the whole life of a fool, though running in fi ts and starts and in peren-
nial disorder, is nevertheless inserted into the order of things by divine 
providence. God’s ineffable and everlasting law has set aside a defi nite 
place for it, not allowing it to operate outside it. Should anyone then limit 
one’s attention to the narrow reality of that life, he would feel utterly dis-
gusted by it. But on raising the eyes of the mind to such heights as to 
survey the whole universe, he would fi nd nothing out of order, each thing 
perfectly fi tting in its own assigned place. 
Once again Augustine invites the reader not to focus on the individual and 
the particular, to resist the hypnotic force of ‘narrow reality’ and embrace 
instead the global perspective of nature as a whole. Once this is done, wonder 
can be rediscovered, directed, however, not toward the rare and astonishing, 
but the common and the normal, since normality, the direct expression of 
God’s work, is what truly deserves our wonder.304
This attitude makes space for Augustine’s attention, unprecedented in 
early Christian thought, to the topic of monstrous races. We have seen how 
302 Aug. De ordine I.6.15. See also Plot. III.2.14, III.2.17 and supra. Grandgeorge (1896) is 
still useful for a rapid survey of connected texts of the two authors.
303 Aug. De ordine I.3.8.
304 See e.g. Aug. De uera religione XLIX.94 and Ciu. XXI.8. On this idea see Marrou (1958, 
2e ed.), pp. 136–57.
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monstrous races, for instance in Pliny, were thematised by pagan philosophy. 
Augustine considers this a typically pagan problem, but one of great impor-
tance for the Christian: ‘The histories of the nations tell of certain monstrous 
races of men. If these tales are to be believed, it may be asked whether such 
monsters are descended from the sons of Noah, or rather from that one man 
from whom the sons of Noah themselves have come.’305 He believes prudence 
is required here. It is the history of and by pagans that claims the existence of 
monstrous peoples in remote lands. These tales must thus be accepted only 
conditionally. If, however, they are true, then their existence is of paramount 
importance for the theologian, because of problem concerning the origin of 
these nations in the sacred history.
Augustine then moves forward and speaks as if their existence was con-
fi rmed, relating and summarising the ancient pagan knowledge, mainly from 
Pliny, about these peoples:
Some of these are said to have only one eye, in the middle of their fore-
head. Others have feet which point backwards, behind their legs. Others 
combine in themselves the nature of both sexes, having the right breast of 
a man and the left of a woman, and, when they mate, they take it in turn 
to beget and conceive. Others have no mouths, and live only by breath-
ing through their nostrils. Othes again are only a cubit high, and these 
are called Pygmies by the Greeks, after their word for a cubit, pygme. Else-
where, we come across females who conceive at the age of fi ve and who 
do no live to be more than eight years old. Again, there is a race whose 
feet are attached to a single leg which does not bend at the knee, yet they 
move with marvellous speed. These are called ‘Shadow-feet’ because in 
hot weather they lie on their backs on the ground and take shelter in the 
shade of their feet. There are some men without necks, who have eyes 
in their shoulders; and other men, or men-like cretures, are depicted in 
mosaic on the marie parade at Carthage, taken from books as examples 
of the curious things to be found in natural history. And what am I to say 
of those dog-headed men whose dogs’ heads and actual barking show that 
they are more beasts than men?306 
Through the accumulation of monstrous features, Augustine seems to seek to 
produce an effect of astonishment and wonder in his reader. The last race, the 
Cynocephalies, is presented through a rhetorical question that highlights the 
list’s oddest features and thus seems intended to produce the highest amaze-
ment in the reader. Yet as we already know, Augustine wants to undermine 
305 Aug. Ciu. XVI.8.
306 Aug. Ciu. XVI.8.
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amazement and neutralise wonder under the umbrella of an encompassing 
logic that makes every and any phenomenon, no matter how strange or unbe-
lievable, the production of the unique God. Thus Augustine continues,
It is not, of course, necessary to believe in all the kinds of men which are 
said to exist. But anyone who is born anywhere as a man (that is, as a ratio-
nal and mortal animal), no matter how unusual he may be to our bodily 
senses in shape, colour, motion, sound, or in any natural power or part or 
quality, derives from the original and fi rst-created man; and no believer 
will doubt this. It is, however, clear what constitutes the natural norm in 
the majority of cases and what, in itself, is a marvellous rarity.307
The inclusive logic Augustine develops both magnifi es monstrosity and under-
mines its exceptionality and oddity. Nothing must be left outside of the sacred 
history, because nothing is outside of the only existing reality, that created by 
God according to his plan.
This is also true of a less exotic form of monstrosity, namely the physi-
cal anomaly, or human monstrosity, which Augustine and his contemporaries 
might have seen close up. On Trinity introduces a new argument that is even-
tually very infl uential for Christian writers. After having confi rmed that God’s 
will is the cause of everything, and that our amazement about some event 
has to do with its rarity, as in the case of monstrous births,308 Augustine links 
these strange phenomena to miracles. They become both a sort of exceptional 
language and a language of exceptions, one used by God to signify something 
to men. Monsters become signs through which the divine communicates with 
the lower world:
[. . .] just as it was not impossible for God to create whatever natures He 
chose, so it is not impossible for Him to change those natures which He 
has created in whatever way He chooses. This is why there has sprung up 
so great a multitude of those marvels which are called ‘monsters’, ‘signs’, 
‘portents’ or prodigies’. If I chose to recall and mention them all, would this 
work ever come to an end? The word ‘monster’, we are told, clearly comes 
from ‘to demonstrate’ [monstrare], because monsters are signs by which some-
thing is demonstrated. ‘Sign’ [ostentum] comes from ‘to show’ [ostendere]; 
‘portent’ from ‘to portend’, that is ‘to show in advance’ [praeostendere]; and 
‘prodigy’ from ‘to speak of what is far away’ [porro dicere], that is, to foretell 
the future.309
307 Aug. Ciu. XVI.8. See also Ciu. XXI.8.
308 Aug. De trinitate III.2.7.
309 Aug. Ciu. XXI.8. See also De trinitate III.10.19.
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Human monstrosities thus prolong the argument about monstrous races, only 
to confi rm and, if possible, reinforce the inclusive and normalising logic that 
Augustine intends to develop. Augustine is aware, of course, that this logic 
does not add anything to the actual knowledge and aetiological understanding 
of monstrosity. Yet this is not a diffi culty for him. On the contrary, he reintro-
duces here the argument of God’s ineffability and incomprehensibility, in line 
with his transcendentalism. Only God perfectly knows himself, and humans 
should not even dare to attempt a similar understanding. Monstrosity thus 
also serves to remind us of the fi nitude of human intellect:
He Himself knows where and when anything should be, or should have 
been, created; and He knows how to weave the beauty of the whole out 
of the similarity and diversity of its parts. The man who cannot view the 
whole is offended by what he takes to be the deformity of a part; but this 
is because he does not know how it is adapted or related to the whole. We 
know of men who were born with more than fi ve fi ngers or fi ve toes. This 
is a trivial thing and not any great divergence from the norm. God forbid, 
however, that someone who does not know why the Creator has done 
what He has done should be foolish enough to suppose that God has in 
such cases erred in allotting the number of human fi ngers. So, then, even 
if a greater divergence should occur, He Whose work no one may justly 
condemn knows what He has done.310
No ambiguity is possible for Augustine. Using his Platonic theoretical arse-
nal, revised and strengthened by Christian theology, Augustine takes on the 
Aristotelian and Peripatetic theory that sees monstrosity as a result of a 
failed actualisation of forms. Unlike Aristotle’s nature, God never errs. As 
the Stoics understood, we must embrace the whole with our limited intel-
lect, not to fully understand it, but to fully accept it in all its manifestations, 
even monstrous ones.311
At the end of this chapter of The City of God, Augustine pushes his interpre-
tation one step further. His argument seems to fall back on anthropocentrism 
of a sort:
If, however, the creatures of which these wondrous things are written are 
indeed men, why was it God’s will to create some races in this way? Perhaps 
it was so that, when monsters are born of men among us, as they must be, 
we should not think them the work of an imperfect craftsman: perhaps it 
was so that we should not suppose that, despite the wisdom with which 
310 Aug. Ciu. XXI.8.
311 See Bouton-Toubolic (2004), pp. 200–1.
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He fashions the nature of human beings, God has on this occasion erred. 
In which case, it ought not to seem absurd to us that, just as some mon-
sters occur within the various races of mankind, so there should be certain 
monstrous races within the human race as a whole. I shall, then, conclude 
my discussion of this question with a tentative and cautious answer. Either 
the written accounts which we have of some of these races are completely 
worthless; or, if such creatures exist, they are not men; or, if they are men, 
they are descended from Adam.312
This conclusion is notable more for its prudence than for its philosophical 
power. Besides the fact that it does not explain why or how God would make 
a monster to be born among us (unless, indirectly, to signify something to 
humans, as a miracle or a sign), the hypothesis is at least disproportionate. 
God created entire races of monsters so that, when one of them is born among 
us, we will not be amazed. But we should probably stop looking for the argu-
ment of a scientist or a Platonist philosopher here, and see what Augustine 
wants his reader to see, that is, the logic that infl exibly includes everything 
under the positive power of God. Monsters do not exist or, if they exist, they 
are not humans or, if they are humans, then they are no different from us, i.e. 
sons and daughters of the same man created by the only God.
For Augustine, it is really a matter of seeing. Better, it is a matter of training 
our vision through faith so it can discern what is in fact already under our eyes, 
namely the beauty of creation. Augustine’s Platonism, here, converges with 
the Stoic praise for the universe’s beauty that Cicero, Galen and Lactantius, 
among others, had so profoundly expressed. Our situation, Augustine explains 
in De Ordine,
is akin to that of one who, confi ned to surveying a single section of a 
mosaic fl oor, looked at it too closely, and then blamed the artisan [artifex] 
for being ignorant of order and composition, In reality it is he himself who, 
in concentrating on an apparently disordered variety of small coloured 
cubes, failed to notice the larger mosaic work. The apparent disorder of 
the elements really comes together onto the unity of a beautiful portrait. 
The same can be said of the feeble-minded ignoramus. Unable to grasp 
the harmony and interaction of the universe as a whole [universam rerum 
coaptationem atque concentum], and hurt by what is beyond their ken, such 
people rashly conclude that things are inherently ugly and disorderly.313
312 Aug. Ciu. XXI.8.
313 Aug. De ordine I.1.2. See infra, Cic. Diu. II.33 and ND II.119. See also SVF II.534, 546, 
1013, and 1211.
6144_Del Lucchese.indd   317 24/08/19   12:33 PM
318 M O N S T R O S I T Y  A N D P H I L O S O P H Y
This passage reveals Stoicism’s great infl uence on the idea of harmony. Cicero 
translates the Stoic συμπάθεια with concentus naturae, which is the argument 
that Stoics and Middle Platonists used to oppose the Atomist hypothesis, pre-
cisely as Augustine does, by denouncing the absurdity of chance and playing 
ratio against casus.314
It is however Platonism, particularly Plotinus, that most inspires Augustine 
in his concluding argument on the ontological consistency of evil. Against 
Gnosticism and Manichaeism, Augustine explains that evil must not be 
thought of as some sort of negative substance, but rather as lack and privation 
of substance,315 as privation and non-being:
It was obvious to me that things which are liable to corruption are good. 
If they were the supreme goods, or if they were not good at all, they could 
not be corrupted. For if they were supreme goods, they would be incor-
ruptible. If there were no good in them, there would be nothing capable 
of being corrupted. [. . .] whatever things exist are good, and the evil into 
whose origins I was inquiring is not a substance, for if it were a substance, it 
would be good. Either it would be an incorruptible substance, a great good 
indeed, or a corruptible substance, which could be corrupted only if it were 
good. Hence I saw and it was made clear to me that you made all things 
good, and there are absolutely no substances which you did not make.316
There is no substantial evil in the world, just as there is no real monstrosity. 
The reality of evil and monstrosity around us, however, demands an explana-
tion, a theodicy, and Augustine uses arguments from Neoplatonism to explain 
that evil is not the opposite of goodness, but only a lack, a minor imperfection 
characterising things that nonetheless originate in God. Moreover, Augustine 
adds, once again revealing not only the Stoic accents of his philosophy, but 
also elements of Aristotelianism, fi ltered through Plotinus, evil is the con-
dition of goodness. It is something that makes the world move in the right 
direction and that contributes, indirectly and idiosyncratically, but nonethe-
less necessarily, to the global perfection of the universe:
God does not love evil. It would not be in order for Him to do so. He loves 
order so much that for its sake He does not love evil. Since God does not 
love evil, does it mean that there can be any evil outside order? This is 
precisely the order of evil things, that God should not love them. Do you 
314 On this passage, see Solignac (1957), p. 451 and Trelenberg (2009).
315 Aug. Confessiones V.10.19–20.
316 Aug. Confessiones VII.12.18.
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think it is a mean order that God should love good things and not evil 
ones? Evil things are not outside order because God does not love them. 
He in fact loves to love good things, and also loves not to love evil things. 
This is the greater order of divine disposition. Both order and disposition 
keep the universe together by this very distinction, rendering the existence 
of evil somewhat necessary. This clashing of contraries, which we love so 
much in rhetoric, gives body to the overall beauty of the universe.317 
The nonbeing of evil is one of the theories in which Augustine comes closer 
to his Neoplatonic sources. It is also the metaphysical ground of his theory of 
monstrosity, both of which were eventually extremely infl uential for Chris-
tian thinkers. The debate, however, also continues in pagan Neoplatonism, in 
particular in Proclus. Augustine’s theory, especially his metaphysics, helps us 
understand this further development of Neoplatonism and its consequences 
for late Antiquity’s comprehension of the problem of monstrosity.
Proclus maintains the suffi ciency and perfection of natural order, to which 
nothing could be added that would make it better than it actually is. Every-
thing is in agreement with the whole, and particular imperfections are subor-
dinated to the universal perfection.318 Even for Proclus, thus, evil’s existence 
is quasi-paradoxical: inferior and yet necessary. Its Being is not absolute but 
relative, because evil exists as mixed and subordinated to the good.319 The 
consequence of this relative existence, though, is that evil’s necessity must be 
accepted, with everything that is corrupted, deformed and even monstrous, 
because the whole needs it for its internal articulation.320
The typical Neoplatonic conception of a hierarchical order is the attempted 
solution to such a paradox. The relative ontological consistency of different 
things translates into a layered conception of the universe, structured accord-
ing to different levels of perfection.321 Monstrosity is thus not an absolute 
concept, but only the specifi c charateristic of individual things that can only 
be said monstrous in themselves. Nothing, in fact, is against nature, since 
nature’s order encompasses everything. This solution, however, rather than 
limiting and circumscribing monstrosity, spreads it over the entirety of nature 
itself. In some sense, if nothing is monstrous and imperfect for nature in its 
entirety, everything becomes in a certain manner monstrous for any particular 
nature, when it is considered in itself. No matter, in fact, how high or low 
317 Aug. De ordine I.7.18. See also II.1.2 and Evil and Theodicy, in Pollman et al. (2013).
318 Procl. Opusc. De providentia et fato 34.
319 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 7 and 9.
320 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 5.
321 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 10.
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something is in the scale of Being, it is always marked by its imperfection.322 
Proof of it is that a certain disorder, although different from the material one, 
can be found even in the higher sphere, since order, at every ontological level, 
must fi ght with disorder to establish itself.323
Providence, in any case, takes care of the single parts as much as of the 
entire whole, of beings against nature, as much as of beings according to nature, 
of the individual without a species (sine specie), as much as of entire species.324 
As in Plutarch and Plotinus, though, providence’s justice is geometrical and 
not arithmetical. The providential design is one, but it is not the same for 
everything.325 Things themselves are determined to receive more or less from 
providence, depending on their degree of perfection: ‘tantum capere quantum 
potest recipere’.326
Proclus’s energies are also devoted to building a strong theodicy. Evil must 
not be thought of in contrast with providence. On the contrary, it exists to 
allow the perfection of the whole qua whole and to distinguish the fi rst from 
the last things. Evil can thus be said to exist because of providence and certainly 
according to it, for the sake of the higher good. Evil things can, for example, 
be the cause of the generation of other things, whose goodness might not be 
immediately clear to humans. What exists for the good cannot be entirely evil. 
This explains the strongly teleological nature of the universe’s structure. The 
goodness of the ultimate effect casts its shadow backward on the antecedent 
cause, rendering it functional to the highest end, no matter what the nature of 
the means is, either good, or evil.327
The language of teleology insinuates itself into Proclus’s argument with 
unparalleled strength. Finalism keeps evil in check, building a special concept 
of ontological consistency for it:
Certainly one must not put the fi nal cause of all among the causes of evil. 
Indeed, it would not be suitable that the good were the goal of evils. But 
since souls pursue what is in every way good and do everything, including 
322 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 27. Sorabji ed. (2004), p. 58, underlines the presence 
of this idea in Chrysippus and Philoponos.
323 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 29.
324 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 4. De malorum only survives in William of Moer-
beke’s thirteenth-century Latin translation and in a summary by the eleventh-century 
Byzantine prince Isaak Sebastokrator. Sine specie translates ἀνείδεος, often coupled 
with ἄπλαστος, thus formless in the same sense that evil is vis-à-vis goodness. See 
DGA sub voce and also Plotin’s use of the term in I.8.3. On providence’s range see also 
Opusc. De decem dubitationibus circa providentia II.6 and Theol. Plat. I.12–17.
325 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 17–8.
326 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 20.
327 Procl. Opusc. De decem dubitationibus 29.
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evil things, for its sake, someone might perhaps think that for evils, too, the 
good is the fi nal cause. For all things are for the sake of this good, all the 
good and all the contrary things alike. [. . .] perhaps it would be better to 
make neither the effi cient cause, nor the natural paradigm, nor the per se 
fi nal cause the principal cause of evils. For the form of evils, their nature, 
is a kind of defect, an indeterminateness and a privation; their [mode of 
existence, or] hupostasis, is, as it is usually said, more like a kind of [parasitic 
existence, or] parupostasis.328 
Evil takes its power from the good within which, like a parasite, it insinuates 
itself.329 It has a quasi-existence, a παρά-ὑπόστασις, in the sense that it does 
not exist properly (κυρίως). It has however the power to actively absorb some-
thing from its contrary. It is not only the negation of good. It is its negation 
by virtue of its participation in it, which is in fact a violation of the good’s 
purity and integrity. Sharing one of the classic attributes of monsters, evil is 
also incapable of generation (ἄγονος). Being deprived of the fount of good 
things, unlimited, weak, incommensurate, false, ugly, unfounded in its own 
nature, unstable, bearing only privation and lifelessness, it embodies one of 
the strongest fi gures of monstrosity of late ancient philosophy. Because the 
highest cause is the fi nal cause, and because evil is not produced from a prin-
cipal cause, nor has it an end, nor does it belong to any order of which it 
would be a positive means, evil is deprived of consistency and reduced to a 
parasitic existence: ‘Everything that is produced, is produced for the sake of 
the good; but evil, coming from outside and being adventitious, consists in the 
non-attainment of that which is the appropriate goal of each thing.’330
Proclus also establishes a connection between the external and non-
teleological character of evil and the idea of multiplicity, as opposed to the 
One. It is a dangerous pattern, since everything below the One incurs the risk 
of becoming evil in a certain manner, precisely because of its essential alterity:
The non-attainment is due to the weakness of the agent, since the agent 
has received a nature of such a kind that a part of it is better, a part worse, 
each part being separate from the other. For where the One is, there at 
the same time is the good. But evil is – and the One is not – present in a 
split nature. For incommensurability, disharmony and contrariety are in 
multitude; and from these weakness and indigence proceed. Indeed, in the 
gods, too, are to be found the ‘winged nature’ and ‘both horses’; but there 
‘these are all good, consist of good things’ and not ‘of contrary things’. But 
328 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 49.
329 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 52–4. See also Procl. Theol. Plat. I.18.
330 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 50.
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in other beings these are mixed; in them there is multitude and diversity 
of powers, and each [of these powers] pulls towards different things. In the 
superior realm multitude looks at the One and is determined according 
to one kind of life. But where multitude and diversity appear because of a 
decrease in union, there lack of power appears – for all power is what it is 
by the One and from the One –, as well as disharmony and dissidence of 
one thing from another, each being drawn by its own desires.331 
The opposition built by Proclus seems to weaken the concept of παρυποστᾶσις, 
since besides the One, what would not be engulfed by alterity and multiplicity? 
A closer scrutiny of the concept can perhaps clarify the ambivalent existence of 
evil. Sorabji explores the παρυπόστασις within the framework of the commen-
taries.332 Following Opsomer and Steel, Sorabji locates its origin in Aristotle’s 
thought, and in particular in the account of coincidences and chance events 
that are not due to nature’s intention.333 While Sorabji mainly sees a link with 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics,334 Opsomer and Steel also relate the παρυπόστασις to the 
Aristotelian texts in which monstrosity is explained, i.e. Ph. II.4–5.335
In an infl uential article, A. C. Lloyd had suggested interpreting the 
παρυπόστασις as a parasitic existence rather than a quasi-existence.336 His 
analysis is based not only on De malorum subsistentia, but also on Proclus’s 
commentaries and the Platonic Theology. Lloyd underlines the weak existence 
of evil, which is something next to nothing and yet capable of attaining, and 
sometimes even overcoming, the unity of being. It is a perversion of a preced-
ing and perfect form of existence ‘combining the notions of incidental and 
from outside.’ It is a parasite, insofar as it is dependent on the host to ensure its 
survival.337 Lloyd thus criticises D. Isaac’s interpretation, based on a more con-
fl ictual and threatening idea. The παρυπόστασις, in Isaac’s view, is the original 
and inspired solution given by Proclus to the problem of naming what is at the 
same time contrary, complementary, symmetrical and subordinated, ‘that is to 
say a counter existance, an inverted replica of the Good, a shade of the Real, 
331 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 50.
332 Sorabji ed. (2004), pp. 95 ff.
333 Sorabji ed. (2004), p. 100.
334 Arist. Metaph. VI.3.
335 J. Opsomer, C. Steel, Introduction, in Proclus (2003), p. 26: ‘The basis of Proclus’ argu-
ment is certainly Aristotle’s distinction between a causality per se and a causality per 
accidens. The accidental is not necessary, but indeterminate (aoriston); and of such 
a thing the causes are unordered (atakta) and indefi nite (apeira).’ See Arist. Ph. II.4–6 
and supra.
336 A. C. Lloyd, Parhypostasis in Proclus, in Boss, Seel éds. (1987), pp. 145–57.
337 A. C. Lloyd, Parhypostasis in Proclus, in Boss, Seel éds. (1987), p. 157.
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something secondary and relative implying degrees, vis-a-vis the primary abso-
lute without them. [. . .] With Proclus, the [παρυπόστασις] takes defi nitively 
the sense of opposition, deviation, diminution, and dependance.’338 Isaac thus 
accepts the parasitic character of evil, but he also underlines its non-osmotic 
nature, that is to say the character of the malignant guest that openly threats 
its host by its parasitic activity.
In my view, the παρυπόστασις brings to mind the existence of the Platonic 
simulacrum. I believe that Lloyd’s characterisation excessively neutralises the 
threatening nature of evil qua monstrous other.339 Isaac grasps something In 
Proclus’s struggle to set the divine free from any responsibility vis-à-vis evil, 
while maintaining a strictly monistic approach, like Plotinus before him. Evil 
has a counter-existence, which is indeed parasitic, not only in the sense of 
being subordinate, but also disturbingly malignant and threateningly alien.
The danger of characterising all nature as evil through the παρυπόστασις 
is great. Proclus makes use of monstrosity to clarify, at the end of the treatise, 
the way in which evil can be said to be subordinated, functional and para-
sitically part of the good. The parasitic and adventitious dimension of evil is 
explicitly connected with many of the characteristics of monstrosity: dishar-
mony, formlessness, deformity of the body and the mind.340 Evil is assimilated 
to the monstra naturae (τέρατα φύσεος), the monsters that haunt all of nature 
and yet belong to it:
The evil inherent in bodies [. . .] is twofold, one kind existing as foulness, 
the other as disease – I call foul all things contrary to nature that are not 
diseases, for monsters, too, are foulnesses of nature. Of these two kinds, 
[let us consider] foulness. Foulness is in accordance with universal nature, 
as reason and form are to be found in it, <yet not in accordance with partic-
ular nature.> indeed, in a particular nature there is one rational principle, 
and what is contrary to it is for this thing against nature, but in universal 
nature all the rational principles and forms exist naturally. And sometimes 
one thing only is generated out of one form [. . .] sometimes many things 
are generated out of one thing [. . .] sometimes one thing is generated out 
of many, as in the case of mixtures of matter-related forms – these mixtures 
338 D. Isaac, Introduction, in Proclus (1977–82), III, pp. 13 and 15.
339 A. C. Lloyd, Parhypostasis in Proclus, in Boss, Seel éds. (1987), p. 155: ‘In M. Isaac’s case 
I can certainly fi nd no good reason to translate “parhypostasis” as “contre-existence.” If 
Proclus has understood it on the analogy of παρὰ φύσιν he would, I think, have made 
this clearer than he has, to judge by Moerbeke’s translation and Sebastokrator’s résumé 
of De mal. subsist. 50.’
340 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 56–7.
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seem to be monsters with respect to the individual nature, which desires 
to be dominated by and exist according to a single form; sometimes many 
things are generated from many things [. . .]341 
The spectre of multiplicity is haunting nature. Proclus’s attempt is to follow 
the traditional pattern of many and different parts of a single whole. Yet the 
one single form to which everything naturally aspires is doomed to be only 
partially attained. Every real existence, beyond the perfectly formal one, is a 
parasitic existence that spreads monstrosity throughout nature.
The discourse on monstrosity progresses and develops through several 
transformations in Middle and Neoplatonism. Platonist philosophers make 
a great effort in discussing, interacting with and appropriating theories and 
doctrines from the principal Hellenistic systems, in order to recover the 
ancient Platonic message without losing its original character. Their attempt 
is directed mainly at integrating evil and monstrosity in the world, explaining 
them, making sense of their apparently irrational and threatening character. 
The aim is to save the divine from evil: an apparently paradoxical enterprise, 
since evil is by defi nition inferior, for Platonists, to the divine. And yet, with-
out this attempt, God himself, the God of the philosophers, would be weak-
ened, facing the multifarious manifestations of a threatening nature: the Zeus 
of Platonism has yet to overcome Typhoeus.
For reasons of consistency, I have explored Middle and Neoplatonism, a 
complex and long-lived philosophical movement, through the same categories 
used in previous chapters, namely the confl ict between immanence and tran-
scendence, the questions of nature’s hierarchies, teleology and providence, 
and the origin of evil. However, I introduced new elements because of the 
peculiar reworking of these ideas within the new monotheism of the Judeo-
Christian early tradition, as well as their importance for the later medieval 
and early modern philosophy. The refl ection on monstrosity, however, plays a 
central role in the task of elaborating a systematic response to many if not all 
of the problems explored in the previous chapters.
Middle and Neoplatonism try to introduce evil and monstrosity in a scale 
of being, through a hierarchy that emanates from above and receives, in differ-
ent degrees, the unique perfection of the One. Yet the solutions are different, 
because so are the problems and the philosophical threats that these thinkers 
consider, addressed to them by philosophers of different schools. Monstrosity 
is normalised. It is normalised, though, by spreading it across the hierarchy of 
beings, all the more intensely the more one moves away from the One and 
the higher reality. Evil and monstrosity are assigned a paradoxical role in this 
341 Procl. Opusc. De malorum subsistentia 60.
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ontological structure: an inferior and yet a necessary one. Not only, thus, are 
Being and the divine not saved from monstrosity; they are, on the contrary, 
attacked by it at every level of being. The Platonic discourse on monstrosity 
culminates in the concept of parasitic existence. Far from being the solution, 
this is, for ancient philosophy, only the beginning of the philosophical prob-
lem. As the parasite cannot live without its host, the host, in this case, cannot 
exist, beyond its essence, without hosting the parasite. Only a fully theological 
decision is now able to prevent philosophy from succumbing to the problem 
of monstrosity. Christian theology takes Platonism, together with other meta-
physical solutions, with the only exception of the mechanist and Epicuren 
one, as its ground to develop a new perspective.
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291 b 8 267
302 a 28 59
306 b 17–19 78
Cat. 
8 a 33 216
de An. 
434 a 31–32 111
GA 
I.1 111
740 a 20 207
746 a 29–35 301
762 a 24–7 111
767 b, 10–13 119, 158
767 b, 13–15 118
769 a 10–771 a 14 125
769 b 11 ff. 112
769 b 30 113
769 b 30–6 76
770 b 10 113–14
772 b 26–31 128
GC 
315 a 23 64
317 b 16 295
HA 
607 a 1–8 301
Metaph.
982 a 4 9
982 b 11–983 a 25 95
983 a 23 9
983 a 24 ff. 99
985 a 18 59
1000 b 12 154
1017 a 35 ff. 107
1026 a 32 ff. 119
1054 a 14 216
1069 b 15 ff. 63
1070 b 22 99
1073 a 36–7 230
VI.3 322
PA 
640 a 12 ff. 108
640 a 20 ff. 109
640 b 24–9:110
640 b 28–9 110
645 a 7 ff. 94
645 a 19–23 95
663 b 22 107
670 a 30 120
687 a 3–b 25 202
687 a 7–18 203
Ph. 
194 a 20 ff. 98
194 a 28 98
194 b 11 98
194 b 24–7 99
194 b 27–9 99
194 b 29–33 99
194 b 33–5 100
195 a 23–6 100
195 b 30 ff. 105
196 b 10 ff 105
198 a 7–10 107
198 b 3 ff. 107
198 b 10–32 115
198 b 33–199 a 7 115
199 a 8–21 117
199 a 32–3 117
199 a 33–b 9 117
199 b 15–32 117
199 b 23–6 121
203 a 19 58
203 b 20 ff. 77
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Ph. (cont.)
209 b 11–12 78









1451 a 1–2 164
Top. 
100 b 25 230
125 b 28 216













































































35   312
Chaldean Oracles
88   261
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 I N D E X L O C O R U M 399
Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker [FGH]
IV F 88 21
257 F 36.II 272




d. defi n med. 
439 75
De dign. puls 229
De elementis secundum Hippocratem 
I.2 226
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Poetae Comici Graeci [PCG]













6144_Del Lucchese.indd   401 24/08/19   12:33 PM



























































































397 e–398 c 279
399 d 81
400 b–c 253 
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896 d 3–897 b 4 82
896 e 280
900 d 2–3 89
903 b 80







97 b–98 c 59
97 c 102
97 d–99 b 304












273 a ff. 288
Prm. 
130 b 2–3 97
R. 
343 e 264
376 e–377 c 84
378 e ff. 88
379 b–c 89
505 d 5–9 232
507 e 5–508 a 2 87
516 b 3–4 232
588 b–c 86
588 c 83
588 c ff. 269
588 d–e 84




189 d–190 c 90




227 d 5–228 d 2 83




22 b–25 d 193
29 c–d 89
29 e 1–30 c 1 89
34 d–35 a 81
35 a
40 d–41 89
41 a ff. 80
46 d 5–e 2 81





























6144_Del Lucchese.indd   403 24/08/19   12:33 PM

































14.1114 F–1115 B 126
16.1116C 132
De animae procreatione in Timaeus 
1014 D–E 256
1015 E 256
De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos 
34.1076 C 184
De defectu oracolorum 
416 E–417 B 282
418 F–419 A 282
429 A–B 256
429 B–D 255
435 E–436 A 297







De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 

















De genio Socratis 
579 F ff. 282
De Iside et Osiride 
361 B 283












Poetae Melici Graeci [PMG]
207 14
815–24 23
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De decem dubitationibus circa providentia 
II.6 320











































I praef. 13–14 206
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IX.10 a 22. 121
IX.10 a 22–8 122
IX.10 a 26–7 124
IX.10 b 24–11 a 1 123
IX.11 b 25–7 122
Meteorology
6 124
Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta [Theos.]
173.17–174.22 271




















13 A 7(6) 267
21 A 33 193
21 A 41a 267
21 B 1 13
22 B 94 43
28 B 1 231
31 B 6 63
31 B 17 64
31 B 19 69
31 B 21 69
31 B 30 154
31 B 32–4 69
31 B 35 65, 141
31 B 57 65
31 B 61 65
31 B 73 67, 69
31 B 75 67, 69
31 B 86 67
31 B 87 67, 69
31 B 97 109
31 B 115 154
31 B 151 69
68 A 49 226
68 A 141 75
68 A 146 113
68 B 124 75
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αἰσχρός, 23, 181, 191–2, 280
αἰτεῖν, 36































































ἀταραξία, 138, 224–5, 227
Index Verborum
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βία, βίη, 21, 25, 40, 89
βιάζεσθαι, 88
βουγενής
β. ἀνδρόπῳρα, 65, 151n



































μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ’ ἑ. ἐστιν, 57
ἐθέλειν, 213
ἔθνος
ἔ. μυρία θνητῶν, 141
εἶδος, 99, 172
εικός, 85
εἱμαρμένη, 74, 171, 293
εἶναι
τί ἧν ε., 99












οὗ ἕ. καί τἀγαθόν, 99










































6144_Del Lucchese.indd   409 24/08/19   12:33 PM














κακός, 89, 181, 189, 240
κακουργός, 287






τονικὴ κ., 185. 
κρατεῖν, 114, 119


























μ. αὐτὸς ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν, 57
μορφή, 232





ἔθνεα μ. θνητῶν, 141
νεῖκος, 64
νηλεόποινος, 42
νόμος, 171, 227, 312























































π. τεχνικόν, 170, 184
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ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντῃ σ., 229
σπανός, 234
Σπαρτοί, 26
σπέρμα, 57, 75, 171
σπερματικός
σ. λόγος, 171, 174–7
στέρεσις, 267
στοιχεῖον, 70





ἡ γὰρ τύχη τῶν κατὰ σ. αἰτίων, 121 and n











σχῆμα, 71, 132, 172






τέλος, 18, 66, 68, 80, 88, 100, 106, 112n, 135–6, 150, 
213, 224, 242

















τυγχάνειν, 68 and n
τυραννίς
Διὸς τ., 39
τύχη, 65–6, 74, 101, 104, 106, 115, 216
ἡ γὰρ τ. τῶν κατὰ συμβεβεκός αἰτίων, 121
τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων ἀπὸ τ. γενέσθαι τὰ πλεῖστά 
φησιν, 105
τυχόντως, 114
ὕβρις, 25–6, 50, 79
ὕλη, 78, 82, 99, 184–5
κακῆς ὕ., 263
ὑλικός












φαινόµενον, 229–30n, 231 and n, 233
ἀλλὰ τὸ φ. πάντῃ σθένει, οὗπερ ἂν ἔσθῃ, 
229–30














φύσις, 43, 73, 95, 105, 107, 171, 207, 230n
ἀναγκαίας φ., 107
ἔµφρων φ., 80
ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν µορφὴν φ. κυριωτέρα τῆς ὑλικῆς 
φ., 110
λόγον φ., 107








Index of Latin Words
absterrere
natura a. auctum, 142
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continuo has leges a. foedera certis imposuit natura 
locis, 157
agitare







animus / anima, 154n
artifex







fera et immanis b., 247
bonum






c. effi ciens, 99, 274
c. fi nalis, 99
c. formalis, 99
c. materialis, 99





seminibus c. certa generatrice creata, 149
clinamen, 135, 158
coaptatio
uniuersam rerum c. atque concentum, 317
cogitare, 208
commutare
si primordia rerum c. aliqua possent ratione reuicta, 133
complexus


















in sua c. rursum dissoluat natura neque ad nilum 
interemat res, 132
sola c. esse, non esse ideas, 172
creare
c. conatast, 142





haud igitur potuere utendi c. causa, 161
cura, 104n
curare
de minimis non c. praetor, 205
decus
ablatum d. est, 290




uideo meliora proboque, d. sequor, 53
determinatio
d. est negatio, 147
dicere








ratio d. omnia, 149
diuinitus
nullam rem e nilo gigni d. umquam, 132
diuulsus
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fera
f. et immanis belua, 247
fi gura, 157
fi nalis





foedus / foedera, 134, 154, 158–9
aequali f., 159
caeco f., 159
continuo has leges aeternaque f. certis imposuit natura 
locis, 157
f. mundi, 175
f. naturae, 142, 148, 152, 154–6, 158–60, 168–9
f. rerum, 157
fati f., 156
quantum cuique datum est per f. naturai, 156
foedus see uultus
forma




seminibus certis certa g. creata, 149
gens
monstruosa facies g., 233n
genus, 143
gignere




sola corpora esse, non esse i., 172
ignis




fera et i. belua, 247










lex, 149–50, 157, 159, 171, 215
continuo has l. aeternaque foedera certis | imposuit 
natura locis, 157
foedera rerum l., 157
l. leti, 157
l. naturalis, 154




totaque discors m. diuulsi turbabit foedera mundi, 175
magnitudo, 214
magnus
m. mater, 141, 143
malum
bona et m. in ordine sunt, 313
manifestus
m. belli signa, 157
mater































m. facies gentium, 233n
mundus
m. esse urbem (uel domum) bene administratam, 210
mens m., 211
totaque discors machina diuulsi turbabit foedera m., 175
motus
omnia cientis et agitantis m. et mutationibus 
suis, 242
mutare










determinatio est n., 147
nequiquam, 142–3
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nihil ultra, 137
nilum
















































quasi p. atomis dare, 136
pulcher
p. index ueri, 97
qualitas, 263
ratio, 133, 136, 138, 140, 149–50, 155–7, 161, 164, 318
reddere
r. rationem, 179
res, 132, 137, 142, 146
multa uidemus r. concurrere debere, 159








s. certis certa generatrice creata, 149







simulacrum, 230–1, 303 and n, 323
singuli, 218
species, 263
sine s., 320 and n
sponte, 74



































Anthropocentrism, 140–1, 143, 195, 198, 244, 316–17






Atom, 71, 132–7, 211, 245
Atomism, 59, 63, 70–7
Autochthony, 27
Bacchae, 34 and n., 47
Barbarians, 22, 26, 31–2, 46–8
Being and becoming, 63–4, 68, 71, 252, 260, 273, 287, 
292, 298
Body, 47, 49–50, 81, 185–6, 195, 201, 253n, 285
Cannibalism, 22n
Causality, 10–11, 35–55, 60, 79, 97–107, 111–12, 
116, 136
Centaur, 1, 47, 145, 150–1, 158, 164, 173, 177, 260, 
264–5, 301
Centimanes see Hecatoncheires
Chance, 65, 74–5, 104–7, 114–16, 123, 148–9, 159, 
214–5, 218–9
Chaos, 1, 4, 13–19, 28, 32, 66, 150, 175
Chimera, 47, 84–5, 145, 149–51, 158, 163, 260, 301
Civilisation, 21–2, 27, 48
Cosmogony, 9, 12, 16, 25, 37, 58, 63, 171, 175, 
255, 258
Danaids, 47–8
Deformity, 23, 50, 52, 83, 86, 112, 277
Demiurge, 82, 89, 134, 211
Demons, 41–2, 187, 278–87
Deviation, 135–7
Diversity, 59, 195–6, 199–200, 228, 233
Divination, 217–20, 234, 239, 245–6
Dragon, 26–7, 31, 173, 285 and n






Erynies, 34–5, 40n, 41–6
Essence, 99–100, 108, 236
Ethics, 138–9, 188, 225n, 251
Eumenides, 44
Evil, 18, 81–2, 176, 189, 193, 216, 267, 270–1, 276–7, 
280–1, 288, 309–12, 318–21, 323
Fate, 26, 35, 40–1, 74, 144–5, 158–61, 171, 175, 
204, 212
Fear, 45, 60
Femininity, 41, 46, 50–5
Fire, 30, 38, 49, 54, 61, 167, 170, 174, 184




Giants, 1, 12, 17–18, 27–8
Gigantomachy, 24–6
Gnosticism, 82, 176, 251, 274, 283, 312
God and the divine, 9, 13, 20, 36–7, 39, 43–4, 67, 79, 
95–6, 138–9, 171, 177, 184, 187, 189, 205–22, 
239–40, 249–51, 261–6, 274–5, 301, 316
Gorgons, 15, 260
Hand, 201–2, 210, 302–3
Harmony, 64, 66, 68, 117, 167, 183n, 187, 259, 
294, 317
Heat, 59
Hecatoncheires, 18–20, 33, 34n. 
Hermaphrodite, 47, 90–1, 142, 151n, 272




Idea, 72, 81, 172, 174, 180, 252, 262–3
Idealism, 4, 59–60, 97
Index Rerum
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Justice, 15, 35, 37–8, 40n, 41, 43–4, 46, 50, 87
Keres, 15, 42
Kyklopes, 18, 20–3, 293
Law, 11, 12n., 42, 45, 145, 147, 150, 153–61, 171, 




Mask, 43, 47, 87n
Materialism, 4–5, 59–60, 72–3, 98, 171–2, 176, 183, 
206
Matter, 61, 72, 78–9, 99, 101–2, 112, 114, 171, 185–7, 
253–63, 266–70, 272–3, 275, 277–8, 292, 302
Mechanicism, 64, 67–8, 73, 76, 110–11, 114–16, 120, 
127, 167
Miracle, 180–1, 198, 315–16
Moirai, 42–3
Mutiplicity, 71, 256, 259, 324
Myth, 8–9, 12–13, 78, 84–5, 258–9
Mythology, 8–55
Nature, 25, 43, 58, 96–7, 109, 113–14, 116–17, 119, 
136, 138, 141, 166, 182, 185, 187, 199, 218
Necessity, 35, 43, 64–5, 73–5, 79, 104, 114, 118–21, 
139, 141, 159, 217
Nominalism, 97, 172–81
Norm, 59, 62, 69
Normality and abnormality, 4, 25, 47, 50, 55, 58, 60–1
One, 64, 71
Order, 5, 12, 13–19, 20, 25, 28, 31–4, 37–8, 42, 48, 
54, 62, 68, 74–5, 79, 89, 161, 171, 179, 194, 
242, 259, 306, 312–13, 319
Organ, 201
Orphism, 64, 89 and n, 279
Pangenesis, 75 and n
Paradoxography, 10–11, 85n, 200, 272n
Parcae, 159
Parthenon, 25–6, 46–7
Perfection, 59, 67–8, 96, 100, 145, 189, 191, 194–5, 
202–3, 217, 292, 299
Pergamon Altar, 17
Pneuma, 126, 128, 171, 174, 176, 185–7, 208, 
251, 307
Power, 17, 19, 24, 28, 39–40, 42, 49, 51, 57–8, 64
Preformationism, 75
Prodigy, 212
Providence, 10, 18, 67, 74, 89, 104, 125, 143, 168, 
175–6, 178, 196, 198–200, 205–21, 293, 305, 
307–8, 311, 320
Race, 188, 197–8, 200, 296, 313–17
Reason, 52, 86, 241
Regularity, 105, 159
Relativism, 191, 225–7, 232, 234
Roots, 63–4, 102
Seeds, 56–7, 62, 75–6, 132, 149–50, 152, 157–8, 171, 
174–5, 178, 274–5
Simulacrum, 54, 163, 230–1, 303 and n, 323
Snake, 10, 30, 41 and n., 49, 253, 264
Sophists, 44, 88
Soul, 81–8, 256, 260, 264, 266, 284, 287
Sphynx, 1, 164




Teleology, 18–19, 58, 66–7, 70, 74, 76, 80, 88, 98–107, 
111–12, 116–17, 121–4, 127–8,  135–6, 141, 
144–5, 150, 158–60, 196, 201–2, 205–21, 
241–3, 269, 288–9, 298, 304, 320–1
Teratology, 9
Theodicy, 35, 95, 172, 186–8, 208, 216, 320
Theogony, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18–19
Theomachy, 19, 28–33
Time, 151
Titans and titanomachy, 18–20, 25, 28–9, 33, 35, 
38–9
Tragedy, 12, 16, 36–7, 44 and n, 46
Typhonomachy see teomachy
Violence, 15, 30, 37, 40 and n., 79
Void, 63, 71–2, 132, 134, 171–2
Witchcraft, 190
Wonder, 9, 95, 141, 166, 195, 200, 219, 221, 291, 313
Zoogony, 57, 59, 65– 7, 140–52
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Abry, J. H., 192n
Achelous, 238










Aenesidemus of Cnossus, 225n, 228 and n, 229n, 232
Aeschylus, 12n, 16, 25–6, 29, 32 and n, 33–5, 37–41, 
43, 44 and n, 47, 51, 87








 Alcinous, 249–50, 261 and n, 262, 283 and n, 284
Alecto, 41
Alexander of Aphrodisia, 295
Alfi eri, V., 135
Alfonsi, L., 165 and n
Algra, K., 161n, 209n
Allan, W., 37 and n, 41n
Allen, R. E., 58n




Ammonius Saccas, 250, 271n
Amphitryon, 34n
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, 6, 12n, 52–63, 65, 72, 80, 
131n, 201, 202n, 297, 299, 303–4
Anaxarcus, 226 and n
Anaximander, 12n, 36, 90







Antigonus of Carystus, 225n
Antiochus of Ascalon, 249, 254 and n
Antisthenes, 22–3
Aphrodite, 17, 48, 64, 67n, 69, 191
Apollo, 14, 34, 45–6, 91, 255, 258
Apollodorus, 15, 21, 25, 28, 30
Apuleius of Madauros, 262 and n, 263, 279 and n, 





Ares, 14–5, 26–7, 32–3, 64, 191
Arges, 21
Aristarchus, 208n
Aristo of Chio, 246
Aristodemus, 101, 104–5
Aristophanes, 49n, 73, 87n
Aristotle, 6, 9, 56, 58, 59n, 62, 65, 68, 70, 71 and n, 
74 and n, 75–7, 92, 93–121, 122–9, 132, 137, 
144–6, 150, 158, 164, 169, 172, 176, 178–9, 
183, 193n, 196 and n, 198, 200–1, 202n, 207 
and n, 216n, 228–9, 230n, 238, 250, 261, 
267n, 270, 281, 289, 295–6, 299–300, 301n, 
303–4 and n, 305, 310, 316, 322 and n
Aristotle (pseudo–), 294 and n
Aristoxenus, 71
Arius Dydimus, 211n
Arnobius of Sicca, 131n, 242, 243–4 and n
Arrian, 186n, 204–5n, 209n, 213n
Arrighetti, G., 130–1n
Artemis, 24




Athena, 1, 17, 27–8, 33, 40, 45–6
Athenagoras, 175n
Index Nominum
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Atherton, C., 2, 22n
Atticus, 250 and n, 261
Aubenque, P., 95–6 and n, 109 and n, 119 and n





Auroux, S., 64n, 79n, 104n, 107n, 229n, 237n
Axelos, K., 45n
Babut, D., 88n, 184n, 255n, 259n, 282n, 296–7n
Bacchus see Dionysos
Bacci, M., 65n
Bachofen, J. J., 46n, 49n
Baer, R. A., 272n
Bailey, C., 57n, 131–2n, 143–6n, 148 and n, 150 and 
n, 151n, 153–4n, 160n
Balbus, 194 and n, 195, 201, 207, 211, 213, 241n, 242
Ballabriga, A., 28n
Balme, D. M., 109n
Barchiesi, A., 166n





Battegazzore, A. M., 44n
Beagon, M., 165–6 and n., 167
Beagon, P., 196n, 199n
Beaujou, J., 262, 263 and n, 279n, 283n





Benveniste, E., 37, 38 and n
Beretta, M., 131n




Besnier, B., 194n, 241n, 251n, 291n
Bett, R. A., 227n
Betz, H. D., 104n
Bianchi, E., 10n, 197n
Bianchi, O., 21n, 299n
Bignone, E., 139 and n




Bollack, J., 8n, 63–5n, 67–8 and n, 72n, 85n, 131n, 
134n, 153 and n, 193n
Bolus of Mendes, 200
Bomford, D. 65n
Bonhöffer, A., 181n, 204n
Bonitz, H., 107n, 236n
Boot, P., 309
Boreas, 85
Bos, A. P., 184n, 293–4n
Boss, G., 322–3




Bouton–Touboulic, A.–I., 275n, 316n
Boyancé, P., 131n, 154n, 160 and n
Brehier, É., 239n, 266–8n, 280n, 292n, 310n
Briareus, 33, 34 and n, 162
Brinker, W., 81n
Brisson, L., 263n, 268n, 272n
Brochard, V., 85n, 228n, 231n
Brontes, 21, 24
Brown, A. L., 22n, 42n
Brown, C. G., 22
Brunschwig, J., 12n, 16n, 217n










Campbell, G. L., 131n, 141 and n, 142n, 144–6n




Caratelli, G. P., 139n, 155n
Carneades, 223–4, 236–8, 245–7
Casali, S., 212n
Casini, P., 140n, 144 and n, 146n, 161n
Cassandra, 51
Cassin, B., 44n, 228n, 230n
Castelletti, C., 272n
Cato the Elder, 223







Chalcidius, 26 and n
Chantraine, P., 15n, 68n, 87 and n, 112n, 279n
Chaos, 15, 263
Chardin, T. de, 67 and n
Charles, D., 102n
Charlton, W., 97 and n, 120n
Charon, 238n
Chase Green, H., 2, 217n
Cherniss, H., 82–3n, 115–6 and n, 118n, 280n
Chevallier, R., 174n
Chiesara, M. L., 240n, 245n
Christ see Jesus of Nazareth
Chronos, 17–9, 28–9, 33, 37, 41, 89–90
Chroust, A. H., 153n, 182n, 217n
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Chrysippus, 170, 172–3, 179, 181, 188–9, 193, 194n, 
195 and n, 206n, 207–8, 211, 215–16, 237n, 
241, 288, 320n
Ciccarese, M. P., 285n
Cicero, 15, 58, 126, 127 and n, 136, 139, 149n, 159, 
194n, 195 and n, 207n, 209, 210–11 and n, 
220–1 and n, 223n, 234–5 and n, 237–8 and n, 
240 and n, 244–5, 246n, 247 and n, 254n, 274, 
317 and n, 318
Cilento, V., 287n
Circe, 162
Citroni, M., 164 and n
Citti, F., 131n
Clair, J., 15n, 17n
Clare, R. J., 22n
Cleanthes, 170, 183, 208 and n, 211, 216, 238
Clement of Alexandria, 62 and n, 72n, 186–7n, 





Colish, M., 192n, 210n
Colli, G., 34n
Collobert, C., 85n, 87n
Columella, 146
Conche, M., 228n, 231n, 239n
Cornford, F. M., 8–9n, 19n, 63n, 99n, 266n
Cornutus, 33–4
Costa, C. D. N., 144 and n, 146n, 159n
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